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AfghanistanV1_1978-1979.pdf - Wilson Center

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....:. 2. THE, lUSP.LIGHTS OF !ILATF.RAL P.£LATIOf:S I (A) A JOINT TO "ARCTICS' AFGHAR SUPPORT 1-1 THE un THE: au"", fa'!!) PUF.:RTO RIr.tl ISSt'!:S; !NVITATION FROM PRESIDENT CARTEP. TO TO pAY A STATE VISIT TO THE u.S. END SUMMARY. E .2-..s ..... ., 3 ". CONTKUl NO. 1 'i:la . 8!'20 •• A _., ...... - 'l"'T' J : : ... : . \: .. ... .,,; 47 .. " . ," - AS TO ITS TO Ev- QV!R 'tHAT TIj TO IN rHE /lRH. nr: SHI? nE"I!I'·mS:::l LOCAL A ArD TO /JFl:":, SOM£ SALiVJCF TO s::J'.I!rr TN . COUNTRY. '-EH:l.G.N R . .. n ............ ,' .•• ;' .... TO .. ·.. .. Rl'!'lT CI I P. !l70!!-COlJ 874 DELHI '154 RUMJPG/USLO t68 P.!HRAM 5S9m BY !HE us: FFLATIONS TH::; OF AFe:-:A:-lISTMJ TO ESTA?L!SH A TO ANu TP.AFFICKi'G. VHlIrE 1376, THE \'E'lT ON A TO OJJPOSE US THF «- THE GOA GAVE us HtLP IS THE 1977 U1Ji;,. ON p.rco r::SU!S. ACCEPTED Afl fllAl([ A STATE TO U.s. OF IS78. FOR THE PROGRAM 6p' r.rFORT TO OFFSET _.. ALSEIT ·T:> A 'lfOD'!ST -- TilE IllASSruF. SOvIET THE AREA uF FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR THE APGHAN Ft'RCES. FOR POLA' E. 'J. 1 tEi521 (IDS PEPR, AF AFGHANISTAN tg 19771 AN EXTERNAL ASSESSMENT J. DURING J 977, SEClIRlTY ANt) R£:'l2AIr.£D THUS OUP. rORElItOST fOLrCY HERt. M'DE THE REGIO'AL ST tty -- TM£n£.'3Y HELPING TO FULFILLS ARotlP'..P. PRINCiPAL THE TEflI;-TATJOff TO TAK" JEKAC"!AGE OF PAXIS'TI,':·S J'll)ft,ESTIC TURMOIL, CON- TO NU?TlmE THE HE AN9 PRIME BHurTO L4fJrlCHE:> u 191£.' 'iE \fAS IILSO ABLE TO REACH A OF THE IInF- Q..D Kaf'lA!fD.)IATERS . SHIRrl-+-'_ -, TABfl- .. ISFA__ i INFO: AWI--:- / __ . OCM_' __ SA _ PO... L ........_ EooL.... - CONS_ 011" . ADM---:'" GSO, __ __ PER__ RSO __ __ TSO __ . SCRQ__ CRtI_ CEO, __ .... '--- DA."C. Q __ MAAG_ IRS· _ TCTR _ FAA ·TU...... ,...__ CRUow/L...-_
Transcript

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2. THE, lUSP.LIGHTS OF U.~."AFGHAN !ILATF.RAL P.£LATIOf:S ~~~E I (A)t~ABLISH~EMT ~F A JOINT CO~~ISS!~8 TO ~~qAT "ARCTICS' (~,

AFGHAR SUPPORT 1-1 THE un O~ THE: au"", fa'!!) PUF.:RTO RIr.tl ISSt'!:S;AMn·~C) A~ !NVITATION FROM PRESIDENT CARTEP. TO OAOl~ TO pAY ASTATE VISIT TO THE u.S. END SUMMARY.

E .2-..s ..... ., 3". ~ CONTKUl NO. I..)~

J~N ~1 'i:la

. KA~UL 8!'20

•• A _.,...... - 'l"'T' ~ J: : .~... : . \: ..~~ ... .,,;47

.. " .," -

~. AS U~AID/AF~~~NJSTA~ ~~nEAVC~~~ TO SHA~~ ITS ~~~rn~~s TO ~~~

CO"~RrSSIO~~L A~~ ~I~ ~~IDELI~~S, b~~H~~ DI~~UlrTU~~ ~hS Ev­P?r.s~!) QV!R 'tHAT ~?PF:~PE,) TIj TH:::~~ TO r:~ ~ ~!::C(1)Irl~ ~""r,:"!Ct·!

Ct)!'!~!T~ENT IN rHE !)F.'J~LOP'E·JT ~~SU'"i A~Ct: /lRH. nr: H'GI{~~ U'''A;1f''-~

SHI? FRE~UENTLY nE"I!I'·mS:::l LOCAL t,~!l) VI51Tl'H~ ~"'ERlrAN OFnCI!.l~ T~~:

~Fr.H.CHH~!AN W.~TS A MOF.~ vr5I~L~ 6"'!:RIC:\~j ArD PP.ESH~C"" TO /JFl:":,SOM£ C01!~I!~P. SALiVJCF TO TH~ Pl'::I1~:'~I:~AtlT s::J'.I!rr r·nFSF.NC~ TN .T~r5 COUNTRY.

AmEn'\b~ssy '-EH:l.G.NR ~e3~!6t J~N' 7~ . ..n ~.":!~~~SSY ~:~'.:!Ul ............~":'"- ,'.••~ ;' ....TO T't':j!C/~~C~ATt't-@~t";~.! r~.. · . . ..IN~O PQ~r~~1A~~~~ASSY ISLA~A9A~ ~~,~

Rl'!'lT CI :.~t.f':1~I.S!:Y LO~~~OU ItA~P. ~1I~01 A~·I!I~ASSY !l70!!-COlJ 874RU~~~E/A~!~ASSY ~E~ DELHI '154RUMJPG/USLO prKI~G t68RUO~HR/A~!~BA~SY P.!HRAM 5S9mRUH~HGA/CI!'ICPAC

BYCO~FID£NTIAL

3.·P.~L~TIOHS ~ITH !HE us: U.S.-~FGHA~ FFLATIONS nU~I~G 1~77 ~F~E

Er.CE:~LF.:JT. TH::; GOVEP.N~~I~T OF AFe:-:A:-lISTMJ (~I.:'A) F1.lL~tLLED ~~

oeLI~ATI~ATO'US TO ESTA?L!SH A JOI~r COM~I~SION TO CO~'~OL~~P.COTICS PRODUCTI~N ANu TP.AFFICKi'G. VHlIrE 1376, ~~~H THE GO~

\'E'lT P.4~K ON A CO;r"'lIT!'1r.:~ ~OT TO OJJPOSE US O~ THF ~u~'! I~~IfF., «­THE GOA GAVE us HtLP IS THE 1977 U1Ji;,. ON ~OTH GU~K A~m ~t,!:':'Tt)

p.rco r::SU!S. ·l)~'.)UD ACCEPTED Afl !~VITAT1t)m'TO fllAl([ A STATE ,'!~ITTO T~r. U.s. I~ TH~ SU~~£R OF IS78. FUUOI~( FOR THE U.~. ~illT~nY

TRAl~I~r: PROGRAM F~~ AFGHA~ OFFIC~PS.WAS nOU~LED I~ 6p' r.rFORTTO OFFSET _.. ALSEIT ·T:> A 'lfOD'!ST nEe~E£ -- TilE IllASSruF. SOvIETPREO~MI~A~CF. I~ THE AREA uF FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR THE APGHANAR~1!!J Ft'RCES.

CI"CP~C FOR POLA'

E. 'J. 1tEi521 (IDSTAG~I PEPR, AFSL~Jf.CTI AFGHANISTAN tg 19771 AN EXTERNAL ASSESSMENT

J. ~'MMA.'YI DURING J977, ~FGHA!nST"N·S SEClIRlTY ANt) IN!)EPENO!!of~ER£:'l2AIr.£D l'NDVlINIt;1!~, THUS SATISFYI~G OUP. rORElItOST fOLrCY ~(UL

HERt. PRESt~E"T DAOL~ ~lS~ M'DE SIG~lFIC~~ CONTRT~~IO~~·TO THEIflIPP.OV!~F.NT O~ REGIO'AL ST A~It tty -- TM£n£.'3Y HELPING TO FULFILLSARotlP'..P. PRINCiPAL u~~. I)~JECTIVE. ~VOIDIAG THE TEflI;-TATJOff TO TAK"

JEKAC"!AGE OF PAXIS'TI,':·S J'll)ft,ESTIC POLITIC~l TURMOIL, n~ouo CON­TINU~ TO NU?TlmE THE P'6PPP.OCH~~F.~T HE AN9 FOP.~£P. PAKIST~Nt

PRIME !'JI"IsrE~ BHurTO H~n L4fJrlCHE:> u 191£.' 'iE \fAS IILSO ABLE TOREACH A~l~UALlY S~TISF~crOP.Y SETTLE~ENT ~rrH l~AN OF THE IInF-Q..D Kaf'lA!fD.)IATERS DI~P~E. .

SHIRrl-+-'_-,TABfl­

..ISFA__

i 1~

INFO:AWI--:-/ __

. OCM_'__SA _

PO...L ........_

EooL....-PI!,-'~_USI'l.S'~_CONS_011" .

ADM---:'"GSO,__8E~__PER__

RSO__

MSG~__TSO__

. SCRQ__

CRtI_CEO,__

....'---DA."C.Q__

MAAG_

AG~;--­DEA~_

IRS· _TCTR _

FAA·TU......,...__

CRUow/L...-_

ca~1'FID~NI' r;'T /~. T~". ,J,,;J J,. .1 _ r.. ..l..I

5. AFGHAN OFFICIALS Hill) T'lO t'Tr:J-Le"!'."L C~::TAr.Tf- ll'ii"; i'':-;:. '.:C: t._~",,":"!,,_SHIP IN 1977. WH~N A~A!::ft~~:1 A''')UL \-!Al!Il' K"PPl P::tE~f"IT~!\ uIC7CP.EDE"lTIAl.S AT T~E WHITS: Ht·t::~ Ot~ JUt. Y 2S-, ppr'!T"E'~T CAf"!'rp TOlnHI"I -THE UNITED STATE.S "'AS FOLLO'ltl) wtrH I'~T~PF.ST TIotF r~~:"IITIC't~ OF"YOUR 'NEV CONSTITUTION AND WE ARE PARTICULAr-LV AlI.'ARE 'F' !TS "'~:"I!!~

RIGHTS PROVISIONS••• WE ARE ALSO MUCH '~AP.E OF Pr.ESIDENT D~O~~'S

EfrORTS TO IPIPROVE THE tCONOfllIC WELL-BEING OF TII£ ~F(;\(f\t~ Pt:.. ~!.F..WE 'ARE READY TO HELP 1ft THIS EFFORT.- THE PRESID[~T ALSO CO~-PI.. iPlENTED THE GOVDNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN (SOA) OfJ THE EST"~LIS"'­MENT TWO DAYS EARLIER ~F THE NEW JOINT CC~~ISSI_N O~ ~FG~A~NARCOTICS MATTERS AND EXPRESSED HIS STRONG PERSONAL I~TEF~~ INNARCOTICS CONTROL.

6. SUBSEQUEtJn Y, ON OCTO~ER 1, S~:ORn.V 9EFORE THE UNt=A SF.~;'TOtJ,

FOREIGN MINISTER WAH£ED A2DULLAH /'lET WITH S£CRETAPY V'N~f. ~'ID

ASsiSTANT SECRETARY AH!~r.TOM •. ABDULLA}' WAS i..t.D iHAT it~ l'~eREGARf)S THt OPllf.ll-PR.DUCTION PROP1.£rI IN AFGftANISTAN AS "A HIC:J4PRIORlrY ISSUE.- (THIS VIEW WAS ECHOED BY SENATOR WlttlA~ t.SCOTT OF VIRGINIA DURING ~IS NOVEMPER VISIT TO KA~l~, 'wpr~ H~ELUNTLY TOLD DAOUD THAT FUTUflE A~EP.ICAH AID WAS CO~DITI~~~ O~AFGHAN PERFOR~ANCE IN THE NARCOTICS-CO~TR~L APEA.' THE AMEpIC~q

. SIDE WAS ASSURED BY ABOULLAH THAT PRESIDENT' DAOUD ST~!fDS P!P­SONALLYBEHIND THE EFFORTS OF TIO GOA IN THE OPItJlll-CONTPOtFIELD•.' .

7. ~T Ar~AfI1E MEETING,. AB'utLA~ EXPLAINED THAT Tf(E P.OA '-'ANT!nACLOSER . SHIP WITH THE NEW AMERICA~ An~InISTRATI0N AND A"VERY VISIm.~ 'If•. ESE~CE IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SECP.ET,P,Y PE-PLIED THAT THE~~ $ THE INOEPENnEHCE AND TERRITO~I~LINTEGRITY OF AFGHANI.. O~LL CONTHJUE ITS ASSISTANCEPROGRAMS. SECRETARV VANC~ . 7OP~N~ THAT OUR TWO PR~SlDF~T~SHOULD GET TO KNOW EACH OTH_ , ·.-ur-ntlS CONHECTIO~, H~EXTENDED A PRESIDE~TIAL ItlVITATIO~ t~'f{l,...!'JJJ(! fa. STATEVISIT TO THE US DURI~G THE ~U~~ER OF 1978. THE-AYG"A~ PRESIDENTSUBSEQUENn.y ACCEPTED THE IlI'JITATION.

8. RELATIONS WITH THt USSR: AFGHftNISTAN'S MOST IMPORT~Nr BI­LATERAL RELATIOHSHIP CONTINU~D TO BE THE SENSITIVE. BUT LVC~ATI rLINK WITH ITS HUGH NORTHER~I tJEIIH{130R. THE SOVIETS AVOIDED, A~YAPPEARANCE OF MEDDLING IN AFaHAN INTERNAL ArF~IP.S -- AND MAIN­TAINED THEIR POSITION AS THE llIAJOR AID DONORTYO AFGHtarHST ,.tl (:,\Ot)FTHAN ONE BILLION DOLLARS OVER THE PAST QUARTER CEfrrURY, CO~P~REOTO LESS THAN ONE-HALF 9ILLION FROM THE U.S.). ALTHOUGH NO SIG­NIFICANT ADDITIONAL AID WAS COMMITTED BY THE SOVIETS IN 1977,THE TWO SIDES DID HOLD DISCUSSIONS IN APRIL ABOL~ USES FOR THEOUTSTANDING $780 MILLION OF SOVIET CREDITS ALREADY CO~MITTED ~oAFGHANISTAN. SOVIET MILITARY DElIVERIES TO AFGHANISTAN IN 1977INCLUDED A FEW SIGNIFICANT NEW WEAPONS, SUCH AS SA-3 AND SA-7SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES.

\9. FRO!'! APRIL 12 TO 15, D,'lOUD PAID 't!HIl.T BOTH st!)ES STYLED AS A"'ROUTINE" VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION n1HICp., 1!ICmENTALLY, WASAMONG THE pnINCIPAL REASO~S ~HY DAOUD ~AS SO EAGER TO GET ANI"VVOATIO~ FRO~ US -- INORDER TO MAINTAI~ ~HAT THE GOA PERCfIVES

COI\fB1iDiiJi'T'IiIA.L48

•\

\

.'\

•COI'JFIDEI'JTIAL

AS A OPTICAl. BALANCE ~ET"'~FN T"'£. TWO GRFATt'S'! PO~!EPS). !\:J!'!Pr, ryeMOSCO~ SOJOl~~, DAOl~·~ PARTY SI~~F.D A ~E~ T~EtV£-~~R AGDF.~~EMT

TO DEVELOP AFGHAN-SOVIET ECONO~IC AHD T~ADE RELATIO~~.

UJ., RELATIONS YITH CHIN~: 111 ORDER TO PROVIDE ANOTP.E'~ TYP~ {\t"OPT~CAL eALIIHCE TO DAOltD·S TP.IP TO T"~ lISSP. TH~ ~F(?"~l!S D:'CFI'·l:"~ml APRIL 9 A DEL£GATION FROM T~E PEOPLES· PF.Pt~LIC {\r r.UI~f.

HEADED ~Y CH~I SHU FAN, VICE MINI~TF.R rOp. FOP.£I(?» Tr~~~. THI~

VISIT PRODUCED LITTLE OF ~U9STANCE, HO~~VEP.,

11. ALTH~UGH IN A LOYA JIPGAH SPEECH.~~RLi~~ IN T"~ YF.AP ~AO~~HA~ EXPHES~ HIS HOPE FOR ·EVER-EXPAN~ING ~~ATIOMS· ~JTH CHJ~A.

NOT~ING DISCERNIBLE ALOMP. T~SE LI~F.S ~AS ACCOMPLIS~ ~U~I~G

1977. THE CHUESE BRIDGEHCAD HERE ('-!HICH I~CLl'D~S SO!l!F M!NO"AID ,PROJECTS) RE~AINS QUITE MQDEST -- eL~ IS SUFFICIENT TOSYM80LIZ~ AFGHAN N~UTRALITY BETWEEN r.OSCO~ ~ND PEKI~G.

12. RELATIONS 'IIT..H,,) .~~ISTANI THE RE~ARK~~LE P.APPROCHF.~F~T I~­

ITIATtD THE. PREVIOUS ~AR BY O~OUD AND FO~M~P. P~KIST'~I P~J~~

MINIST~ EHUTTO CONTINl~O.THROUGHOUT PAKISTAN'S DOMESTIC POLITICALUPHEAVAL OF 1977. t3HUTTO RECEIVED A CORRECT, eDT pEL AT IVELYRESTP.AtNED A!fD COOL WELCOME DURING A BRIEF Jl'NF. "lSI! TO ·-A~t'1.

(SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DOVUF~LL), A, WHICH TI~E THE GOA SUGGt~E~

THAT FURTHER DETAILED T~LKS ON THE PUSHTUNISTAN IS~UE (DE~('!'I~rn

BY THE GOA AS THE ·SOLE DIFFERE!~Cr.- I!ET\t'EEN THE T'!.O STATES) B~

DELAYED UNTIL AFTER THE THEN-F.XPECT~ PAKISTA~I F.L~CTIONg.

SIMIL)r. unDERSTA~DI~GS WERE REACHE9 L~TF.P vITH eE"£~~L 7.t~-l~­HAQ. PAKISTAN·S CHIEF ~P.RTIAL LAW AD~INISTR~TOR, DUPINe HIS

. OCTOC3ER 10-11 VISIT TO KABUL. HAQ ASSURED THE ~FPH6~lS -- AP?I'?ttrrtYTO THEIR SATISFACTION -- THAT ALL ElE~ENTS OF PAKIST~~l SOCI~Y

NOW SUBSCRI9E TO THE DETENTE YITH AFGHA~ISTAN. FOP. TH~l~ a~nT,

THE AFGHANS HAVE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED AMY SE~BLANCE O~ InTr~­

FERENCE IN THE t~TERNAl. AFFAIRS OF PAKIST A~, ALTHOU~H n'~Y t:'y­PRESSF.D GR~AT SATISFACTION YHEN ~AL! KH~~ ~AS RF.CEnTLY·?~L£~~E~

FROM PRISON AND·ALLO~ED T~ REJOIN THE POLITICAL LISTS.

13. THE SOVIETS HAVE REfI'Wf~ED OL'n'M?DL Y N:SSIVE ARCIJT THE {lF~U6"'­

PAKISTA~I RAPPROCH£!II~~T THUS FAR. m! THE OT~E:P. PANO, us OFn"·ULSIN 90TH COUNTRIES HAV! M~DE CLEAR ~AgHINGTO~'S GREAT S~T~~~{lr.TION

OVER THIS DEVELOP~E~T WHICH SATISFIF.S O~F OF OUR MOST IMpOnT~~T

RE~IO~AL OBJECTIVES.

14. RELATIor~S liITH IRA~: T)AOUD ALSO rr-JUGHT AROUT PF.rTE? pEL~i10~~

WITH AFGHANISTAN'S CULTunAL COUSIN. InAN. PC SETTl!~G -- ~l LFA~7

FOR THE PRESENT -- A LONG-5!AM~ING ISSUE ~ErYEr~ TY~ T~O ITAT~~:

THE DIVISlor~ OF THE ~'ATERS OF TH~ ~:~!1Jl"lD PIVER. ~f"1"~.~ ~!-'''',)I'':::

HIS PP.OTHER AND SPECIJlL E~VOY, :"!O~~~r.~D ~~llJ~. TO P~\If)~'! TO all"!:"THE ~AY. THE GOA EXCHJl~GED WITH TH~ GOV~~~~~~' OF 1~~~ 6K~GOI)

I~STRU":~t1T~ CF p.ATl~!reT!O'1 FOR T~~ !~73 }!t:LMP;!l9 \·:I\TE?S TR~~TY,

WHICH H.~D BEEN LEF1' Hf.~.~H~'~ U LInr flFTER THe ROYAL r:O"~~NV,E:JT

OF AFGH~NISTAN, ~HICH H~~ NEGOTI~TED IT, HAD BEEN DEPOSED P,Y THE

•-CONFIDENTIAL '4 -/ S'~

~E'" REPU9LICAtJ p7.r;!llI~. NAIIlI ALSO ~S\:u1i!:."D IT.A'fIAN urmfp.~T_'mlt.lGTO VHAT ·U~TIL TH~~ HAn9~~N A.CO~TPOVEr.SIAL FLOOD-CONTPOL _NOm~lG~TIOH PP.O...'F.r:T TH! A~H"t:S ~tM~'rED TO l~U"'CH I~ TH£ LO~;:PHElMANn (THIS P~QJ~CT IS ~C~ I~ TH~ CESIGN"STAG~).

15. ON THZ 9E~lT 51'!, HO~~JER, T~E AFGHA~S CO~TINt~' TO ~~~~~~ NG..,HAT THEY -- WITH SO'E JUSTIFIC~TIQNvfG ...\eJ> p.s \QP!I)~I~~£..GiON PAST AI~ PRO~IS~S. AS THE YEAR [~DEn, ~~REOVER, ~~TP.~~O~!~~­~NTS ~EP.E INTENSELY, P.IIT· DISCP.EETLY TP.YI~G T~ p.rSOL~ ~'~QUA~~Ltt.'/C"R A S'llALL l'ISPU!Et' ~:::~~=NT OF 130pn~ NEt.J~ I~~'" ~ALA '(IN THFfIIE~H!!)-Ir.:~AT ROA!). I~RITAT£!) p'! REPEATED FXpr~SSI'·J~.~F~"CO!ICC"r.~B'f THE SHAHIJOV£P. SOVET UlFlUENCE ttl "roHAtIIST~N A!f~ '.~ LAC~ OFAN ASSUP.EQ PLA~ OF S~CC~SSIO~ FOR DAOUD, T~F AFGMA~ ~!~~FP~HI~COU~TERFO' AT EVERY APPP.OPRIATE OPPOPTUNITY BY\C~~J~~'~HEIR OVMYORRIFS ov~e l'HF. SUCCESSION QUESTI~N IN IP.A!J. .' '111J'~'16. R!L~TI"NS \'rITH OTHER ~~TESI ,)U:H~G TH! F~t"'. «=~ ~OA 0[­CEIV£D A RAPID SUCCESSION OF FQBEIGrJ DIr:NITARH:S,' \4HOst tfI~ITC'PROOL~~ LJTTLE OF REAL SU35T~1 CU~AN DEp,UTY FOPr.IP.~ ~INI~F.aPELEGRJN TO~RAS CSErTE~9~R 19-2~), HUNG~RI.N pp.[SIn~~T PALLOSOUCZI (OCTO~~n 1~-le), InAQI VIC~ PRESln!~ TAH~ ~UHI-AL-

DIN MA·r.UF (OCT~9ER 22-25), ~~O "ONGOLIAN ~OPEI~N MINISTEp"ANGAlYN DUGERSUREN (OCTOBER 26-3~)~ UPON HIS P.ETt~N FP.O~ ~~ UNr-~

SESSION t~~D A TOUR OF CAlIFOR~IA>, A~GHAN' FOP.EI~N ~tNIcoTEp W~HE~D

ABDULlA~ VISITEO IRAQ, ·IRA~, A~~ VAPIOUS PERSIft~ ~ULF ~~TES

(WHERE HE TRIEO TO ATT~ACT FINANCIAL" ASSISTANCE FP'or. T~E LATTEp •GROUP OF WEALTHY CORF.LIGIONISTS>. 'OST OF T~I~ FL~RY nrDIPLO~ATIC VISITING WAS DESIGNED TO BlmNISH AFG~A~ISTA~·SCREDF.NTIAlS AS ~M ACTIVE NOH-ALIGNED STATE, AS KAqUl A~9ITIOUSLY

PP.F.PAP.!O TO HOST THE MAY ~EF.TI~G OF THE· COORDI~ATI~G r.O~~ITTEE

OF THE NO~-AlIG'ltD GROUP or STATES. THE' GOA HAS eEF..l U,..~rAS1NG

ITS ACT rVITY n~ SUPPORT OF THE ~ON-Al I<.:tl~O 1lI0VE~ENT I 'l SE\~RALAREAS, SUCH AS THF lAYSOF-THE SEA CONYERENCES AUD RO~TH-SOUTH

ECONO~IC ISSUES. KABUL IS PARTICULAP.LY FAr-ER TO I~PPOVf THF.STATUS OF LANO-LOCKE~ OEVElOPIHG COUNTRIES AN') HAS T~~OU~~Otrr

1977 UTILIZEO :'V~RY O?P3~T~NITY 10 PROMOTE THIS CAUSE.17. ALTHO~~H THe: GO\}~nrl.·'plT-C:)t:T~OLLEO AFGHAN PRESS REPORTED T~EPEACE-TALK~~ACTIVrTY I~ T~E ~ID~LE EAST 1M A-THOROUGH, ~ND BALA"C~FASHIOfl, THc."GI)~ WARILY CJNTINUED ITS lONG-STArlOlNG POLICY OFAVOIDING ANY I~vnLVF~~~T -- ~ND HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY' CARC"FULIN THIS AREA SINCE SADAT'S eRF.AK WITH SEVERAL ARAB sr4TES:~ AFGHANS SEE TH~~SELVF.$ AS NON-~EMITIC ~USLI~S, WITH NOTHING

1f..2..~~ BY TAKItIG A'~Y ~ll\f!D OTHER THAN PROVIDING GEr~ERf\L LIP­~~c TO THE APA~ C~~~F..

18. -CO:"l~E~T: U.s. I!~H::::-::·fS HI iNt: PP...MOTIOtJ AND PRESFPVATION OFREGIO~IAL STABILITY ~~r.,:: \:'ELL S£RVEO OU?H!G THE YEAR BY D#lOl""SRESPonSI!3L! I~PRO':~r!k.~IT o~ A!=,!?H,HI PElATIO~!E WITH PAKI~T~N 61f01P.A~I. !iIS }'A:~JLI:~G OF n:: DIFFICULT II::') CO:1PLEX ~ElfiTIO~Sll!P

WITH T:-tF USSP ALSO CC!-.'T !'IUED TO 9£ OEF'T Arm flBLE. II~ ~E~"'AL

WHC;, A~GHANISrA~I'S GE:':..UTIC~L fITlIATI ..N ROUGHLY RF:SFIIl9lF:S THATOF FDLI\ND -- M:D DAOlJ1) "'H~/lGl:.:S THIS CHALLEN<:E AT L~AST AS ".I~L

AS, IF' flOT Br.TI ER. THAN lrEi<!<ONH1. CONFIDEN711 ~ T_ .l-1...LJ19. If~ ORl)~R TO ~UPPQF'T fr.r;:}i"'1I~TA~I·S FFFORTS TO PR::~~RVE T~~

LAn~~~;- POc;SF.L ~ D~(ml=.:lr 0r.' H1DI?I'~!JDENCF F"?Ofi! SOVIET :lP.ESSU"~!;

W~~!Cr. IS T!-'~ lJi~gCIPAL UC' ~Ol H~v r-OAl '~E?'::, wt;" CO~~T~':!.lt iO !:'~"cr~- •~P_4TJ=: :"l:..;r. F~ln'~l.Y r,',; T~'~GPLE 1t:TE~:::~T T~P~Ur.:·! I> \I!~I1:L~

A'W-H;A!~ P?;:~:!=:NCE !~ TI-'IS COm1Try. ·nr. STATE VIS!;- I]'.: IlAVE ~LftE:ADY

p~a\!~~n DA8UD IS TH~ KFY ITEM O~ TH£ IS7S U~-AFGHAU ~GE"~A.

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rOSITJo" OF [lIE~CrCr: Gr', ·'!'t T~ TI:::: [CCr;n::ICf. £FCTIO!' Or--rH~ :'ir:'~~TH'f 07 n:~::s C:r:! I::VIIS'f:-'ES. HJ~. C:ISrF.:-!~ J-lr,V::R.~l:::~ t~/!aLY <:,:!!-,'··n~'f:::?~ CF' Jj~. M!Al:U'i RAT£~~ADAHf THi:: PR':SHITMI:i!~'i::r! OF !:OCI fit, !'F'F!\!'~S. .

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DR. ~~lftH WALl (IILF:f:I1:·~1.I--:-'!~·IC;T·-!' (1- P1I8!..IC HEALTH. TH~ L.~~TNfl:l: I:.LE:~OZA I :::ST I\:~. I .....- ~ P.!;.: i\:: !i rur.;:.jTU:·! fROM TH::: Y.A ,/DAHl\::>Al;ZA. IJ~.LI G~!,DU!'.T:-:~ .: ·C··: 7H':' r·j;:·)J CAL SCHOO'. OF KAPUt IItHVr;?SITYAm ':lAS A!J A~r-ISTlHlT Fi'r'--~50R (IT Ttf:. r"::::'IC'!'t SCHOOL I~J

JALI\LA3A:'. H;: I1AY HA\J!: r.ZC:::IVeD ~O!';E TRAI:!!::G IN CZECHOZL(:VAKI!l.Ilr THE TIHE 0;: THE coup I!:::' 'l!tS D~Pll!Y :)IPF.Cra? Of iU\BUL ur.'IVT"!'5ITY~'om·:;· S HO!';PI1 AL. '/Jll.I UAS O~J::: Of TH~ SEV;:,:r' CO~1~U'1I SI~ A;mEsr,,:)BY THE DAOU~ GOVERN!IENT ON APRIL ~5.

GHULA~'l Of,~TI~I;: PA~JSHI;-{ I--fU;:IST;:::l OFEDUCATIOtJ. pAf-:JSml':I UAS F'ORr~ERLY l)!r.~CTO~ or CFrJSOR.sHI~,RADIO AFnHANi~TA~ (1963-65) AND DIRECTO~ Of LIT~R~RY'PRI!~S , MI~ISTRY OF p Jfom1ATIOf! lWD CtltTUR':.: (1!)6~).HJ::~t'\S Ir.Pr.ISONSD D"r.IN~ THE 1959 -P~RLIA~·1r!~TARY ;::L:::CTIONS FOR·I~S!~TING THZ KI~G· AHD WA~ P.~l~A$ED I~ f~7~. a~ronE HISARRESa HE ~~S ASSOCIATED wrTH KHAIaA~ ~~D BA~RAK KA~M~L,BUT EVIjE~~lY ~Hrl~ I~ PRISON HE u:::SIG~~r, F'nOM THE PP~CHAMPARTY IN ~;IJC!I H':': ~IAS A ~::~lBER Of 'iH~ Cr::JT?tL CCi1i1ITT?:'i:.IN 197t!, PM:JSHIRI M!D II COllSUI ron~rm Ii ~?!.IHr:-:~ GR(!lIP CALL'":!:!DEI'!OCR4TIC KHAL€) l\ARCM~I AFGHA~'I~":1. HE '!f,S ONE OF' TH~ GRell?OF SEVEN ARRE~:'D O~J APRIL 25 •.

~iOHf..=:jI;t.D H"SSM! 3AR=:K 5H~rII (SH~F'I·E) -- ~1H:IST!::R or IIJF'OR;.iA7IO::l1NL> 4'ULTmn:. A "LE':DP!G ~F'GHAN PO-::T·, ·SH,~~!·;;: IIf,S TH!:: EDITClROF TH£ THE~ rJ:::tl PlI:UCHII)!! ooIOl.l'!L:)" r~ 19(;G, A~!!) ~1f11? nl~~C10~OF PHCrTOGRAr:r~ITnY I tJ THE CA~TCGUIP:rrc H!STIl'':;T~ O~ p;;:r~I·!!S7P.Y OF !"H'r.:S M'I) Ui)i¥.;T~I!::S fRO:1 195A Tn 1~67. ,~£ 1\1.50EDHF.!) "PA~HTU!! ..IAGH"' ILIl.r.~.ZI~IE ,,'m '~f1S DI:>ECTCR FO:? "PAYAm:E'tlA7'· I!'I 1965. I:~ 196r HI:.: ~F.~T TO ~!ORK AT TH~ r'II:!I STUY 0::­n!!='O::~lATl OU 1\1:1) CiJl.TUiH': H! AN U~SPECIFIEI) POSITIO!:.PUP T ~::; TIfE .SAtiE YEAR H~ 9ECAt"!E A S:::CRETAP.Y OF TH=: PA::1CHAMc~r:r::f:l co:·~r:rTTE:E, HAVI~:G STAYED \-lITH PARCHA:1 A!="TEP. THEHp.:'.!~r SPLIT. :>urHNG A 1966 CONVF.~S4TION l!lIT!i TAP.~XI AND SHAFE" I,ErmflSSY OFFICERS REPORTED THAT T"~AKI ~AS VE~Y ~OLICITOUSOF ~H.4Fe:·l, A'JD THAT HE CO"!SUl.TE1" :.wITH HHI P~IOP. TO MJS'J~RnJG()I:~TCIJLT flllE::;TIONS. ALTHOtiuH ~K~;:-;'" I"S LAi~GU~r;:ES ARE SUPPO::;E~LYU:'U;:D TO FARSI AN:> P'J5HTO, n~::::s OF'ftCF.RS BELIEVEO HE COULDFe', 1."11 rOST OF' THHR ~!,!r,LISH Co"~:;-:p~"TIn~'.

~..:.:: "~HiMJ LAEf)--!~I:lIsr!':R OF' ~A':'r(l A'm TnEVl~IOr-J. SE~ KA~UJ.:!o.:. ~~':: •

58 .

PROFESSQ,1 HAHMOOD SU~/\H--MmlSlER OF HI!1HER tDH~!iTrcm. SU!.]f\JtIS A PROFESSOR IN TI::: FACULTY O~ scn:;~cr.. !C JS ETn:rn ASY~1PATHIZER o.=:t MEf.i!l!:~ OF THl: KHALQ PAnTY.. m: 1:t.l: ..t'!~Ii·:S CO!~N,CTWITH KNOWN PARTY ME~·;aER So

DR. ANAHITA RATEBZADAH·-llJINI~ER OF ~ar:!I\L flrF!;!~;' acmNABOtn' 1929 IN KAIH.'i., SH! ATn::nm !,:~~,.:~$ Sc.!iO~·!. :r!~ c;rIC;',:e"1951-53, ArID MEDIC.'.!. SCHOOL fl.'!' l~fl~u_ u :·Y::;:':S7:":'. ~"::.: ';?:r. ..:~ '1"1-"::LOVER OF B!,JRAK K~.!~I~r;L ABOtJr 19GD I\lm, ~.';:!:':N E:~:."-:"":.iJ TO rt.:.!~lf.nl::~ITIN 1967, t.UtS ASSOrV,'fl::D UITI·! I:A::tI"f.L (~U !:m r.!: "'; Cl~:":'1) !I!i .ONE OF'Tm: .. COMMu:n:.:i' 1R IU:1VL:;"fZ In F.'.:,,;'. ~.~::::":." l':! 1!"72i5!!E ~AS REPO~Tr.o TO BE OIl THE P/iRC;!;\N· F';~:~"fY C::::.i:!?, cC:::~ni:Ei:..f,ODUL ·QADUS GHcnSAl-IDI--MItlIsr:::R OF cn:~:::~\cr::.. P: t)'T!1 G!:'.:.'~r;r1:mlwr.s A 11E!·II.1r.:R OF THE Pt.:?CH!\'l C=:'.i:'il,.t r.Cl:~Ui"E~ r.:::'> f\ CLOSEFRIEND OF B:.r3RAK KhRHAt. VE kAVE NOTlli:R Il;}:();;:1.~·!"IC~l AT THISTIM£. '

59

NIZAr1UDDTN Tf.HZIB--M!!!IST£R r·F TRIBAL :Y~;t"J-::'S. T~ EEl Ie:; f.i10!1l'Ui'muz, BO!HJ "l,prnlr.~:~;f.TELY !5.'':;~. IN n;;;: t ... 7tLY Ir:~~:.j' S TI\I:::11:.T'Aliimr AT lir,3InIA CC'i.L~GE :':.::'l r,!:') AT 1 :-.: IS!J ~:":: Lyr'~·::.lHE IS A G~A.DUATE 07 THE IS1..Ar;Ic F"A'CUl.lY C;:- \(:'.~~L 1.1:~IIJ:~?srTY.L/I"f£R HE ~]O~n~~D FC;,/ Kt·BU. Rt.D Io Am r~;::tJ rO~l: f'.. "F~ '.1 UP.Tm: MIln~:7';\Y or E::>UC,iTION le:l'r:;1i: ~ LlC:::~:D W T;,': C:':~'.·.~T:;;:::TOJ ENCYCLC:':!)IAS IIlm t/AS A C:::!.L rlE~ri::R 0F SO:~: ::·:.;,:~CH OF 'i:f:~CC::;mNI:;!' :'t';1TY. r;.; 1%6 !2 ~:r.:; REFC:;T::':iJ TO t;:::::;-; m:GUL,"~'\:IEi:Kl.Y :~::":T:i:3S AT T!;: };il·';. 07 Nl~~ i:8l" ':1Nl 'i' : ,',::i. lIT '(L7'fi~:::: HE 1:'.::; f{£FORT;))l~Y ImC'~\':-") IN PC':"'" 1:«~I::.i··.. m 19';~F"-: \.'~S j":>·:i:·:r.l Tn :.':~ D·".r" r':' '!"-:: 7::',' .:~S' 1".· .;~~ : .. ') .' .:.... ":'fl' ;:,:::; 11 (;. -', rrllL'.... .' i:' ioo.:·,. ': sr.;.!", :., ~."D~~I~ l<;,{~!1AL1.1::' SlJl_f\~: .':~; L;~t:c:: ,.. :....: ::.~~ ~.~ " _ Pt,·:T:" ::0:-:rIO:-;..

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MEMORANDUM

GeM" IDEN I IlItt-

INFORJ.'fATION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

.. _. . _.. _.. -- . ---

2826

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILMay 11, 1978

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

PAUL B. HENZE l~\The Asian "Soft Underbelly" and your Visit to Peking

I would expect the Chinese to be much more upset about the recent turnof events in Afghanistan than about anything that has happened in thoHorn in the past year. The Chinese will be concerned not so much becauseof Afghanistan itself, though it is important to'them, but because ofthe implications of a pro-Soviet government there for Pakistan, whichthe Chinese have always (perhaps somewhat unrealistically) seen as acounterweight to India. The problem goes deeper, ho~ever, and it willbe interesting to see whether our views and the Chinese view are veryfar apart.

Hugh Seton-Watson in his splendid new book, Nations and States, characterizesthe area from India/Pakistan through Iraq as one of the most inherentlyinstable parts of today's world. He points out that all the states ofthis region are potentially brittle and none fully meets his definitionof nation. Pakistan's future is problematical, perhaps deeply affectedby what happens in India itself. Afghanistan's major peoples all overlapwith those of its neighbors. Iran, for all its wealth and ambition, isloosely consolidated as a nation-state with large minorities who muststill be expected to have centrifugal tendencies if central controlweakens. Iraq has never solved its Kurdish problem. The Russians havebeen keenly interested in this area since the 19th century and now, withits oil wealth and the absence of a major outside counterforce, itoffers them almost irresistable temptations, possibly as a diversionfrom the growing nationalism of their mushrooming Central Asian Muslimpopulations. The more successfully Iran modernizes, the more vulnerableit becomes to Soviet subversion. No one who is not deliberately myopiccould see expansion of Soviet influence in Afghanistan, whether it hasresulted from design or accident, as anything other than a large potentialgain for th~ Soviets.

There is a real case in this part of the world--especially as betweenIran, Afghanistan and Pakistan - for some political restructuring. Butto expect this to occur peacefully and without external major powerinvolvement may be as unrealistIc as in the Horn of Africa. Shortof this, there is a natural case for Iran and Pakistan to draw closertogether in face of a Soviet-supported leftist government in Kabul andto look to us for help. The Chinese will be very interested in knowinghow we view all this and what we plan to do to bolster Iranian andPakistani confidence. We have an instrument at hand: CENTO. It doesn'tamount to much. It has not been popular or fashionable recently; we

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CORFIDENTI~/NOFORN

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PAllTICIPAHrS: Cuermady ICAzaak1n. S,v,ee Embassy, TehraaJaM D. Stempel. AlDedcaD £mba..y, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: July 18, 1978 - Chinese Restaurant, Pablavi. Ave.

SUBJECT HlIIYft R18hts. Afshaniatan and Intemal IraaianPoUeics

DISTRIBUTION: CHARGE. POL. Olt. USIS.IoIIO. REA/lIN. iNRJUAINRlOn/B. A11EHBASSY ICA!UL

The tenor of the lunch vas sec when Stempel invited ICazankinto bring Shcbaransky alang a. an extra guest. ICazankin a.kedwho Shcharansky was and Stempel aaid he would be deHshted totell him over lunch. The foLlCIWing poines of lnterese callieout durins the meeting.

Human Rights - Stempel 1mmediately launched into a lIIOderatelyreatralne~ attack on Soviet policy with respect to dissidents.Why was the Soviet Union being so deliberately abrasive1 DidKazankin reau.ze" how s.illy and counterproductive the recentSoviet trials bad been? lCazankin attempted to brunt thethrust with a fairly hard-line response that this was theSoviet way and very quickly shifted co AmbAssador Young'sstatement of polid.cal pr1soner. in the U.S. After aconsiderable amount of back and forth discussion. talk abouthuman rights lIIOre or le.s dlssolved. Kazankin showed himselfextremely adroit at bringing .Young's comments to bear a,ainstAmerican criticism of Soviet di..ident activity.

Afghanistan - Kazank1~who had served in Afghanisean In thelate 60. sald the Soviets were adoptlng a wait-and-seeattituciCl toward the new regillle. When Stelllpe.l dryly askedwhether placing various Soviet advisors in the ministriescia., to tbe priwy cleaner lewl was a.wa1.t-llld-see at:titude. lCazankiftsatd ~hese were all technical specialists and were not advisors.Stempel cballenged him on this and asked for his comment onthe nearly two dozen economic agreements the Soviets hadslgned with the nsv Afghanistan government. Kazankin saidtbe Soviets were giv1ng help to Afghaniscan because they feltthe govcmment VolS doing IIIDre for 'che people tb.an preViousgovemlQt>nts. He /laid Soviec relaei"ns vil:h the two previousAEgban regimes had also been excellent to good. Stempel nocedthat there remained a good deal of suspicion in lIIany quartersof Soviet actlvities in Afghanistan. Ka:ankin pressed forIran's views of the problem. Stempel merely noted that theIranians vcre suspicious. Kazank1n described the newAfgnanist:.n's governmenc's program as u a good democracicbourgeoisie" prt... ··am and reslstt=d wich only mnor uneasinessScempel'.5 j:lbs " COllllllUl\1st influence in AfghanLstaft.

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

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C09FIDENTlAL/NOFO~l 2. •Internal Iranian Politics - Kazank1n p~essed at aeveral pointsfor Stempel's vIews on the Iranian Incernal Political acene.S:empel, pleadiag a ~ecent return from vacation. merely saidbe had heard the political system was opening up. lCazankinpoo pooed th1a and said" "If the Shah. 15 atill around Dex::year. everything will be rigged by the government." Stempelpicked up on the "if" and asked if 1C&zaokia had any :levs thatwould suggest differently. Yere the. Soviets planning somethingin· Iran'l ICllzankin cl~ared bta throat and treat1lcl 5tempel..tethe rumor that the Shab was reportedly sick from canCdr orsome other blood disease. (This rumor has abounded in manyquarters and may be of Soviet inspiration.)

Kazankin a180 said he had heard the U_5. wa. trying to makeDr. Ali Amini prime minister again. Stempel denied this witha derisive anort and said the U.S. waa delightsito see thepolitical system opening up but th~U.S. bad.nopreferred candidates.

Visitors - In what has become a ritual, Stempel and KazankindIscussed perspective visitors from their countries to Iran.lCazankin noted that the hea~ of the Soviet chamber of cOll2lllercebad been in Iran 1n mid-Juri and Iran and the USSR bad agreedto open a Soviet-Iran joint chamber. ICazankln did not seemvery interested in Under Secretary Newsom'. visit andDr. Eugene Rostow'~ short stay here. (Comment: Perhaps theSoviet intelligence list has not caught up with recent events.On the other band, maybe they feel they know all they needto know about the visit. Kazankin's lack of interest inthese ewo visits ~as unusual.)

Rio floce - K.:1ZIUh in w1l1 be leavinf for ~sia for vacationAugust:I. He invited the Stempel amily for a Tnursdayafternoon s-.n.m lunch an July 27. (Collllllent: OR' notes :his15 an unusual step; few official Acericans are ever invitedto Zarcandeb. tbe Soviet summer compound.) Kazankin alsoexpressed interest in seeing journal 'Irticles from Americanpublications such as Foreign Policy, '/hieh dealt with Iranand the Mideast. Stempel promised to provide a few.

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I.A. tFGBiNISTAN: ArGnAN OFFICIALS EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE: F~I~ND1J RELA!IO~S .ITH TH~ ~NITED STAT~S ANn ~MPRASIZ­

E. '~I~ r~~ICT OF NO~-A1IGNME~:. TRE! SAID iRAT T~!Y ~~RE

~';ll~I~G-VARIOUS ISSUES SUCS ~s TB£ FRONTIeRS ~ITa

PA~i5~A~ AND THE ~ATER AGRE!MENT WITH I~AN AND HAD NO:~~T DET~RMINiu TH£IR POLICIES. TR~T STATED THAT ~RATEVF.R

.. ~ . ~ !'~CI510NS THEY riOr~D ~o USOUE ISSUES VI!H THEIR~=OhS THhOUGH ~6GOTIArIONS.

~. ~. I~TtRNAL MATT1RS, THiT SAID THE! WOULD BE DRA~ING

UP A ,IYS YEAR PLAN AND THAT THEIR FIRST FRIORIT! WOULDBl LA~~ R~FOR~. THE! SAID TnET FAVORED COOP~RATIV~S OVRR'f) i L ~:'I-! v\:~ •

c ••IlIi.·; ~:':;iti:: IS GEI~LRA1 I:-IPS-ESSION .-ROUND wESTiRNt"'~AS:: 1 :. I ' :\P.UI. Til,u TRE NUM :!'~R OF SOV I t.T AD'lIsnSIS 1:.:.', : ... .; .• qS "'A~ NOT r1E"'10NED 3T AFGHAN OFrIC:ALS,"L'::;; .... .. ~r:I\ • .i !'OI'\Ti.D :HJT Tn.n H::'iAIf{STHi HAD HAD COOr.~~L'1:J . • :1~ i~~ ~OVlrT UNION ~~~ SIXTY YEARS AND LOO'­:. h;",·h .. 1\.1 .:iU:,~l'At..1AL H::L? i:\J:1 n!r ~\)vIE!' UNION.- .. .': -uP:.u TO GU" Su3~!A~lTHt ¥ ".'..1' ~'QO", O'!'liHS AS 'HLL •

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RE'a STATE 2..0..11

I. AOOR£SSEES All£' NT IIfNf ftAS YIATUALI. Y FAOf' TfoIE"AST HEr.o PAIYAT£, VlEtI_ ft!tI AFGfWt QOY£AIV£lH AS FaAALI. '''T£NTS AND PURPOSES A SEAyAftT oP THE SOYI£TS. foI£HAS OISGU'SED THIS VI£II B£JtIN) Nt oPP1CIAl. POlIC., OF-"AIT-AND-SEE- QIYlftG THE ftEti QOA £YERY 8£~EFIT OF rfolEDOUIT. POARAL REI.ATIONS HAYE CONT'~UED AS 8EFORE.IftCL~' ... COftT'NUI..Q DIS8lJASEME~TS ~ EJ'STI..G ECO~O"rcC~I~TI (TEHRAN '1.1 AftO ~~OU" TO DEPT AND (AB~L~ AUcaul', aa) BUT Al.IIAYS "ARllY.COftF' IO!ftT'ALCDlCP lDE"rrAt.

TEHRAN 09a19 2'09JJ2

2. SHAH fW)E IT CLEAR TO THE MBASSAOQA. AT TfoIE Tl"E.

• CWlDE"nAl

~Ar.F THPF~ 5 £ C R F T 1111A

3. SAuDI ARahI~/YiMENS: SAUDI CFFICIALS CON,;'YED ~F.EPCJNCEiN O~~A !BE iECR~T COUP tN ADEN .3ICH THEY pgRCr.!V~

AS IURTBiR ~1IDENCE Of A SOiI~T iFrORT TO ENC!RCLE THtIROIL-HlC~ ~r.NINSULA _ITa REGI~r.S HOSTIL~ TO MOD~R~Tl

GOVERH~~NrS. TBiY EIPR.SSED PARfICULAi CONCERN OVER~RA~ TH1Y A~LI~~~ Tv B~ AN INFLUX or FOREIGN TROOPSJNT~ TH6 r£OP~E'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF !f~EN FOLLOWING't'Sl G:!l!P. WE COMPLIMENUD THE SAUDI GOV;;atof1&NT FJR ITSROL! IN JULY 2 ARAB LK\GU! MrETI~~ WHICH RtSJLT!D INA COHD~~NATIO~ BT A HAJJRIT! or L~AGUi ~E~Bg~S or PDRT'S&OLi IN 1Ft ASSASSINATION or NORTa !EME~ PRiSID~NT

GP.ASBMI A~D FURTB!R POLITICIAL AND iCONOMIC ISOLATIONor ~Hl ADtNI ~EGIME. V~ ARE ALSO WORKING WITH THE SAG!IT1f~166

PAGE FOtTR SEC RET 11128.,' -1~uc13 \~., U .a.

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·rH SiCSTATE VASgDCTO RUFHNA/USMlSSlON USNATO IMMEDIATE 9393INfO AUSBLK/AMEMBASSl lABUL IMMEDIATE 5130RUQMBP./AMtMBASSI T£H~AN IMMEDIATE 57~7

RUSBQD/AHtMB15SY ISLAMABAD IHH!DIATE 0821RUUH/AM1MIsASSY NtW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2211RUQMRA/AM~MBASST JIDDA IMMf.DIATE 42658TSEC RET iINAL S~CTION or 2 STATE 1941~6/2

LIMtIS

TO ACCELiRATl DELIVlRY or ALREADY APPRO'ID us ~!LITARrEQUIPMENT TO NORTa lEMEN AND to NOT INTEND TO RESPONDA1 THIS rIM~ TO ANY PDRY INTER~ST IN IMPROVSD R~LATIONSWITH US.

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3. THE ASSE3SMENTS OF ArGH~~ISTAN'S N£IGH30BS ARE SIMILARTO OU~:> t,LTrlOUGH p~l:ISrA~J Ai,;'; 12AN COiJIl::t-lD THAT AFG:iAtHSTANIS AL~Z~OY I~~~VOCA~LY -LOSr- TO THE S~VI£T UNION •PA;(ISTA:~ S:::r::·:s TO ,:!,\:'l US n :;riArtC: T!Elrt ASSC:SS·:,.:n OF" THZr:';;:;:::AT, P;:;::':;;Ui·iA.:iLY T:; CJTAli'; A Gi,;;:t,T:.: t;.~. C~J:."lTi,ji::tn TO~~~rSiAS'S S~CU~ITY. nr NO TIM~ HAV: I~£ Pft~I5TA"IS

~ IJ:·:STI O~;:D .ill 2 P ~t! (.Y OF i ;,\ L ~:, r ::r ;~G T;::: U.S. f":':'S':: r·:c:::: F

2. wE SZi, AS YOU DO, OUR RZ~10UAL INT~REsrs AS PARAMOU~T

I~ OUR CO~SID2RATIOw OF A PROPlP. APP~CACX TO THE ORA AND~OULD VIE~ AN Ia~IJE~rIST AFGAANISTAN, ESP~C!ALLY ONEgACKED ay raE SOVI~iS, AS A S,RIOUS Tij~EAT TO PEACe:: ANDSTA3ILlTY IN THE A2l::A. \11£ 3iU'::VE Td15 IS A RE:AL FEAR

ESPENIALLY IN PAKI~TAN AND ALSO IN IRAN.

tAGS: PEPR, EAID, AF. US

SUBJECT: ASSESSl1ENTOFAFGHAN D£VELOPJ~ENTS A.ND U.S.-AFGHANRELATIONS

REFS: CA) STATE 240411; KABUL 7370

1. W~ AGREE WITH THE B~OAD OUTLIllZS OF YOUR ASSESSMENT OFTnEGi~ER~ DIRECTION 07 DEVELOPMENTS IN AFuHAHISTAN ANDTHE UNCE~TAIN PROSPECTS FOR A RETURN TO CLOSE U.S.-AFGHANRELATIONS. NEVERTXELESS, ~E STILL FIND OURSELVE~ U~SURE

A30UT THZ SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME, EVEN ASSUMING THAT THEP?ESEIU REGIHE MAlflIAINS ITS HOLD ON POWi::R, Aim WE BELIEVE~, SrtOULD WORK FROM T~E P?Z~ISE THAT A CONST~UCTIV~ U.S.­AFGHAN UORAING RELATIONSHIP COULD srILL EMeRGE. WE WOW~iR,

IF AND ~HC:N THE SIT~HriON G2LS A BIT ~CR~, ~H~TH:~ TH~ DnA~ILL a~co~c A D~CIL~ CAI~-fOLLOW£R DC~INAr,D 3Y irlE USSR,oaA ~ADICAL-LifTI~T ~SGI~, ON THE FRINGE ~F TH£ UON-ALIGN~D

~OVLr~~T Bur ~IIA P~CULIAR AFGHAN CHARACTERISTICS AND A C~­

Gn~E OF I "D~E~JDEiJCE.· TjiE: l·iJ5T ADYC::P,S;:: i)iVELOPi·;..:lH I H UR:1SOF OUR IiUERES LI. D :-.. ~ r;' ON OF SOV ':" ',' TT WAlCH WOULD SinIOUSLY uiSTURB TaE

toJIIA' R(:GION.

NNNRVV £SA370BRA29~'RR ilUQPiHRDE RUEHC 4356/01 3351021ZNY SSSSS ZZK"~ g1ZS12Z DEC 78f" SECSIATi WASHDCTO RUS3LK/AM£(1SASSY KABUL 6410INFO r.USJQu/A~rmASSYISLA~aAD 2545RUQiolilRlAI'Z('1JASSY TEilRA N 3391RUSDAUAi:.znaASSY NiW· DELHI 4725RU1'lJDK/A('1EteASSY CACCA 7116RU£HfiO/A(~HaASSY MOSCOW 3754RUMJPG/uSLO PEKING 3985RUQ~GU/AM,KBASSYANKARA 6935RUHQHQAI CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII 1843RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GEBTSEC RET SECTION ~I OF 82 STATE 304356/91

EI~l~·E.O. 116521 GOS

NNNNW ;::SA.371a~A~~S-­il;i RU~ i1iiRDE RUiac ~35&/~2 '.3351023ZNY SSSS!i ZZi(R ,U&12Z DEC 78 :: , ':O'lLFH S£CSTAT£ WASHDCTO RUS31.1~1 Ai1E:'1aASSY KAdUl. 6411INFO RUSJ~D/A~E~~ASSY ISlA~A3AD 2546RUQI1HR/Ai-l!:i'L3ASSY re:HRAN 03)2RUSBAE/Ai-l::l1dASSY I~C:~ DEl.HI 4726RUMJDKIAI1t:~~ASSY DACCA 7117RUEHMO/A~~I~ASSY MOSCOW 37~5

RUI~PG/USl.O PE~lNG 3936RUQ"GU/Ai~~ASSY A"KARA 6936RUHQHQAI CIUCPAC HOUOLULU HAWAII 1344RUSNAAA/USCIHCEUR VAIHIHGEN GEaT~ E C RET FINAL SECTION OF 02 STATE 304356/92

LIraDIS,

CONCERN A30UT TaE NEW REGIME"S QU~~TIONA3LE HUMAN RIGHTSp~RFOnMANC£. T~E AFGHANS SHOULD BE KEPT FULLY AWARE OFTHESE CONCERNS IN OISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEADE~SHIP.

7. WE REGARD THE SITUATION IN AF~HANISTA~ AS AN EVOLVINGC~E WHICH ~UlnES OUR CONIINUING ATTENTION AS ~ELl AS A~~NTINUING DIALOGUE WITH OTHER STAT~ IN THE R'GION. ~E

ENCOURAGe: E~=ASSIES T~i~AN, ISLA~~JAD, A~t nEW DELHI INPARTICULAR TO CON!1NUE ,XCriANGING VI~wS WITH HOST GOVERN­MENTS ON THE NHANGING AFGHA~ SCEN~, K~EPi"G IN MIND THAIOUR INrLUENCE IN KA3UL.IS SEVZRELY LI~IT~D AND THAT WE

LOOK T~ AFGHANISTAN"S NkIGH30RS TO TAK~ THE LEAD IND~VC:LCP I:~G A NETIJOrtA OF COO?:::nATIVE FrZLATIOI:S l-liUCH \:II LLCONTRlaur~ TO PEAC2 AND S!A5ILITY IN THE R~GIOU. VANCEaT

4356

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Eoc:

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Afghanistan and U.S.~Afghan Relations

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

vasiliy K. Gorovoi, First Secretary, USSREmbassy

Ronald D. Lorton, Country Officer forAfghanistan

DATE: April 11, 1979

•DISTRIBUTION:

NEA/PAB, EU~/SOV, S/MS, SY, IUR/R~A/SOA,

INR/OIL/~. NEA-Mr. Miklos, Embassy Kabul,Embassy scow, Embassy Islamabad,Embassy ehran, Embassy New Delhi, NSC­Mr. Thornton

Gorovoi said he had not been able to understanddevelopments in U.S.-Afghan relations since he hadlast met with Lorton, commenting that on his lastvisit (February 8) relations between the U.S. andAfghanistan had appeared to be "calm" but that sincethe terrible event which resulted in the death ofthe American Ambassador in Kabul there had been anabrupt change in those relations. He cited as evidence,the U.S. decision to reduce economic aid to Afqhanistanand calls in Congress for other actions such aswithdrawal of the Peace Corps. Gorovoi explainedthese developments as incom?rehensihle because theu.S. has always sought to preserve its position aroundthe world.

Lorton agreed there have been difficulties inthe U.S.-~fghan relationship, explaining that althoughrelations before February 14 had been normal, we none­theless had a number of questions on our minds including

•CO~~FIDENTIAL

GDS 04/11/8584

CONFIDENTIAL- 2 -

our inability to Agree with the Afghans on variousmatters of International concern and the apparent lackof interest in the part of the ORA in many of theprograms we were continuing to offer. What disturbedus about the handling of the kidnapping of AmbassadorDubs was the ORA's complete lack. or cooperation oreven consultation with us in their handling of theincident. All of these factors were part of ourdecision to reduce our assistance level. Lorton concluded.

Gorovoi questioned what he called the u.s. viewthat the Soviets were in a posi tion to control thebehavior of the Afghans at that time. He said Afghan­istan was a sovereign country and denied that the USSRis in any position to ·order· the Afghans to do something.Lorton demurred and said it was not a question of iSSUingorders, but our view that the Soviets who were advisingthe Afghans should have been in a position to urgerestraint on them. In reality, the Soviets even playedan operational role in some aspects of the anti-terroristoperation, according to eyewi tness reports. Nonetheless,Lorton noted we have expressed our view to interestedMembers of Congress and others that it is the AfghanGovernment which must bear the responsibility for theoutcome of their action. .

Gorovoi opined it is difficult to see how U.S.-Afghanrelations can make progress in the light of the sharpu.s. decisions. Lorton said the U.S. had no desire tosee a deterioration in our relationship with Afghanistanbut observ~d that one·of the major difficulties inhaving a cooperative relationship in the future is thecontinuing charges emanating from Moscow regarding outsideinterference in Afghanistan's affairs. Lorton notedthe two recent public statements made by the u.s. inthis regard, reaffirming that the u.s. has not interferedand has no intention of interfering in Afghanistan'saffairs. Improvements in U.S.-Afghan relations would bedifficult, Lorton concluded, as long as these kinds ofcharges and the atmosphere they create continue.

Lorton asked Gorovoi for his assessment ofdevelopments in Afghanistan and the major problemsfaced by the Taraki Government. Gorovoi thought thatthe ORA was facing problems common to all revolutionsas the old and new classes vie for control. Gorovoiobserved that there is a;strong religious tradition in

..PCONFIDENTIAL

85

CONFIDENTIAL- 3 -

Afghanistan and indicated this was a source ofopposition to a regime which sought to separate churchand state and remove religion from politics. Healso noted the autonomous traditions of certaintribal groups and observed that a number of dissidentshave crossed the border into Pak~stan to carry outanti-ORA activities. However, Gorovoi continued, theORA enjoys a lot of support for its reform programs(such as land reform) which benefit the masses ofthe Afghan population. He viewed the military askey to the progress of a revolution in developingcountries.

Lorton questioned whether the regime indeed had"mass· support, observing that large $egments ofthe general population appear to have expressed theiropposition to the regime in. the revolt in Herat andby leaving Afghanistan for Pakistan. Lorton suggestedthat these were indications of less than mass popularsupport for the regime and a reaction to the harshmeasures the regime is taking against its opponents.

Gorovoi responded that every action provokescounteraction and quoted Lenin on the need of arevolution to defend itself. He recalled that largenumbers of Russian peasants had opposed the RussianRevolution because they were uneducated and illiterateand did not know where their real interests lay. Hesaw the task of the Afghan Government's leadership asbeing the education of the masses regarding their trueinterests and described this process as difficult.

yorton concluded by saying that he thought itwould indeed be a difficult time ahead for the Afghanpeople since the ORA appears to prefer destructionof old institutions in~avor of new structures ratherthan attempting to work with or through those institu­tions.

Drafted by: NEA/PAB:RDLYr~on:lcbX29552; 04/1'"2/79

CONFIDENTIAL

86

Cleared by: NEA/P~:~QOon

,I!I

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CINCPAC, ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 128651 GDS 5-7,,85 <TAYLOR, JAPJES E.) DRooPTAGSa PEPR, PINR, PGOV,"PINT, SHUPI, AF, PK, UR, IRSUBJEcr. THE -BIG LIE- BECOMES STANDARD KHALQI TOOL

REf. (A) KABUL 3278. (B) KABUL 3166

1. (C.. ENt IRE TEXT.)

2. SlI'IflIARYI SEVERAL NEV POLIT ICAL WiiINKLES WERE PART OF A DE­LUGE OF ANNIVERSARY SPEECHES AND PRESS CONFERENCES GIVEN OVERTHE LAST DAYS BY PRESIDENT NOOR PJOHAflPlAD TARAKI AND PRIPIEPlINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN. INCLUDING ANOTHER HINT THAT SOPIE FRICtIONBETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS PlAY 6E A REALITY. FLAt DENIALS tHAT ANYARPlY MUTINY HAD OCCURRED IN JALALABAD. OR tHAt THE REGIPIETOfiTURES ITS POLItICAL PRISONERS, INDICATE THAT THE -61G LIE-PlAY HAVE BECOME THE REGIPlE'S PREFERRED PUBLIC TACTIC FOR DEAL-ING WITH THORNY ISSUES. ALLEGED INTERFERENCE BY IRAN, PAKIStAN,AND -IPIPERIALISM- REMAINED tHE GOVERNPlENt·S PAIPIARY EXCUSE FORCONTINUED DOMESTIC OPPOSITION, WHILE tHINLY-VEILED BARBS WERELAUNCHED AT -BROTHERLY- COUNTRIES (SPECIFICALLY CZECHOSLOVAKIA)WHO PlAY CONSIDER PROVIDING REfUGE TO THE EXILED PARCHAIIIISTLEADERS, END OF' S\J'IMARY. . .

87

3. TARAKI-~~IN RELATIONS: DESPITE A~IN'S nECENT EFFUSIVEDESCRIPT ION OF TAnAKI AS -THE MOST GLORIOUS PEflSONALITY INAFGHAN HISTORY" (WnICH ELIMINATES &UCH NOTA6LES AS DARIUS,AlEXANOER TKE BKEAT, GENGHIS KHAN, TAMERLANE, AHMAD SHAHDURKANI, LAVY SALES, AND fLASH~AN), HINTS CONTINUE TO SURFACETHAT DIFFERENCES Ok floiICllON bETWEEN 'IHi: TWO LEADERS MAY

XIST. IN ONE NEWS CONF£Ri:NC£ hESPO~SE REGAkuING AMIN'S·RE-..;EHT CONDE~NAIION OF ANY CULT OF PEr~SONALITY SURROUNDINGTAnAKI (REF A), TH~ Gn~AT LEADER HIMSELF MODESTLY REPLIEDTHAT THE AFGHAN P=.OPLE -LOV£ AND RESPECT l'iE" .so !''lUCH THATTHEY INSIST ON PliTT ING UP PHuTOGkAPHS EVEGVl.iHERE, HE ADDEDTHAT THE GOV£RN~eNr HAS ISSUED IN~TRUCTIONS TO CEA~E THISPRACTICE, oUT THE ~EGI~t .ILL NOT USE FORC~ TO PREVENT THEPEOPLE FROM EXHI5ITING THEIn AFFECTIOI~. (Corr,rIlENT: A LARGE NUflIBEROF TARAKI PHOTOGRAPHS HAVE DISAPPEARED riECENTLY.) AT THE SAMECONFERENCE, TAnAKI CATEGORICALLY DENIED ThAT AMIN HAD EVER SAID,OR EVEN INTIMATED, THAT CEnTAIN UNKNOWN ENEMIES ARE ATTEMPTINGTO'wiNFlUENCE" IHE AFGHAN PnESIDENT (f.EF B). TARAKI PETULANTLYB1SISTED THAT Ai'lIN HAD ::>AID "NOTHING OF THE SORT, W AND THAT HEKNEW THIS WAS T~UE D~CAUSE HE HAD "fiEAD ALL OF AMIN'S INTER­VIEWS aVEii THE PAST YEAn."

4. HU~AN nlGHT~: ~DLIQUELY COUNTERING WIDESPnEAD REPORTS,CONFIRMED OY EYE~I1NE~SE& AND VICtIMS, THAT THIS REGIME PHY­SICALLY P1ISTI\EATS MNY OF THE NUflIEROUS PIHSOHERS IN ITS

. CUSTODY (UQ.UDING LARGE-SCALE NIGHTTIME EXECUTIONS OF POLI­TI~AL PIUSONE:RS, SANS TidAL, AHD THE APPlICATION OF ELECTRICAlSHOCKS TO CERTAIN PARTS OF THE BODY), A11H1 CLAIMED THAT ·WEHAVE Nor UNDER~INED HUMAN DIGNITY. eVEN WHEN ilEALING WITH THOSEHATCHING INTRIGUES AGAINST OUR PE.OPLE AND THE COUNTRY,· ANDAIiDED THAt "WE HAVE NOT ACTED 4GAIN5T ANYONE USING MEANS" CON­TRARY TO RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY". TARAKI INSISTED THATONLY "oETWEEN 1,000- AND 1•• 00 POLITICAL PRI~ONERS ARE INTERNED.· .(COl'lI'iEHT: W:: THINK THAT THE FIGURE 15 ACTUALLY WELL OVER TENTHOU&AND.) '.

• DOMESTIC SECURItYI aLAME .FOR INTERNAL ~ECURITY PROBLEflISCONT INUED to 8E LAID At THE DOORSTEP OF ·F"OREIGN I NrILTRATORS,.' .ESPECIALLY .. ~OLD IERSoU.AFGHAN DRESS· FROM PAXIST AN AND IRAN.tARAKI INDI~ECTLY ADMItTED THAT FIGHTING IS UNDERWAY IN NORTH­WEST AFGHANISTAN .WHeN HE INSISTED THAT VIOLENCE AROUND MAIMANA(A TURKrtAN REGION NEAR THE ~OVIET bORDER) 1~ THE WORK OF"IRANIAN INFILTRATORS" WHO ESCAPEu FOLLOWING THE UPHEAVAl INHErtAT. TAHAKI ALSO ASSERTED THAT "l~TEREFERENCE· ay IRAN ANDPAKISTAN HAS COMPELLED THt: REGIME TO itETAIN THE OVERNIGHT CURFEWIN KAEll. MOnE THAN ONE YEAn AFTER THE FcEVOLUTION. TARAKI BENTTHE FAC!~ 5UkROUNDING A COUPLE OF POINt;; WHEN HE CATEGORICALLYDENIED THAT "ANYTHING," ~UCH LESS ANY ARMY MUTINY, HAS HAPPENEDI~ JALALABAD RECENTLY, AND INSISTED T~AT NO ONE (SPECIFICALLYSHl'l~S) HAS SEEN AkRESTED b~CAUSt: 01' TH~Ifi RELIGIOUS BELIEFS.Elt3557

8&

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6. GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION: !ARAKI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEBUILDING OF' A SOCIALIST SOCIETY IS A LONG-TERM TASK, LUT HECLAIMED THAT tHE "FOUNDATION" OF A SOCIALIST SOCIETY WILL BELAID IN "SIX TO TE~ YEARS." AS FOR THE NATUitE OF THE REGIME,JARAKI REMARKED tHAT "DEMOCRACY MEANS THAT MlASURES SHOULD BETAKEN fOR THE BENEfIT Of THE MAJORITY," ANu AD~ED THAT "WECAN CALL THE DRA A DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP bECAUSE IT IS INfAVOR OF' 98 PERCENT OF THE PEOPlE."

7. RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN: "~EGIONAL REACTIONARYPOWERS" (READ' IRAN AND PAKI st AN) WITH THE SUPPORT OF "11'1­PERIALISM- (READ US AND UK> CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT "ARMED AGGRESS­ION" AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, ACCOnDING 10 THE AFGHAN LEADERS, ANDHAVE "MARTYRED. A LARGE HUMBEfi OF PEOPLE" INCLUDING WOMEN,CHILDREN AND THE ELDERLY. JARAKI CLlAr'iED THAT ~INCE APRIL 8,1979, "PAKISTANI SOLDIERS HAVE COMMITTED ELEVEN INFRINGEMENTSONTO AFGHAN TERRllORY"'. TARAKI INSl~TED THAT ALL FURTHER EN­CROACHEMENTS WOULD BE REPULSED DY THE AkMED FORCES OF AFGHAN­ISTAN, wSUPPORTED BY AFGHANISIAN·~ INTikNATIONAL FnIENDS."TARAKI ADDED THAT ·WE.DO NOT CON5IDER ZIA-UL-HAQ AS OUk ENEMY,BUY MAYBE SOONER OR LATEh Ht: IlIILL STOP SENDING INF'ILTRATORSINTO THIS COUNTRY."

09

8. RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES: TARAKI INSISTED THATTHERE ARE ONLY BET~EEN 1.0e0 AND l.lae SOVIET ADVISERS HERE.AND, OF THESE. ADOUT ~~z ARE SERVING WITH THE AFGHAN ~ILITARY.(COMMENTI WE BELIEVE THAT THEnE ARE APPROXIMATELY 1,000SOVIET MILlTARYA::lVISER:i HfRE -- AND AROUND 2,50" CIVILIANADVISERS.) HE SUGGESTEiI. THAT FufiElGN COnnESPONDENTS COMPARETHAT FlGUftE 'liITH THE ~lTUATlONS IN IRAN, PAKISTAN. AND OTHERCOUNTRIES WHERE "SIXTY TO SEVc.NTY THOUSAND AMEi(ICAN- AND OTHERADVISERS ARE PkESENT. fiEGARDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM THEUSSR, TAnAKI CLAIMED THAT ".HATEVE~ WE NEED AND CAN MANAGE.WE GET." ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, TARAKS IN~ISTED THAT "BRO­THERLY RELATIONS· bETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND CIECHOSLOVAKIA INDI­CATE THAt CZECHOSLOVAKIA WOUlD "NEVER GIVE SHELTER" TO FORfliER~BASSADOR BABRAK KAR~AL. HIS EXILED PARCHAMIST COLLEAGUES,OR OTH£R ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUf 10M.

9. PARTY HELATI0NS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT: ACCORDINGTO TARAKI, THE PEOPLE·S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANI~TAH (PDPA)HAS HAD -HISTORICAL SOLIDARITY WITH THREE MAIN ANTI-IMPERIALISTMOVEMENTS." THE "GLOBAL FRONT FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS;" THE-INTERNATIONAL ~ORKIHG CLASS ~OVEMENT;" AND, THE "NATIONAL ANDSOCIAL LIBERATION MOVE~~NTS ALL OVER THE WORLD."

Ie. CONCLUSIONS' AbIDE FROM THESE NEW FOn~ULATIONS, THE GREATDELUGE OF HIGH-LEVEL VERBIAGE SURROUNDING THE FIRST ANNIVERSARYOF THE REVOLUTION COVERED OLD GROUND. PUDLIC DENIALS BY THELEADERSHIP THAT EVENTS KNOWN TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE <E.G., THEJALALABAD MUTINY, TORTURE OF PRISONERS, ETC.) HAVE EVEROCCURRED APPEAR TO HAVE BECOME THE ACCEPTED -&IG LIE" TACTIC,THEREBY FURTHER UNDERCUTTING WHATEVER DOMESTIC CREDIBILITYTHE REGI~E MAY HAVE POSSESSED. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST INTHIS CONNEctluN IS TARAKl·S DISINGENUOUS DENIAL THAT AMIN~VER MENTIONED THAT -PEOPLE" WERE TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE GREAT"LEADER. A REFERENCE BY THE ~IME MINISTER WHICH IS PART OF THEOFFICIAL· PUBLIC RECORD IN THE GOVERNIlIENT-CONTROlLED PRESS.TARAKI·S BARBS DIRECTED AT ~AGUE COULD ALSO HVE BEEN AIMED ATOTHER -BROTHERLY- COUNTRIES (E.G., YUGOSLAVIA, OR EVEN THE USSR)WHO MAY NOW OR AT SOME POINT PROVIDE A SAFE HAVEN FOR THE EXILEDPARCHAMIsr LEADERS. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT SEEMS THAT THELONGER THE KHALQI REGIME REMAINS UNA6LE TO CONSOLIDATE ITSOWN DOMESTIC SECURITY, THE MOHE CONCERNED THE KHALQI LEADER­SHIP MAY BECOME THAT ITS "INTERNATIONAL FRIENDS" MAY BEGINCASTING ABOUT FOR ALTERNATE LEnIST LEADERSHIP TO SUPPORT.AMSTUTZBT13557

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SUBJEct I (C) PAKISTANI DIPLOMAT DISCUSSES SOVIET-PAKRELATIONS, AFGHANISTAN

I. (C-EItIRE TEXT)

2. A PAKIstAN Dlfl.OMAT (PROTECT) HAD THE FOLLOWlllG TOSAY ABOUT SOVIET-PAK RELAT IONS AND THE SITUATION INAfGKAllSTAIl DURING PlAY 7 CONVERSATION WITH EfllBOFF.

3. ON SOVIET-PAK RELATIONS, HE COMMENTED THATI

-- AMBASSADOR KHAN RECENTLY DELIVERED A LETTER FROMGENERAL ZIA TO PREMIER KOSYGIN. FOLLOWING PRESENTATIONOF THE MESSAGE. KHAN USED THE I'IEETING TO STRESS THATISLAMABAD WANtS TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WUH THE SOVIETUNION AND AFGHANISlAN. IT DOES NOT WANt THE AFGHANREFUGEES IN PAKISTAN AND DID NOT INVITE THEM. PAKISTANWOlA.D; BE .PLEASED IF THE REFUGEES RETURNi::D HOME. TKESOVIET UNION AND AFGHANlcTAN CAN DO WHAT THEY WANT INSIDEAFGHANISTAN TO KEEP THE :FUGEES FROI'l ENTERING PAKISTAN,TO THE EXTENt OF SULLO!... A WALL IF NECESSARY. HOWEVER,TKE IITERNAL SITUATION l~ AFGHANISTAN AND NOT PAKISTANSHOlLD BE BLAl-jED FOR THE EXODUS. PAKISTAN HAS THEHlJIlANITARIAN RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE THAT FOOD AND OTHERESSE Nt IAtS GET TO THE REFUGEES.- KOSYGIN'S RESPONSE WAS -MODERATE-. HE HOTED THAT THEAFGHAN VERSION DIFFERED FROM AMBASSADOR KHAN·.- PRESENTA-TION. IT WOULD aE GOOD IF THE REASONS FOR rH~SE AFGHANAPPREHENSIONS WERE REMOVED. HE SAID •

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-- IKE sovm AftBASSADOR II ISLAJtABAD WAS "ORE DlREcr.Iii RESPONSE TO PAKIstANI DlSAVQllfQ.S Qf 410lP.8 -ACI-DUAct IVlt IES DlANAt ING FROIt THE REFUGEE CAflPS.-.c""STAtmELUIltLY tHAT THE 'AKIST All GOVERIIM£lIt IS PROVIIUIG ... totHE RE~S.JR£TIRED PAIISTAIII MILITARY '£RSO.IEL AlltRAIllia ~roGEESFOR MILItARY ACTIVity AGAIiIt till DRA,AND ·OFFJCIAL- PAIISTAIII PROPAGAIIDA IS CRItIC4 or , ......

.. -- WHILE RE1,JJct Alt TO DRAW AllY DEFlln IVE CQlQ.USlOUif "t_OJ ·'AXISfAIIl-.UJ&ASSY III MOSCOW BELIEVES tHAt ItOSCOW IS- ILL"

.0, INtEJt£STED IN PURSUING GOOD RELATIOIIS WITH' ISLAMABAD AIDfIIAY EVEI BE RESTRAIIIlla KABII. ·,FROfi flOVIIiG ~lVELY to STIRup. BORDER PROBLE"S WlfH PAKlstAI. AT tHE SAfIE t IIIE. tHE£MBASSY IS APPREHENSIVE THAt tHIS APPAREIr SOVIET POS11101COlLD CHANGE, D£'EIIDIIiG 011 tHE SlTUAtlON II AFGHAIlSlAI.

-- OTHERWISE, 81LATEBAL RELATIOIIS ARE DEVELOPI.G VELL.EGDI IAT lOllS ARE UIIDER .IAY FOR SHIPPIIiG AID COISlI.ARAGREEMENt 5." COOPER AT 1011 all tHE SOVIET-ASSISTED STEEL MILl.IS PROCEEDING WELL. All EDUCATIOIT AGREEltEIIt Wl1.L BE SIG.EDAt THE 'END OF THE MAY OR THE BEGINlllHG OF JUliE.

... 011 AFGHAIiISTAI, PAXISTAITI SOURCE STATED tHAT.

-- PAXISIAII1 llI'ELLIGENCE HAS OBTAINED IIIFOR",TIOIL FROfILOWER LEVEL AFGHAN BUR, UCRATS tHAT SEIIlOR ORA OFFICIALSHAVE stRUCK "ORE OF A •,..~FIDEtn' ATTItUDE FQLLOVlJlG THEVISIT TO KABUL BY GENeRAL YEPISHEV. DETAILS OF THE VISIt.HOWEVER, ARE HARD TO COME BY~ YEPISt(EV filET OILY WITH TWOOR THREE TOP OFFICIALS IN TKE GOVERlLftENT. TKE RESULts OFTHESE "E£TIIiGS ARE BEING VERY CLOSELY HELD.

- IT IS .U.. lKELY tHAT THE HELICOPTERS US~:O TO HE1.PSUPPRESS THE JALAKABAD MUT lNY WERE n.OWI bY AF'GKAITS. SliCEtHEY HAD OILY RECENTLY ARRIVED IN KABU1.. THEY VERIPROBABLY P!LorEnc BY SOVIETS. TOOlBY'1~5~

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1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT

2. SlJ1lIMARY: HUMAYUN liSEn. AFGHAN ATTORNEY FROM PARISWHO ACCOMPANIED SYED AHMED GAILANI TO [MBASSY ON APRIL23 (REITEL) t CALLED ON E!"lBOFF MAY 13 WITH UP-DATE ONPROGRESS IN FORGING UN.ITY AMONG PESHAWAR-BASED GROUPS.ASEFl ALSO ADVISED OF SUCCESSES IN FIGHTING BETWEENDISSIDENT FORCES AND DRA TROOPS. HE LEIT WITH US PARTS HEALLEGED WERE TAKEN FROM M16-21 AIRCRAFT DOWNED ElYDISSIDENT FORCES IN ,LATE APRIL. EN[)/SUMMARY.

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3. ASEFl, WHO HAS BEEN TRAVELING i"HROUGHOUT PAKISTANSINCE ftlEVIOUS VISIT TO EMBASSY IN ATTn TOESTABLISH UNITY or DISSIDENT tiOVEMEHI', SAYS -MEANINGFULASSOCIATION"' or THREE GROUPS (ANLF, GAI1.ANI GROUP, AND"IAN GlL JAN GROUP) IS NOV 98 PERCEHI' ASSURED AND SHOULD

'BE ANNOUNCED BY NAY 18. THE AGR££IIENT WILL BE SIGNED 5YLEADERS or THREE ORGANIZATIONS IN PESHAWAR AND WILL BEANNOUNCED TO PRESS -THROUGHOUT THE WORLD-, ASEFl SAYS.THE ASSOCIATION VIU INa-WE COMANO COORDINATION IN FlELD_OPERAT-IONS AND COOPERATION AT TOP LEVELS IN PESHAWAR.

4. AS£FI HAS ALSO ARRANGED FOR EXPATRIATE AFGHAN BUSINESS­MEN TO SPONSOR A RADIO STATION WHICH WILL BE PURCHASED INEUROPE AND SET UP IN tAlIHISfAN UNDER DIREcnON or UNIFIED·tmOUPS COMMITTEE. ASEFI REPORTEDLY TOLD HIS COUSIN GO~

FONSEC SHAHMAVAZ, OF HIS INTENTIONS AND ASKED PERMISSION TOIRJIORT RADIO EQulfltENT. ASEFI DID NOT REPORTFONSEC APPROVAL. RATHER, SHAHNAVAZ -DID NOT TELL ME TOsrop THE ftlOCESS, ASIFI SAID.

5. ASEFI SAYS IlAJCII TRIBAL GROUPS OF AFGHANisrAN HAVERECENrt.Y BECOMI IlORE ACTIVE IN SUPPORTING REBEL ACTIVITIES.VAZIRS HAVE ACTIVELY JOING FIGHI' AS OF flAY 11 ANDIlENGALS, TAJUS, UZBEXS, AND AFRIDIS HAVE ALL AGREEDIN PIUNCIPLE TO Do SO BUT LACK ORGANIZATION TO COORDINATETHEIR PEOPLE·S EFFORTS. ANOTHER FACTOR CAUSING SOlIEHESITATION ON PART OF. THOSE ETHNICITRIBAL GROUPS ISLACK or ANY LEADER OF -NATIONAL- stATURE VITH VHOMTHEY CAN IDENTI". ASEFI HAS LETTER ALLEGEDLY SIGNEDBY N.1. THESE GROUPS ADDRES&m TO KING ZAKER SIfAHAPPEALI fiG FOR HIS RETURN, OR THAT OF ABDUL VALl, TO REPR£SENTBALL YING POINI' FOR DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES. LETTER IlAKESa.EAR TO KING, ACCORDING TO ASIFI, THAT RE-ESTABLlSHIlENTOF "ONARCHY NOT, RPI' NOT, INTENT OF THE GRQUPS. ROYALPERSONAGE VOULD BE FIGUREHEAD R.!!!!!R THAN RULING MONARCH.

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~. ASEFI SAID HE HAS ASKED FONSEC SHAKNAWAZ ABOUT POSSIBILITYOF UlCER SIfAH·S OR ABDUL VALI·S BEING PERIIITTED TO ESTABLISH ABASE III PAKl5tAN. SHAHNAVAZ· RESPON£ WAS - f'ERKAPS ALmLE LATER, BUI' Nor NOW.- SHAHNWAZ ALLEGEDLY TOLD ASEFI THATSOVIETS IfAVE MADE DDlARCH AT IIFA OPPOSING 8OP·S PERIIITTINGAFGHAN ROYAL FAfllLY TO TAICE UP RESIDENCE HERE.

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THE SOVIETUNION. THESE lNI'EN1'IONS CANNOT AT1fIE, ASEFI COMrINDS, OR THE SUPER-RELIGIOUS WOULDIIISUNDERSTAND AND UNITY WOULD BE. IflPOSSIBLE•

..s. .PLRPORTEDLY REFLECUIIG VIEVS or SYED AHKED GAILANIAND OTHER LEADERS IN PESHAWAR AREA, ASEFI VARNED E"BOrrTHAT Melt ZIA NASSERY IS ·IROB~Y A DOUBLE AGENT.-ASEFI a.AIU XU HA$my 1ft VIIlLHUI' In , aB: MIii:-AT UNLASt YEAR SHORTLY THEREAftER VISITED KABtn.. HE THEN-APPEARED IN PESHAWAR AND ALLIED HIKSELF WITH GAILANIAFTER BEING REPULSED ANl.F LEADER, IIOJEDEDI. GAILANINOV REGRETS BEFRIENDING ZIA NASSERY AND WANI'S IT UNDERsrOOD THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEENHIM AND THEA1'IERICAN, ACCORDING TO ASEn.

9. ASEFI REPORTED THAT DISSIDENT FORCES HAVE: NOT SHOTDOWN THREE DRA lUG AIRCRAFT. THE FIRST AT VOlA INTHE ZADRAN AREA or PAKflA ON APR I XL 25; THE SECONDNEAR PACHAl OGAN (SIC) VILLAGE PAKfIAI AND THE LATEST, ON PlAY 9 NEARXHOWSf IN PAKfIA. HE DID NOT SPECIFY HOW AIR CiA" HAD BEEN SriOlDOWN Bur LEFT 'lITH EI'lBOFF--ON LOAN-- SEVERAL REMNANTS OF' THEAIRCRAFT, INQ.UDING FIVE IIARKINGS PLATES TORN orr THE FIRST "IG,AS WELL AS PHOTOS OF THE AIRCRAFT. COPIESBEING POUCHED TO LONG£TEIG C/o IHR/RNA/SOA FOR INTERESTEDWASHINGTON CONSUNERS.

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REF. ISLAMABAD A-113, ISLAMABAD 4288

J. (C) - ENt IRE nxr2. SlnMARY. THE RECENT TIDE or AFGHAN REFUGEES SWEEPING INtOBALUCHISTAN HAS KEIGtaENt:» CONC,RN THERE OVER THE CONFLICTACROSS THE EORDER. DC:SATi OVER \lHA! THE MARTIAL LAWADMlnSfRATIOH IS [iOING Arm SHOULD DO VIS-A-VIS AFGHANISf ANREFLEers AND EXACERBATES DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PROVINCE ANDBEtWEEN THE PROVINCE AND THi: FEDERAl. GOVERNPIENT. IN THISDEBATE, THE .REFUGEE~ T'':.t1SELVE:S AnE BECOPIING AN ISSUE.ODDS THAT TENSIC-I'': O' AFGHANISTAN WILL SPARK VIOLENCEIN BALUCHISTAN :';.~~':" lEN klHEN THE £LEcnON CAt'lPAIGtlBEGINS. PlUCH COULD D~r~ND ON MOV THE us COMMITMENT TOPAKISTAN IS PERCEIVED.

A MILT IR.IER EFFEer3. FIVE MONTHS BEFORE NATIONAl. ELECIIONS, ('IIR TALKSUITH RESIDENTS OF SALUCHISrAN SHOW THE'" .10. .; PREOCCUPIEDay THE spaLOVER FROI'I ArGHANISTAN THAN S: tHE PROSPECTOF GOING TO THE POLLS. THE EVENTS ACROSS THE BORDER AREREAL AND IPJ[·1EDIATE 1I!H?:REAS THE ELECTIONS tlOVE"BER 17 AREA PlUCH-DOUBTED PROI1IS£. BEHIND ~OPl.E·S CONCERN IS ,THESELIEF THAT 'PAKISTANI INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANIStAN CANHAVE A MULTIPLIER EFnCT ON BALUCHISTAN BECAUSE ~F THEPROVINCE·S INTERHAL INSTABILITY.

T~ TIDE OF REFUGEES4. UNI'IL THIS ·SPRING, THE TIDE OF REFUGEES FROM NORTHAND WEsr OF THE DWlAND LINE F1.0W£D INTO THE NORTHWESTFRONTIER PROVINCE. THEN, IN APRIL OR MAY, THE EFFLUXFROM AFGHANISTAN BEGAN A SECOND CHANNEL TO THE SOUTH,PERHAPS REFLECfING A GEOGRAPHIC SHIrt Itl THE FIGHTING INTHE BORDER AREA. ON ONE DAY A ~AV£ Of AS MANY AS 12,000PERSONS REPORTEDLY CAME: ACROSS INTO 3AlUCHISTAN. THECHIEF SECRETARY or THE PROVINe:::: ASSERTS THAT BALUCHISTANAND THE FRONTIER NO~: SHAR;:: ABOIJ( EQUALLY A TOTAL OFloe,""" REFUGEES. OTHERS ESTIMATt: A lOW£~ SUT STIllSU9SI'A..aIAL FIGURE FOR BALUCHISTAN•

5. THE UPSURGE OF AFGHAN REFUGEES HAS COINCIDED WITHINCREASING a.EAVAGES OVER THE GOVERtmENTO S ROLE IN DEAl.UIG

,,; ITH 'THE INSURGENCY. PERCEPTIONS DIFFER OF ""HATI~AMABAD IS DOING AND WHAT IT SHOULD DO. THE DEBATEBOTH REFLECTS AND EXACERBATES DIVISIONS WITHIN THEpnOVINCE AND BETWEEN THE PROVINCE AND THE CENTRALGOVERNMENT.

DIFFERENCE OF OP~HtONS

6. THE DIFFERENCE OF OPINIONS APPEARS TO FOLLOW A LEFT­RIGHI' PATTERN. ~EfileERS OF THE PAKIsrAN PEON.E·S PARTYAND THE PAKISI' At~ NAT IONAL PARTY, ON THE • PROGRESSIVE-END OF THE POL IT ICAl SPECTRUI1, BELIEVE THAT THE MARTIALlAW ADfilINISI'RATION IS AIDING THE ~IUJAHIDS IN THEIR FIGHI'TO OVERTHRO~ THE REGIME IN KABUL. AN URBANE FORMERPROVINCIAL NINISI'ER FOR THE PPP SAID THAT, IF THE MlA ISSERIOUS IN IT S DENIALS OF SUPPORT FOR THE INSURGENTS,- ITSHOUlD SEAL THE BORDER. HE ARGUED THAT THE GOVERNMENTCOULD MOVE THE REFUGEE CAMPS INLAND AS FAR AS PUNJAB ORSIND TO PREVENT THEIR CONI'INUING TO BE A POTENTIAL SOURCEOF PROVOCATION TO KA3Ul. THE OPPOSITE POINT OF VIEW,THAT THE rLA IS HElPING THE MUJAHIDS BUT SHOULD DO MORE,G:::r~ERALLY COft:ES FROitJ MiNBERS OF THE PAKISTAN NATIONALALLIANCE AND OTHER CONSERVATIVE PARTIES. FOR EXAMPLE,THE PERSONAL ASSISI'ANT TO TEHRIK-E-ISTHLAL PRESIDENTASGHAR KHAN ASKED US WHY THE US CIA HAS NOT ENGINEEREDA CO.UP D·£TAT AGAINST TARAKI.

DIVISIONS--HIsrORICf.l . • •7. SOME OF THE DIVI:IC· REFLECTED AND EXACERBATED BYAFGHANISI'AN ARE H1;:;TO. : AL. ALTHOUGH \·:E HAVE YET TOMEET AN ADVOCATE OF G:t:::ATER BALUCHISTAN WHO "-'ILL CONFESSHIS VIEWS TO US DIRECTLY, FOfi('1ER GOVERNOR OF BALUCHISI'ANAK2AR KHAN BUGTI AND OTHERS TOLD US THAT A SIGNIFICANTNUMBER OF BALUCHIS STILL HAP.BOR Ar-1BITIONS TO UNITE THE8ALUCHI PROVINCES OF IRAN, AFGHAUISTAN AN[' P".KIsrANBTO A SINGlE NATION, POSSIBLE INCLUDING ~ II • BUGTI SAIDT HAT THESE PEOPLE BELIEVE THE AFGHAN REvel UT ION HASsrR:::NGTHENED THEIR C.4US'::, THAT THEY LOOK TO THE TARAKIREGIME AND TH~ ~OVIETS FOR SUPPORT, OVERT OR COVERT,AND THAT THEY f'llGH! TAKE ADVANTAGE OF POLITICAL .DISI'URBANCES ~IITHIN PAKISI'AN TO BEGIN AN OPEN STRUGGLEAI1AINST THE f1LA. OTHER BALUCHIS, WHO SEEK GREATERAUTONOP1Y FOR BALUCHISTAN IJITHIN PAKISTAN BY CONSTITUTIONALMEANS, HAVE TOLD US THAT PAKISTAN MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRA­TION SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN INSURGENTS MAY ALREADY HAVESFI?RED RETALIATORY SOVIET DABBLING IN BALUCHISTAN. NOTA FEW GO SO FAR AS TO eNVISION THE PROVINCE BECOMING ABATTLEGROUND FOR TH~ SUPER POWERS. SINCE ILLOGIC ANDEGOCENTRISM At;E STRONG, THESE PEP-SONS SHOW LITTLEINCLINATION TO QUESTION THEIR DOOHSDAY' VISIONS OF SOVIETTANKS AND INFANTRY DIVISIONS BEARING DOWN ON QUETTA IN ARACE TO THE .. HOT ~,'AT ~R PORTS.BT67275 . ,

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••• SOCIOLOGICAL•••8. OTHER DIVISIONS ARE SOCIOLOGICAL. BALUCHISTAN REI'IAINS

• LAREGELY A TRIBAL SOCIETY BUf ONE THAT IS BEINGTHREATENED BY CHAfiGE. ON THE ONE HAND WE TALICED TOTRIBAL LEADERS WHO SAID THAT THE FIGHtING IN AFGHANISTANIS A CRUSADE TO PRESERVE ISLAM AND A WAY OF LIFE, ONTHE or fER TO PERSONS WHO REBELLED AGINST THE UNJUSTRILE OF TJUBAL LEADERS AND PRAISED THE TARAKIGOVERIIIENf·S EFFORTS TO DO AWAY WITH THE WORST FEATURESOF THE TRIBAl SYSTEfol IN AFGHANI SfAN. Q.EARLY. PEOPLEOF BALUCHISfAN APPEAR TO BE LlNING UP FOR OR AGAINSTTAJIAKI PARTLY ON THE BASIS OF THEIR ATtITUDES TOWARDTHE SOCIAL SfRUcrURE OF BALUCHISUN•

••• AND ETHNIC.. 9. ALTHOUGH OUR EVIDENCE IS SKETCKY, WE BELIEVE fROl'I

TALKS IN KARACHI AND QU£TTA THAT DESPITE CROSS CURRENTSTHE AFGHAN REVOLurIO~, ADDITIONALLY, MAY BE DIVIDING .THE ETHNIC B.~LUCHIS AND PAT HANS. THE RIVALRY BETWEENTHESE TWO LARaEST GFiOUPS OF THE PROVINCE: SURFACEDCONSfAHfLY IN CONVEIi~ATIO~S. UE DISCERNED A GREATERDEGREE OF SUPPORT FOR TARAKI AMONG THE REPRESENTATIVESOF THE ROUGH!. Y '0 P:::P.C£Nl BALUCH POP1A.ATION THAN AMONGTHOSE OF THE APPROXIllIATELY 40 PERCENT PATHAN.INTERESTINGLY, THE HEAVIEST CONCiNTRATION OF REFUGEES ISIN THE NORTHERN DISfnICTS, \.'HERE THE PATHANS ARE INTHL:i'lAJORITY. TO CROSS DIRECTLY INTO THE AREASWHERE BALUCHIS PREDO:"lINATE THE REFUGEES W01A.D HAVE TOTRAVERSE A VIRTUAllY IMPASSABLE DESERT.

GOVERNMENT CAUTION12l. THE GOVERNMENT APPfARS TO BE AWARE THAT IT MUST

\.'ALK A tIGHrROPE IN DEALING PUBLICLY lHTH THE INSURGENCYIN AFGHANISTAN. IN n<:) NE£TINGS WITH US, FORMER FEDERALMINIsrER FOR LOCAL [ODI~5 KHAN MOHAMMED ZAMAN KHANACHAKZAI PRAISED THl:. ·COnJ\ECT·WAY IN ~HICH THE MLAHAS ACTED. HE ENPHA:'IZ'::[l THAT HUilIANITARIAN ASSISTANCETO THE REF'UG£!S IN THE: LHIIT OF THE GOVERNMENT'SINVOLVEMENT. l'lANY OFf>ONElnS OF THE llJl.A, HOWEVER, TOLDUS THEY ARE NOT SO ":I~,':. THEY BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENTZIA-UL-HAQ, THE 501. Of A MAULVI, IS IDEOLOGICALLYMOT IVATED TO FAVOR TII::' I Sl..f.llIC REBELS, AI~O THAT THEPAKISI'AN ARMY CANNOT SIT ON ITS HANDS WHILE AN OPPORTUNITYEXISI'S TO ELIMINATE A HOSTILE NEIGHBORING REGIME.

THE REFUGEES AS AN ISSUEII. -THE REFUGEES THEMSELVES ARE steaMING AN ISSUE IN

THE GOVERNMENT'S RELA~T"lNS ~ITH THE PEOPLE OF BALUCHISTAN.ALTHOUGH CM1PS E~:T"'T' THEM, MANY AFGHANS LIVE OUTSIDETHEIR CONFINES. A::I r :iAVE TO HAVE SPACE TO GRAZE,AND TH~ REFUGZE:i HAV:,:OUGHI' WITH THEM ALMOST THENUI-IBER Of CAt'lELS, SHEEP, GOATS AND DONKEYS A~ THER AREOf' THEMSELVES. THE DISPERSION OUTSIDE CAMPS MAKES 11DIFFICLLT FOR THE GOVERNM£NT TO EXERCISE CONTROL ANDCREATES SUSPICIONS THAT THL GOVERNMEtlT DO~S NOT WISHTO DO SO. IT IS ALSO CR::::ATli~G TENSION aEP£. J THEAFGHANS AND PAKISTANIS OVfR GRAZING PIGHT;. iVEN WITH

ITS NORMAL POPu..ATIu~, THE LAtID IS ~AJ\t:LY CAPABLE OF'SUESISfENCE. SO F'AR THE HOSPITALITY OF' THE NATIVES HASOVERCOME THE IRRITATIONS. BUT IF THE NUMBER OF' REFUGEESCONI'INUES TO SlJELL AHI) THEIR STAY LOOKS TO BECOflIEPERMANENt, THE GOVERNI'I£Nl WILL HAVE TO DEVISE POLICIESTO SETTLE THEM OVER A WIDER AREA.

ELEer 101 VIOLENCE.12. THE ODDS THAT AFGHANlSrAN WILL BE THE SPARK 'OPVIC1.£Nt TROUBLES U BALUCHlSrAN "AY SHORTEN VITH TItZB£GIIINING OF THE ELEClION CMPAIGN. III A DISl:USSIOI ~ITH

US, THE PROVUCIAL USPEClOR GENERAL OF POLICE IUDE NO SECHEr 0'HIS BELIEF THAT LAW AND ORpER WOlLO BE 8£fTP PRESEHVEDVEIE THE ELEeI'IONS TO B[ POUPaND. RECEIII' ifaTf ~EITSBY THE BALUCHI IAtlONALIsr LEADER OF THE PAIClSf. 'INAtiONAL PARTY, fllR GHOUS BUX 81ZENJO, SUGGEST T E TYPEOF RHErORIC THAt COlLD Un-AItE PASSIONS. AT THE PHP' SCOWElrION U KARACHI JURE I, 8IZENJO REPORTEDLY SAntHAT THE PROGRESSIVES AID DDiOCRATS OF' PAKISfAI VILL RISETO DEFEND THE REVCl.UnON OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE l' THE"COUNrERREVOLUTIOIiARIES VILL lor DESISI' FRCII THEIRaeI' IVlT IES. ICHAIR BUX flBRI THE LEADER or THElPIPORTUr flORI TRIBE, VHO Is SAID TO CONSIDER HlfiSEL'THE CHE GUEVARA OF BALUCHISTAN, IS A POTEITIALLEADER OF A GUERRILLA-SnLE lNSURGEICY. ECONOfIICDISSATlSFACT ION IN THE PROVUCE COlLD CREAst CONDITIONSFAVORABLE TO DIstURBAIllCES. TO DATE, HOWEVER, THE PROVIICEIS QUIET.

THE us,13. WHEIHER BALUCHISTAN £Runs COll.D DEPEND all THETliOUBLEt1AKERS' PERCEPTION OF THE STRE~GI'H OF THE U':COillilInlENT TO PUIsrAN. THE BELIEF THAT THE US HAS

/A3ANDONED PAKIstAN EMBOLDENS SOME, POSSIBLY INCLUDINGEIZ::NJO, WHO THINK THEIR BEST INTEREst' LIE IN flAKINGAN ACCOMMODATION NOW VITH THE SOVIEt UNION. UNFORTUNATELY,flI0Sf OF THOSE klE TALK TO FROPI BALUCHISTAN EXPRESSnu: OPINION THAT THE US HAS DESERTED HER FRIENDS.THE REASONS ADVANCED INCLlJDE THE STANDARD REFERENCESTO LACK OF US SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN IN 1965 AND 1971,AI -~~n US FAILtmE TO SI'AND UP TO THE SOVIETS INANGOL... '-uIOPIA AND AF(;HANISTAN, US -apPOSITION- TOTHE flIUSLII'I wORLD un T US cur-Off OF' AID TO PAKISTAN.

14. DESPITE THE CF:ITI.; ..;~, !'lUCH GOOD WILL TOWARD THEUS REMAINS. II1PORTArlf SEGMENTS OF BALUCHIsr AN SOCIETYPREFER TO RETAIN GOOO RELATIONS WITH THE US. THESEINQ.mE GOVERN='IENT OFFICIALS (ADt'.ITTEDLY MOSTLYPUNJABI>, BUSINESS P~OPLE AND MANY TRIBAL LEADERS.ALTHOUGH HIGtl.y CRITICAL OF' RECENT AMERIC.HI '1CTIONS, THEYCONTINUE TO HOPE THAT THE US I:ILL COI'IE TO P. <ISTAN'SASSIstANCE IN THE EVENT OF SOVIET-INSPIRn· SUBVERSIONOR ATTACK. THE DIFFICULT TASK WE FACE IS TOPuaL ICIZE TO THESE ~R SONS AS WELL AS TO POTENTIAL"UISLINGS THAT THE tiS REMAINS COMMITTED TO PAKISTAN· STERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, INDEPENDENCE AND STABILITYWITHOUT IDENTIFYING OURSELVES WITH THE UNPOPULAR I'ILA.THIS tASK IS BOTH CO:·IPLICATED AND HELPED BY THE ZIAGOVERNMENT' S EFFORTS TO SHOW THE PUBLIC ITS ARMS-LEI~GTH SfANCE TOWAnD TH£ US WHILE IT NEGOTIATES ENTRYINTO THE NON-ALIGNE~ MOVEtIENT; COMPLICATED BECAUSE WEOFTEN FIND OU~ GESTURES OF SUPPORT REJECTED BY THE f'IlA,ArlO HELPED BECAUSE ZIA' S TROUBLED RELATIO~S WITH THE USARE 'SEIZED ON AS EVIDENCE THAT THE US FAVORS ANALTERNATIVE REGIME. MOST DAflIAGING IN THE LONG RUN1rI0lLD BE OUR FAILURE TO CONE TO THE AID OF PAKISTAN INA ~ITUATION WHICH n. HAVE INDICATED ~OULD ENGAGE OURPLEDGE UNDER TH, 1959 BILATERAL PACT. SUCH US INACTIONCOlLD ElESlLT WERE PAKISTAN NOT TO HAVE Cl.£AN HANDS. UNQUOTE

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--5. THE NARROIII POLITICAL 3~S:: ~:: TJ-:~ :-:'.~. \ P~~ I =':'~'T~t):':'"THAI tR£Ht WERE Fi,PORTS CI:"clllATl:~G Hi:\! 1P':: r:?A L:'~~:~.:~lPWAS TAlKIflG ~nH FORCiER P?I::~ 'arHS!'::::: Z!;:!:A:iI M!J y:,,,s,z:ABOUl JOINING TH~ sovr SO AS ;0 :P.OA~::'I~ !T~ ~(!L;r!cn ,K:Z,AND THAT THE SOVIETS \-"ER~ PLAYIt'G SO:~::: F.CI.::' IN THIS,SAFRONCHUK SHOOK HIS HEAD. "\o:HAT IS T~~':,- M;' CO:~F'ID~~,

"IS THAT WE HAVE BE!N Ur.GINS THi vxA l~D.=:FSHIP To $?lJ~c:r;

D'S BASE BY BRINGING IN NEll! P:'OPl.! I:~TO THi: SOVT, 3'..'T "-"HATIS Nor TRUE IS THAT WE HAVE ~~~ HCl.DU~ DISCt!SSIO!'!S "'!!YYOUSEF OR ET£lIlADI.- COt.'TINUIHG, ~ s:.!~, "::::sr A;!.ISHING ANAT IONAl FRONT, LI!'L OTHEf. COllt:TF.Ii:.~ H~~ DOII~, f~C!'LD ~.;:

SENSIBlE FOR THE!'.." SAFRONCHUr. cor:Pl.AI:~:'='HorEV~ THAT:-THEY (ORA) "Ill NEITHER ALLm' A~Y OP?CSITlor~, O~ lie T~~Y \-'ISH T:SHARE POWER. TKEl~ "IDEA ASOUT ;p.CAJ!'~n~G TI£ P'JLITIC.4LBASE IS SOLELY TO dRGANIZ:; STUDE~'T, YOUTP., ~:O~1£N AN~ FOr.Y.E~SORGANIZATlUWS, BUT THOSE ARC ALL PA~T O~ TM: SAr~ POLITICALPARTY. THIS IS NOT 2ROADENING TJoU: POLITICAl ;;AS:." HERDIARKED, "THEY eDliA) ASE ''FRY S:;:NsITnv.:: AF..OUT A!lY SU~1~~IOr!

OF SHARING POWER. THEY ARE STU3eor.~! P~~PlE .. •

6. REFLECfING ON TH! PRO~LE!~S FACIN~ THZ DnA, H:; SAID !):1E:NarABLE WEAKNESS (UD Nt: Y.::PT Rn~~Il\G TO THIS PO!tl!) ~':';

THE -VIRTUAL ABSENCE OF INT£lL::'CT:JAlS U' TN, GOvr.-HE sm: ·YOU SEE THIS A9SENCF U ::M~Y ~·~'!s. IH::::NEWSPAPERS ARE TERRIBLE, M~~ TM2 ClJLT!tr:AL LIFZ !E BAF.REN.­IT WAS Il'IPORTANI' FOR THE G:lvr, ';AFRO!:CP'I'~ SAI~', TOATTRACT TO ITsar -r:ORS: INTELl':CTUAlS.-

7. T~ ~~URGE~- SAF1\ONC~IJr. SAID' HIS zr':~ASSY FINDSTHE i 0 NCY ~ Y Cot~FUSIN$". TJor.:Y CANf,~OT I!)::fTIFY A~YSINGlE REBa LEADER WJ!O DO:'lH:ATES n:=: OPPJS!TIOtJ ~!.rCH ASJO{()llIEINI OR HO CHI ~IN 1"10 IN r ....£1:': C!)flf'T:-::IES. HIS E;i2ASSYDOES aaIEVE THAT THE IP.ANIA~! A~' P'\~ISTA~ ':lVfS AFEABErT ING THE REBELS, T •. AX ~ Y ?ll:-LIC :r u ~::::r'''TS A~m

RADIO BROADCASTS, AND THE PAKISTANIS ~Y CL.~!\J::ST!:f:::LY StJPPLYHl,

lARMS AND MATERIAL SUPPORT. H::: S! MFr. fl.f_L1j!1~: {-ISU.~t IT IS A

ERRIBlE R Groer'" E ~ N· : ,i08" I F'J;T5:'! ;- :..;":'1\ F')F: TI-!C"INSURGENCY. THE POPU.ACE, It:: SAID, ;':5.:-'1f:::: -:~: "':I'ISTS Ar~ M;o.t:,qIS-AM," Atm THIS HE 09SE?v;::n I~t.l~~ TM::" ZjF.A" ~ Tf\~:': V~.F.Y ::lIFFlt;l'LT.

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8. WHEN, AT ONE POINT, 'r TOLD HIM THE us GOvr WAS NOTAIDING THE INSURGENTS. THAT \1E HAVE SEVe-RAL TIMES TOlD THEDRA THIS. AND THAT I WAS CONsn'UENTL Y UPSET BY THE REPEATEDPIer tfiE CAPT IONS IN THE DRA PJtr:SS nus PAST 11:££1<, IMPLYINGTHAT THE SHOWN "CAPTURED-\o.'EAPONS Op.IGH~ArED \!ITH THEUSA (AND CHINA), HE HAD THIS TO SAY... N I'IY I'IANY CONVER-SATIONS ~ITH TOP LEVEL ORA M!NIST!:RS AND D s."

A D T US AC S SING THE INSIIRGENCr-. WHEN I POINTED our THAT MOST OF' T~ FOP.EIG~I'JILITAI\Y \lEAPONS IN PAKISTAN ~:EP.E OF' us OR CHINESE ORIGIN, ANDTKUS IT "'AS UNDERSTANDABLE FOR THE INSURGENTS ALON<= THE PAKFRONT lER TO HAVE SUCH ':EAPONS, HE SAID THAT THE DRA' LEAD~SHIP-KNOWS THI5"'. RETURNINt:: TO AFGHAN-US RaATIONS, SAFRONCHUI<SAID THAT. -THE I AItn' ABOur THE USA IS NOT ABOUTYOUR GIVING ARMS BUI ABOUT YOUR VERY CRI _

9. THE TIME TO EVACUATE WOf'IEN AND CHILDREN 'HAS NOT COME.I TOlD SAFRONCHUK THAT ONE OF' ~Y G~ING CONCERNS WAS \!ifENAtm IF TO EVACUATE A~ERICAN OEP£NDE91S. ItICID£NTS U1<ETHE J.UNt 23 OurBliEAK IN MaUL, I SAID, COI'IPELLED OUR EMBASSYTO AJ)IMtS~THE QUESTION. SAFRONCHUK RESPONDED THAT, WHILE HE HIM­SELF DID t~OT HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT- THIS KIND OF QU£STION("'THIS IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AMBASSADOR AND THE OTHERftlNlsrER-COUNSELOR-), HE SAID HE COllJ) UtJDERST AND MY r.OJiRY.-VHO 1<NO¥S," HE SAID, -\~H.4T NEXT WEEK OR NEXT MONTH \'Ill BRING?­AS FOR ~HAT HIStMBASSY HAD DONE, HE SAID IT HAD EVACUATED 10THE USSR -All WOI'I!N AND CHILDREN OF SOVIETS WORKING OUTSIDE KABUL."tt FOR THOSE IN KABUL, HE SAID. ALL THE DEPENDENTS W)(JE STILLHERE. "WHEN THERE IS TROUBLE. LIKE YESTERDAY," HE SAID,-WE BRING THEM INSIDZ THE Er:BASSY COMPOUND F'OR SAFETY."kE THOUGHT THE ORA WAS IN C~Nl'ROL OF' KAEUL AND DIDNeT THINK THESECURITY SITUATION IN THE CITY RE~I!IRED AN EVACUATION.

Ie. 310 iJATA. FOR A SOVIET ::>IPLor~Ar. SAF'RONCHUK IS ExtRA­ORDINARILY OPEN. HE IS ~IILLING TO ANSWEr. OUEST!ONS, AND HZ STROCKME AS 50TH INTELLIGENT ANn A ~AN YOU CAN ~EASON WITH. ~ITHIN THfHIERACHY OF THE SOVIET E~1~ASSY, HE DESCRIBED HIMSELF' AS"~F'ESSIOtJALL y- HAVI NG THE RAfJ!< OF' .. AMBASSADOR, - BUT PROTOCOL­1r:ISE WAS HERE RANKED 0Ni. Y AS NO.3. THIS 'J}AS S::CAUSE THE OTH::RMINISTER-COUNSElOR, YIJRlY K. AL:'XC:::V, HAD PRECED~ HIM TO KAaUl,AND SINCE HE ARRIVED~ST,?71-3 2- 53:#,6:-~)6 ,9.2 AFTER AMEASSAD~~

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F.O. 12~65: GDS 6/25/85 CAMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE> OR-MTAGS: PINT, UF, AF', PINRSUBJ: ec) MF~TING WITH SOVIET DIPL~1AT: PART II OF III -

SOVIc:T-AFG~AN RELATIONS

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1... Slf'If'iAP.Y. THE: MOST INTERESTING COMf'ENTS SAFRONC){UK MADEOur-INO OUR MEETING RElATED TO SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS, SPECI­FICALL Y HIS DENIAL THAT THE SOVIETS "-'OUlD CONSIDER BRINGINGIN SOVIET TROOPS TO SAVE THE ORA. SAFRONCHUK QUOTED LENIN ASSAYING, "EVERY REVOLUTION MUST DEFEND ITSElF. - END SUMMARY.

3. DURING OUR DISCUSSION OF THE INSURGENCY, I TOLD HIM THATTH2RE 1r:.4S SPEC1l.ATION IR THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS THAT HIS GOvr¥;Cll.D, IF NECESSARY, BRING IN TROOPS TO SUPPORT THE DRA.SA~OtJCHUK DENIED ANY SUCH INTENTION. HE REFERRED TOFD.,EZH:.J::"V·S JUNE 11 SPEECH IN MOSCOW, IN WHICH THE LATTERSAID, .. \"£ SHALL NOT ABANDON IN TROUBLE OUR FRIENDS - THEAFGHAN PEOPLZ, - eur .EXPLAINED THAT IN SAYING THAT, -BREZHNEVD!D NOT MEAN TO IMPLY THIS INCLUDED MILITARY INTERVENTION.-SAFRONCHUK WENT ON TO REPEAT SEVERAL TIMES THAT LENIN HAD .-JJSAID, -EVERY REVOLUTION MUST DEFEND ITSELF."

4. PURSUING HIS THEME, HE SAID THAT ~'ERE THE SOVIETS TOFRING IN TROOPS, THIS WOUlD HAVE BAD REPERCUSSIONS INTER-~;!~TJONALLY. HE EXPLAINED. -IT WOUlD HARM SALT AND THE POSITIONCF THE SOVIET UNION IN THS ~ORLD," - HE THEN ADDED, "QUITEASIDE rnOl'l rrlfERNATIONAL CONSIDERAT IONS, IT WOULD BE '3AD~LICY I N TERMS OF INTERNAL AFGHAN AFFAIRS." I OBSERVEDTHAT SOVIET TROOPS WOUlD HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME IN THIS RUGGED,~10UNT.uNOUS COUNTRY. HE NODDED_HIS HEAD VIGOROUSLY.

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5. ENlARGING ON SOVIET POLICY, HE SAID, -LIKE YOUR COUNTRY.OlJ\ MAIN OBJECTIVE HE'RE IS TO PROMOTE REGIONAL STABILITY-(HE MUST HAVE STUDIED SOME OF OUR POLICY STATEMENTS). -WHATWE ~ISH TO SEE,· HE SAID, -IS A PROSPEROUS AND PEACEFULAFGHANISTAN••

6. WHAT THE COUNTRY NEEDS MORE THAN ANYTHING ElSE. HE CON­TINUED, WAS TO ElIMINATE ILLITERACY. IF EVERYBODY COULD BELITERATE AND ACHIEVE A BASIC EDUCATION. THAT WOULD BE THEBEST THING THAT COULD HAPPEN. THEN HE COMPLAINED, -INSTEAD,THE AFGHANS KEEP ASKING US FOR MORE AND MORE ARMS - NOT FORMORE HELP IN EDUCATION.-

7. IN RESPONSE, I CONFIRMED THAT IT HAD BEEN LONG-STANDINGAMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANtSTAN TO PROMOTE SIABILITY INTHE REGION. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE AFGHANISTAN AT PEACE WITHALl. ITS NEIGHBORS, NOT ONLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BUT ALSOWITH IRAN, PAKISTAN AND CHINA. FOR DECADES TOO, WE HAVE HADA, HlJIIANIT ARIAN I NTEREST HERE, INVEST ING ROUGHLY $20 MILLIONPER ANNUM IN THE COUNTRY· S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPfllENT.TO THE EXTENT THE AFGHANS COULD UPLIFE THEMSELVES SOCIALLY ANDECONOM I CALL Y, ~E BELIEVED THIS WOULD PROMOTE STABILITY.SAFRONCHUK AGREED.

8. I ALSO TOLD SAFRONCHUK THAT AS A COROLLARY TO OUR POLICYOF WORKING FOR REGIONAL STABILITY, WE HOPED THAT AFGHANISTANWOlL» NOT BECOME AN AREA OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN OUR .TWOCOUNTRIES. TO THIS SAFRONCHUK RESPONDED, - I AGREE WITH YOUCOMfLETEL Y. - GOING ON, I WARNED HIM, THAT WERE THE SOVIETSTO BRING IN TROOPS INTO A~GHANISTAN, THIS WOULD VERY MUCHCOMfLICATE AND HARM SOVIET-AMERICAN RElATIONS. HE NODDEDHIS HEAD.

9. COMMENT: I CONSIDER SAFRONCHUK' S REMARKS SIGNIFICANT.I APPRECIATE THAT ONE COULD ARGUE THAT HIS DENIAL OF ANYSOVIET INTENT ION TO INTERVENE PHYSICALLY WAS THE ONLY ANSWERA SOVIEr DIPLOMAT COtR.D HAVE BEEN AlffHORIZED TO GIVE TO MYQUEST ION, AND FURTHER THAT THE QUOTATION F'ROM LENIN WASHYPOCRITICAL IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE.YET, REFLECTING ON OUR CONVERSATION, I THINK HE GENUINELYBELIEVED \.JHAT HE WAS TELLING ME, NAMELY THAT SOVIET PHySICALh"TERV£Nt'ION WOULD BE MORE HARMFUL THAN HELPF'UL FOR SOVIETINTERESTS, AND THEREFORE IT \,,'OULD NOT OCCUR. AMSTUTZaT'46~9

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2. AS ANTICIPATED IN THE REFiEL, DR. HERMANN SCHWIESAU,THE AflIBASSADOR OF THE GERflIAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AT KABlI.,CALLED ON ME JtL Y 9 TO CHAT ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATIONIN AFGHANIsrAN. AS IS HIS USUAL PRACTICE, SCHWIESAUENDEAVORED TO APPEAR FRIENDLY AND FRANK.

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3. SCHIiIESAU EXPRESSED PlIZZLEPlEN1' OVER HOW THE AFGHANS!£EPI TO I'IISflIANAGE THEIR RELATIONS WITH OT HER COUNTRIES,P1ISSING OBVIOUS OPPORTUNITIES TO DISPLAY' A SMOOTHER DJPLOflIATICIPiAGE. USING KABIL·S BILATERAL RaAT IONSHIP WITH ISLAMABAD ASAN EXAPlftE, HE WONDERED WHY AFGHANISTAN HAD APPARENTLYCHANGED ITS SIGNALS AT THE LAST /lIlNUTE AND HAD OPPOSEDPAKISI'ANI I'IDIBERSHIP IN THE NONAlIGNED I'IOVEMENT AT THERECEN HAl'! CONFERENCE AT COLOMBO. SCHWIESAU RECALLED THATTHE AFGHANS HAD APPEARED TO HAVE a.EARLY PROMISED PAKISTANBEFORE THAT CONFERENCE THAT THEY WOULD SUPPORT PAKISTAN·SBID FOR MEI'IBERSHIP IN THE NAM. SCHWIESAU REVEAlED THATTHE RUSSIANS HAD EVEN URGED THIS COURSE OF ACTION.s:ItUESA U SAID THAT )€ AND OTHER OBSERVERS WERE SURPRISEDWHEII THE AFGHANS TOOK A STRON ANt' 1- PAKIST AN Sf AND ATCa..QllIBO. 113 -8$ 51-5 8'5 297)$ ,..,.'5 ?U, z).'5VERER FOR THEAFGHANS TO HAVE INSl'EAD STATED THAT, -ALTHOUGH AFGHANISTANHAS MANY BD.ATERA!. PROBLEMS WITH PAJ<ISTAN, THOSE CAN BERES(l.VED IN OTHER WAYS, THEREFORE. AFGHANISTAN IS NOTa.OCKING PAKISTAN· S ENTRY INTO THE NA/ll. - HE FOUND THE AFGHANPOSIt ION ESPECIALLY- STUPID- BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT GET ENOUGHVOTES TO BLOCK PAKISl' ANI MEMBERSHIP ANYWAY.

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4. SCHWI£SAU ALSO WAS StfiPRISED THAT THE AFGHAN POLICEAtI'HORITIES WOu..D BE SEIZING A PAKISTANI EPIBASSY STArrrfl:EPlBER AT THE SAPIE TIPIE THE THE AFGHAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS WAS PREPARING FOR DEPUTY FOREIGN PlINISTER DOST·SFRIENDLY VISIT TO ISLAMABAD. SCHWIESAU LEFT NO DOUBTTHAT HE B£LIVED THAT THE PAKISTANI HAD BEEN FORCIBLY~IZED BY THE AFGHAN·S SEC~ITY PO"dCE, AND HAD NOTDEFECTED VOLUNT ARIL Y TO T HE AFGHAN SIDE AS THE KHALQISa.A IJlI. WHILE ON THE TOPIC OF THE DOST VISIT, SCHWIESAUWONDERED WHY THE KHALQIS HAD FELT COI'IPELLED TO REFl1J'E THE SUBSE­QlEN!' PAKISTANI STATEMENT THAT AGHA SHAHI WOUlD BE PAYING ARETmN VISIT ON PRIPIE MINISTER HAFIZI1.LAH APlIN. ASIDE FRO'THE PROTOCOL SENSITIVITIES INVOLVED, SCHWIESAU THOUGHt'AMIN SHOI1.D BE ABLE TO RECEIVE AGHA SHAHI GRACEFULLY -AND TRANSFER HIM OVER TO A LOWER OFFICIAL, SUCH AS EDUCATIONMINISI'ER JALILI, FOR SUBSTANTIVE TALKS.

5. WHEN I ASKED SCHWIESAU WHY HE THOUGHT THE KHALQI REGIMESO FREQUENTLY SEEMED TO BE OPERATING AT CROSS PURPOSESWITH ITSELF, SCKWIESAU REPLIED THAT IS A MYSTERY TOHIM. HE OBSERVED THAT, ALTHOUGH ONE MINISTRY MIGHT PROCEEDALONG A DIFFERENT COURSE FROM ANOTHER MINISTRY,. THERE HADTO BE SOME OVERALL DIRECTION FROM THE rOPe FOR EXAMPLE,SCHW IESA U NOTED THE AFGHAN DELEGATE· S ANT I-PAKISTAN SPEECHAT COLOMBO HAD TO HAVE BEEN APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY NO ONELESS THAN PRIME MINISTER AMIN.

6. TURNING TO THE INSURGENCY SITUATION, SCHWIESAU REGARDED'J[ AS SERIOUS. HE RECOMMENDED THAT THE DEPENDENTS OF ONEOF HIS OFFICERS REMAIN BEHIND IN BERLIN WHEN THAT OFFICERRET URNS TO KABUL FROM HOME LEAVE, BECAUSE HE THOUGHTTHE SECtRITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN IS -DANGEROUS.­SCHWIESAU REVEALED THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAKS ARE SENDINGSOME TECHNICAL ADVISERS BACK TO THE HERAT REaION, BUTWIT HOUI' THEIR WIVES AND CHD.DREN.8T15246

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7. SCHWIESAU SAID THAT HE FINDS ESPECIALLY FRUSTRATINGTHE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE MESS IN THIS COUNTRY. }£ HASOFTEN TOLD T HE AFGHANS THAT r HEY ARE FOOLS NOT TO ENCOURAGET HE BROADEST POSSIBLE PART ICIPAT ION BY ALL NAT IONS. EASTAND WEST. IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT. IN THIS CONNECT ION,SCHWIESAU SI'ATED THAT tE WAS TOLD KHALQI POLITICAL EXTREMISTSTHAT THEY ARE our OF STEP WITH THE MODERN SOCIALIST MOVE-MENT WHEN r HEY ATTEMPT TO SQUEEZE" IMPERIAL! sr" REPRESENTATIONOUT OF KABtL. HE SAID THAT HE TOLD THEM HOW IT IS NECESSARYFOR ALL NAT IONS TO WORK TOGEr HER FOR PEACE AND ECONOMICPROGRESS.

8 AS FOR EAST GERMAN PROGRAMS FOR AFGHANISTAN, SCHWIESAUWAS VERY BEARISH. HAVING LONG BEEN VERY SXEPT ICAL ABOUT THEABSOR PI' IVE CA PACIT Y OF AFGHA NI ST AN FOR FORE IGN AID,&:HWIESAU SAID THAT, AT HIS RECOMMENDATION, THE GJR HASOFFERED THE KHALQI REGIME A MODEST INITIAL AMOUNT OF AIDCREDIT TO TEST THE POSSIBLE SUCCESS OF EAST GERMAN PROGRAM­MING IN THIS AREA. SCHWIESAU WAS DISCOURAGED, HOWEVER, BYIS FIRSl TECHNICAL CONVERSATIONS WITTH AFGHAN AID OFF'ICIALS.THEY WANTED EASl GERMANY TO BUILD A TURNKEY-TYPEINDUsrRIAL INSTALLATION IN AFGHANISI'AN,REQ\JESTING THATEA sr GERMA NY UNDERT AXE T HE COMPLETE PROJECT. SCHIESAUSAID THAT HE TOOK THE AFGHANS TO AWORLD MAP, POINTED OUT}«)W DISI'ANT EAST GERMANY WAS FROM AFGHANISI'AN, AND ASKED

'THE AFGHANS WHETHER THEY WERE SERIOUSLY PROPOSING THAT HE,FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE EAST GERMAN BRICKS TRANSPORTED ACROSSPOLA NO AND THE SOVIET UNION FOR SUCH A PROJECT. HE CON­C1.UDED THAT HE HAS THUS FAR GOTTEN NOWHERE n GETTING THEAFGHANS TO BE PRACTICAL ABOlIT SUCH PROPOSITIONS.

8. COMMENT: T HE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY SCHWIESAU ON JULY 9WERE CONSISlENT WITH THE GENERALLY CRITICAL ATTITUDE HEHAS DISPlAYED TOWARD THE KHALQI REGIME IN PROVATE CONVERSA­TIONS WITH OTHER DIPLOMATS SINCE HIS ARRIVAL HERE ELEVENMONTHS AGO. SCHWIESAU DID NOT MENTION THE SUBJECT OF RECENTSOVIET-SPONSORED "NEGOTIATIONS" TO FORM A "NATIONAl FRONT­REPlACEMENT FOR THE KHAL QI REGIME (REFTEl>.

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, CLD COUNTRYI AFGHANISTAN CAF)/PAKIsr AN CPK>2. CU) REPORT NUPIBERI 6 Bee 8046 79J. CO) TITLEI SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN". UD PROJECI'NUflfBER I MIA5. CO) DATE OF INFORJlIATION. 1907896. CO) DATE OF REPORT I 7987.87. (tJ) DArE AND PLACE OF ACQI 1907B9. KABUlB. cm REFERENCEI INITIAT IVE9. (tJ) ASSESSI'IENT I A. F-6, B. F-610. (tJ) ORIGINATORI USDAO KABlL .11. CO) RUtEST EVAL I 11012. CO) PREPARING OFFICERI ROSERT c. DISNEY, LTC, USA, ADATT14. CO) SOURCE I A. SCI 6 see 066, B. ONE TIJlIE SOURCE15. (to DIRCI NO16. CONFIDENTIAL/1I0FORN SUPlJlIARYI ACCORDING TO TWO THIRD-COUNTRYDlfLOJllAT S, THE SOVIET UNIO. ALLEGEDLY HAS THREEOBJECT IVES IN AFGHA NI Sf AN. THESE ARE SAFEGUARDING THEINVESfJllENfS THEY HAVE JlIADE TO SUPPORT THE REVOLUTION,JlIAINl'AINING A SOCIALISf REGI"E IN AF, AND EXTENDING THEIR AREAor INFt. DENCE. IF IT APPEARS TO THE SOVIET· S T HAT THE CURRENTCITARAKI» REGIME IS NOT GOING TO BE SUCCESSFtL IN AFGHANISTAN,THEY WILL NOT HESnATE TO REPLACE THE REGII'IE WITH ONE THATWOlLD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE BULK OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, INORDER TO SAVE FACE AND TO ATTAIN THESE OBJECTIVES. THIS NEWREGIME WOlLD PROBABLY BE OUTWARDLY \lIORE NATIONALISTIC AND WOULDPROBABlY BE DRAWN FROM THE ARflIED FORCES. THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT

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t£SITATE TO INTRODUCE THEIR OWN TROOPS INTO AF TO INSURE THESlJ:CESS OF' THE REVOLUTION, A DEVELOP\lIENT WHICH WOULD, IN SOURCES'VIEW, NOT PROMI'T A SER IOUS USG REACT,ION.

22. CONFIDENrIAL/NOFORN DETAILS' SOURCE A. ON HIS OWNINIT IATIVE PAID AN OFFICE CALL ON REPORTING OFFICER (RO).DURING THE RATHER LENGTHY (2 AND AHALF HOURS) VISIT SOURCE AND RO HAD A CONVERSATION WHICHCOVERED SEVERAL SUBJECTS. THE PRIMARY TOPIC OF' CONVERSATION WASSOURCE·S VIEWS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AF. IN RESPONSE TORO·S QUESTION SOURCE STATED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE SOVIET UNIONHAD THREE OBJECT IVES IN AF". THE F'IRST OF THESE WERE THESAFEGUARDING OF' THE I'IASSIVE INVESTMENTS OF WEAPONS, EQUIPMENTAND MONEY WHICH THEY HAD PROVIDED THE TARAKI REGI!'lE TO SUCCESS­F'lLL Y CONCLUDE THE REVOLUrION. THE SECOND WAS TO ENSURE THAT ASOCIALIST REGIME SlJlVIVED IN AF, AND LASTLY, TO ENSURE THAT THEIRAF' VENr URE, All) EXTENSION OF T HEIR AREA OF INFLUENCE, VAS NOTREDUCED Bur FURTHER EXTENDED. SOURCE CONTINUED BY sr ATING THATIN HIS VIEW THE CURRENT REGIME WOULD NOT LAST -TOO !'lUCH LONGER­BECAUSE OF'THEIR INCREASING PROBLEMS WITH THE MUSLIM INSmGENTS"'WHO WERE DIAMETRICAlLY OPPOSED TO A SOCIALIsr GOVERNMENT ANDBECAUSE OFITS UNPOPULARITY WITHTHE FERVENTLY RELIGIOUS llIUSLIM POPULATIONOF AFGHANISTAN. ALLEGEDLY THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO BEGINNING TORELAIZE THIS AND, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE REVOLU­TION AND TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES, THEY WOUlD NOT HESItATETO REA-ACE THE PRESEIIr GOVERNl'IENT WITH ONE WHICHWOtLD BE 1II0RE ACCEPTABLE TO THE IS-AIIIIC P1AJORITY, BlIT WHICHWOlLD ALSO BE PRO-MOSCOW, BUT IN A LESS Cl.ARING SENSE. ROELIECITED SOURCE·S VIEWS 01 WHO WOlLD FORM THE NEV REGIME.SOURCE SI'ATED THAT If VOULD "AINLY COMPOSED or NATIONALISTICf'In.ITARY OFFICERS WHO WERE SYMPATHEt IC TO THE SOYIET CAUSE. HECaNT INUED BY STATING THAT HE KNEW SEVERAL AF OF-FICERS WHOWalLO FIt THIS "OLD, Bur DID 110 ELABORATE FURTHER. CONTINUING,somCE SI'ATED THAT THE sovn:rs WOUlD NOT GIVE UP THEIR ULTIMATEGOAL OF OBTAINING AIt ACCESS TO PK WARP! WATER PORTS ON THEARABIAN SEA. THE PURPOSE OF THIS WOULD BE TO PROVIDE THESOVIETS WITH A BASE FROM WHICH THEY COULD PROJECT THEIR lAVALPOWER TO CONrRO THE SEA LINES 0' COMUNICATIONS opal WHICH1lI0VE THE BLLK OF' THE FREE WORLD·S FlEL REQUIRDlENrS•. ACCORDIIIGjO SOURCE THIS ACCESUOlLD BE OBTAIIIED THROUJlR...I.HE__A..SSISI'ANC[

160

OF FRIENDLY "ELEMENT S III THE BAlUCHI sr AN PROVINCE OF' PK. -EVENTODAY THERE ARE BOTH COIlERT AND OVERT ElEMENTS IN BALUCHISTAN,IN THE PAY OF' THE SOVIETS, WHO ARE ADVOCATING THE INCREASEDAurONOMY OF' THE PROVINCE. IN TIME, AND WITH THE REQUISITE POLITICALa.IMAJE, BALUCHISTAN COULD BECOME A SEPERATE POLITICAL ENTITYAND THEN THE SOVIETS VOlLD BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE JHEIR L9NG-SOUGHTGOAL - ACCESS TO T HE ARABIAN SEA-. IN SOURCE· S VIEW IT ISIMPERAT IV[ THAT THE USG PROVIDE THE HECESSAR\' ECONOMIC AID TOASSIsr PK IN THE RAPID DEVElOPMENT OF BAJ.,UCHISTAN IN AN EFFORTTO BLUNT SOVIET INITIATIVES IN THE REGION. ADDITIONALLY SOURCE

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MADE A STRONG REQUEST FOR USG MILITARY ASSIStANCE IN ORDER TO JPROVIDE PK \lITH -CREDIBLE DEFENSE FORCES"'. 1M RESPONSE TO RO·$QLEsrIOM AS TO HOV THIS MILITARY AID, IF PROVIDED. /'lIGHT BEVIEWDD BY INDIA, SOURCE STATED THAT IT WAS -LlJDICRQUS- FOR ANYNATION, INa.WINO IIIDIA, TO BELIEVE THAT PK HAD ANY HOSTILEINI'EHI'IONS TOWARDS INDU. ·'K IS A SMALL COUNTRY WlTH VERYLIMITED RESP;RCES All> IT itAS 10 IffTEffTION OF UXlIIlI ANY HOSTILEsrEPS AGAIN A MAJOR POWER SUCH AS IIDIA. PK WOUlD BE WILLINGTO PROVIDE GUARAIfI'EES NECESSARY THAT ITs "ILITARY CAPABILITYWOlLD HEVER BE USED AGAINST INDIA, EXCEPT IN DEFENSE OF ITSOlIN SOVEREIGNTr. TO ENSlF.E THE SUCCESS OF THE SOCIALISTREVOL or ION Iff AF' AND TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES IN THISREliION, SHOURCE SAID THAT -I Aft CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS WOUlDNOT HESITATE TO INrRODUCE THEIR OWN TROOPS, INTO Ar- IF THISPROVIED NECESSARY. IN RESPONSE TO RO· S Q\!ESTlOIi AS TO HOW THISDEVELOP\'lENI' HIGHI' BE VIEWED BY THE NATIONS OF tHE WORLD, ANDESPECIALLY BY THE USG IN LIGHT 0 THE RECENT SALT II AGREE"ERT,SOURCE COUNrERED BY SI'ATING THAT IT WOlLD HOT CAUSE -TOO "UCHCONCER~ ESPECIALLY AS IT APPEARED TO PX AHD "ANY OTHER FRIENDLYNATIONS THAT THE USB HAD -WRITTEN OF'F' PK AND THIS REGION AS BEINGUNESSENl tAl TO YOUR SfRETEGIC AND NATIONAL INTERESTS-.

DURING AN ATTACHE FUNCTION WHICH RO ATTENDED LATER THAT DAY,SOURCE B, IN RESPONSE TO RO'S QI.£SfION REGARDING SOURCE"S VIEWOF' SOVIET INTENTIONS, GAVE ESSENTIALLY TKE SAME VIEWS AS STATEDBY SOURCE A. ONE POINT WHICH BOTH SOURCES STRESSED WAS THEAPPARANT LACK OF' INTERST BEING DISPLAYED BY THE USG IN THE!FOLDING DEVELOP/lIENrS IH THIS REGION. BOTH SOURCESUNDERLINED THIS POINT BY STATING THAT THE usa MUST TAKE THEAPPROPRIATE ACTION TO HALT THE SOVIET EXPANSION IN THIS REGION.ORIGINATORS COMMENTSI (CONFIDENTIALINOFORN) BASED ON THE ABOVEII' APPEARED TO RO THAT BOTH SOURCES 'WERE ENUNCIATING THE PARTYLINE OF THEIR GOVERNMENT. IN AS MUCH AS THIS IS THE rIRSTTIME RO HAS OBTAINED ANY INF"ORl'lATION FROM EITHER OF' TKE SOURCESAN ;-5 RATING HAS BEEN ASSIGNED.DE a.. 10 JUL 85.BT152A19

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E.O. 12065. GOS ~-I'-S5 CTAY1.0R, JAMES E.> OR-PTAGSa PEPR, PINS, PINf, AFSlSJECf I (lOU> AFGHAN UNDERGROUND PROPAGANDA CALLS FOR THE OUSTEROF PH IME ..INI srER AM IN

I. (C - ENT IRETEXf.)

2. SlJ1l'IARYa A RECENT SPATE OF .. UNDERGROUND" LETTERS CALLINGFOR THE OUsrER OF PRIME MINIsrER AII\IN AND HIS COLLEAGUEScsur NOT PRESIDEHI' TARAKI>, AND THE FORMATION OF' A UNITEDFROHI' OF ALL -TRUE REVOLUfIONARIES,- COULD BE PART OF ARlI'IORED EFFORT TO MODIFY THE COMPOSITION OF' THIS REGIME'SLEADERSHIP IN ORDER TO DEFUSE THE GROWING DOMESTIC INSURGENCY,THE LETTERS' THEMES, HOWEVER, ARE THOS[ OF THE RIVAL PARCHA/'IWING OF THE PARTY, AND THEREBY, WITH THEIR EXTREII\E LEFTISTANDINHERENI' ANI'I-\'ESTERN BASES, OFFER LITtLE COf'lIFORT TOTHOSE WHO MIGHrHOPE FOR A GENUINE MODIF'ICATION OF' THE KHALQIGOVERNMENT'S POLICIES. END OF' SUMMARY,

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3. UNDERGROUND -HIGHT-LETTERS- (SHAaNAHMASOO) STARTED eIR­ClLATING THROUGHOUT KA8tL SEVERAL DAYS AGO. DISTRIBUTIONHAS BEEN SURREPTITIOUS, BUT STILL FAIRLY OPEN (I.E., COPIESHAVE BEEN FOUND LYING ON THE STREETS, AND ONE FLUTTERED OVERA DIPlOMAI·S WALL IN BROAD DAYLIGHT) THEREBY SUGGESTING THATSOME SEGPlENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE TURNING THE OTHER WAY.THE SUBSTANTIVETHRUsr OJ:'' THESE LETTERS ISSIMILAR, AND INClUDES THE FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS:

-- PRIME PlINIsrER HAFIZULLAH AMIN. ANi) HIS ·FASCIST BANDOF' GANGSTERS,· REPRESENTS THE PRINCIPAL URGEr. IoIHILE NOeft IT IC I 9lI OF' PRES mENT TARA XI HAS YET BEE N SEEN.

-- OTHER TARGEI'S ARE: • UNITED Sf ATES IMPERIALISPI· (WHOSENEFARIOUS HAND, BY CLEAR IMPLICATION IS BEHIND ALL EVENTS INTHE R&GION); THE \'IU&. 1M BROTHERHOOD (-IKHWAN-I-MUSLII'IIN·);­THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OFPAKISfAN; THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT,AND -REACTIONARY FORCES.·

-- GOALS OF' -TRUE REVOLUT IONARIESOO SHOULD BE rH OSEPRO-Cl..A IMED BY MIR AKBAR KHAIBAR <THE FORMER PARCHAMIST INTEl.­LECTURAL WHOSE MURDER ON APRIL 17, 15)18. ,SET OFF THE CHAIN OFEVENTS LEADING TO THE KHALQI REVOLUTION), AND THE ·WORKERS·IDEOLOGY,· WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHERSOCIALIsr COUNTRIES, SHOlLD SERVE AS A GUIDING LIGHT.

-- THE REGIME OF THE ·CHIEF OF THE PROFIESSIONAL CRIMINALS·CA1'1 IN) IS TYPIFIED BY INDISCRII'IINATE ARREST AND TORTURE OFFEMAlES, THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE INTERESTS OF ·U. So If'IPERIAL~

I~,··ANIMAL TORTURES- OF ·nWE REVOLUTIONARIES,· AND THEPILLAGING OF INNOCENT PEOPLES· HOMES, ALL OF WHICH WEREFEATURES OF' ADOLPH HITLER· S RULE.

-- PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION. AND DEFENSE OF THE TERRI­TORIAl INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE HOMELAND, IS IM­POSSIBlE WITHOI1l' THE· IMMEDIATE ELIllIINATIOH- OF AMIN AND HISASSOCIATES.

,r-.

__ -DEATH TO AI'lIN Aft) HIS FASCIST PARTISANS, TO THE CIA,TO IKJNANIS, TO MAOISTS,· AfI> ·FORWARD WITH ALLIANCEAND UNITY OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND NATIONALIST F'~CES.·

j CO!'IMEHT: THE TRACT CLEARLY REfLECTS A PARCHAMIST AUTHOR­SHIP, AS MOST OF THE VITRIOL IS DIRECTED AT THE KHALQIlEADERSHIP, ALBEIT MINUS TARAKI. THIS PARTICULAR FEATURECOlLD BE PART OF THE RUMORED EFFORT UNDERWAY TO REMOVE SOMEMEMBERS OF THE CURRENT lEADERSHIP IN ORDER TO DEFUSE THEDOMESTIC INSURGENCY, SINCE A GENERAL PARCHAMIST BROADSIDEAT THE: KHAlQIS WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE RESERVED SOME BRICKBATSFOR TARAKI. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE APPEAL TO FOLLOW THEPREACHINGS OF KHAIBAR -- WHO BEFORE HIS DEATH WAS REPORTED­lY A PROPONENT OF THE 1977 KHALQ/PARCHAM WEDDING --AND THE ASSERTION THAT THERE REMAI -TRUE -REVOl..ur IONARIES·WITHIN THE KHAlQ PARTY, COlLD REPRESENT AN APPEAL TO AllLEFTISTS CPARCHAMISTS AND DISENCHANTED KHALQIS) TO FORM A-UNITED FRONT- FOR THE OUSTER OF AMIN AND HIS COllEAGUES.VE HASTEN TO ADD, HOWEVER, THAT THE MYRAID ANTI-WESTERN DIA­TRIBES UNDERSCOR THE CONCLUSION THAT A lEFTIST AFGHAN RE­GIME·S BASIC POLICIES, EVEN WITHOUT AMIN, WOUlD PROBABLY NOTMODIFY TO ANY GREAT EXTEHT.

5. FINAllY, THE MERE APPEARItNCE OF THESE lETTERS IN SUCHVOl..II'IE (VIRTUALLY EVERY DIPlOMATIV MISSION HAS GAINED POS­!£SSION OF ONE OR MORE COPIES) ANI> THE MANNER OF THEIR DIS­TRISur ION SUGGEST THAT, FOR roME REASON, THE POLICE ANDSECtlUTY AUTHOR IT IES HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO SQUELCHTHE SPREAD OF PROPAGAPmA CALLING FOR THE REMOVAl CORWOR3) OF THE COUNTRY·S • STRONG-MAN.· HOW LONG T HIS SITUATIONWD.l PERSIST REMAINS TO BE SEEN, BUT AMIN, IN OUR JUDCJlIENT,IS NOT THE KIND OF POlITICIAN TO MEEJQ..Y FOLD HIS TENT ANDPERMIT OTHERS TO TAKE OVER -HIS- REVOLUTION.

6. OTHER ANTI-AllIIN PROPAGANDA HEARD HERE RECENTLY PORTRAYSTHE PRIME MINISTER AS A SECRET CIA AGENT WHOSE MISSION HASBEEN TO DESTROY THE CREDIBILITY OF THE USSR IN AFGHANISTAN.AMST UTZBT1536"

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BYCON F IDE N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 KABUl 5433

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E.O. 12865: GOS 7-17-85 (TA'tlOR , JAPIES E.) OR-PTAGS: PEPR. PINS, PINT. AF, iii .SUBJEct I <LOU> SOVIET EFFtRT TO URGE DR A TO FUD A POLITICALRE~m.UI'ION Of DOIIIESTIC CONFLICT PlAY BE UNDERWAY

REF. (A) KABUL 5892, (B) KABUL '8881 (C) KABUL 5146,CD,} KABUL 52881 (E> KAB11L 5368, (F) KABUL 4695 (ALL NOTAL)

1. (C - ENt IRE TEXT.)

2. SU'lIllARY: A NUMBER OF RECENT DEVELOPl'1ENTS IN AFGHANISTANSUGGEST THAT A SOVIET CAI'IPAIGN MAY BE UNDERWAY IN KABUl,AJIlIED AT -HELPING- THE EMBATTLED DRA LEADERSHIP FIND A POlI­TICAL, RATHER THAN STRICTLY lllILIlARY, l'IEANS TO COUNTER THEGROWTH OF DOIIJESTIC At{) FOREIGN 'OPPOSITION. STEPS TAKEN SO·FAR, WHILE PERHAPS BUYING THE REGIPIE AND MOSCOW~I)IIIE BREATHING SPACE, ARE PROBABLY INSUFfICIENT IN THEMSElVESTO GUARANTEE THE FUTllRE OF THE REVOlUTION, AND CONSIDERABLY!"'ORE SuESTANTJVE CHANGES WILL PROBABLY BE NECESSARY. OPTIONSALtlNG THESE LINES ARE FEW, HOWEVER, AND THE -VOlUNTAR - DE-PARTlfiE OF ONE OR !'lOR E MEMBER S OF TH OP SHI PI'! Y BE M ~ 010 FACING A ORA SOSF. M ITARY INTERVENT ION IN ORDER HKHAl.Q!S ~AY-AFLOAT. W AIN THAT SOVIET -ADVICE-WILL BE kEl!J)W BY TKE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP, AND MUCH I'IAY.DEPEND ON THE PER SOHAL D IPLOfIIACY OFVASIL Y SAFRONCHUK, THE RECENIL Y t>.RR IVED-TROUBLESHOOTER- AND SENIOR DIPlOMAT WHO COULD WElL HAVE BEENCHARED WITH SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR FIND INC; ,. VIABLE EXITFROIII THE CtRRENT I'IAZE. PITFALLS AND tJlll(NOWNS REMAIN NUM­EROUS, BlIT CONT INUED SOVIET ASSlfi ANCES TO THE :t'.F(;Ht>.N -PEO­PLE,- At{) RECENT IHO ICATI ONS OF I NCREASED SOVIET INVOLVE­MEN! IN THE MILITARY FIELD HERE, SUGGEST 'tHAT A SOVIET-GUARANTEE- OF THE REVOLUT ION MAY BE THE INDUCEMENT OFFERED THEKHAl.GIS IN RETURN FCfl THE SACRIF'ICE~ WHICH !'lAY BE NECESSARYTO REVERSE THE T IDE OF CURRENT EVENTS. END OF Sl'M!'1AR Y.

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~ • 3. A ~AR eM FOR A POL ITJ CAL R£SDLU110ff !IF' DOIll£ST I C PROSl EMSPlAY BE lIf1)ERWAY. OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS THERE HAVE BEE~A IIl1tBER OF DEVElOPl'lENTS WHICH SUGGEST THAT THE AFGHAN GOVERN­

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OPPOS. "E HAS BOlDLY, AI.. PERHAPS DISIN-GENUOtlSL Y, DEa.ARED ITS LAND REF~f'1 fROGR~1'I ·sucCEsSrliLLYCOfllfLETm· CREF A), THEREBY AT LEAST AVOIDING tHE CREATIONor FLRTHER OPPOSITION ALONe THE L IHES THAT PARTICULAR RE-FORI'! ftEASLR£ APPARENTLY HAS fRDrlPTED SINCE ITS INCEPTIOH.LIKEWISE, ACCORDING TO RECEm HINTS BY PRII'JE "INISTER AIUN,THE DRA'S LITERACY CAI'IPAIGN, WHICH HAS PROVOKED HOSTILITY1.N THI~ EXTREPJEL Y CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY BECAUSE "OST AFGHANS

DO NOl WISH TO SEE THEIR FE"ALES EDUCATED EVEII TO RUDIPJERTARYLEVas, OR -EXPosm- TO flIAlE TEACHERS, "AY SOON BE DECLAREDA -SUCCESS.- A DRA ANNOUNCE"ENT ON Jtl. Y 11 PROMULGATINGSEVERAL "CONCESSIONS- TO THE PR IVATE SECTOR OF THE EtONOPlYREPRESENTED, INTER ALIA, ANOTHER ATTE"PT TO "OLLIFY ANY oPPO­SJTIOft STE1'll''IING FROPJ FEAR OF THIS REGI"E'S FutURE ECONOPlICPOLICIE~. THUS, THE GOVERNMENT APPARENTLY HAS BEGUN TO DIS­TANCE ITSELF fROJIl A NuPlBER OF ITS MORE APIBITIOUS UD GRATINGREFORJIlS, NOT NECESSAR It Y BECAUSE THEY WERE ILL-COfiCEIVED,OR UNNECESSARY, BUT PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY WERE OVERZEALOUSl YINITIATED -- AND AP01!SED SERIOUS RE'5ISTANCE.

4. REPORTS OF • tlEGOTIATIOtiS- A"ONG THE REGIME, THE SOVIETS,AND SEVERAL LEADERS OF FDRIIIER GO"R'lENT S WOtlJ) ALSO POI NT

TO AN EFFORT TO ESTAELISH SOME SOP. OF -NATIONAL FRONT-(REf B), COPlI'IENTS BY USUAlL Y WEl..L-INfORfilED EASTERN ElItOPEANAND SOVItT DIPLOI'IATS HERE LEND A CERTAIN ~EDENCE TO THISPARTICt1.AR THESIS (REF C). U1 THIS CONNECT ION, THE REPORTEDRElEASE FROl'\ PRISON OF PARCHAJIlISTS (REF D), AM> THAT GROUP'SSUBSEQL'ENT PRINTING API) WmESPREAD DISTRIBUTION or ·UNDER­GROUND- LETTERS CREF E) ATTACKING, INTER ALIA, Al"IIN AND OTHERELEI"!ENTS OF THE REGIME, REINFORCE THE CONTENTION THAT CER­TAIN fORCES ARE WORKING TO PROVJDE SOME FORM OF LEADERSHIPAND PARTY MORE BROADLY BASED THAN THE PEOPLES· DEMOCRATICPARTY OF AFGHANISTAN Cf'[)PA).

5. ON THE FOREI~ POLICY FRONt. AS WELL SOME SIGNS HAVE SEENDtTt"CIED THAT SUGGEtt A DEVELOPING PROGRAM TO AVOID OR DRAWBACK SELECTIVElY FROPI CONFRONTATION. THE EARLY JULY VISIT TO IS­LAMABAD ElY DEPUTY F<liEIGN P1INISTER DOST HAS BEEN THE !'lOST IMPOR­TANT DEVaOPl'lENT ALONG THESE LINES, ~SPECIALLY SINCE THERE HASBEEN RECENTLY A SLIGHT /'IODERATION IN THIS GOVERNMENT· S ANTI-ST15433

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. PAKIstAN PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN. I'J(REOVER t WE HAVE BEE. TOSEDA FEW I'JINOR OL IVE-TWIGS LATE1. Y -- RELATIVD. Y HIGH-LEVELATTENDANCE AT OlR JlL Y .. RECEPT IOII.·A FIRST -EVER "££TUG t

AT AF'GHU INITIATIVE, BETWEEN APIU AND A VISITING USICALEamER -- WHICK COllLDUDICATE THAT THE DBA "~ :: ~~­tERESTED IN 1 IEIJlG OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSI!!f-fiNCuE NADIRIT HAS REACHED IN RECENT MOUTKS.- .

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6. HIGH-LEVEl. SOVIET DJPLO!'AT COULD BE T~~PUTg1BEHI"THESE DEVELOf'lllERtSa AU OF THESE SIGIIS KA ERG SliCETHE EARLY JUNE ARRIVAL IN XABUL OF SOVIEt DIFLOMAT VASIL YSAJiRoH~Ok, FtJ(JlIER AMBASSADOR TO GHANA, FelnlER DEPUTY PER­JlIANENT REPR ESEIf1' AnVE AT THE UlflTED RATIONS, AND A CAREERDlflOJllAT vITH APPRENTLY SOLID POLITICAL CONllEcrIONS, VHOIS OBVIOUs.. Y OVER-QUalIFIED TO SERVE AS THE THIRD-ftAIXUG"AN IN THE SOVIET D1BASSY IN -KABUl (HIS PROTOCOl. RANK VHICHNO ONE HERE 8£LIEVES). PRICII TO HIS ARRIVAL, STIBIES CIR­CtLATm IN KABUl AND IN JlIOSCOV THAT SAFROIICHUK VOILD SERVEAS SOI'lE SORT or -ADVISOR- TO THE HIGHEST LEVElS OF THEAFGHAN GOVERRPlENT, sranEs WHICH PlAY HAVE BEEI BORIIEOUl' BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. GIVEI SAFRORCHUIr S EXPERIENCE,WE BEtIEVE IT SAFE TO CONO-WE THAT HE IIAY HAVE COIlE TO AFGHANI­sru wITH ORDERS TO TRY All) Fum A P01.ITICAL, RATHER THAN P~E1.Y

IlJILITARY, RESOLUTION OF THIS COUNTRY'S DOfIESTIC STRIFE,FROBAaL Y "ost I"PORTANTLY 11 ORDER TO PBECLQPE A DRA APPEALE.CR DIRJCt sOVIET PlIUTAR Y HELP IN Sf AYING AFt.OAT. II tRISCONNCE lOR, "osr OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT SAFRONCHUX HAS NOROR"Al FUNcnOI IN THE SOVIET DlBASSY. ALTHOUBH SOPIE OFTHE suunSES ABOUl' SAFRONCHUX·S IUSSION ARE SPECUlATIOH, VEBElIEVE THAT THE SUDDE'MESS OF'. AND THE PECUlIAR ClRCUPl­~ANCES SffiROUflHNG, HIS APPOINT"ERT, HIS STATUS· SINCE HISARRIVAL, AM> THE POLICYDEVElOPfllENTS 10TED ABOVE, CLEARLYltOICATE: THAT "OSCOV IS tRGING, IF NOT PRESSURING, tHE DRATO TAKE srEPS TO REVERSE THE TIDE OF EVENTS, All) TO PRE­SERVE THE INTEGR IT Y OF THE REVOLUT I'p••

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7. IONS WHICK •ON THE DR A TO F1 TICAl. SOLUT ION I THE AFGHAII REGINE SAPflRENT INABILITY -- OR UHWILLIIGNESS -- TO utmERTAICE, ON ITSOWN S1'EPS WHICH wOlLO STABSLIZE THE DETER IORATING SECURITYAND' POLITICAl. SITUATION U THE COUNTRYSIDE, OR BROADEN THEGOVER filIlENT· S BASE OF SUPPORT, wOULD flROBABl. Y CONST ITUlE THEGREATESI' IfllPETUS Fal ANY SOVIET DECISION TO URGE, CAJOLE, ORPRESS!.fiE THE AFGHAIl LEADERSHIP TO SEEK POLITICAl. SOLUTIONS-TO ITS PROBLEfIIS. LUnJISE, P10SCOW l'JAY WELL HAVE WAITED toDEFtECI' THE DRA' S WILLINGNESS TO BUILD T£NSIONS WITH ITSNEIGHBORS (ESPECIALLY PAKISTAN), A TREND WHPCH COULD HAVELED TONUN AFGHAN APPEAL FOR SOVIET HELP TO COUlTER FalEIGN-AGGRESSION" (REF F>. l'Jal£OVER. THE CHILL III AFGHAII-U.S.RElATIONS, AfI) THE DRASI'IC REDUCTION OF OUR ECOIOPlIC ASSISTANCEPROGRAfll (ESPECIALLY SINCE THE JUL Y 13 VOTE BY A SENATE-HOUSE CON­FERENCE COI'JPlITTEE TO cur AID). COULD ALSO HAVE BEER VIEWED BY

.THE IGID1LIN AS COUNTER TO SOVIET LARGER INTf:RESTS, SINCE l'JOSCOVal ITS SlRROGATES WILL PROBABlY HAVE TO TAKE UP THE ASSISTANCE9.ACK IF OTHER FREE-lIalLD DONORS DEPART FROft THE AID FIELD HERE,AND BECAUSE AN) EVEt.! GREATER PERCEIVED DEPENDENCE BY THE DRAON THE SOV lETS WOlJ1.D PROBABLY EXAIERBATE THE DOftEST IC UNREST,RATHER THAN APIEl.I~ATE IT. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, A CONCERNTHAT AN ArTHAN SOS VAS BECOJI/ING PlOOE AND PlORE LIxtl y. ASWELL AS-JUSI'IFIED- INTERPIS OF THE 1978 BILATERIAL TREATY,AT A TIPIE WHEN fII0SCOW HAD lARGER INTERSTS WHICH IT PROBABLYDm NOT WANT TO THREATEN BY PlRSUING A DECISION TO INTERVENE,MAY WELL HAVE BEEN THE BOTTOJI/-LINE CONSIDERATION IN DIS­PATCHING SAFRONcHUK ON HIS PlJSSION TO KABUL •

s. A POLITICAL RESOlUTION WIll PROBABt Y REQUIRE PlORE -CON­CESSIONS- THAN HAVE SlfiFACED HERETOFORE: BASED ON OUR READ­ING OF WHAT MAKES THE INSlRGENTS FIGHT, WE BELIEVE THAT THE

ORA lEADERSHIP WILL HAVE TO ·SWEATEN THE POT CONSIDERABLYlIIORE BEFORE THE TIDE CAN BE TmNED IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THEVARIOUS REFORM PROGRAfIIS DID INDEED CONTRIBUTE A GREAT DEALTO THE GROWT.H Or DOMESTIC HOSTILITY TOWARD THIS REGIJl/E, BUT,NEVERTHELES~. THE ovmWHEUII NG MOTIVATION EM 1II0 ST AFGHAN

HAVE TAKEN UP ARMS HAS BEEN THEIR PERCEPT ONTHAT THE KHAL IS ARE PUPPETS.

o D THESE DEEA. Y-HElD BElIErS WIll ClEARLY R UGREAT SKILL AM) SUBSTANT IVE CONCESSIONS WELL EXCEEDING WHATTHE REGIME HAS DONE SO rAR. WHETHER THE SOVIETS AND THE DRALEADERSHIP CAN CQlIIE UP WITH AGREED AND NECESSARY NEXT STEPSREfIIAINS TO BE SEEN, But THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THEIR TASKIe: FOR[IlIDABLE.

S. AVA TlABLE OPTIONS ARE NOT PlENT IFLn..; IF, IN rACT, THEGROWTH OF THE OPPOSITION HAS NOT BEEN COfllPLETEl Y STUNTED BYTHE GOVER N[IlENT " S REPRESSIVE MOVES SO rAR, THERE STIll ARE NOT [IlANYMORE STEPS AVAILAELE TO CREATE AN ALTER NATE REGIME WHICHWOULD CARRY An GENUINE POSSIBILITY OF TURNING THETIDE, YET STOP SHOR OF' THREATENING THE INTEGRITY OF THEREVOL UT ION.BT#54.3.3

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le. THE 1'10ST paO!ABLEs AND PERHAPS T~I MOST rCESSAiI!:WOOLDBE A ~AN~! Ii fHE DB 5 Tnp ttifiERSBIP. ECNOHpASSI~G !BJ ­DllARTURE OF A"I~ OR TJRA~I -- oa BOTE. BASED ON SOME IN­DICATIONS (fIg RICIN! spITE OF UNDtRGROUND TRA~S. MOS! orVlICH RAVE BITtERLY A'l'UCKED AMI"), AND ON j,--C:ENEaAL -FEEL"AMONG VIRfUALLY ALL OUR AFGHAN CONTACTS, ~ARAIII1GL1 VIEVED AS A FIGUREHEAD W!O SEOULD N

~ '!'BE R NSIDERED RESPONSIELE lOR,., PPROESSIVE POLICIES OF ARRES'!', TORTURE,

AND iIECUfION, AS WELL AS THE DRIVING FORCE !E~IND THE :RAT­ING DOt1ESfIC RElORM PROGRAMS, AND AFGEANISTAN'S ARDENT EM­BRACE or 'l'BE USSR. 'l'BER1FORt, ANI SINCERE ATTEMPT TO RECON-

])CILI 'fBE YORelS LOOSE IN ArG~ANIS'l'AN TEROUGE A LEADEiSEIPCHANGI WOULD P10!ABLY HAVE TO INCLUDE T~E DEPA3TURE, oa --II'!''!!R YET - TB~El'1'8 or 'Ml.~ (IN THIS LAND OF TEE iLOOD FEUD,SOME ~RALQl LErmfi HAS TO PAY THE TRADITIONAL PRICE FOR T50USANDSOF DEA'l'?S). WE COULD rORES3~ A SC~NARIO IN WRICH TARA!I WOULD RE-MAIN AS THE POLITICALLY IMPOTZNT "GR:!1T LtAD'ER. - IN TEIS REGARD,TEE~ONSTANTLI !UILDIN; TARA~I "PERSONALITY CUL'l'ft (SY~BOLIZ1DMOS RECENTLY!! THE tAVISE CELEB3ATIONS SURROUNDING HIS 62NDJIB DAY ON ~ULY-l4l SUG~ES'l'S TBA'!' 'l'A~lKI'S DEPA~TURE WOULD BE AVIE HIN~ ONl:JOR~E REVOLUTION, AND ~OULD EE UNDERTAKEN ONLY AS

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A'D~~prqA'E LAST RESORT. INCIDENTALLY. TARAKI IS STILL RESPECTEDBY ELEMENTS IN NON-~BALQI S~MENTS or AFGBAN SOCIETY. PARTICULARLYIN r?1 RANIS 01 T!E EDnCATED.

11. 1H! SALItNT QUESTION, OF COURSE, IS WfETBER THE SOVIETSCARRY S~!FICI£~' ~tIGBT TPAT TstIR-ADVICE- COULD COHVINCt TliA~I ANt/OR AMIN TO SACRIFICE BIM~

~ SELF FOR THE SAKE OF fEE lEVOLUTI0N. EVERYTHING VOOLD DEPEND~ ON !OY SUCH ADVICE ~AS COUCHED. PROBAEGY THI MOST TIA-! ILE APPROACP ALONG TBES!. LINES WOULD EX TBE T6E515 TEIT TBi; STA'~ O~ AFFAIRS rOR TBIS GOVIRNH!N! BAS RIACHED TBr POINTP IFA! T!E SPIER EIISTEKCE or THE REVOLUTION MAND1TES TBE5 BONO!ABLE AND VOLUHTARY- RETIREMENT OF ~ERT1IN MEHBERS OFJ TBE DiA L1ADE1SBIP. AT TBE SAMZ TI~E, MOSCOW VOULD lEER!-! AFfEP. -GUAiANtEE- THE FUTU'-E OF TE~ REVOLUTION '!ROUGB PLEDGiS

JOF INCREASED MILI~A!Y AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT. RECENT STATE­MENTS JY TEE SOVIET ELITE PROMISING SUPPORT FOR TB! AFGFAN! ·PEOPLE,· AND TiE 4B1 IVALo I~ AFJ£EAN1&TAN or DOZENS or SOiIET

_ HELICOPTER PItOt~. INDICAfEf T:!T HOSCO~ IS PROBABLY 1!­:1rSSURING tBE DR! LEADEiS!!P OF CONTINUED SOVIET !AC~IN~,

DESPITE TBE SIMULTANEOUS CAHPAI~N TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLU!ION.

li. SOVIET ~ISCALCutATIO~ OE FEAVT-PANDEDNESS. OR A TAR1~1­AMIN DECISIoN·TH1T tHEY TRULY RATF. NO OPTION, aUT 10 FOR;E!BEAD ALONG CURRENT PATES, COULD VERY POSSIBLY SCOTCE ANYSlAKe! FOR A NON-HILITA3T APPROAC! TO THE INS~RGENCY. VIDOUBtT fBAT THE SOTIETS ARE .ILLING OR ABLE TO FORCE THE RE-'HOVAL O! ANT OF THt D!A LEAD~XSfIP. ALTROU~E

MOSCOW MAY EVENTUALLY DECIDE TOLEND ·s~PPoaT· ro ANT ELEMENts ~HICE DISPLAY A~ INCLINATIONTO SETTLE TaE CONYLICTSSORT or AN APPEAL roa DIRECT SOVIETMILITARY HELP. THIS COULD INct~D! A COUP D'ETAT BY THEAFGEAN MILITARY.

13. INTRANSIGENCE C~ fEF PARr or TARAll AND AMIN, OR ANABORTED SOVIET CA~PAIGN WFICE MAY NOW BE UNDERWAY. WOULD PROB­ABLY SIGNAL "MORE OF raE SAMr" FROM THE DR1. A STANCE wBICB WOULDLiADE TO rURT£ER CONTLIC1. BLOODSHED, AND INSTABILITY. THIS LOW­ERED TBRiSEOLD or VIOLENCE -OULn. O! COURSE, CARRY SERIOUS ECURITYIMPLICATIONS FOR FORIIGN!~S STATIONED IN TBIS COUNTRY.

14. CO~CLUSIONS: .E MAY BE IN TEt MIDST OF A SOVIET ATTEMPTTO NUDG! OR PuSB AFGHAN POLICIESIN DIRECTIONS ~EICB _OULD REVE~S~ THE GROWTB or DOMESTICOPPOSITIO~, lNt D~rcs! DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN HOSTILITY TOT~I~REGIME' SO TEAT. IN THE LAST Ah!LYSIS. MOSCOW ~ILL NOTEAV : TO FACE lN AFGHAN APPEAL FOR DIRECT MILITARY HELP. AT!HE AM1 TI~E; STATEMENTS !Y TEE SOVIET ELITF. AND INDI-CAT NS OF INCREASED SOVIET MILITARY INVOLVEMENT SUGGEST A

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EiS: RDS 7/18199 (AI'lSTuTZ. J. BRUCE) .CR-J11PINT. PINR. AFt liS(S) GDR AMBASSADM REPORTS THAT SOVIETS HOPE TO REPlACEPH Ir.E MINISTER AlliIN WITH A BROADER BASED GOVT.

REF: KABlA. 5433

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. Slr.I'IARY. I HAVE JUST HAD AN EXTRAORDINARY MEETING wITH6ERPIAN DEIlIOOlATIC REPUBLIC AMBASSADOR DR. HERMANN SCHWIESAU.IT AA~ EXTRAORDINARY ON ACCOUNT OF WHAT HE -DISCLOSED- WITHRESPECT TO SOVIET INTENTIONS HERE INa.VOING THE UKaIHQODOF A C:QVTET-BACKED MOVE TO OUSI PRID'!' lIIINTSIE1LJiAF'IZ!A.LAHAMIN. OVER THE LAST 3 WEEKS WE HAVE HAD HINTS OF A POSSIBLE"SOVIET-ASSISTED INTERN~.L COUP. BOTH FRQrlI GDR AMBASSADORSCHWIESAU (KABUl.. 5246) AND EARLIER FROf'I SOVIET I'lINISTER­COUNSElOR VASII..IY STEPANOVICH SAFRONCHUK (KABUl.. 4888).THIS !IME. THE GDR AMBASSADOR WENT IlIUCH FURTHER IN SPELLINGOtlT ~OVIET DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ORA, TKE ~OVIET DILEllIl'IAABOUT WHH TO DO, AND THE ?OS~IBILITY OF AN INTERNAL PARTYCOU~ 10 EI..!P!INATE AlliIN. HE HINTED THAT THIS (\lIGHT OCCUR INAUGUST. END SUMMARY.

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4. SOVIET DISSATISFActION WITH THE ORA: YESTERDAY WE SU'TA REPORT CREnEL) ANAlYZING THE PRESSURE~ SEEr.INGL y. BUILDINGUP FOR AN INTERNAL CHARGE IN THE DRA LEADERSHIP.' WHAT

. SCHlIIESAU TOLD "E AT Olft flEETING CONFIRMED ALL THIS, INCLUDINGTHE DeI!'J'ENCE OF BEHIND-THE-SCE""[S NEGOTJATI'ONS BY SOVIETffIRISI'ER-COU8SELOR SAFRONCHUK WITH PDPA PARTY LEADERS ANDotHERS TO ElR IHG ABOUT AN INTER NAL CHANGE. SCHWIESAU REPEATEDLYC:t;'~ T!!AT ~HE ~OVIET~ 'a'FF'F. DEcrPLY O1~R!E!) nVFR TP.E wnrU:F.NU:;SlTUATIUN IN AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID, -THEY KNOW THE REGlPlI:: HASLITTLE PUBLIC SUPPORT AND IS LOSING CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY.­WHILE TELLING PIE THIS, HE ALSO SAID, -WE ARE DETERPIINED TO SAVE

. THE REVOLunON.-

5, SCJIIJESAU a.EARLY LAID THE BLAflIE FOR THE DRA'S TROUBLESON FlUIlIE 'UNISTER/FOREIGN MINISTER HAFIZUlLAH A"IN. HEDESaUBED AII1IN AS -TIlE STRONG (lIAN- IN AFGHANISTAN. -HE!'ERSONAlLY RUNS THE ERIIRE GOVT ,- HE SAID, -CONTROLLING THEARffY, THE INTERIOR I'IIRIstRY, AM)·HE P1AKE~ AlL II'IPORTANTDECISIONS,- A/''HN HAS BLUfI)ERED BADLY, HE SAID, IN THE WAY!fE HAS IMPLEPlENTED THE GOVT'S ECONOI'IIC AND REFORM PROGRAI'IS,AND PARTICtLARLY IN THE WAY HE HAS -HARSH!.. Y"' ACTED AGAINSTPERSONS HE SllsPEcrm I'IIGHT OPPOSE HIM.

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6. C:CHWJESAt' DJSl'lISSED TML'KJ lS JNEUEcrJVE. HE: DESCRIBEDHIIll A~ AN-OLb, KINDLVTEACHER, PKll0S~AND WRITER- WHOJ!' WEU ]NTENTIONED, AND LOVES THE ADUlATION P.EA~ ON HIM It.TP.E PRESS (·ESPECIALLY THE PICTI'RES""). ·WE SUSPECT ,-C:CHWIESAU cAID, -THAT HE DOEC' NOT KNOlll P1UCH OF' WHH IS GOINGO~ IN TliF COUNTRY."

7. SOVIET l'!AI:EL'VERS: ~CHWIESAt; COHFIRfllEO THAT SOVIET~IHISTER-COCNSE1.0R SAFRONCH'.'K HAS BEEN GIVEN THE TASK, BYr.OSCOW, TO B!H NG ABOll1' ~ -R AD I CAL CHA NGt" IN THE GOV!.SAFRONCHUK WAS GIVEN THIS' TA51(, SCHWIESAU SAID, BECAUSE,.. TT J~ NOT r,O{;D FOR THE l;OV lET Ar.BA~SADOR HII'ISElF TO BE SEENHOLD ING THE~E DEl.rCATE NEuOTIATIONS.· HE CONTINUED, -IFn!E~E tJEGOTlATIOt~S FAIL, AND/OR SAFRONCHUK \oI£RE EXPElLED ASPERSONA ~ON SfATA, THAT k'OtLD ATTRACT LESS ATTENTl<JN AND BELES~ OF A DIF'LCI':AlIC EI'!BARRASSMENT FIM THE SOVIET UNION THANIF Ar.9~SSADOP. PUZANOV WERE EXPELLED.-

9. AS To WHAT IS LIKtLY TO HAPPEN, SCHWIEc.-AlI Cl ,_~ND • CAT ED Tli T ACl NTH I Nt; AI':INAND PERHAPS OTHFRc, IS AHAT THE SOVIET~ INTEND. S'CH\tIES~U

~A!D HER!:' ARE NOil DEEP DJVISION~ IN IRE PDPA PARTY,'f1AHY/'IF :..:HocE LEAD !NG P1EPlBERS ARE VERY DJSSATISFIED '.'ITH THE?RESEtJT CO~S~ OF EVENt'S ~ND Al'IIN·S LE4DER~HIP. HE SAID iH~T

WHAT !~ NEEDD> IS A NEW fIR IME MINISTER WHO IS A -STRONG PlAN­AND -NOT IDE~'TIFIED- \lITH "PRE~ENT· POLICIES.

::. WHEN I MENTIONED DEFENSE MINISTER WATAN.JAR AS A POSSIBILl~Y,

SCHWI~SAll ACTED A~ IF I HAD CAUt;HT HII'I IN A c:'ECRET. AFTr:R"~MJ~, ~ ~AID WATANJ~ IS - NOT A POlIl ICIAN, Sl!T OF COURSET:;:- I':IL nARY l~ KEY TO I\NY CHANGE." THEN HE W::NT Pt; TOOB!=:EF.VE T!oIIIT, SINCE THE REVOLUT ION, WAHNJ~R HAS NEVER !'lADEA ..,.?F.::C~ THAT 1tA~ F'RINTlffi IN TH~ PRE~l= I'rID THAT HIS EX~cr

~OL !T ! rr,L v IE,,·S /IRE NOT CLE~R T i) THE PUBLI C. !PH'\.. yItiG BY T:f] STH~T Il:ATANJAR ~/l.S .. Q.F.AN. - cCHI.'IESAl' WF:NT ON, HOl,:~VER, T0'it NT TI.:AT IrJ HIL E WAT ANJ /lR MIG HT PL II Y f. ROLF. t N A COllNTER CIJt:p.n: ~j:,S NOT L!KEL Y TO BE ?R I~E nNISTEP. ~ItoCF. "HE ':!6~ N0T::~F!? I:: ~r:ED.-

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1:\T.. E C RET SECTION 2 OF 2 KAStl. 5459

Ii. SEVER Al T II'lES SCHW IESAU SAID, -WE ARE NOW sEEI NG THEClOSI Nt' C!'lAFt~ OF TH! S GOVT." HE I'lUST HAVE USED THETERI'l, ".Q..0~U1G CHAPTER-, AT LE~ST TlltEE TIJIlES TO PIE. AS TOWHEN THE CHANGE WAS LIXEl Y TO OCCUR, C;CHWIESAU HINTED THATIT COlLD HAPPEN ANY TIME BlIT WalLO PlOST ·LIKELY TAKE PlACE IN

CAUGllS'G) HE SAm HE WAS SEHDTNG HIS wIFt TO £AST BERLIN SOONFOR -TlftEE OR FO~ WEEKS REST.- AfI) LATER HE TOLD IIIE HEHII'!SELF COlLD Nor POSSIBlE LEaVE KABUl THIS SUPlPlER SINCE-AUGUST J~ t;OINT TO BE HOT. AND I DON-T MEAN THE wEATHER_­EARLIER IN OIR CONVERSATION, HE SAID THAT THE SITUATION WITHINTHE GOVY WAS HIGR.Y UNstABLE AM) THAT SECURITY IN KABUL COULDDETERIORATE ANY TIME, so FAST IN FACT THAT IT WOUlD BE- IJ'llPOSSIBlE TO EVACUATE DEPENDENTS."

11. ~OVI'EJ INTERESI~: SCHVIESAU SAID THAT NO INTER NAL PARTY-R~.D I cAL CHANGE" COULD oecm HERE WITHOUT SOVIET SUPPORT t

AND THAT SOVIET INTERESTS WOlt.D HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNlBY ANY NEW AFGHAN GOVT. "AFTER ALL,- HE SAID, "AFGHANISTANBORDERS THE ~OVIET UNION AND JUST AS YOU HAVE A SPECIALINTEREST IN ANYI'HING HAPPENING IN CANADA AND /'IEXICO, THE SOVIETUNION HAS A !=PECIAl INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN.- lHUS, HE SAID,A POLITICAL SOLUTION HAS TO TAKE: INTO ACCOUNT T~8f FACTQRS·r ;'SAV!NG THE FACE OF THE SOVIETS, SAVING THE FACE THE AFG.l'AN

L.!A.~TY (PDP-A', AND SAVING THE FA~ /'IUSlIMS.-

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12. IN CONNECTION WITH SAVING SOVIET FACE, SCHWIESAU SAIDT~AT T'iE SOVIETS MAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THEIR RELATIONSHIPAND REPUT ArION WITH ·OTHER PARTIES AROUND THE wmLO.· IF THESOVIETS WERE SEEN TO ABANDON THE PARTY HERE IN AFGHANISTAN,HE SAID, !T WOlLO HAVE A -VERY UPSETTING EFFECT ON PARTIESEl.SEWHERE WHICH WERE F1UENDLY wITH MOSCOW.· THIS COPIMENTTRACKS wITH HIS COMMENT "ENTIONED ABOVE (PARA -') THAT, "'WE"'US! SAVE TKE REVOLUtION.-

13. QUEc:TION OF SOVIET lllILITARY INTERVENtION IN AFGHANISTAN.TOWARD THE Eft) OF Otfi CONVERSATION, SCHWIESio' VOLUNTARILYRAISED THIS C:UESTION. HE SAID HE WAS AWARE THERE WAS SPECULATIONIN THE DIPLOPIATIC COJIIJllUNITY AS TO wHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD,IN THE LAST ANAlYSIS, INTERVENE 1111LITARILY IN AFGHANlSTAN.-WERE THEY TO DO SO,· HE SAID, - IT WOlLD SOLVE ONE PROBLEM BUT~EATE ANOTHER.- SOVIET INTERVI'NTION COULD ELlflIINATE THEPRESENT GOYT THEREBY SOLVING ONE PROBLEM. IT WOULD, HOWEVER,OlEATE A~OTH£R PROBLEPJI NAMELY, THAT THE -ENTIRE AFGHAN NATION­VOILD Tlfi N AGAl NST THE SOVIETS, JUs\" AS THE AFGHANS TUR NEDAGAlIiST THE -mUTISH INVADERS- IN THE 19TH CENTDRE. HENCE,HE SUD, IT "ADE NO SENSE FOR THE SOVIETS TO INTERVENEIII IL IUft IL Y.

1~. "iHE PARCHA~ISIS: SCH"'IESAU, IN DISCUSSING THE PARCHAIUSTS,COPlPlENTED THAT TARAKI HIMSELF HAD BEEN ACCEPTABLE 10 THEPARCHA!'!IST WING. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE wITH HAFIZUl.LAH APlIN.EX ILED PARCHAJlJIST LEADER t BABRAK KARflIAl, AND APlIN wmE -'RIVALS.·SCHWIESAU OBSERVED THAT IT WOtl.D BE IPlPOSSIBLE FOR APlIN ANDBABRAK KARPIAL 10 BE IN THE SAJIIE GOVT. REFLECTING ON THE TWOWINGS OF THE PARTY AT THE TIPIE OF THE REVOLUTION, SCHWIESAUCONFJRI'lED Olfi IfffRESSION THAT THE PARCHAJlJISTS HAD A WIDERFOLLOWING THAN THE KHAlQIS WITHIN TH! PARTY AND APIONG l!.AB.US't'l'lPATHIZERS, Bur THAT THE KKAlQIS WERE STRONGER IN THE I'[email protected] LATT£R·~ STRENGTH IN THE MILITARY PROVED DECISIVE,SCHltlIESAU OBSERVED, IN PlilGING THE PARCHAPIISTS. I ASKED HI'"WHETHER HE HAD INFORI'IATION AS WE DID, THAT MANY PARCHAPIISTSHAD eEEN RECENTLY RELEASED FROM PUL-E-CHARKI PRISON. HE SHOOKHIS HEAD. HE SAID THOUGH THAT, AT THIS PRESENT JUNCTURE I N THE~ ISES FACING THE ORA, IT WAS NOl ENOUGH TO BR IHG BACK PARCHAMISTSINTO THE GOVT. • rr IS NECESSARY TO BR CADER THE BASE OF THEGDVT rAR BEVON) THE PARCHAJIlISTS.- n:o OTHER THINGS NEED TOBE DONE TOO, HE SAID. ONE WAS TO RELEASE MANY POlITICALPH ISONER~ (-EVEN PARTY MEMBERS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED-', AND THEOTHER WAS FOR A NEW GOVT TO BE -FIREND!=: WITH THE PlOSlEPICOUHTR IES. - •

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15. sns ANI> PIECES: SCHWIESAU OBSERVED THAt THE DRA HAS-LOS]' CONTROL OF MANY PROVINCES. - WHEN I ASKED HIIlI FOREXAf'lA.£S, HE 5AlD KEP.AT (THOUGH WE KNOW HERAT CITY REMAINSIN DRA HANDS) AND THE PROVINCES IN THE CENTRAL PART OF THECOUNTRY (THE HAZARA..!AT REGION).

16. EE IU~W,*I~~lAr ~:FjUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WAS MOREANGEROU~ __IW H HAT Of PAKISTAN. WHEN I ASKED HII'!

WHY. !it: SA!D IT WAS BECAUSE OF I S INFL ENCEW~ TME SHIlA POPLl.ATION WHICH RELIGIOUS ELEPI£Nl PREDOPlIHATEEDIN THE PROVISCES BORDERING IRAN AND IN TKE PROVINCED ""KINGUP THE I'!OU~"TAINOUS CENTRAl P1A55IF.

17. THEN. SOI'IEWHAT IN CONTRADICTION TO THE ABOVE R£l'lARK.!iE SAID T~t.T THE PUS TUNS WERE POL IT ICAU Y THE "OST IPlPORTA../lTETHNIC EL£r:ENI IN TlI£ CO(iNIRY. RENCE, SUCE SO flANY OF THEpll~!'lfl'NSWEP.E. ·OPPOSING THE REGUJE P1ILITAR ILY,. THIS WASANOTHER ~ 10US POL IT ICAL PROBLEPI.

l!l. COPlI'lENT: AS A REStLT OF THIS CONVERSATION. tOGEMERWITH EAR1.IER ONES MENTIONED. WE a£LIEVE THE EVIDENCE. JS NOWQ.EAR THAT THE SOVIERT ARE D ISSATISFI£D WITH HArIttlLlAR Al'\IN"; ::: i~Yi~ 10 ENGINEER A wBAPIcAlO CHANG;. wE ARE ALSOT lPIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS, BY flEANS OF SAfRONCHUX· SCONVERSATION WITH I'IE ON JUNE 24, AND SCHWIESAU'S two CONVER­SATIONS WIT U~ ON JIL Y 9 AND 17, HAVE TRIED TO SEND US A SIGNAL.

/THAT SIGNAL SEEMS TO BE THAt t THEY ARE UNHAPPY wITH THE APlIN

LREGIPJ£' THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO ARRANGE A CHANGE, AND 81 Al'ISPEClLATING HERE) ARE HOPING THIS WILL NOT HAVE A NEGATIVE II'JPACTON US. ONE COtll.D AL.SO DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT, WITH THEOBVIOUS SLIPPING GRIP THE ORA HAS OVER THE COUNTRY, THESOVIETS HOFE THAT BY BRINGING ABOut A CHANGE AND BROADENING THEBASE OF' THE ::CVT. Afi> BY POSSIBLY MAKING AMIN A SCI.PEGOAT,THEY CAN AVOID LOSING THEIR INVESTMENT IN THIS JIIARXIST PARTYAt«) GOVT. AID AVOII> A MAJOR BLOW TO SOVIET INTERNATIONALPRESTIGE. A"'!'1'!rt'ZBT1'5459

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REF: KABIL '45'

1. (5 - [NT IRE TEXT)

2. SIJlIIIIARY: [ASf GERMAN AMBASSADOR SCHVIESAU HAS IDENTIFIEDCERTAIN IOH-PU5HTUN CABINET MINISTERS AS BEING IN SUPPORT OFCURRENT SOVIET fllACKINATIONS TO ALTER THE AFaNAN REGIME..:;:cHWIESAII THINKS II "IGJa 8E TOO LATE TO ACHIEVE A pm ITlCAJ,.91.mION TO IHE PRESENT MESS 1M AFGKANIsrAN. END OF SUI'IMARY.

3. DURING A CONVERSATION WIlH THE A~ AT A SOCIAlEVENT ON JtL Y 18, DR. h.::.RMANN SCKWl'tSAU, AMBASSADOR OF TKEGERMAN DEPIOCRATIC REPUBLIC, EXPANDED SOMEWHAT ON THEPRESENTATION HE MADE TO CHARGE AMsrUTZ ON JULY 17CONCERNING CURRENT SOVIET EFrORTS TO REsrRUcTURE THEAFGHAN REGUIE CREFTEl). SCHWIESAU EXE:RCIS£D CARE TO \CONVEY HIS VIEWS OM... Y TO THE APIERICAN OFFICER, CHANGINGTHE TOPIC OF CONVERSATION WHEN THE BRITISK AND JAPANESE \AMBASSADOR S JOINED TKE GROUP•

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4. WHEI ASKED WHEtHER HE THOUGH PRINE IIIUSTER HA'IZULLAH ANII,THE PRIIIARY TARGET OF THE SOVIET NACHIIATIOIS, IS AWAREOF WHAT IS HAPPEIIIG, SCHVIESAU AFFIRNED THAT A"III ISVERY ALERT TO DEVELOPflENrS, But- PROBABLY 1M "'ARE Of~RTHfIIG THAT HAS OCCURRED DURII~ ~~ P:~ WI, V~"

qwU:t EFFORT HAS MOVED INTOJiEI PHASE:WHEN ASKED WHET HER Mill WOILD ACCEPT HIS FATE QUIETLY ORnena, SCHWIESAU REPLIED THAT IlE Dm .or XIIOV.

,. AS fIE"BERS OF' THE ANrI-MlIIi ALII.IIEIIY , SCHVIESAUIDEIII'InD THE FOLLOWING NIIISTERS, NOTUG THE SIIIIIFlCAILCEOF THE FACJ' THAT ALL ARE NOI-PUSHrUIU FUAIICE IIUISTERABDIL KARl" 'USAQ, A HAZARAI JUSTICE "IIIISTER ABDIft.MXIPS SHARAI! JAUZJAlI, AN IJZBEXI PUBLIC WORKS "III5ThDASUSIR PANJSHIRI, A TAJIXI AND "liIsrER OF I'FORNATIONAIID CLTURE BARE;'SHAFEYE, A TAJIX. <HE DID Nor REITIO.(JI'HER IOI-POSHtUIS, LIKE MIIISTER OF CONIIDCE ABDUL QlDUS8KORBAIDI, A TAJIX, OR flIIISTER OF "IllES AID INDUSTRIES"OIWUlAND ISftAn. DARESH, A XtllLBASH.> SCHVIESAU I"PLIEDtHAT AR I"PORTAIT PARt OF tHE CURREIft POLITICALFRoa.Eft IS tIlE EXCESSIVE PUSKTURIZATION TEIDERCIES OFtHE CIJUtENI' IHALQI LEADERSHIP.

C. WH£II tHE A1DCfI OBSERVED THAT It lOW SEEMED A LITtLELATE II THE nIlE FOR AR ATTEllPI' TO ACHIEVE A PCLITICALSlLurIO. TO tHE JOIALQI IlESS, SCHVIESAU GRAVELY NODDEDHIS AGREDlEIf. SCINIESAU FURTHER AGREED THAT A••UIIIEL Y EXPANDED POLITICAL BASE WOU NOW APPEARDIFrlClLT TO CONSTRUCT SliCE tHE IKALQIS SEU TO HAVEaLlElATED AL"OST EVERY ELEMENT OF.,WKAI SOCIEty.

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7. SCJNIESAU vIlE OR TO COPIPLAIN BITTERLY ABUT THERASH INCOftPETENCE OF THE KHALQ! L£ADERSHIP THAT UEVITABLYLED TO THE CtMR£Nl SnUATlOIi. AS AM EXAPIPLE, t£ CITED THECOraROVERSIAL LAND REFOR.. PROGRA.. ; WHICH HAS BEEII RESPONSIBLEFOR P1UCH OF THE OPPOSITION 1M THIS COUIITRY. SCHVIESAURECALLED THAt HE HAD VARIIED THE KHALQIS LAST YEAR TOGO !LOW WITH A COMPLICATED PROGRAPI OF THIS TYPE. ADVISINGTHEPI THAT THE GERPiAN DEPIOCRATIC REPUBLIC, -THE MOSTADVANCED SOCIETY IN THE SOCIALlsr CAPlP, -HAD' CAREFULLYPHAstD IT 5 LAtI>-REF'ORft PROGRA" OVER A fiFtEEN-YEARPER 100. SCHVIESAU ADDED GlUPll Y THAT THE OVERLY ERrHUSIASTICKHALQIS REJECTED HIS ADVICE -- AND sr ATED THEIR COIVICTIOITHAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WOlLD SUPPORT THEIR ACCELERATEDPROGRAM. AFTER SIX MONTHS, SCHVIESAU OBSERVED, IT VASQ.EAR THAT LAflD REFORfII VAS A DISASTEIl. t£ RECALLED HOWMAllY LANDLESS All) -LAII)-POOR- PEASANTS HAD WANTED TOREFUst TO ACCEPT LAtI) BECAUSE OF RD-IGlOOS SCRUPLES ORFEAR OF F'UI'lJRE RETRIBut ION BY THE DEPRIVED LANDLORDS.THE KHALQIS FORCED THEM TO ACCEPT THE LAII), THREATENINGTHEPI WITH IPlPRISO...ENt IF' THEY REFUSED. ACCORDING TOSCHVIESAU, SEVERAL OF T H£SE PEASANTS LATER COI'IMJTTEDSUICIDE.

S. COI'tPlEHT: THROUGH SCHVPQSAU, THE SOVIETS WOULD SEE" TO 8EtRYING TO PlAICE CERTAIN THAT WE ARE BEING KEPT- INZRPlED- 15 ,,-

1$5 S3,3398.3,5 -- FOGIWHATEVER PURPOSETHEY HAVE IN PlIND. (AN INTERESUNG NOTE, INCmENTALLY,IS THAT SCKWIESAU HAD A LARGE BOUQ(£T OF TOWERS DELIVEREDCHARGE AMsrurZ A"ER TH£lR JULY 11 HE£tGNG.'

9.· THIS EMBASSY RE"AINS SICEPTICAl THAT THE SOVIETS VIl.l.BE ABLE TO BROADEN! THE POLITICAL BASE OF THE AFGHANREGIME SUFFICIENrlY TO srILl THE WIDESPREAD INSURRECTIONIN AFGHANISTAN. VE FREQUENTLY HEAR RUPIORS THAT THE SOVIETSARE sr aL TRYING TO BUILD A NEW REGIME AROUND FORNERROYAlISI' PRIME PlINISTER YUsur, W}fO WOULD PROBABLY SERVEAS A FIGUREHEAD PERSONAGE. THE LARGE NUPIBERS OF AFGHANS~HO HAVE NOW BEEN INCITED TO BLOOO-FElD ACTION ARE UNLIKElYTO BE F'OOLED BY Q.D WINE IN NEW BOTTLES. ANY SOLUTIONINVOLVING THE REPlACEMENT OF KHALQIS BY PARCHAPIIsrSWOLLO ALSO BE A LOSER. THE LATTER' ARE ALSO REGARDED BYAFGHANS AS PRO-fl!OSCQIi ATHEISTS.

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E.O. 12065: GDS 7-29-65 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-FTAGS: PGOl, PINS, 1FSrBJECT: (LOU) AMIN GIVEN MORE DIRECT ROLE IN PROSECUTIN~COUNTERINSURGENCY

1. (c) SUMMARY: P~lME MINISTER AMIN HAS BEEN GIVEN AMORE DIRECT ROLE IN CARRYING OUT THI REGIME'S TRUGGLEAGAINST TFt DOMESTIC INSURGENCY, AS WELL AS RESPONSIBILITYFOR DIRECTLY CONTROLLING AFFAIRS OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY.T~IS ENHANCED POS1TION SUGGESTS HIS DEPARTURE FROM THEscrNE IS NOT fET IMMINEN!, ALTHOUGH IT IS UNCLEAR ~EERt

TFIS PARTICULAR DEVELOPMENT FITS IN THE STILL UNFOLDI~G

POLITICAL DRA~A BIRE. END OF SUMMARY.

2. (LOU) RADIO AFGHANISTAN, IN ITS FVENING NEWS BROAD­CAST ON JULY 27, CARRIED A "DECREE" FROM PRESIDENT NOORMOHAMMAD TARAKI WHICH APP~ARS TO ENHANCE THE ROLE OF PRIMEMINISTF~ BAFIZULLAB AMIN IN COM~ATTING THE DOM1STIC IN­SURGENCY. ACCORDING TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT, "THE CONTINUEDAGG~ESSION" '~AI~~T AFGHANISTAN BY ·PAKISTANI AND IRANIANMILITIAMEN" BAS REQUIRED TARA~I TO ASSU~~ PERSONAL LEADER­SHIP or THE C~UNTRY'~ DErE~SE A~D COMMAND OF TBE ARMEDFORCES. TARAKI, ~OWEVEP., ~AS ·ENTRUSTED" AMIN, IN ADDI­TIO~ TO P.IS OTHER DUTIES, WITP TEE EXECUTION OF TARA~I'SORD~B5, AND HA~ IN~TRqCTED THZ PRIME MINISTER TO REPO~T

REGULARLY R~GA?rI~~ F~OG?~S~ I~ TH! COUNTEP.-INSVRGENCYEFFO~T. MOREOV!o. A~I~ H~S !IEN INsrSUCTID TO "TAKE OVE~­TEE AFFAIRS OF TR~ MINIST~Y aF D~rENSE nNDER TAR~V.I'S

213

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OVERALL COMMA~D AND GOIDA~CE.

~. (C) COMMENT: WHERE TfI~ PARTICULAR DEVELOPMENT FITSIN TBE CUR~!NTLY UNFOLDING POLITICAL DRAMA HERE IS STILLUNCLEAR. VHAT ·SEEMS FAIRLY CERTAIN, EOVE'ER, IS TBAT THEAU!HORIT~ AND, PERHAPS, POLITCIAL PRESTIGIE 01 DEFENSEMINISTER ~OHAM~AD ASLAM WATANJAR HAS BEEN DIMINISHED.MANY OBSERVERS BELIEtt THAT WATANJAR COULD PLAY A PROMINENTPART IN A~T EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A MORE !ROADtT BASED RE­GIME -- BECAUSE HE IS CO~SIDIRED MORE NATIONALIST THAN THETARAtI/AMIN TEAM -- AND HIS FAT! MAT PROVIDE HINTS REGARDINGDIRlCTIONS POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS MAY TAKE.

4. (e) AT 1 MINIMUM, THE ANNOUNCEMENT POINTS TO A LARGERAND ~OR! DIRECT ROLE FOR AMIN IN TEE DRA'S ANTI-INSURGENCYBATTLE, A POSITION VHICH SUGGESTS THAT 1MIN'S DEPARTURE -­TO PAVE T6E ~AT FOR SOME SORT OF ·NATIO~AL FRONT· REGIME-- IS NOT YET IMMINENT. UNCERTAI~TlrS CO~CERNING THELOTALTY AND MORAt! or TBE ARMED FORCES COULD HAVE PROMPTEDTPoIS Movr, SINCE THE DRA LEADERSHIP MAY BATE FELT THATAMIN, RATPER THAN PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER WATANJAR, WILL BE~ORE CAPA!LE OF INSTILLING PROPER REVOLUTIONARY ZEAL WITHINTHE WEARY AND F.ARD-PRESSED.AFGPA~ MILITARY FORCES. AT THE!IME OF TBE 1978 REVOLUTION, AMIN HAD MANY DIRECT PERSONALTIES TO ~ILITARY orFICERS, MOST or WfOM HE HAD PERSONALLY~rCRuITtD INTO THE PARTY. ~Hr. CURRENT STATE OF THOSE TIESAFTER MOR! TRAK ONE TrAR OF PURGES, INSURGENCY, AND INSTABILITYIS.UN~NOWN. A~STUTZ

'T#5683

214

•THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION INAFGHANIST~~

1. The localized tribal fighting that erupted in the eastern

provinces ....hen thepro-50viet coup group seized po....er In

late April 1918 has since grown into a countr}~ide

insurgency. (5)

B.•

,-

A. Faced with the hostility of the great majority

of the traditionally independent population, the

regime of President Taraki and prime Minister Amin

haS·Do ~tte~~t~a~-an even chan1t to complete its

second year in power. (5)

Taraki 'lnd Amin will survive only as long as the

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broadly based 90vernment as a means of

defusing the tribal insurgency. (s)

I

led by, or at least have the backing of leftist

military officers. (5) ",:.. ;' 'r' .:l "i .. ~ ." f-.

The most likely successor regime would be

loyalty of the military, the security service and

the ruling party remainsintact.~~~~tS~:h~~vY·~~~~~~':~i~9"i);~~9'htt~b-;;;~\;Yh~a~~~~f;~C~S~ .·~(~)1.

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. ' I.:C···;,:-:-,:.. t;" 2. Coup plotters might seek MOSCOW's tacit approvcalJ' . ~. "'.. I - ~ .. , L' \\\":,,,

l~.'.::::.~_r·~~]::'~"1"~."t'\... ;"\..t:~ se1.ze f'Owerwould in any case retain s~rong

1\..:1.J~a..J."_ ~;.,t-.t . ties with the50viet Union. (5)

~·.~-J1''- ~:J~i .~"~.):.~~~: The Soviets favor the ).nstallation of; a more- - : _.. -.-..r\. \v... '/: '....(.. (( '.>

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JI. Taraki and Amin have been the key fignres in the regime

since the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan seizea

power in April l~78. (S)

A. However. Taraki, 62, is not in good health and.there

are signs he is playing a less active role than

during the early days of the revolution. (S)

B. Amin is de facto key decision-maker in the day-to

day affairs of the gove~ent. (S)."7.'~- '" .) _ l.·' ,

1. His status a8 the regime's IIlOveE 'nd· shaKer was

confirmed 31 March when he was ~romoted from•

deputy prime minister to prLme minister, a

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post Taraki had held since the revolution. (S)

The regime's key policymaking body is the ruling

party's seven-man Political Bureau. (S)

1. Taraki. AlDin and Deputy Prime Minister Shah Wali

IIl4ke up the Political Bureau's Secretariat. (S)

The top party leade~hip seems fairly well united as

it faces the country's multiple domestic problems. (S)

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1. There are some frictions but the key figures

recognize they must submerge their differences

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at a time when their survival is threatened by

a countrywide insurgency. (S)

The beleaguered Taraki regime's survival has come to

. depend increasingly, as the insurgency has spread, on

Soviet political, military, economic and technical support.

(There are between 1,5000 and 2,000 soviet advisers

presently in Afghanistan.) (S)

- - 2 -

53 •

•A. Afghanistan's nearly total dependence on Moscow

has given the Soviets far more say in the ~~ghan

C~vernment's day-to-day decisionmaking process

than they have ever had., (5)

1. Still, Taraki and AJdn appear to be setting

the main 1ines of policy. (5)

B. The regime does not yet face a security situation

that might prompt a request to Moscow for the

direct intervention of Soviet forces. (S)

However, an appeal for Soviet combat ~it.

is conceivable within the next 12 months. (5)

indefinitely trying to shore up a discredited

(11l~~~J.Ut.,~~~1N'J..Jtr1'~~.P.. f., t~. '"regime. CS) ..~ ;;~~- hAt""" "lU~'o~t:"J~'"

~fk. oJ.~i.~~·CA~'1t ISoviet leaders -also 'tiiv d-weign-the reqioD 1--

The Soviets wi1l go to some lengths to protect theiJ::

interests in Afghanistan but probably not to ,the

C') ,.If /

extent of ~ntervenin9 militarily. S ()J-flU'1'oA,. /. -~-. ---

1. The Soviets would be deterred' by the prospects

that their forces would be bogged down

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c.

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particularly wiht respect to Iran, Pakistan

and India--and international political costs

3.

of -direct intervention. (5)

However, if serious f~c;Jhtin9 broke out in areas

- 3 ­SECRET

54•

near the Soviet border, Moscow lI\iqht provide, J('{' '214')

increased numbers of tactical aircraft, ~ellcopters,, tnJ

pilots and advisers to assist Kabul. (5)

~T -~'~J -(,( ~\I(I':21 ,p.,'~·v-J.o':>

•tribal insurgency, which continues to spread and erode

military capabilities. (5)

A. If morale in the military continues to decline

it will affect the government's ability to hold

Kabul and other key cities. (5)

B. Casualties and defect.ions to the rebels have left

the regime short of men in major commands through­

out the country. (5)

C. In spite of continuing Soviet support, the Afghans•

face pr~blems in maintaining equipment and supplying

units in the field. (5)

v. The tribal insurgents operate with impunity in oyer half

of the country. They have overrun a few government

~sitions i~ the eas~ and interdicted main roads for a •few hours but they have been unable to seize an important

town. (5)

A. They lack centralized leadership and strategic

1~' ),. "; T. '....... - .' ".f' ~oorQination needed to unify them int.o a cohesive

They have a long t~adition of guerrilla warfare

(5)regime for some time.

.,J f .. ~·.~ ~t._~ ..1, ..... ~ ~~should"be able to maintain pressure

1.

i . Ii , I •• ...:... - ." fprce. (5)'.' "'~;' I"".: \:1.1.:J..~ • ,B. Still, they

• ' '.. ,.. i 1:·, .!.,J .,. • _I ;•.•':.• - f a.gainst the

arms captured from government forces. (S)

and can draw on large manpower reserves. (S)

2. Simple logistic requirements enable them to

live off the land and to equip themselves with

- 4 ­':SECRETr .. I

55

', .... •

A •

B.

)l /'1 j ; .' I( 1 'I ~ <I

I. The Soviets have suffered setbacks in relation. with

the US and the PRe and have made little progress 1~

mending rifts inside the C~unistallianceand move­

ment, but they have clearly registered gains in the

third world, particularly in Africa, the Middle East,

South and Southeast Asia. Some ot these galna have

been marginal but--if cleverly exploited--could lead

to larger triumpha.

XI. The extent of Soviet involvement in Africa haa

increased significantly in recent years.

The number of Soviet advisers--both military and

civilian--in 29 African states now-totals nearly

8,000. Cubans total almost 50,000.

The Soviet Union has signed friendship treaties

with Angola, Ethiopia, and Hozambique--but had

one abrogated by Somalia in 1977.cJ!

C. The USSR is the princi~ foreign backer of the

Angol~ 3nd Ethiopian governments, and is deeply

involved with the Rhodesian patriotic front

guerrilla movement.

III. Moscow's greatest success ir Africa has, ot course,

been in Ethiopia.

•SECRETNOFORN

.. J- ~ . (. ~ . .i- .•."1'.. ( • «v.... <.- , •• a ,:t.. "." 1:lf( .... ''''\ .•0;'.. ,,- •~. £.(~, c • t"'. ~ I' ' .. / . JII ~ '!..,;.. /.... "",,:-.• ~c·.:, Of ... ••" ... a- ... _--

..... eo. ~. 11 ...... , ...

,. r; ~ ,: .. ( ,- c.. #0 I r.-. 1......4 ., / I:::"

t J.f , f , ,,:,...' """ ... (

;J'll 1',.:. ~f."

~) r (. ,t t~·.

N()FO~'1

A. Mengistu could not have pulled off his military

success in the Ogaden and his more limited

achievement in Eritrea without Soviet guidance,

assistance, and logistic support. The Ogaden

campaign in particular was conceived and led by

a Soviet general officer--an unprecedented in­

volvement for the Soviets in the third world•

.And i. lIved 1~,jOO-15,OOO Cuban troops, equipped

by Soviets.

1. The Soviets have nearly 2,000 military and

civilian advisers in Ethiopia and the conclu-

sion of the Soviet-Ethiopian friendship treaty

in November indicates that Moscow is di99~n9

tor the long haul.

2. Possible base rights to replace those lost in

Somalia.

A. Dahlak Island with floating pier and

floating barge.

B. But Ethiopia still independent and ethnocentric.

Some differences in relations and ultimately

Soviets may go out as did in Egypt, etc.

-2-

SECRETNOFORN

102

•1.

. II It_I"

tW, c)I{N

~c.onomic agreements su~gest Soviets may make

a special effort to meet some of Ethiopia's

more important needs and thus assure Moscow'.

long-term presence.

IV. Relations between Moscow and Angola are also good with

no indications of serious policy differences.

A. The Soviet-Angolan friendship treaty provided for

the strengthening of ~litary cooperation on the

Mbasis of corresponding agreements which are

being concluded,· an unusual formulation in'a

soviet friendship treaty. (1,000 Soviet military

advisers, 19-26,000 Cuban military).

1. So far Soviet military assets in Angola

include a shore-based communitations link

between naval headquarters in .Moscow and Luanda.

The Soviets reportedly run the Luanda naval

base where their naval, merchant and fishing

ships enter and depart at will. An AMUR-class

repair ship has been stationed at the base and

has serviced soviet naval ships, including

hull maintenance for the diesel submarine on

patrol in the area. Since 1977, Soviet TU-95

long-range aircraft have deployed to Luanda

-3-

SECRETNOFORN

IO~

\

\

......."... ,'r

airfields periodically for reconnaissance

operations over the South Atlantic and around

the Cape of Good Hope.

2. The aircraft-carrier Minsk rec~ntly called

in Angola and Mozambique.

B. Military assistance is the foundation of Soviet

influence in Angola, but the Soviets have also

moved to make their influence felt in key

financial and commercial ministries.

C. There have been reports of friction between the

Angolans and Soviets and Cubans at the working

level, but so far these do not appear to have

led to serio~s differences between the two

gover. .nts.

The Soviets also want to carve out a larger, more

influential role for themselves in Rhodesia, believing

that any majority government t'lat achieves power as

the result of military struggle will be more dependent

on the USSR and less receptive to Western influence.

A. To achieve this objective, the Soviets have:

1. _U~ged an expansion of military operations by

the PF against Rhodesia.

-4-

SECRETNOFORN

Ifl..1

•2.

. I J

l~lJ~"lJJd;

Otf~red Lo in~rease deliveries of militdry

cquipr.lent to the PF and to increase the number

01 :oviet and Cuban advisers working in Zambia

and Mozambique.

3. Encouraged the major factions of the Patriotic

Front to unify their organizations and form a

government-in-exile.

4. Have increased military deliveries to Zambia

and J.1ozamblque.

B. But, both FLS and PF suspicious of Soviet ~otives.

C. Military assitance has clearly been the key to

~ Soviet successes in Africa thus far, but poor

economic performance could ultimately undermine

this success and diminish Soviet prospects in

such areas as Nigeria and Guinea where military

assistance is accorded a lower priority. Toure

has seriously reduced Soviet presence.

1. nigeria is particularly disenchanted with

Soviet economic performance.

VI. President Sadat's willingness to pursue a separate

treaty with Israel could provide the Soviets with an

opportunity to reverse their recent dismal performance

in the Middle East.

~-5-

SECRETNOFORN

:-) r •. ".l:';~Or'O~N

A. In recent years, the Soviets have witnessed:

1. The complete deterioration of their relations

with Eqypt--the former linchpin to the Soviet

position in the Arab world.

2. A worsening of relations with Syria because

of Syrian intervention in Lebanon against

another soviet client, the PLO. And,

3. Increased Iraqi flexibility which has been

marked by economic and military purchases

in the West as well as the execution of

prominent Iraqi communists.

~. There also are trends in the region that are favor-

able to the Soviets.

1. The us and West Europe are already faced with

higher oil prices, which is in Moscow's interest~

2. Soviet clients in the area--particularly the

radical Libyans, the Marxist South Yemenis

and the stateless Palestinians--serve as

middlemen or at least spokesmen for the USSR.

3. TI luthority of established governments in

the region is becoming more fragile and, a~

power bases become smaller, the opportunity

for Soviet exploitatio~ becomes greater.

-6-

SECRETNOFORN •

•4 'J In.: d<:li\ibC of Ct:NTO.

C. The Soviets will have to move cautiously to

exploit these ncw opportunities, since key AIab

statcs already are alert to an expansion of Soviet

influence in the area. Saudi and Iraqi in~ecurity,

for cxample, has already bcen heightened by:

1. 'l'he toppling of the nonaligned Afgban. govern­

ment in April 1978 by a Soviet-trained army

~u· ed by a small number of local communists.

2. The assassination of the North Yemeni president

by a South Yemeni, and the coup in South Yemen

in June 1978 that broug' t to power a leadership

more receptive to the Soviet leadership. And,

3. Soviet logistical support for the South

Yerneni's in the recent PDRY attack against

North Yemen.

D. The Soviets will also try to exploit Arab resis-

tance to the separate treaty between Egypt and

Israel, particularly among the Syrians, the Iraqis,

and the Libyans.

1. Even Saudi Arabia has been flirting with the

idea of diplomatic contacts with the Soviets

because of its recognition of expanded Soviet

influence in the region.

- '7-

SECRETNOFORN

VII. :':OSl:OW'S jlllcres.t in South Asi is less intense than

its interest in the Middle Last, but the region is

close to the USSR and the Soviets do not want it to

be used for actions inimical to the USSR.

A. The Afghan government has always needed Soviet

political, military and economic support, but

the increasingly close relationship with Moscow

threatens Afghan independence and President Taraki s

own freedom of action and risks increasing popular

discontent. The number of Soviet a~visers may

have doubled since Taraki's coup--to about 3,500

including 1 200 with the military.

1. Taraki's Soviet-backed regime is already

facing serious threats from Mosl~m insur-

gencies, which have already forced Moscow to

become directly involved in keeping the

government afloat.

2. Soviet military advisers have been helping

government forces combat the insurgencies

in eastern Afghanistan, where Soviet pilots

reportedly have flown MI-24 helicopter gunship

operations along the Afghan border with Pakis-

tan.

-8-

SECRETNOFORN

108

.'- :

J. ,_ I, l. ... i",.", .::; .~lo.1Y ho.1vC .,d~o t..skcn pull in

It!lInlJing rebel-held posit.lons in Herat recently,

and Soviet militdry and civilian advisers

have been killed by various dnti-gover~ent

forces.

4. Soviet efforts to protcct their e~uily in

Afyhanist.m could complicate Soviet relations

with both India dnd Pakistan and could even

jeopardize chances for Senate ratification of

the SALT II treaty.

VIII. The Soviets are also acting to bolster their strategic

pos it i on in 1\sia in the wdke of the Sino-Japilnese

rapprochcment, the normalization of Sino-American

relations. and Bp.ijing's dbrogdtion of the Sino-

Sovi I·t f; ndship treaty. The Soviets appear to

bclieve that a stronger mi litary position in t:.he area

will in the long term compel the North Asian nations

to take Soviet interests in~o account.

A. The most dramatic Sovie~ moves have been in the

Pacific.

1. The Soviets now have t.he aircraft cacrier

Minsk under the Pacific con~and_

2. Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border

are being upgraded and, earlier t.his year.

-9-

SLCRETNOFORN

llUr'ORN

-.

the Soviets held the most extensive military

exercise ever staged along the border.

3. General petrov reportedly has become the

~ander-in-chief of a newly formed Far East

command and also participated in the exercise.

B. The continuous enhancement of Soviet forces in

1\s1a will not contribut(~ I..> the success of Moscow' &

intensified diplomatic activity in the area.

1. The Soviet presence in Vietnam will irritate

other Southeast Asia countries and complicate

soviet bilaterals with them.

2. Soviet activity in the Northern Territories

will not go down well with the Japanese, who

have used it to justify higher military

budgets and closer defense cooperation with

the us.

3. An antagonistic soviet posture on the border

with China certainly does not augur well

for talks that are tentatively slated to begin

in Moscow in ~id-September.

A. It is possible for example in view of

China's previous precondition for Soviet

withdrawal from Mongolia, that Soviet

-10-

SECRETNOFORN

I I ()

deploymeJlls along the Sino-Sovie~-Mon<Jolia

border will become an intractable proble~

in the early stages of negotiations.

b. The recent border incident alonq tbe 51no­

Sov1et border could also delay the talks.

c. Soviet activity could, therefore, accelerate trends

toward greater Sino-US-Japanese cooperation that

Moscow would like to forestall .

-11-

SECRETNOFORN

•6Auc7~ i'

POLCHGECONCHRONRF

ZlSVVV ESA923MJC30900 RUbt1HP.DE RUSBLK 15967/1 2181005ZNY SSSSS ZZHo P 061012Z AUG 79~ AMEMBASSY KABULTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASK>C IMr:EDIATE 5085INFO RU~JPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY (i58RUSBQO/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 9125RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1124RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1192RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1799RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 315RUSBKR/A:"ICONSU. KARACHI PRIORITY 4388RUHQHQA/CINCPAC PRIORITYRUSNAAA/CINCEUR PRIORITYRUFHNA/US"lISSION USNATO PRIORITY 21BTSEC R E r SECTION 1 OF' 2 KABUL 5967

NOFORN

DEPr. Ai. SO FOR: A/SY/CC

KARACHI: FOR RSS

E.O. 12QJ~: GDS 8-5-85 (FlATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-PTAGS: ASEC, PINS, AF, PK, IRSUEJECT: <LOU) AN INITIAL EVALUATION OF' THE BALA HISSAR MUTINY

REF': KABUL 5942

I. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.>

2. SUMMARY: KABUL WAS AGAIN CALM ON AUGUST 6, FOLLOWINGSEVERE FIGHI'ING THE PREVIOUS DAY BETWEEN MUTINOUS AFGHANTROOPS AND FORCES LOYAL TO THE KHALQI REGIME. AFTER RE­SI'ORING ORDER, THE LATTER CLAIMED THAT THE TROUBLE HADBEE N CA USED BY "THE AGENT S OF PAKI ST ANI AND IRANIAN RE­ACT ION." THIS WAS AMONG THE MOST SERIOUS CHALLENGES THEKHAt QI REGIME HAS YET FACED. -- AND IT SHOWED ITSELF" CAPABLEOF HANDLING IT. HOWEVER, THE EIISODE FORESHADOWED GROWINGPR091EfIlS FOR THE KHALQI REGIME AND ITS SOVIET MENTORS. ENDOF SlJ'IMARY•

228

,J. AS DAWN ROSE OVER KABUL ON AUGU6, THE CITY WASSlLLENLY QUIET, AND UNDER THE F'IRM CONTROL OF'THE KHALQIREGIME. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF' THE CONTINUED CLOSURE OF' AFEW STRATEGIC STREETS, TRAF'F'IC WAS ALLOWED TO Fl.Ow FREELY-- OVER PAVEMENt'S TORN BY SPEEDING TANK TREADS THE PRE­VIOUS AFTER NOON.

04. MOST OF' THE AUGUST 5 F'IGHTING APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CEN­TERED AT AND NEAR KABUL· S ANCIENT BALA HI SSAR F'ORTRESS,SCENE OF' BATTLES OVER SEVERAL CENTURES. ESSENT I ALL Y, THEMAJOR CONFl.ICT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN BETWEEN MUT I NOUS TROOPSIN THAT AREA AND ARMORED UNITS, WHO REMAINED LOAYLTO THE KHALQI REGIME. EXACTLY WHAT INITIATED THE F'IGHTINGIS sr ILL UNCLEAR. SOME KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERSTHINK THAT A BALA HISSAR UNIT LAUNCHED THE MUTINY, BUT THAT THEBACKUP F'ORCES T HE MUTINEERS HAD DEPENDED UPON SUBSEQUENTLYCHICJ<ENED OUT. ALTHOUGH MUTINOUS TROOPS \IERE F'IGHTING INSIDE THEBALA HISSAR, THE RED KHALQI FLAG WAVED OVER THE F'ORTRESSDURI NG THE ENT IRE BATTLE. THIS INDICATES T HAT THEY PROBABLY NEVERGA INED F'LLL CONTROL OVER THAT ENT IRE MIllT ARY COMPLEX. THEAOOUsr 5 MUTINY, LIKE THE HAZARA SHI·A UPRISING OF' JUNE23, F'A n.ED TO IGNITE ANY SIGNIF'ICANT SUPPPRTING ACTION ELSE­WHERE IN THE CITY, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE ISOLATED F'IRING IN­CIDENT S THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT [email protected].

.~,

s. ALTHOUGH n IS DIFrIClLT TO EVALUATE THE CASUALTIESAND PROPERTY DAMAGE AT THI S TIME BECAUSE SOME OF THE PRIMARYAFFECTED AREAS ARE STILL CORDONED OFF BY GOVERNMENT FORCES,EXTENSIVE TANK FIRE AND HELICOPTER GUNSHIP FIRE WAS PUMPEDINTO THE BALA HISSAR NEIGHBORHOOD FOR OVER TWO HOURS INA TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF KHALQI OVERKILL TACTICS. ONE AFGHANSOURCE, WHO LATER WAS AaLE TO GET NEAR TO THE BATTLE SITE,REPORTS THAT LARGENUMBERS OF MUT INOUS TROOPS WERE SLAUGH­TERED. AlTHOUGH ~E HAVE NO WAY OF' VERIFYING CASUALTYFlGURES, WE DID NOTE DtfflING THE BATTLE WHAT APPEARED TO BEGOVERM"J~NT FIRING AT TROOPS FLEEING OVER THE SHERDARWAZAHMOUNTAINSIDE THAT OVERLOOKS THE BALA HISSAR. WE ALSO NOTEDHElICOPTER GUNSHIPS F'IRING IN THE VICINITY OF THE KABUL-LOGAR ROAD. THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AT FLEEING ML1T INEERS.

6. THE MODO IN KABUL TODAY IS SULLEN AND RESENTFUL. IT ISTYPIFIED BY AN AFGHAN WHO MUTTERED TO AN EMBASSY OFFICERz-,IF OM.. Y THEY DID NOT HAVE THOSE PLANES, \lo'E MUSLIMS WOUlD'TAKE CARE OF THE~ THIS COMMENT, INCIDENTALLY, ILLUSTRATESTHE EFFICACY OF THE KHALQIS' HARDHITTING RETALIATORY TACTICS.THEY DO PRODUCE A S03ERING, INTIMIDATING EFFECT ON ANYONEWHO IS CONTEMPLATING ENTERING INTO THE FRAY.er15967

230

NNNNVV ESA925~JC321

00 RUQIlHRDE RUSBLK 15967/2 21P.le57ZNY SSSSS ZZ Ho P 061012Z AUG 79 rF1'I ArlEMBASSY KABl1. u AUG i: . -1,TO RUEHC/SECSTATE It:ASHDC IMMEDIATE 5086INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY ElEIJING PRIORITY 659RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISlAMA3AD PRIOF:ITY 912~

RUDTC/Al'IEMBASSY LONDON PRIOR IlY 1725RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEll' DElHI PRIORITY 7193RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 180~

RUQlIHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 376RUSBKJUAMCONSLL KARACHI PRIORITY 4309RUHQHQA/lINCPAC PRIORITYRUSNAAA/CINCEUR PR lOR IT YRUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 22BT .5 E C RET SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 5967

NOFORN

DEPT. AlSO FOR: A/SY/CC

KARACHI: FOR RSS

E.O. 12065: GDS 8-5-85 (FLATIN, BRUC:: ft.> OR-?

7. COMMENT: THE BALA HIS~A? !:>ATTLE OF AUGUsr 5 ALSO ILLUSTRATEDONE OF THE MAIN WEAKENSSES OF THE KHALQI REGIME: TH~!4

E-TERIORATING RELIABILITY OF ITS REGULAR TROOPS. IT ALSOD.LUSTRATEO AT THE SAME TIME AN IMPORTAf\'! COMPO~!ENT OFTHE CO NT I NUl NG STRENGT H OF' T HE TOUGH, TENACIOUS KHALQILEADERSHIP: THE FIRM SUPPPORT OF' THE COUNTRY'S Kr:Y FORC:::S,SUCH AS COMMANDO UNITS, ARMORED BRIGADES, AND THE AIR FORCE.AS IN THE REVOLUTION OF APRIL 27-28, 1978, THE TANl< AGAINPROVED ITSElF TO BE A KEY YJEAPON IN SECURING THE CONTROLOF KABUL. TO A LESSER DEGREE, THIS ~"AS ALSO TRUE OF THEHElICOPI'ER GUNSHIPS. AS ""AS THE CASE DURING T HE JUNE 23UPRISING, THE KHALQIS AGAIN MADE QUICK USE OrTHEIR PROPAGANDA ASSETS: DROPPING LEAF"LET~ FROM HELl­COPTERS, MAKING ANNOUNCEMENTS F"Ror1 SOUND TRUCKS,AND ISSUING BUSINESSLIKE RADIO AND TELEVTSION BULLETINS.

2.31

•." '

Be THE AUGUsr 5 BATTLE WAS A MUCH MORE SERIOUS CHALLENGJ::TO THE KHAtQI REGIME THAN THE HAZARA SHI·A UPRISING OFJUNE 23 HAD BEEH. IN T HIS LATTER CASE, T HE GROWING PRO­aEM OF DISAFFECTION WITHIN MILITARY RANKS DISPLAYED IT­SELF IN THE CAPITAL -- IN F:1.A.L VIEW OF THE AFGHAN ELITEAND FOREIGN OBSERVERS. StNCE THE MILITARY AND POLICE DE­FECt'IONS OF THE HERAT UPRISING IN MARCH AND THE MUTINYAT THE JAl~ABAD ARMY BASE IN APRIL, THERE HAVE BEEN RE­PEATED REPORTS OF DESERTIONS AND DFECTIONS OF AFGHAN UNITSENJ

OED AGAINST REBEL FORCES ALL OVER AFGHANISTAN. SOME OFTHE UNITS INVOLVED HAVE BEEN LARGE, PERHAPS UP TO BATTALIONAND REGIMENTAL SIZE. ALTHOUGH THE KEY UNITS AROUNDKABlL REMAIN LOYAL AND EFFECTIVE -- AS THEY PROVED THEM­SELVES AGAIN ON AUGUST 5, THIS HEMORRHAGING OF MANPOWER ISLIKELY TO CONFROHI' THE KHALQIS AND THEIR SOVIETMEHI'ORS WITH SOME TOUGH CHOICES. UNTIL NOW, THE USSR HASBEEN ABLE TO KEEP THE TARAKI-AMIN OPERATION AFl.;OAT THROUGHGENEROUS INJECTIONS OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT, MILITARY MATERI~L,

'AND MILITARY ADVISORS. THE LATTER HAVE BECOME STEADILYflIORE NlJlIEROUS -- PERHAPS NOW TOTALLING SOME 2,000 ~- ANDTHEY HAVE BEEN ENTERING INTO DIREIQ

COMMAND ROLES IN SOMEUNITS. THEREFORE, THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET COMMITMENTAPPEARS TO BE EVOLVING THROUGH STAGES NOT TOO UNLIKE THOSETHE USG WENT THROUGH IN VIETNAM (E."G., THE GRADUAL SOVIETASSlJlIPI'ION OF CONTROL OVER BAGRAM AIR BASE>.

'9'. fJl-.»ffll.:::Or.THE,WORSENING MANPOWER SITUATION,--f~ts COlLD EVENTUALLY ASK THE SOVIETS~-iJp;rHEIR ANTE HERE gy CONTRIBUTING SOME COMBWOSUNI'I'S."'ONE POSSIBLE SCENARIO THE SOVIETS MAY CONSIDER IS THEASSIGNMENT OF SPECIAL COMBAT

, • ReES TO KABUL, JALALABAD,AND -6304 (36 LOCATIONS -TO 'PROTECT SOVIET CIVILIANS" THERE.(MOTEa KAtllL· S fIIIIJmOYAN fCUSHfGJ)fSTRICT FOR SOVIETS HAD

.-J£AVY4II1t.1TAR)' PROfECTIOtVOlJR1'NG THE AUGUST 5 FIGHTING.>~..AF'COMf'tENr. "

Je.. SECURITY NOTEa NO AMERICANS WERE AFFECTED BY THE AUGUST, FIGHTING. THE U.S. MISSION IS CONDUCTING NORfllAL OPERA­TIONS.

AMSTUTZBI'15 967

232

'~,

NNNNVV ESB324BR!75~

PP !lUQM!!llDE ROrBN! #5515/~1 2231753ZNT SSSSS ZZEP 091737Z AUG 79r~ OSHISSION OSNAroTO RUERC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRI~RI!Y 1542INFO ROFHH/ALL NATO CAPITALSRUSBLt/AMEHBASST KABUL ~~18

RUEB~O/AHEMBASS! MOSCOW 6423ROEBBAC/AME~BASS! CANBERRA 0109ROQMBR/AHEM~AZST !IRRAN ~e11

RUSBQD/AHEMBASS! ISLAMABAD 0~71

BTSEC RET SECTION ~1 OF 0€ OSNATO ?~615

E.0.12065: RDS-l 08/09/89 (GLITMAN. HAY~ARD) OR-P1AGS: PINS. Ar. NATOSUBJECT: POLADS DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN (5)

REF: (1.) STATE 202431 (NOTAL). (B) STATE 204724

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

eN 358

POLCHGECONRFCRRON

2. AT AUGUST 7 POLITICAL CO~HITTEE HE~TIN~, o.~ .• FRG,CANADA AND TUR~IT SUBMITTED wRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS ONAFGHANISTAN SITUATION. TEXTS ARE TRANS~IrrrD PARA 6.U.I. REP WH~ HAD SU~GESTED EXCHANGE ON AFGHANISTAN ~x­PRESSED APPRECIAtION FOR CONTRIPUTIONS AND RECO~M~NDED

fBA! POLAD~. I~ VIEW OF THE DEVELOPING SITUATION, DISCUSSSUBJECT AT NEXT MEETING AS WELL. THIS ~AS AGREED.

3. U.s. RtP UNDERLI~ED PER REF A VASHIN~TON INTERESt INALLIED ASS!SS~ENT OF SOVITT INTENTIONS IN AfGFANISTAN(WRITTEN CONTRIBO'IONS ADDRESS THIS SUBJECT IN PART), ANDSAID T!~Rt SHOULD BE A CONTIN~ING rXCHANGf. ON THIS ~ITRIN

fHE COMMITTEE. CANADIAN REP, IN RFSPONSE TO U.S. DESCRIP­TION OF SUCCESSFUL EVACUATIO~ OF U.S. D!P~NDENTS A~D ~~~­

ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL FROM KA~OL, SAID TBAf CANADIANS TOOWERE "INTERESTED" IN r.VACUATION ISSUE. HE WENT ON TONOT~ OTTOWA'S VIlY TiAT REBEL MOVEMENT WO"LD REMAIN rRA~­MEN TED AND INEFFECTIVE O~TIL A SINGLE ANTI-TARA~I LEAD~F.

EMERGED WRICS BAS NOT bE~N TSE CASE TO DArE. CANADIANREP AS~ED FOR ANY VIEWS OR l~FOR~ATl~N OTHERS ~IGF.T HPV~

ON ]S ASPi:Cr.

4. I ALlAN REQUESTED THAT AUGUST 5 COD? RF THE SUBJECTOF THEa DISCUSSION AT ~Er.7 POLADS ~ErTI~G. FR~ RF.P .SAID HIS AUTHORITIES JERr NO! S~RE .r.E~R~~ R~CENT GJVERN-

~!NT RESHUfFLE WAS DUE TO DESIRF TO IMPPOVE EFFICIE~CT

CR WAS DIRECTED AGAI~ST ! POSS~BLE USSR IN~ERNAL -PLOT-.

5. ACTION REQUESTID: NEX! POLADS MEETI~G VILL BE AUGOS!21. VE VOOLD APPRECIATE ~LT OOB AU3UST 21 ANY WASnIN~TON

COMMENTS ON THE ALLIED PAPERS AND fBE VARIOUS POINTSRUSED ORALLY.

f. EEGIN !EXTS or ALLIED PAPERS:

E~GIN TEXT OF CANADIAN DELl~ATION P!PbB:

SITUATION IN AFG~!NISfAN

INTERNAL OPPOSITION

1. THE TRIBAL OPPOSITION MOVEMEN~ IS SLO~LI BUT STEADILYINCREASING IN AfGHANISTAN. ALTHOUGH rHE ~OVERNMINT CON­TINUES TO RETAIN CONTROL OF THE MAJOR URBAN CENTRES ANDTHE MAIN ROAD NETWORK. IT HAS SURRENDERED ITS AUf DORITY INT~E COUNTRYSIDE.

2. ALTHOUGH ARMED OPPOSITION IS INCREASING. IT CONTI~UES

,TO BE FRAGMENTED VITH LITTLE READILY APPARENT PROSPECTor MERGING INTO A COHESIVE FORCE. IT HAS NOT YfT DrVELOPEDTHE ClPACITY rOR SUSTAINED CO-ORDINATED HILITARY QUESTIONSSUIFICIENT TO [NOel OUT THE TARA~I ~EGIHE. DESPITE ANELEHENT 01 DISLOYALTY IN THE ARMED fORCES AND PROBLEMSOF ARMS AND ~~UIPM1NT SBORTA~ES, THE ~OVERNMENr SEE~S

ABLE ~o MAINTAIN ITSELf IN TSE URBAN CENTRES VHICH ARE'ITAL TO ITS EIISTENCE.

PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS---,-----------3. PAKISTAN CONTINUES TO RECEIVE AND TO HELP SUSTAINArGgAHISTAN RErUGEES VHILE AT THE SA~f TIME DOING ITS

.BEST TO LIMl~ THE REfOGEES' POLITICAL/MILITARY ACTIVITIES.THE PAIISTAN ATTEMPTS IN THIS AREA MIGFT BE BEARING SOHEFRUIT IN THAT THE USSR REPRESENTATIVES AND TASS aAVE INTHE PAST TWO VIlIS BEEN DROPPING VERBAL BOUQUETS ABOUT

,PAIISTAN AND P1IISTAN/USSR RE1ATIONS. WE SlY MIGHT· BE­CAUSE SUCH ACTIVITIES COULD'BE' INSPIRED BY SOMETHING OTHERTHA~ EVENTS IN AfGHANISTAN. 1.1. TO HA[E INROADS INCHINA'S COMPARATIVELY fAVOURED POSITION IN PA~ISTAN.

:~. iiE RECENT REDUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOVIET Ar.CU­S1T S Of PA[ISTAH'S CONNIVANCE VITB THE REBEL FORCESTER H THI ACTIVE SUPPORT or RlfUGEE AGITATORS MAT ~E

EASING ONE ASPECT or BORDER TENSIONS. NEVERTHELESS. ANISTI~ATED 125,000 RErUGEIS IN CAMPS AS ~ELt AS TBoaSANDSn"5615 "

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OF OTHER AFGHANISTAN R[F'UGEES P.Ef.I::lIHG !,.'ITil BORD;::;; llPEAKINSFOLK, IS A DRAI:; ON PAXIS7!,N'S PATIEIJCC: Arm ?ESO!!PCES.l'AKIST AN'S OBSESSION \HTH 1 HE SOVIET prl1:S?-tICE A':['l INFLU­ENCE WITHIN AFGHArHSifdl IS llPl?:?EOICTA9LE Ai·iD A FAC'i(j!~ CON­THIBUfUlG 1"0 n{E POTEr-.'TIAL FOR ItlSTA9ILITY IN THE ,o?'t:'A.THE IRRATION4L ELE~:'NTS IN HI!: rA!(IsrA~r F'OREIG~1 "'-iLlCY.INCLUDING ITS OOISLA!l1C" DP1EtlSIO~ ALSO PLAY A PMn.SOVIET ROLE'.-.----------5. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT AS FAR AS THE SOVIET POSITIONIS COHCER~ED LITTLE HAS CHANGED IN THE L,\ST TWO !·!O:lTHS.

Go WKILE THERE HAV:: BEEN PERSI :;TENT RUMOU:iS THAT THESOVIETS WOlJ'.. D BE PRE"A!~ED TO Dnop THE TA:?:'Il(J LfllT'fRSHIPI1~ FAVOUR OF A GRO:J D WHO "lICH! BE MORE ~CCEP; A3LE TOT HEAFGHANI5rAN MASSES. THERE HAS BEEN tlO H~.~W EVJDJ::/;Ci: TOSUPPORT THIS ASSERl IO:~. UDF.ED, T tIE rO?:::10ST :;0\'1 c:T OB-J~CTIVE r.usr BE TO I(EEP AFGH(.~JJ:rrAN CLO~:::LY UNOF.f{ THESOVIET THIMB AS Mol'( t:::HANGE I N f'O~.'ER IJIHIHI T HE ClJm~TRY

SHOULD ~IOT BE ALLO'i~D TO INTF.RF£RE WIT H THE "NEW LEVEL 00

0;'- f,OVIETlAF~HIINISTA:J RELATIOns. AT THi ~O:1ENT. TPEf?EFORE,IT VOllLD 1.I'P:::,\R H!,,\T THE SOVIETS HAVl. DF.fI~lITELY DECIDEDTO conrrN~I::': TO SU?paRT THE PRE:::::NT REGli';;:: liP TO A POINTS;~1)~1T OF VIflseT IrIEP.vElviIOrJ \1I11LE AT THE SAME TIMt:, THEY'/-11. Y' BE C,,\5i! ~G A90;jT FOq HE\o! U:ADERSHI P \o.'HERESY r HEY CANrr.JtITAIN TP~IR A::iFZ P::ESE::CE I.'HILE OF"F~RING A r.O?EP/ILATA8LE (,uVERN:-:E~;r TO THE AfGHAN PEOPLE.

CtJNCL USIO!~

7. THE Ci,L!. OF A';~"!'.N Mln.lAHS FOR A -,JIHAn- AGIIP'3'7 THETARnKl/n~IN n~GIME H~S Not LED TO THE EMERGE~CE OF ONELEADER FRO~ ~IT~I~ THE GU~RRILLA RANY~. WE HAVE ~1 EVI­I·:::NCE T!':.T ~):iE lUlU A?Pf.AR. klj~ SO LC.f;G f,S THE ClP::-OSITIC,')il~~.~ltlS [IISO~GANIED Tl-lE sroUC:CLE APr:'AF.~ BOllflD Tu oEPrtOT RACT ED.Etlu iEXT •

Si='~I\I<ING I:OrES

SUBJf:C!: AFGHflrJlGTAN; COI'J:·,ENTS O~l THE SOVIET ENGAGE.r~a!T

I. Ar(jii;,(HsrA~;'S WIERf::.!. 5£C~rry 5I1UATIar~ IS RAPIDLYWOR~E~r~G. THE PRO-MOS~G~ TARAKI R~GIME IS APPARENTLYFACI/I;,; IJlrF'IC~_T lESe Iii SPIrt: CF ~lf\SSIVE r1ILITARY SUPPORTBY T H:: SOVIETS IN THE Form O~ LARG::-SCALE DELIVERIES OrW::APor~s Arm THE U:iE OF I3F.TI'!F:EN 3,0$1~ AND 3,5~13 MILITARYADVI~::'~S - 50''1:: 0':- TH~M 1:: L;:A~I'i(l POSlrIO;IS - THE AFGHANCENTRAL GOVERti;1f. I IT HAS :>0 FAR BEEN UNABLE TO BREAK THEPREDO~'II tlANTLY f{~LIGIOUSL Y-:~uT1VAT£D RESIST MICE OF LARGEPARTS OF' THE P,')t"LU,TION. ON THE COtlTRARY, THE RESISTA:~CE

GROLIPS JI:~E ACHIi:~'JNG GRo\·.:H:G SUCCESSES. WITHOUT SOVIETSUPPORT, THE RF..GJilIE W(O~1.D F?09A9LY HAVE FALLEN A LOflGTIME AGO.

2. AS FAR AS iHE SOVIET LE~DEP.SHIP IS CONCERNED, THISMEANS THAT Ii \lILL SOOtl BE OBLIGED TO TAKE A DECISIONCONCERNING ITS FUTURE ErJG~GEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN.

j. If CA.' PROBA!lI. Y BE RULED OUT THAT /'Ioseo\;' WILL DROPTHE PPESENT REGI=·jE SINCE THIS /'lIGHT MEAN THE lOSS OF ANIf'IPORTAIll' lOtlE OF' INTEltEST FOR rHE SOVIETS, BECAUSE - :3YWINNING AFGHANISfAN - T~E DISTANCE SEPARATInG THEM FROMTHEIR GEOSTRATF.G!C AIM, TJfE INDIAN OCEAN. HAS SHRUNK TO50B 1C1S. IF' AFGHANI Sf AN WERE TO RETURN TO A MonE OR LESSISlAMIC srATE, l"lOSCOW WOULD IN ALL PROBABIUT Y ll~VE ANANI'I-SOVIE:T NEIGHBOUR. APART rRO!1 SUCH A POLITICAL SET-BACK. IMPlICATIOnS ON OTP.ER SOVIET ZONES OF INFLUENCEAND TilE MUS-I:"! aEMENI'S IN THE SOVIET POPULATION COULDNOT BF. EXCl UDED.

~. Tft:: POSSIBLE REPLACEMENi OF THE PRESENT RULERS INKASLL BY A GI)VEnt:~lENT WHICH APPEARS IN A LESS PRO-MOSCOWUGHI' TO THE OlITSIDE WORLD - THIS IS WHAT TilE SOVIETS AREAPp~p.n7LY TRYING TO DO AT THE PRESENT TIME - WOULD HA~DLY

HAVE A~4 HIFtUEtICC: ON ThE RESIST/WCE MOVEMENT. THEY Ant:FIGHT Itlii NOT SU MilCH AGAI NST THE ME~8ERS OF THE ;'l\ESEUTREGIi':E IHIT AGAINST THE eOM:'IUtH sr IDEOLOGY \-IHICM, FOR THEM,IS PR!ioiARILY REPiH':SENTED BY THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THECOUtIT~Y.

BT15 615

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·S E CRt T SECTION 03 or 96 OSN1TO 15615

,. :5. TBERElORE, IF MOSCOW WANTS fa MAINTAIN ITS PRISENT

'POSITION, Ir ~OS! REINrORCI ITS COMMITKENT E'EN 'URTIII •TBI SO'IET PRESS BAS RECENTLY INDICATED TBAT TBE ACTI'1OSE 0' SO'IET TROOPS IN SUPPORT 0' TIE T1RAlI RIGIMEMIGBT BI CONSIDERED. ACCORDING TO ARTICLE • or TBI rRIEND­SBIP T!EATY BETWEEN T51 SO'IET UNION AND ArGHANISTAN, THISOYIET ONION ~OULD BE ENTITLED - ArTIR MOTUAL CONSOLTA­TIONS - fa TA[! ACTION TO MAINTAIN TBE SECURITY, INDIPEND­tNCE AND TERRITORIAL INTIGRITT or A'GHANISTAN. THISCOULD !I PREPARlD POLITICALLT AND PSYCIOLOGICALLT IY POI­~ICATIONS IN rHE SOVIET AND ArGRAN PRESS ON TBI SOPPORT or

REBELS· AND TBE ·AGGRESSION BT PAIISTAN. lOR TBI rIRSTTIME, AFGHANISTAN IS DESC~lIED IN TIl SO'Ilt PRESS IS 1MEM!ER 01 THE SOCIALIS' COKMUNItT, WIICH WOOLD Mlr.E lEISUBJECT TO rat BREZINEV DOCTRINE.

S. 10WEVER, IT APPEARS DOUBTrUL ~ETHIR tHE SO'IIT ONION. WILL STtP OP BER IN~AGEMINt fa TBI LEVEL or MILITAa!

INTERVENTION SINCE tHIS WOULD LEAD TO SIRIOUS IIS!S.FIBST or ALL, SOCH A STEP WOOLD II BOOND TO PRO'O[E NEGA­TIVE REACTIONS, ESPECIALLY ON TBE PART 0' THI ARAB ANDISLAMIC VORLD. EUT ~OSCOV MIGBT StILL BE PREPARID TO IONTHAT IISI.

~. ~OB! SERIOOS, BOVEYII, VOOLD EI tIE RESISTANCI TO IIEXPECTED FROM THE AFGHAN POPULATION AND THI RESULTINGCONSEQ~ENCES FOR TBE SOVIETS. THI A1GBAN POPOLATION 11­GIRQNOTHING AS MORI IMPORTANT TBAN ITS rRIIDOM; UP TONOW IT BAS BEEN lBLt TO DlrEND ITSELF AGAINST ALL rORIIGNCLA. 07 SUPR~MACY AND HAS NEVIR BEEN rORCID UNDli ANTrOR 7 COLONIAL ~ULE. IN CASE or A SOVIET INTERVENTION,TEE OPULATION IS LI11L1 TO IGNORE ALL THE EXISTING TRIBAL

I

9

1)

QOARR~LS AND ~O ~ISE AS ONE ~AN AGAINST THE SOVIET IN­VADERS.

8. IT APPEARS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD BE·ABLI TO OVIRCOHI THIS RESISTANCE. THE INACCESSIBILITY 07THE TIRRAIN - 8e OF Ar~!lNISTAN ARE COVERED BY MOUNTAIN

iCOUNTRY VITHOUT ROADS AND lRE FAVOURABLE rOR GUIRILLAS ­:T!E MENTALITY OF TBE WARLI[~ MOUNTAIN TRIBES AND THEIR:lORH or VARFARE ~A[I THIS UNLI!ELY. IT MUST BE ASSUMEDTBAT lN INTIRVENTION WOULD L!~D TO A PROTRACTED GOIRILLA

:VAR WBOSE OUTCOME WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNCERTAIN AND VHICHWOULD TIE DOWN SOVIEr rO~CES FOR A LONG TI~l.

~

'9.THERI CAN BE NO DOUBT TRAT THE SOVIET UNION VILL·CON~~TINUE TO TA!E ACTION IN SOPPORT OF THE RE~IHE IN [ADUL.)ADDITIONAL ARMS WILL Bg SENT. AND TBE NUMBER OF SOil IT

ADVISIRS WILL INCREASE. IT IS ALSO CONcrIVABLETBAT;HOSCOW HAT USE SOVIET TROOPS TRO~ UZBElISTA"'AND TADCHIKI­

STAN WHO, WHEN PUT INfO AFGHAN UNIFORMS, ~OULD~REHAI~ UN­:CONSPICIOUS fROH A PHYSICAL AND A LINGUISTIC POINT or:VIEV. BOVEJER, IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS AT PRES1NT·~RE­

'TBER MOSCO~ IS REALty PREPARED TO ACCEPT TBE RISK 01 AMILITARY INTtRVENTIO~.

END TEXT.

BEGIS TEIT OF TUR!ISH PAPER:

!rG~ANIS'UN

• U! G!NEUL I"InESSION AlTER 'fBi ceup IN APRIL '1978WAS Tilt THE Hi" REQ-II1E VOULD UV.E A DU'lICt'LT TI~'£ ··TAKING·ROOT AND THAT TBr. CONSIRVATIY! AND IND~PI~DENT·CBARJC!ER.

or TBE AFGBAN PIOPLE VOULD.N~T !l!E EASILY TO fBI SOVIET~INCLINID AND COMHUNI~T NATURE OF THE RE~IME.

• THIS lOPEeAST ~AS rURNED.OUT to B! TRUI: rIRST ·THE.NOMADIC TRID!S ALONG THE COUNTRY'S INTERNATIONAL BORDERSREfUSED T~'CO~E U~DE~ rEE RULF 01 T!E R&GIMEl rHF-IR RESIS­TANCE SPR!At J~AD~ALLY UNTIL THE FI~HTI~~ BRO!! OUT INSr.RAT IN MA?C2 1979 AND'TH~N IN KABUL ON 23 JU~! A~D OY!RTEt Ll~T VEr~!ND. DrSPIT! GOYER"HENT EFFORTS TO EXPLAINAWAT r~!s UNREST AS IOREIGN-INSfIGAtED. TaE MAIN reaCEBEHIND IT SEE~S TO~!E 1St DISCORD~NCE HENtIOHED ABOVE.

• !iIT IS PLAIN 'rHA'! IRA," AN1) PUISU~ DO NOT.VIEii THEj!G REGI~! .ITB A Y'R~ H~ART. AND ~~~lRD IT AS A CO~­

'RA TIO~ OF ~REIv ow~ ISLAM-INSPIRIt RF.GIHES. NOTiITH­STI.. !ol~. NEIT!!!:? C0~Nl'Rf IS IN A POSITION TO rAr.~ ACTION.

• PA~ISTAN: r~OH~HIC CONDITIONS '~D BFR ISOLATIO~ INn

1'5615

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BTS r C RET SECTlON 04 OF 06 USHATO ~5~15

THI REGION CO~STITUTE DETERMINING FACTORS IN HIR AtTITU~E.If IS TaUE rHAT !ER.NOMAD POPULATION ALONG THI lf~HAN

BORDER UNDERTAKE ACTION DIRECTED AT AFGHANISTAN; WIrs OR:WITHOUT AfGHANISTAN, THIS IS A MAJOR PROiLEM lOR PA1ISTANFOR, TO BRIN~ ORD!R AND GOVERNMENT RULI TO TBAT REGION,SBE HAS TO lESORT TO AN:EITENSIVE MILITARY OPIRATION ALONGTHE LO~G AND RUGGED BORDER REGIO~. I

• IRAN: VARIOUS STATEMENTSBY IiAHIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERSCONDEMNING THE PRiSS~RE BEING EIERCISED ON THIIR COUNTER­PARTS IN AfGHANISTAN NOTWITHSTANDING, IT IS DIFfICULTTO ENTISAGE HORE SUBSTANTIAL IR1NIAN HOVIS IN HIR PRESINT

·DAY CONDITIONS. .

• ALONGSIDE·DOMESTIC OPPOSITIO~ to THE AFGHAN REGIME,'AIIOOS GRODPS HAYE EEEN 70RH!D ABROAD, WHO R"E DIMON­STRATED IN SOMEIOROPEAN COUNTRIES AND IN INDI1. TBEM1IN lTTRIBOTE OF OPPOSItION GIOOPS AT HOMi OR ABROAD,ARMID 01 NOT, IS THIIi INDEPINDENT MATURE FROM EACH OTHIR,LACl or CO-oRDINATION 'AMON~ TKIM AND TBEIR LACt or LIADER­SFIP. THISE SHORTCOMINGS'MIlI SOCCESS tlSS LIKELY.• tHE SOVIET lTTITUDE IN THE fACI or STRONGER DOMESTICOPPOSITION IN AFGHANISTAN WILL BI or SIGNlfIC1NT WEIGHT.'THI03GBOUT JUNB THIS rEAI,~RUMOOIS CONCERNING A POSSIBLESOVIET INTERVINTION-HAVE CIRCULAtED IN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLESIN tABUt. AN ARAB lMEASSADOR TOLD HIS !ORrISH COUNTERPARTTHAT TARAII 11NT TO ~OSCOW ON STH JUNITO ASt rOR SOVIETiTROOPS, AND TH1T.THE SOYlErS TURNED THIS REQUEST DO~N,.0NLiEASSURIHG fHl AfGHAN LllDIR THAT ECONOHIC AID WILLCON I UE. THE.CLAUSE IN THE fWO COUNTRIES' lRIENDSHIPTRi PROVIDING.10R THE EXPEDItION_Ol SOVIIT TROOPS VAS

·INS ED AS A RESUtT OF AN AfGHAN RIQUIST. IT IS OBVIOUS.TBAT T~E SOVIET LEADERS SEE TRIS AS A LAST RESORT, AND ..

11

l:.!

-

EVEN THEN ~OULD HAVE TO Y~I~B !?[ SITUATION VERY CARiFUL1f.BIIIINC 1M MIND THE rOLLOwIN~ CONSIDERATI~NS:

• - SUC! A STIP ceULD LEAD CHIN1-~AKISTAN-IRAN AND'THE ~S1 TO CLO~E RAN~S.

~ • - TB! SOVIETS COULD T~OS !ND UP PL1Yl~: INTO CSIN-~ IS! BANDS.I:

S• - THE SOVIETS COULD BE DIRECTLY CONFRONTED WIT~ THEjA'GEAN PEOPLE, IN A VIETNAM-T~pr ADVENTURE.

i. IN TRr CASt OF A FoqTHER DETr.RIORATION IN TARA~I'S

IPOSITION, THE SOVIET'S C~ULD BOWEVER PROCEED TO A RESHUffLE

101 'HI AFGHAN MARrISTS, TRas TRYINr. TO RETIIN A SYMPATHETICAPP!lRANCF. THIS SEEMS TO !S A STRON~Ea POSSIBILITY. THEY

lHAT l 'OR INSTANCE, THIN! ABOOT INSTALLIN: SOMEBODY ELSE;BELoNGING TJ TAiA(I'S PEOPL?,'S PA~TT (KS!LQ PARTT), OR;EyrN ABOUT SUBSTI!UTING TFi °ERC~H PARTY, PREVIOUSLY OUSTED·BT ~gAtQ PARTY. ~BETfiSR ~3 NOT THESi COCLD BE lCHIEVED.~ITfOUT BLOODSHED IS DIFFICULT TO fORESEI. ALSO IF A PO~ER

STRUGGLE AMON~ TBE ~ARXISTS V~RE TO TAKE PLACE THIS COULDOFFER THE OPPONENTS JF TPE RE~IM! ~OOD PROSPECTS. .

• INDICATIONS T~lT THE EASTERN COUNTRIES IRE NOT ALLTBAT ~APPY VITH TARA[I BAVE ALRElDY STARTED TO SURFACE.IN THIS CO~TEIT, TBE 'OLLOVING RIM1RIS HADI TO TBE TURKISHA~!ASSADOR BT THE CDR AND TBI NBWLY-1RRIVED VIETNAMESE#~B1SSADORS, ART. ILLUMINATIN::

• (G~R) -TSt REASONS FOR THE REGIME'S DIFFICULTIESLIE IN THE STRING or MISTAIIS HADI. IN TEE 'ACE OF THECOUNTRY-WIDE RESISTANCE A~lINST TBE"REGIME, 'THERE IS NOMORE ROOH FOR NEW HISTA(ES. TBt LEADERS B1VE TO BE VERT~ARY FROM NO. ON. tHI lIRST WRONG STEP ~ILL, JUST 15 INCHESS, COST THEM THE GlME. T~OSE ~HO RESIST ARE PUT UNDERlRRE:T _ITBoor ANT DISCRI~INATION FOB CEILDREN AND WOMEN.EVERYBODY ~~O~S THAT T£IS CANNOT woar.- ALL TBE SAME,SOVIET suppoat SErMS fO CONTIN~r.. PERRlPS IN A SHORT~~IL~, INTERNALLT AND IN PARTICOLAR lROH THI PARTY ITSELF,SO~1 ALT~~NATIVES COULD APPElR.- . .

• (T~! VIETNAMESE) -DESPItE MY RECENT ARRIVAL, ITIS NCT ~IF?!~UtT TO )BSIaVl TBI INTERNAL CRISIS. THISSTF.~S 'RO~ r~E DISTANCE SEPARATING TPI LEADERS AND TEE'POPI~IO~. TSE TCry~! LIME ADOPT!D YIS-1-VIS TaE REBELSAND .IHALLT ~EFOR~S BEING MADE WITPOUT TEE NECESSARYPRI INAPIES. TFESt MiY AL~O BE THE P.EASON BEHIND TBE~AT ~OVERNMENT REsSUrrtE.

AfGHANISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH Tnt WESTERN COONTRIESC1~NOT BE SAID TO BE GOOD. lLTBO'GH UNTIL ASBORT WHILEJT'5e15

,!

~'.

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Is E C ! E f SECTION Z5 01 06.USHATO 05615

. AGO. fHi LEADERS EMPHASIZED TBAT fRET VANTED TO BAVI GOOD·;RILA'IONS VITH fBi USA, SINCE fBE MURDEI or fBE AMIIICAN

-AMBASSADOR AND TBE fOLLOWING COOLING 01 RI~ATIONS, fBEYHAVE, IN TBEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, TENDED " N6ME lRANCIfHI 01 AND THE OSA FIRST AMONG fBE COUNTRIES AGAINSf fa~1IGI:011-.

• aFGHAN-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP ~ONTINUES fO BE fENSI.ON lVllY OCCASION, 'EE~A1GBAN SIDE CALLS THE IRANIAN REL­IGIOUS ~EADERS AS fHE RE1C'ION1RT 1ND FA~lTICll LIADEnsor IIAH AND BEHIND EViRT UPIISING LOOK FOR A SHIITE ONIRANIAN fIN~ER. ._ TEE JOLY ISLAMABAD VISIt BY DOST, THE AFGHAN DEPUTYrORIIGN MINISltl, CONSTIfOTED IN· OPENER FOR A D!A~O~U!

VITB PAr.ISTAN. PllISTANI AUTHORITIES STRESSED TO tHETORtISH EMBASSY TBtI! IMP~!SSION THAT ~OST DID NOT HAVEMUCB AUTBORI!Y AND TFAT BE DIn NOt r~MMIT HIMSELF TO ANY­!BIN~ DORIN~ TBE VISIT. NEVIPTHELESS, IT WAS ONLY AFTERTHIS 'lSI! TBAT TEE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT ~y TEE PA':IST1NrOREIGN POLlcr ADVISFR, ~R. AGBA SBAHl, IN PREP1R1TIO~

FOR A SUMMIT 9F.TWF.iH TAP.A~1 AND ~ENERAL ZIl. APPEARED.END fEU.

BEGIN TEIT OF or. P1PERa

AFGHANISTAN

1. RECENT REPoRTS nEMONSTRATE THAT THE Tl~A7I rtE~IM!'3

UIiT To ~E!P COf\'TROL IS INCREASIN~LT DtPENDENT ON saVInMIL RT SUPPORT. TSE MAINTENA~CE or A FRIE~DLT AND CO­OPE IVf. ~OVERNM~~T I~ AFGRAHISTAN IS Moes MORE IMPORT~NT

TO SOVIET rNIO~ TRPN TP.E ~AINTENANeE OF TARAf-I ANDAMIN. BUT WE SnOULD NOT ONUER€STIMArE fFE SOVIET e~~MIT-

13

MENT TO THE -AFGHAN REVOLUTION- AS SUCH.

2. THE RUSSIANS HAVE INVESTED MOCH IN rBI PROPOSITION~~AT TIFRE BAS BEEN A RE'OLOTION IN AfGHANISTAN, THAT ITREPRISENTS A MAJOR ~AIN rOR Til Af~HAN PEOPLE AND THAT ITCO~FERS 1 -QUALITATIVELY NEW CHARACTER- ON SOVIET/AFGHAN

~RELATIONS. IF A SUCCESS~R ~EGIME ~ERE TO DISAVOV THE~REVOLUTION, THE RUSSIANS ~OULD SEE THIS 1S A SET-BACK,~WHETBrR OR NOT AFGHANISTAN REMAINED IN PRACTICE.LAR~EL!

. ; DEPENDENT ON TEt SOVIET UNION. THEY VOOLDBE THE MOREpCONCERNED IF raEl BAD REASON TO FEAR AN ANTI-SOVIET BACI-aLASH. .i . .13. IF THERt IS NO ALrE~~ATliE TO lARA[I A~D.AMIN walCH- IS LIIlLY TO PR~VE VIABLE AND TO PAY AT LEAST LIP SERV1CEiTO REVOLUTIONARY CONTINUITY, THE RUSSIANS WILL GO TO CON­~SIDERABLE LENGTHS TO PRESERVE TBE PRESENT REGIME. THESDISADVANtAGES OF DIRECT "'nITART ·IN~ERVENrzON, IN TRt SINSE;or LARGE NU~BERS or SOVIET TROOP.S OPERATING D~RECTLY AH~

• VISIBLY ONDER SOiIET CO!1:1AND, ARE MANY AND. TIU:· .,RUSSIANS ,ARE UNLIIELY TO CONSIDER IT EXCEPT AS A LAST ~ESORT. THE

~ PROBnLE SOUET· PREFERENCE, AND THE ONE rOR VHICH .'.rURE .~ IS INCREASING EVIDENC~ IS TO FURTHER SUENGTHIN THE SOVIETtC) MILlrAFT PRrSENC~ IN AFGR1NISTAN, MORE ESPECIALLY IN SOC'. FAR AS A DErEiIORATING INTERNAL SITUATION CAN BI BLAMED ONto EXTERNAL INTERVE~TIO~ AND IT CAN BE ARGUED TU! THIll IS

1 TIRIAT TO THZ SICORITY, INDEPENDENCE AND '.rERII'.rOIIAL- INTJ::JRIU- OF U'GHANI.STAN VITKIN 'fHETEI/'1S.· or-AlnCLE .~

or '1'81 SOVUT!AFGiJANTRIATY. ... I . .

••. THE RUSSIANS BA'~ REkCRID OUT IN. AFGHANIS!AH rOR MORETHAN THEY REALLY NEED, BUT ARE NOW IN A· POSITI~N VHERIT!IY CANNOT EASILY RETRIA'.r WITHOOT CONSIDERABLE LOSS orlACE AND THE POSSIBILITY 01 ~ORE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO TEEIR.INTERESTS.

5. SUBJICT TO TBE ABOVI, THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THERDSSIANS WOULD LItl TO SWITCH BORSES, IF AN ALTERNATIVE.TOTARAn AND AMIN ~IRI lVlIJ:,AJLE'. THE PROBLEM IS THAT ANTALTERNATIVE SET or LEADERS VOULD rIND IT DIFrICULT TOESTABLISH' A POPULAR BASE UNLESS THEY COULD DEMONSTRATETHAT TIEY wIRE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE INDEPENDENT or THE RUS­SIANS THAN riRAII AND AMIN. EVEN WERE THE RUSSIANS PRE­PARED TO CONTEMPLATE lLLO~IN~ A SUCCESSOR RIGIME A LOOSERRII!"THIRE IS NO POLITICAL GROUPING AVAILABLE TO TAIE .ON ROLl. A MILITART REGIME HIGH! BE AN ALTERNATIVE.THE HY HIGHT BI SIEN BT fHB·POPULATION At LARGE AS BEINGsur IENTLY DISTINGUISHABLE fROM fHE KBALQ HOT TO BE .TAR VItR TRE SAME BRUSH. FOR THlIR PAR~ THI·RUSSIANS

14

'HIGHT BE SAfISlIED THA! !HE LARGE NUMBER or orlICIRS VI'E,RAIHING IN Tar SOVIET UNION WOULD INSUIE TEl CONTIMUATIONor THEIR IN1LUENCE. BGVEiIR. AL'HOUGH IT MICa! BI RELA­TIVELY EASY FOR fBI RUSSIANS TO INGtNllR 1 COUP, !RIIIIS COOD REASUN !O DOUBT ~BtTnER THE Cl~IBI! AND RELIA­BILITY or !HE ARMY ARE SUFFICIENT TO BlAB THt ADDIT!ONAL

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'. , .. Or'THE COUNTRY (WHOSE HAZAnA/SH1~.A 'POPlLAT1Ot~. Tm,.. II' Ru..NG :OS TKE, t.F6P.A~ ECONO~IC ANt> SOCIAL. LADDER, ,1S .'

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..' ..".CINCPACz .ALSO FOR' POL AD

":, .... ":.. '. , ..PRoeA!lY~FIGHrIWG'l"~ORDER TO A~NGE PAST,nEPRtssIONSSUFFtRED' AT THE· ,HANDS OF pusmUN-DOMINATE:). -ctNTRAt· 'GOVERt~­I'E"'T~l· THE AREA :AROUffD HERAT, CITY ·eitf\Ep.E. Y.l£RE ~HAV£ BEE~,~E lWlCATlON~ THAT .IRANIAII -IRf1.UENCE'! OR. ~EXPEa~ENC~,MY 8E· AIDlHG THE :lARSI"'AN AKD PUSHrU 'INSLRGEHTS) :'~:AN!), ' ..'THE TURKO:".!:! ANt 'OZ8rk ABl1ICU.TURAL "REiuOZfS BORTH OF"tffE "KIII»U KUSH ..(AlTHOUGH TH£S£ REOIO/fS ARE lE~S ..1iEAVIL-Y-MAtIHtD .

. BY. THE AyaM" ARI1Y', tHE FIBHUHG- HAS ttor"REAC~':THE,<PRO-'":,:..fIORrIOJIS·OF.. THAt :ALOHG THE PAKlSI'AN-AFGHANISJ'Ali Bmu>ER)~ 4

;.EV.JDEIIC£.O':COORDINAfION OF r~SE £FFORTS;.HDWMR.RDfAiRS;:aIJSJJlEi";AJI), :50 :rAR .AT L~Asr. rHESE-;'sueCESSF'UI;' OPElAT:I()fI~.'tCAVf}f'RIIIC!PALLy.. BUll" ur~ERTAKEff ·£YLO::A!.". tflHAsn AIfTS"': :',FlOHr.l'a'·Tv .~f;nIID·TH!IR OWM TURF., IF' THE IfiSURGEffTS 8£- ,GIll "OUNrII"n'AJor.~·OP.ERAT%ONS..oursIDE, tHESE INDIVIDUAL :.',"':REGIONS (AS'PJAY..8E:fHE CA~ ,.:oW TITH'THE'JlURISTAHls>,·THE.JI£Olrn:~S:'PROBLE"S MY Brcor£:' MAtUF'£stlY MORE DIFnClJLT•.!·', .. . ' .. -... .. ". .

S. 'FOfiDAPlENUL OPPOsnIOll GRIEVARCES' APPE'A~' SUFFIC'IF:IOT'to susrAlIf LOlflJ·TE)U' nGKI'InGr TWO FUI'IDAI"1E:fTIJ.:: PERCEPTIONSTRAIfSC£1ID ~THESE··COl'2PL'dltts- f1OtIVATJNO IP!)JVIDUAL OPPO­SITION.El.Er1£NTS, AI!) FUEL T~ OVZ:tIJ.L lNSUReEtfctES TOA FARGR~TER.·ExrENI'. THAll 'AlY' OT~R CONSIDERATION. rm:SE AREtHE VIRtUAlLY URIVDlSAl."'. .p£RCEPTIORS .tHAT .THE ,ORA LEADERSHIP. IS KIJ)E 'O":OF :,"GDD!.£SS CO!"ll'JutlI srs.· '1U:D THAT, THE TARAKl.. .AIUR .TEAPI ems SOLD AF'GHAHlSTAU· S 'Nt-UOHAL SOlll.· AND FURTURE 'TO i'lOSCOW..~n:ARS.OF'rJ«E lLTWAYE REPRESSION OF'THEIR "RD. IGlOOS JUGta S A"LA:. SOVIEtCEl:I'RAJ: "ASIA' en SHOULD"BE '.tllEl'i£M8ER£D'tHAT<I'IANY."U~1!'tS'f1.ED THOSE AREAS TO AYOHANISr"MJtIN TH1S<\CENf-uR,r.' II .,ORDE!t·TO PRtSERV~ .·TJr:;lR ~E1.1GIOUS ".INTE-

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PROVOr.ED· S~ SCATT~ED OPPlJSnIOf;, [d':' Tlit O~GOIt-;c: 'IHSUR­w:w.:y IS flor·-J'i!!MAr.~'(·.St:ST r.1 ~L ~'! 1:~H Il~T 'l" TO rH!SEFRO­tiR~'St 110 1'!IJTi:F. HO~ UNPCPtn.Ar: T~Y r:AY HA'Ti: Sc:£I:. CHAT!EE"" Q.EAR· IS THAT DEEf'l.y-mT :~clIO~~ I.F.E NECESSARY to

•CAUSE EVE,. AFGHANS TO ':' ,.".£ UP AR!"1S AGAIN~ r·;r.DERN "f£APb:l~~IE1.DIJ) BY A f)i:1'~!'IIr.rD fI:~D nun~E~S GOV£f-:Hi~UT, At:D ~~HAT

St£H EMotIONS DO, II( FACT, .F.itVAIl Ol~ THE ClffiR~HT ~F'GJfAll'PCLtI' ICftL ..SeE NE. .

Ie.-~E.V P01.tCY OPrIONS ARE' AVUlASlE TO Tm: R£eIt1ETO RE­~_ tHEPR£SENT tR::HDt THE DRA LEADERSHIP APPEARS to· HAVE~Y:.~~'PoL=lTICAL:,OPfIONS AT ITS DISPOSAl' ~}{1CH, '~F ADOptED,,,'tOlLD "HAvt~IAB1.E:.cHA2ICES·.OF.REVEF.SING THE: CURHENI' TIDE.' .":t HE aOVEJUR'lEtJr.:·.:NAS -DECl.ARED A' HtmB£R or 'ITS PROGRAMS (PlOS!'fi01'ABlY.LARD~RUOR") :~SUCCEssrl1.tY CO:'lPlETIJ>," BU! THIS

"ACUON "HAS..HAD LUTLE NOTICEA91E IP'lPACT 0:: THE LEVEL OF .'''IGRtING," A D£VELOPME~ wliICH WOUL~ $UFPO?T THE Cor.TEt:rIQr~

IJCAI·TlCE JlEGlfllE-S REFORMS: DID 1i0T R~Piir:s::r:r P.OOT CAUSES.T:U~ 'GROllTH OF TIE OPPOSITION.. .;) , .

11. J'"O ADDRESS THE RalGIOUS I ssur, 'AHt LEADERSHIP HAS!'iOI.!l!I'ED AN INl'EtlSE· PUBLIC R£tATIOI:S Cf.lllPAIGU, l:~ctWING

·REP£ATE[\ ASSUU':CES BY TARAKI ANt A~It! Ir~ THEIR PUBLICSF..ECHES THAT THE DRA IS ADSCLL'IELY :~.OT Of'~SED TO ISLA.).

-r.Of:EOvtR, ~ EARLY AUGUST COtCLAVL IN r.AE~U1. Or OVER ONEMurm;::£I) -'l5LAl'JIC SCHOLARS" I SSUEDA STAT 'MENT SUPPORT!NG .'THE -D~OUIUESS- OF THE: REGI(II£'~Nn CLAltUr.G THAT· rUE .DRA:-I.CI' UA!.1.Y IS TH! -PROTECTOR- OF ISLAM. NONI:1'HElESS, .THIS .'FAR! IClLAR EFFOP.T MAY vaL ....AVE COME 100 LATE TO convucE •.lHE MASSES" THAT .TJtE··Y,flALQI Rt:GU1E DOES NOT HAVE THEREDUCTIOR'OF' ISoAfl1,U"AF'GHANISfAN 1.5 ONE of" ITS PAIf1AAYGOAlS.. ~. .' .J2 KODIFlCATIOUS.:tR. tHE DRA·S RELAT.lOiISHIP \'nH THE ~OVIETUNION:PJIGJ«:{!'OSSmLY "OLLIFf T HE OPPOSITION TO SO!'lE EXI'ENI' •

.J3ur·: U'''ls t)2:mCIL"T ;·TO .ID~HT IFY. MEAnINGFUL ll:ASY TJf' KHALQIS,GOlLJ).DotKlS:.VItflOur·RISKING T~lP. OWN SElf-nC::STftUCTION, ."­SINCE :TlIt <sOVi!.Tft:ORNECUON ,is ..THE CRUCIAl. SUPPORT FOR t·HE·:CtJlRENT·l.EADERSHIP.~:THUS, T~ ·I'ARAI{1-AtlIN TE4M FACES THE."er.AlmARl.TKAT··1H£:DRA PROBAalY COU1.!) NOT .SURVIVE WItHOUT .,....•l:XtENSIVE SOVIET ·:SUPPORT;· ~HllE" AT THE "SAJliE t Ifl1E, THAT '\'ERY:SUPPORT 'SERVES TO',FAIl.THE··F1.AMES -CF THE nATIONAlIST1C "OPPISUIOH. ',' .aT'~'l

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. f.i.CAP.!'LESS C;" T H: Al'.OUtrr or !Ol!?CE OF our SIDE f':'£SSUP.£. ASA C:;;:~~~·GZI:C:-- I~m If' THe: AI:5ENCE OF lNIHVlDUAl. ASSASS-1l1~T 1"'.:, ~ ~CS3Ii!!LITY UHICH CAlmar &E JWl.ED our' -THE ..r.:!.!.\:l lE,Ai2ERS 1.'ILL Fi\09ftEL'! FORGE AHEAD WITH THtJR CURRE,rrE?To:;rz 70 Si' ~!'IP ~UT tHE: OPPOSITICrl BY FQP.CE, A POLICY ~RICH

~n.L PI'C~f.!:L Y R!£:lLT IN 1:fCr,£AstlJ FIGHUNC IN ·TKE COUNTRYSIDE,'.Hl~H!:k LEvn.sor SOVIET SUPFORT, A'in,. EV!NTUALLY, POSSIaLt . .DI~Lcr !:\!I!::T Itrr£P.VE~!I'I!lN TO ·S:'Vl: fJiE REVClUTlotJ.· .

14. THE O?POSITION IS ltOT TEN F1:U :rAJ..~:r·'D£Sp·Ir£ TKt·PRo;.!!.Z1I:5 II' HAS CHEATED FO~ tHE KKAli:U REGlI't£~ T~ OPPOSITIDlJFACES IrS own OBST Aa.£S, AND THi:: .1)£1':15£ or tHE DRA 'IS 'BY NOr.Et.N~ IfEVUA£LE. FOR £XAr:PLE. tHE: INSURBEll!'s (PE:RHAPS ·BY·.···DESIGJO HAVE m TO CAPTOR&: AND HOLD· ANYTHING lA.qGtP. THAN ",.1:T(J.·N CALn·:OUGH·lARGE· AREAS Of THE COCHTHYSID£ AfiE NOV ,··OFF";'·l.I":JrS- FOR GOV£P.IfI1£M& FOF.CZS!. ESPC:CIALLY AFTEr. t:IGHI'FALL),·~.-· ...,_r HE!'!: APPEARS TO BE NO 1%)£:'7 UICJ) OPP-JSIT l~H LEADER 'WHO CAN COM-·.­M~ t:ATJCn~'J!)! ALL!GUU~£, toN!), r.r:n"p.ECYl'lL' EFFORTS 'REfl:AIN"UNCO~;.uU:Arc:n Ar~ IOITnJU! ANt APPAREf,"T cvtRALL ptA~. TO·· ..O~![. T:I£ opPOsnIM HAS ·?tEf: PRIII:P.F.Il Y ~?'!:lP.ED BY THEr.EGlr';i· S O'lt: MY~MZS A~'D ~A'JY-".A!o~r;t.$';, ~,'\C'TO?S WHICHAP.~ Es~r:rIALl.Y r:::GATIVI: r.r.nv:'TIOl!S. nm.'l.:: n::: Y.J{ALQISAVCI~ F'J'TH:::': !'l~..'Or, C':IS\:,".l.Clt.r.nONS on i,:';:':-L ~:}!;: CLEVERPt'LITJCAL PLOYS :::, rrLli- C~'::, A~:~ SHOt'!..!' r;:~ :~:~'!;:G!:rrrs

Co: lWAl!Lr TO (\f'CA~~lZ':: 7\.;:·... ::~'J:::: UND~? I. l'!iIFE<: l:::ADEF.SP.IP,IT IS U:.'C£RTAU hO..' L~l': ~;~f~ATI VE INCE::rIlfiS CAN roUST AI:!THE HARDSHI-P AND SU~'rL:,!;;C !iC:C:SSAl\Y 10 OVE;::!Hl\OIi A DE­n:F.:-:HED AND \·El.L-AP.~iLt' r.r::r.II'IE. SI'R£SS, ATTHI7ION, AN:)

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. F~·:::. ;.t: OPPOSITl(;I~"~~!J r.;EGlfl:E ";t:~!L[' P:!~OSt.LY NOT HAVE ' ..,~:.:·cttJ. g~ ECO:!O:'~IC fi£F"OF.lI';S (CO ~::C£:SSh?,{ F~ THIS BACJCVARl1:;::'U:':!'~'{) U.ltnIOt- l!~ p~!~lin\' \..IST. !P.:mSA~S·OF PtP.~ONAl\I?:~;:F.iTA'?' .'OtlLn P~:-~t\i:t. ';" zr c~r.P.lt!l ~m- l;C~lI:sr ,SWiVIVINGf:-lt;:.C: ·~FFICIAl!'t !;·:'i.:d' ~\l:;A9LY. U:ifiIZHIIJG II POS!-DJiA.!.;:~H~·S :il.r,"'~ R::~r. ;.::C;-·;:;, ;';0 :'!AnEp. H:~: .JU!lTIr.I£D Rt..TF.;:{j,IOI\ A':.t.U~:': $)"';: c;:nCH1.E ~;}Clfi Af.-r~:.~ f:l 9i. AR -,l!·:IT:l:~~l.Y sr~r1:t l:j~t.-~. 11:-': l'~s;.(~~7 I::L\il:;,!:·tE, ~UT C'E~­

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17. Jf~ I.1!-..LAt:~::t ti:l\-::Vi:~, CUR 1 ;.i-;G::'::: I~:rE2!::sr!;., C:S~~CIA\..LY,:Hvr.f~ TiG: DilA·:: £XTl\!f::.L'l' CU)~,r. Til! 'r:l ::i)SC;;'':, HilS R£GIMr·st.L1';o~r OP;'I-I HO:Tl1.1TY TO liS, AND· Jr.:: .UMOSPHEf:t OF rEAR.n ,,_HA~ CP.F.ATlD HmOUGHJIJT ThIS COUNTRY, vc:r_G PHOf,A5L-Y, ar ....• :SF.'RVETJ BY rnt I)£~!I~ OF th"Z r JinAK1 AN!) ,',;':rN R[GIM£, PtSPITE ~

\,HATEVER scrBAC~S HilS ~IGHT ~::'AN ~'OR rLIT uiH: ~OCIA1. AND ',. . ,ECOIij):'HC' flErORt~S \'UHlt: AFGi1AIHffi i.;;. .

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E.O. 12~65: GD~ 8/13185 (FLATl':, 9R'.'CE t.) OR-MTAGS: PEPR, PINR, MASS, J>J~, H, ~SUBJ: (S) PAVLOVSKIY MI S~ION TO KMWL

REF: STATE 228642 (NOTAL>

1. (S - ENT IRE TEXT>

2. GENERAL PAVLOVSKIY, COMMANDER ~F <:,OVIEI GJWUND FORCES,AND TWELVE OTHER SOVIET GENU: AL~ :-itVE EEEN aT KABUL SINCEAt'GlJc:'f 17 UNDER VERYTI';Kl £Ernfr'Y ~~ !iEfoVY SECURITY PRO­TECTJON. TRUSTED AFGHAN OFF'lCULS SAV~ BE'::N TOLD THAT THE~OVIET MISSION IS HERE FOR -F/lCT-F'IJIDur;- ~URPOSES. FRIMEP'UETER AtO ACT ING DEFENSE ~INISTEP. He.,FIZ~'llAH A/'IIN HASo !RECTED THAT LOIIIER -RANKI NO OFn CT ALS OF THE DEFENSE P1INlnRYAnE E~:POlj.'EJ(rn TO ~IGN ROUTINE ~GREElW!ENTS "'ITH THE VISITINGSOV lET TE~r:.

." II

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51

• ':'"Copy .._~..-14 September 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The National Security Council

SUBJECT Alert Memorandum on. USSR-Afghanistan (U)

. The Soviet leaders may be on the threshold of a decision to committheir own forces to prevent the collapse of the Taraki regime and protecttheir sizable stake in Afghanistan. small Soviet combat units may alreadyhave arrived 1n the country. I am concerned that the Soviets may beunderestimating the difficulties of shoring up the regime and may findthemselves under growing pressures to escalate the scope of their inter­vention in the next few months. Moreover, the Soviets may now be moreinclined to gamble on a substantial intervention in Afghanistan becauseof their perception of a downturn in relations with the US and the un­certain prospects for Seqate approval of the SALT treatY.~flNC/OC)

Atta....

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4..." .-'" ",- rs,a SECREI"-NOFORH/HoCOrfnRA~CON

•• • -

SJJ8

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 17, 1979

. q!QP 5Ee!t!l'!'/CODEWORD

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: THOMAS THORNTQ.K\!.,.c..--.-

SUBJECT: What Are the Soviets Doing InAfghanistan? (S)

Simply, we don't know. Speculation is, however, intriquing.(S)

We have no evidence that proves or disproves any of these .•••••••••••••••••••••• before the

There appears to be three possibilities:

1. The entire sequence over the weekend (dismissal of theDdlitary in the cabinet: retirement of Taraki: Amin' s announce­ment of the end of one-man leadership) was stage-managed bythe Soviets as a way of getting a more acceptable governmentinstalled in Kabul. This doesn t t seem likely. The Sovietsmade quite a fuss over Taraki last week in Moscow: Tarakiwould have been a much better figurehead for a nationalfront government in"Afqhanistan; and the Soviets would notseem to have any reason to do in the military faction. This~uld seem to be the least likel~ explanation. (S)

2. Amin is doing the whole thing in defiance of the Soviets,facing them with a fait accompli. This would be a high­stakes game for him, but he is capable of it. It is notclear, however, why Amin would now be calling for broadenedleadership unless that is solely window-dressing or nothingmore than a gratuitous slap at Taraki. (S)

3. Amin started out on his own, but after the dropping ofTaraki, the Soviets stepped in, called his bluff, and arenow forcing him to accept a collective leadership -- some­thing the Soviets have probably been looking for for quite awhile. (S)

• WOP SECRB':lI/CODEWORD

OIlIGIIAL CL It z !YZi78nstt •o DECL Kl REVI' oX: e t 99

S,I'1JIIT1ZH'

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PER P.E ~~S:-, 1- .. I _

..5338 •

~p 6ECRE'P!COOEWORD 2

ouster of the military men may denote foreknowledge, but notnecessarily complicity. As between the second and third ex­planations, I like the second one since I think that Aminwould have held out longer in his bluff against the Soviets,and will doubt his vague professions of future collegialityuntil he starts implementing them. That, however, is onlya guess. (TS/Codeword)

It is hard to see how the Soviets can come out winners nomatter which is the case. They tried before to put a nationalfront together and failed, probably because nobody else wouldplay. Why would anybody be more willing to sign on now -­unless the Soviets could give credible guarantees that therewould be a genuine sharing of power? That doesn't seem toolikely. And, given the growing weakness of the regime, whywould anybody want to share power now when they might get thewhole thing shortly? (There may be in fact reasons that would~pel people to do so, arising perhaps from inter-tribal con­siderations. But I donft understand these and know nobody whodoes.) (S) •

Most likely, the Soviets have just been pushed a big step nearerto their moment of truth in Afghanistan. In this game of "TenLittle Afghans," there is now only one left. (S)

Whatever the Soviet role in this, they should be made to lookas if they had a hand in the operation. Taraki was somethingof a Lenin figure and had a degree of foreign respect. Aminis the Stalin of the drama and the Soviets should have himhung prominently around their necks. (S)

Brement concurs.

.,Top SECRf:T/COOEWORD •

• LJ"DU

POL(HGCHaONuu

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•MEMORANDUM

.,SEC~'1',.!SENSITlVE

INFORMATION

MEl40RANDUM FOR:

FROM:

5507-X

NATIONAL SECUR.ITY COUNCIL

September 24, 1979

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

THOMAS THOlU~TO~~

•CHRONFILB

.- -.... ~

SUBJECT: Regional Cooperation re Afghanistan (5)

Bob Gates said that you wanted a paper on this; one is attached.I have discussed it with Gary Sick and it generally reflectshis views. (C)

The paper sets forth two strategies -- A is low-key and wouldbe my preference between the two. B is much higher profile.They could also be characterized as Indian and Iranian strate­gies. (And that choice tells you something about the problem:)(C)

Beyond this, you are aware of my various efforts to stimulategreater discussion of regional security problems. This is, ofcourse, very long range. In addition, Mike Oksenberg and I areworking on ideas to bring the Chinese to a greater degree ofcooperation. (S)

~EeREIJSENSITIVE

Original Classif. by Thooas ThorntonReview on September 24, 1985

DECLASSIFIED

±t;~·U~~·C~.6:~ ~.o::~k1~;:

"."5507-X

sEcaa~/sENSITlVE

Preliminary Observations

First, what are our objectives? Assumedly they involve:

Preventing a Soviet psychological victory and forcing theSoviets back at least to the status quo ante as regardsAfghanistan.

Second, bringing about a change in government in Afghanistanthat will be no less favorable to us than was the Daoud regi~e.

Third, developing a self-sustaining security system in South­west Asia that is compatible with US interests. (S)

The third of these needs further examination since it is notonly an objective in itself but can also be the means of attain­ing the first two objectives. (S)

I~eally, we seek a regional approach which comprises an Indianleadership role in South Asia; broad acceptance of this role bystrong and independent regional states (especially Pakistan);a substantial improvement in Chinese-Indian relations to thepoint that each accepts the bona fides of the other; the re­establishment of a strong Iran that has sympathetic relationswith us and the other countries involved. The US would haveno significant security involvement beyond limited armssales to Iran, India and Pakistan, and a modest, offshorepresence that was accepted as benign by all others. TheUSSR would play no greater role than we do except that itmight be very heavily installed in Afghanistan. We are along way from this situation and it may be unobtainable. Itshould, however, be our goal and we should try to avoidactions in conflict with it. (S)

Short-Term Approaches

The following suggestions fall into two groups. The first(Group A) constitutes steps that are consistent with the longterm goals; the second (Group B), in varying degrees, lessconsistent and should be pursued only if it meets the criteriaof urgency and probable effectiveness. (5)

9ECRET/SENSITIVEOriginal Classif. by Thomas ThorntonReview on September 24, 1985

SANmZEDE.O.1295B. Sec.3.6

P~RE r--\.LL-:fL-:s?­rrv-*-NARS.D.A~~

• ~SENSITrvE

GROUP A

_-.1.---.......... . .,.. -~

SS07-X

2

1. We seek to develop increasing awareness of the situationthrough a program of diplomatic and intelligence briefings.The main aim, from our point of view, is heightening the aware­ness of the regional states that Soviet involvement in Afghani­stan presents a novel security problem for them. Most of themdo recognize this; India, which is key to our strategy, ishowever reluctant to accept the idea. (5)

2. Through these discussions we are seeking to stimulate dis­cussion of the problem among the regional states. We shoulcdo more -- e.g. urging Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, etc. toput pressure on the Indians to take account of their re ionalconcerns.

3. The China factor must be turned into a positive rather thana negative element -- i.e. Peking should take added initiativesto improve relations with India and reduce the Indian percep­tion of a Sino-Pakistani (and perhaps US) alliance. (5)

4. Something has to be done about Iran. First, it seems in­capable of purposeful action; second, our relations with it arepoor; and third, its strident Islamic tone frightens the Indians.The third point might be amenable to improvement if we could con­vince the Iranians to initiate some discussion with the Indiansabout their concerns with the Soviet role in Afghanistan. (Simi­larly, we might encourage the Iranians to start thinking of theChinese as a potentially useful connection in that regard.) Thefirst and second might be amenable to some improvement if weand the Iranians could find ground for collaboration inapproaching the Afghan problem. This subject has been broacheddiscussions could be intensified. (5)

5. The Pakistani element is substantially frozen by the nuclearimpasse, although there seems to be increasing Pakistani interestin assistance to the insurgents. The problem with that is en­suring that it not justify a Soviet intervention or otherwiseevoke a more direct Soviet threat to Pakistan. We have consul­tations coming up with the Pakistanis next month and can soundthem out better then. Before then, we should concentrate onintelligence exchan e~~"""""""""1I1I1I1I1I1I1

·-(5 )

S~C~~/SENSITIVE

.....----------------~c&-...-

..sseRB'f/SENSITIVE 3

5507-X

•6. India is very difficult to deal with because of the absenceof a functioning government. This problem will at the earliestbe resolved early next year. In the interim, we should play anunobtrusive role, concentrating perhaps on briefings throughintelligence liaison channels. We should not take the initia­tive in urging the Indians to consult with others. (S)

In sum -- We would be relying essentially on the regional statesto take initiatives among themselves to heighten mutual aware­ness and perhaps lay the groundwork for cooperative action.Our role would be limited to behind the scenes efforts and therisks would be small. But the chances of an effective resultare also not great unless there is a massive and unambiguousSoviet intervention in Afghanistan that so alarms the regionalstates that they can put lesser problems behind them. (S)

~e~T/SENSITlVE

• -Si§RE!fSENSITlVE

GROUP B

4

5S07-X

This set of actions would escalate Group A significantly interms of us involvement. The strategy would focus on closerregional coordination, with the US playing as unobtrusivea role as possible, but nonetheless one that would be muchhigher profile than in the Group A scenario. (5)

1. In this strategy, the emphasis shifts from India to Iran.We would pick up on their offer to discuss the Afghan insur­gency problem. If they show further interest, we would haveto be prepared to offer Iran help in supporting the insurgency.We could provide arms, money and training; we would consultclosely with Tehran and provide intensive intelligence brief­ints. It is by no means certain that the Iranians (especiallyQom) want to play this role but it is one of our few sharedinterests and a major benefit of this strategy is that itgives us something to talk about with Iran .

4. The Chinese would be urged to add something to the pot forthe insurgents, working through both Iran and Pakistan. (5)

5. The overall coordinationmuch more structuredhave to be a focalparties concerned

~ECRE~/SENSITIVE

of this kind of effort would bethe Group A case. There wouldcoordination of effort amona the

SECPE'P{SEN5ITIVE 5

SS07-X •6. Iraq is not likely to join in. We and other concernednations should, however, urge Iraq to take a benevolentlyneutral stance, pointing out that the issue of the day isthwarting Soviet hegemonism, rather than exploiting oldregional an~agonisms. (5)

8. A heightened as military presence would be appropriate,demonstrating support for Pakistan and in the Gulf area. (S)

aECnE~/SENSITIVE

--------_._--- ----_.

• SECBET/SENSITIVE

GROUP C (?)

6

5S07-X

Theoretically, there is a Group C -- actions that would pro­vide a much more dramatic us profile. This would call for apublic and leading US role in the coordination of SouthwestAsian security, involving a reborn CENTO or, at least, openUS membership in the coordinating body dealing with Afghani­stan. (S)

The costs of such action -- polarization, raising of unrealis~ic

expectations, damage to other US policies -- are too high towarrant consideration, given the meager increase in benefits tobe ex?ected. (5)

Crit::rue-~

Ther~ are several serious problems involved in the Group Bacticns (and a fortiori in Group C) that must be kept in mind:

1. Cuts ide involvement in the Afghan situation will serve asa tr:gger -- and for many a justification -- for Soviet inter­vent:'on.

2. Aside from the political costs with India, etc., this willmake it highly unlikely that whatever we and others may do willsave the insurgents from defeat. We will in all likelihoodhave our bluff called and emerge from the confrontationweakened. Even the regional countries who welcomed our supportwill have to reconsider their options vis-a-vis the Soviets.

3. The strategy relies heavily on Iran which is one of themore uncertain trumpets around. We could reduce this dangersomewhat by focussing mainly on Pakistan and China, but thiswould simply be the replay of 1971.

4. If we drive India definitively into the Soviet camp thepolitical cost would far outweigh whatever gains we have anyreasonable expectation of making elsewhere. Hope for anystable regional security system would be destroyed. (S)

The B Strategy thus shows little promise of meeting the objec­tives set at the beginning of this paper. In addition, it does

•SECReT/SENSITIVE

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5507-X •not meet the test of urgency since nobody really expects usto do anything in Afghanistan. (5)

At the same time, it might be worth pursuing for domesticpolitical reasons; as a means of showing our determinationto become involved in Gulf security; or as a global signalto the Soviets. Certainly a successful thwarting of Sovietdesigns in this important region would be of immense benefiton all fronts. Also, this strategy could be of importance inbuilding a new relationship with Iran and the greater thedegree of foreign involvement, the greater the chances forcoordination and effective action by the Afghan rebels. (S)

The cost-benefit equation will be more favorable if we canmove rapidly, decisively and effectively, and if our role isappreciated. The chances of bringing this off depend partlyon skill, but also heavily on ou= ability to manage the publicinformation side effectively. That has not been our strongpoint recently. (S)

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saVIn OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

KEY JUDGMENTS

Moscow probably views the situation in Afghanistanas e'tlen more unstable after the fall of Taraki. While theSoviets may have previously decided to implement new mili­tary measures to support Taraki against the rebels, theuncertain tenure of Prime Minister Amin' s regime makes itlikely that Moscow is deferring major new initiatives toexpand the counterinsurgency effort pending a dec~sion asto whether Amin can consolidate his position. ~-..-.

e

may fear.s coup might fragment the Afghan y and lead to

a breakdown of control in Kabul. In this event, they wouldbe likely to deploy one or more Soviet airborne divisionsto the Kabul vicinity to protect Soviet citizens alreadythere as well as to ensure continuance of some pro-Sovietregime in the capital. Although we might not receive prior e'"warning, we believe it likely that we would promptly detecta deployment of Soviet forces on this scale once it began.We do not believe that Moscow would intend such a deploy-ment for use in fighting against the Muslim insurgency, al­though, once in Afghanistan, such Soviet airborne forcescould eventually be drawn into such fighting. We have notseen indications that the soviets are at the moment prepar-ing ground forces for large-scale military intervention inAfghanistan. ,~.

This memorandum was prepared under the ausp~ces of the NationalIntelligence Officer for USSR and Eastern Europe, National ForeignAssessment Center. It was coordinated within the Central Intel­ligence Agency; with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, De­partment of State; with the Defense Intelligence Agency; with theNational Security Agency; and with the intelligence organizationsof the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. In­fo~ation available through 27 September 1979 was used in the prep­aration of this memorandum.

TCS 3267-791

-:.ta~ J$eei'et ..... ."....,J' •

• • "t •

In the months before the coup, as the insurgency inAfghanistan intensified and spread, the soviets increasedthe numbers and expanded the counterinsurgency role thereof what now are at least 2,500 of their military personnel,who are heavily involved in quiding combat operations.Moscow may also have permitted direct participation ofSoviet helicopter pilots, and possibly some tank person­nel, in combat alongside the Afghans. In addition, webelieve that one lightly equipped Soviet airborne battalionhas been quietly deployed in Afghanistan since early Julyto provide security at Bagram Air Force Base.* Meanwhile,also during the summer of 1979, the Soviets have apparentlytried and failed to induce the regime to admit other politi­cal elements to the government to broaden its base. Allthese measures have proved inadequate to halt the deteriora­~on of the regime's position. ~~111111

Amin's seizure of sole power within the Khalqist re­gime in mid-September has further complicated these sovietproblems in dealinq with both the reqime and the insurgency.We believe that the Soviets probably did not instigate orforesee this move by Amin. Moreover, they probably alsoevaluated it as rendering the counterinsurgency task moredifficult, at least in the short term, because it furthernarrowed the regime's base of support, and, in fact, threat­ened to divide the ~linq party itself. ~_

If Moscow, within the next few weeks, concludes thatAmin has consolidated his position and that no effectivechallenge from within the regime and the Army is likely,we believe the Soviets will probably increase their counter­insurgency role over the next few months, albeit incre­mentally rather than dramatically. In this case, Moscowmay further increase the number of Soviet advisers and

. expand their combat activities, and may gradually bring inadditional special battalions or regiments to provide se­curity in key cities. In addition, Moscow could bolsterthe counterinsurgency effort by providing Soviet-mannedcombat support and combat service support units, such asattack helicopter, logistic, and maintenance units, toenhance Afghan combat reach and effectiveness. ~TS1llll

* The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency believes that thereis insufficient evidence to determine the role or function of theSoviet unit deployed at Baqram Air Force Base. There is no evidencethat this unit is equipped with crew-served weapons. 5f9"

TCS 3267-792 .•

" ... '

SecLet:

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...... •We believe the introduction into AfC1hanistan of ad­

ditional Soviet battalion- or reqiment-s1ze units forsecurity purposes, like the forces already at Baqram, couldbe accomplished without immediate detection if this weredone gradually, alonq with the onqoinq airlift of materiel.Our ability to detect promptly the incremental introduction9f Soviet combat support and combat service support units~s.s~milarly limited, although time would increase the pro~­ab~f our learning that such units had entered Afghan~stan.~TS_

. The Soviets are probably well aware of the open-endednulitary and political difficulties that could flow if suchlimited intervention were allowed to grow into a largerand more visible commitment. They are also aware of the~dverse pol~tical consequences this would entail for th~m~n South As~a and the Middle East. On the other hand, ~tis clear that the Soviets' sense of their interests inAfghanistan is now more ambitious than it was before theadvent of the Marxist regime in 1978. They see the mainte­nance of a Marxist state in Afghanistan as important to theirstrategic and political interests in the region. This per­ception has increasingly supplanted the Soviets' earlier andless ambitious goal of simply maintaining a friendly buffer •state on their southern border. If they do decide to providesome additional military support to Amin, they are likely todo so' in the hope of bolstering the anti-insurgent struggleSUfficiently to avoid fac~g a decision as to w.ethr touse Soviet combat units on a large scale. J,JJ:.9

In the event that Amin does not consolidate his posi­tion but that an acceptable and viable Marxist alternativeemerges, the Soviets are likely to shift their politicaland military support accordingly. If no such viable left­ist alternative appears, and the Khalqi regime fragments,the Soviets would promote installation of a more moderateregime willing to deal with them, rather than accept thepolitical costs and risks of a massive Soviet invasion tof~ght tJ:1e insurgency. Nevertheless, we can foresee con­t~ngenc~es under which the chances of large-scale andlong-term Soviet intervention would become substantiallygreater:

Prolonged political chaos.

The prospect of advent of an anti-Soviet regime.

Foreign military intervention. ~'rS_

TCS 3267-793

... ,­~crat. •

DISCUSSION

1. The threat raised by the Muslim insurgency to thesurvival of the Marxist government in Afghanistan appearsmore serious now than at any time since the government as­sumed power in April 1978. During the past 17 months, thegovernment has become increasingly dependent on Soviet po­litical, military, economic, and technical help. The Sovietshave been generous but the Afghans remain unsatisfied. Mean­while, the declining fortunes of the Khalqist* regime probablyhave caused Moscow to reassess what level of assistance wouldbe needed to keep the Khalqis in power and at what point therisks and burdens associated with such assistance would out­weigh the benefits of preserving the Taraki-Amin regime--andnow the Amin regime. j,I1If

2• Although a fairly important garrison recently sur­rendered to the rebels, the various insurgent groups do notyet pose an immediate military threat to government controlof the major cities, and can only intermittently interdict'key communications routes. But the Afghan armed forces areincreasingly stretched thin in their efforts to deal withthe insurgents, and their willingness to support the govern­ment has been continuously eroding.~

soviet Interests in Afghanistan

3• Until last year's Marxist coup, Moscow's interestin Afghanistan seemed to be focused on ensuring the continuedprimacy of Soviet influence in a state on the southern bor­der of the USSR. Before last year, Soviet interests inAfC1hanistan were guaranteed by two treaties (a 1921 Friend­ship Treaty and a 1931 Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggres­sion which prohibited Afghan territory from being used foractions inimical to the USSR) and by the USSR's role aschief economic and military aid donor. To be sure, Afghan­istan's foreign policy was nonaligned and Moscow's abilityto influence Afghan internal affairs was limited, but theSoviets seemed satisfied with their level of influencethere, and regularly cited Afghanistan as a model 0 f howtwo states with differing social systems could peacefullycoexist. J!!t

* Ine dominant faction of the People I s Democratic Party (PDPA). Jcr

4

.~*NOFO .. OCON'lBAC'l-oRCON

4. We have no convincing evidence to confirm reportsthat the Soviets were behind the coup which brought the Marx­ists to power. The USSR undoubtedly had been the chief in­spirational force and financial source of support for theAfghan Communist movement since its establishment in theearlr 1950s. But the Soviets were always worried aboutthe ~act which support for the Afghan Communists wouldhave on their relations with the Afghan Government andwere extremely circumspect in their direct dealings withthem. Indeed, Moscow has never officially acknowledgedthe existence of an Afghan Communist party, or permittedany Afghan Communists to attend international party meet­ings , even inc0gnito . ;tc )..

5. 'the successful seizure of power by the Afghan Com­munists, however, dramatically changed their status in M~SCOW.B~th the USSR.' s envoy in Kabul, Ambassador puzanov! who. 3.Sreporte~ to be an ideologue with important conn~ct1.0J?-S.l.nthe SOV3.et party Central committee, and the SOV3.et II1l.l1.tary ,who are likely to have seen an opportunity to enhance theSoviet strategic position, probably urged soviet leadersto take advantage of the political windfall and to crea~eyet another Communist regime on Soviet borders. In addi­tion, the Soviet leadership probably thought that the con­solidation of Marxist rule could take place gradually andbe managed in a way that would not jeopardize more importantSoviet foreign policy interests. (~C=OC)

6. It is clear that the Soviets' sense of their in­terests in Afghanistan is now more ambitious than it wasbefore the advent of the Marxist regime in 1978. They seethe maintenance of a Marxist state in Afghanistan as beingimportant to their strategic and political interests inthe reqion. This perception has increasingly supplantedthe Soviets' earlier and less ambitious goal of simplymaintaining a friendly buffer state on their southernborder. ~.,

Evolution of Soviet Involvement

Mindful of the narrowness of the new req1.me IS

5

TCS 3267-79

base of support, and anxious to help it consolidate itsposition, the USSR also began increasing its military ad­visory presence, which at the time of the coup numberedan estimated 350 persons. In 3uly 1978, Moscow concludeda $250 million military aid aqreement with the new regime.~JoC).

8. As opposition to the government increased lastfall and winter, the soviets continued to augment their mili­tary advisory presence. By early this year, their pres­ence had grown to at least five Soviet generals and an esti­mated 750 to 1,000 military advisers. These soviets wereinitially stationed in the Kabul area, assisting newlypromoted officers in running the Ministry of Defense andtraining Afghan recruits. As conditions in the countrysidedeteriorated, an increasing number of Soviet advisers weresent to the provinces to assist in the government IS anti­insurgent effort. JiJS_

9. The uprising in Herat last March and the subsequentvisit to Kabul by the Soviet military's top politicalofficer, General Yepishev, in early April led to a furtheraugmentation of the Soviet military presence. In June 1979,Moscow deployed eight AN-12s to Afghanistan to assist thegovernment in transporting men and materiel to the variousbattlefronts. We now estimate that there are at least_2,500 Soviet milit.a.rY personnel in Afghanistan. * ~

10. there are Soviet advisersattached to every major Afghan Armr command, as well as toat least some reqiment- and battall.on-level units. Theyappear to be heavily involved in quidinCJ Afghan combat op­erations as well as in Af an Arm 10 stics and administra­tion.~

* This figure does not include up to 3,600 additional troops which,according to unconfirmed reports, have recently been moved intoKabul to safeguard facilities there. See paragraph 39. ' •

TCS 3267-79

TCS 3267-79

11. In addition, there are some reports which are notconfirmed, but which we regard as fairly credible, allegingthat Soviets have piloted helicopters together with Afghanpilots in strikes against insurgent positions, and have onoccasion furnished tank personnel for combat operations .

.~

12. If these latter reports are accurate, the soviets,in addition to guiding Afghan combat operations, are them­selves already participating in combat on a small scale andin certain limited ways. In general, however, t."ley are notorganized in cohesive combat units intended to conduct uni­lateral operations. ~••~

13. Soviet personnel also appear to be stationed inconsiderable numbers at Bagram Air Force Base north of Kabul,wh~re they apparently service the airlift from the SovietUmon. In addition to the aircraft service and supportcontingent at Bagram, an airborne battalion--some 400 per­sonnel--has apparently been at the airbase since early July.The unit is lightly equipped and probably has been deployedto Baqram to provide security. We have no evidence that ithas been used in combat operations against the Afghan insur­gents.* p_

~ The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency believes that thereis insufficient evidence to determine the role or function of theSoviet unit deployed at Bagram Air Force Base. There is no evidencethat this unit is equipped with crew-served weapons. .<..TSW

7. _~

14. soviet civilian involvement in Afghanistan hasalso grown appreciably since the coup. By the end of 1978,we estimated that the number of civilian advisers had nearlydoubled to some 2,000, as the Soviets assumed top managerialand planning jobs in the government's economic ministriesand became involved in changing the government's educationalsystem. The Soviets, however, have not promised the Afghansany significant new economic assistance beyond additionaldebt relief (the USSR is by far Afghanistan's largestcreditor) and 100,000 tons of wheat. This is because theAfghan capability to absorb substantial increases in foreigneconomic assistance is limited and because there is stillsome $300 million in unallocated credits from the $1.3 bil­lion extended to previous reqimes. The 60 economic aidagreements that were signed last year allocated only $200million of the $500 million in credits outstanding at thetime of the April 1978 coup. Nonetheless, the Afghansare said to be dissatisfied over the level of Soviet eco­nomic assistance actually being provided, and annoyed overtheir unsuccessful attempts to join the Soviet bloc'sCouncil for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) in hopes ofloosening Soviet purse strings. (S NF.::;J.C. ec)

.Jfi4!J'15. Moscow's political commitment to the new reqime

was symbolized by its willingness in December 1978 to con­clude another friendship treaty with the Afghan Government.The treaty is similar to others signed with Third Worldcountries; in that it said nothing about the Marxist­Leninist character of the new regime, paid lipservice toAfghanistan's professed foreign policy of nonalignment, andcontained no explicit mutual defense commitment. ArticleFour of the Treaty, however, presumably could be invokedto justify soviet combat intervention on behalf of the re­gime. It calls for the two sides to "consult with each otherand take by mutual agreement appropriate measures to ensurethe security, independence, and territorial integrity" ofthe two states. #)~

16. As the prospects of the Khalqist group for con­solidating its rule have declined, Moscow has become in­creasingly concerned that Afghanistan's neighbors, P~

an mi ht be te ted to aid Ai han insurgents.~To deter such support,

the Soviets have kept up heavy dip omatic and propagandapressure on Pakistan and somewhat lesser pressure on Iran.They have also repeatedly accused the United States, China,and Egypt of training Afghan insurgents. ~'fS~

'"

Tes 3267-79

•Recent Soviet Behavior

17. In addition to increasing their military involve­ment in the government's anti-insurgent effort, the Soviets

. have urged Taraki and Amin to seek political means for easing~e situation. They convinced the government to abandon.1ts land reform program. But they were not able to reversesome of the other social and economic reforms introducedby Taraki and Amin that have alienated deeply religiousAfghan tribes who refuse to be wrenched from their near­feUdal way of life. ~)

18. Similarlf, the Soviets have apparently had littles~ccess in persuading the Afghan regime to modify its hos-t1le posture toward Pakistan in the interest of inducingPakistan to minimize support for the Af han insur ents.

19. The apparent lack of harmony between the Soviet •and _Afghan leaderships lent support to the numerous indi-cations that Moscow-throughout the summer of 1979 wasseeking alternatives to .the Taraki-Amin regime. We havereceived reports that the Soviets encouraged leaders of theri!al ~archam faction of the People's Democratic Party, ;neX1le 1n-Europe, to believe "that the USSR would back the1rreturn to power and, alternatively, that the Soviets wereplan"; ng a military coup. Jailed members of the Parchamfaction in Kabul, who were released at Soviet urging in earlyJuly, were rearrested in August after they began circulatinganti-Amin and anti-Tarakidocuments. (~JOC)

20. MOscow's desire to enlarge the Afghan rulingcircle apparently was discussed directly with Taraki andAmin. Ambassador Safronchuk, the Soviets' special envoyto Kabul, told the US Charge on 24 June that Moscow had~ot yet been able to persuade the regime to bring new people;nto government. By mid-July the East German Ambassador1n Kabul was claiming that the Soviets were going to replaceTaraki and Amin by force if necessary _ In late July, thepublic comments of Taraki and Amin made it clear that theywere aware of the Soviet machinations and that they would

TCS 3267-79 •

resist. Amin pointedly reminded Moscow that the prerequ~sitefor continued close ties was Soviet "respect for our natJ.onalsovereignty and independence. II In the same period, therewas evidence suggesting that'Amin had taken steps to circum­scribe the power of the Minister of Defense Watanj ar,a key fiqure in any putative Soviet effort to induce theAfghan military to depose Amin and Taraki. On 28 July,Amin assumed effective control of the Defense Ministryand appointed Watanjar as Interior Minister. (~NC ec)

21. Events during the latter half of August suggestthat despite the difficulties in its dealings with the regime,Moscow was n~~repared to halt the growth of its commit-ment to the qis. On 19 Auqust Soviet leaders Brezhnevand Kosyqin sent an unusually warm message to the Afghanle~ders in connection with Afghan independence, day. A fewdays before, a large high-ranking Soviet military delegationled by the Commander of Soviet Ground Forces, General pavlovskiyhad arrived in Kabul secretly to conduct a lengthy assess-ment of Afghan military needs. ,~.JIC."OC)

22. In mid-September, Amin's seizure of sole power,~irremoving both Watanjar and Taraki from the government, ratefurther complicated the Soviet problems in dealing withboth the regime and the insurgency. The Soviets probablysaw the Amin coup as 'rendering the counterinsurgency taskmore difficult, at least in the short tem, because itfurther narrowed the regime I s base of support and in factthreatened to divide the Khalqi party itself. J..'r~

Military Options

23. On the eve of the Amin coup, in the apparent absenceof viable political alternatives, the Soviets seem to havedecided by late August to renew their commitment to the Afghanleadership as it was then constituted, and to focus on thescope and character of military support needed to supportthat commitment. The size and rank of the Pavlovskiy dele­gation, plus the long duration of its visit, strongly sug­gest that it was tasked to make that assessment of mili-tary needs. If Moscow chose to provide additional militarysupport, its options could be divided into four categories,as discussed below. ,Js1-~

24. Equipment and Advisers. The most obvious optionis to supply more equJ.pment and to increase the number ofSoviet advisers. Because of a shortage of trained Afghan

• 'rCS 3267-7910

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•manpower, such an increase might necessitate allowing Sovietadvisers a more extensive role in combat and air supportactivities and in ferrying men and materiel within Afghanistan.The Soviets, for example, could assign more personnel tofly and maintain tactical ground support aircraft and heli­copter gunships for operations against the insurgents. ps~

2S. Introduction of Combat Support and Combat ServiceSupport Unl.ts. Another optJ.on, at a higher level of l.nvolve­ment, would be to provide the Afghan Army with Soviet-mannedcombat support and combat service support units--such asattack helicopter and additional logistic and maintenanceunits--to enhance the Afghan combat reach and effectiveness.Combat support and combat service support units could bemoved to areas of the USSR adjacent to Afghanistan and in­crementally introduced over a period of weeks without strain­ing the Soviet transport system. Our ability to detect suchSoviet movements and intrusions promptly is limited, althoughtime would increase the probability of our learning that suchunits had entered Afghanistan. jJtS~

26. Lindted Intervention With soviet Combat Units. •The Soviets might cons1.der dep10p.ng a 1111l1.ted nUiiiEer of theirown units to provide security or operate in combat as separateentities. The Soviets would have to weigh whether theirincreased combat presence would alienate rather than bolsterthe Afghan forces that are now loyal to the regime. Be-cause of this uncertainty the introduction of Soviet combatunits probably would be accomplished incrementally. Itmight begin, for example, with a few battalions up to andincluding an airbol:I1e division or two to help stiffen AfghanAImy resolve or provide security for key cities or criticalpoints. As noted earlier, we believe one such battalionhas already been introduced to provide security for Bagramairfield since early July.~

27. The most likely airborne division to be called inis the one nearest Afghanistan, located at Fergana in theTurkestan Military District (MO). It could be brought up toits operational strength of some 7,900 men in a few hours.~)

28. The airlift of an airborne division into Afghanistancould be accomplished within a day or so if ':he transportand airborne forces were previously alerted and prepared.The Fergana division is situated about 380 nautical milesfrom Kabul, and the flight time between the two locations

'.rCS 3267-79

11St!!#"~~- •

is onlf about one and a half hours. With the short dis­tance :Lnvolved, the Soviets would probably elect to estab­lish an air shuttle and deliVel:' the division in severalreqiment-size increments, each requirinq about 100 aircraftsorties. Some 200 additiona! sorties would be required forthe division I s support equipment. An airlift of this naturewould be well within the capabilities of the Soviet mili­tary transport fleet. /iPS•••

29. ~he Soviets could also airlift to Afghanistan in­fantry elements up to regimental size from divisions in theTurkestan MO. Without their heavy equipment, these unitswould not have the. firepower or mobility of airborne unitsbut could be used for point defense or, with .the commitmentof substantial helicopter lift and support units, to pro­tect communication lines or conduct anti-insurgent opera-ti:ons. V)

30. All of these limited deployments could be suppor'teby fighter aircraft from the three tactical air force basesin the Turkestan MO. Only 45 of the approximately 120 tactical fiqhters at these bases have a primary role of qroundattack, but other aircraft could readily be deployed toborder airfields if necessary. The closest combat assaulthelicopter unit is in the Transcaucasus MD, 1,100 milesfrom the Afqhan border, and other units are farther awayin the carpathian and Transbaikal. MOs. Soviet transporthelicopter units are located 'throughout the western andsouthwestern military districts. The Soviets probablywould not consider that airstrikes by themselves would re­verse a deteriorating military situation, but they miqhtuse' such strikes to support Soviet combat units if theywere introduced. ,f-'"

31. Massive Soviet Mi.lit~ Intervention. Anythingbeyond securU1q Kabul or some other key Cl.ty and a few critical points would require the commitment of large numbersof regular ground forces in a potentially open-ended'opera­tion. An overland move to Kabul--particularly with thepossibility of Afghan Army and insurgent opposition--wouldbe a multidivisional operation exhausting the resourcesof the Turkestan MD. An operation of this magnitude wouldtherefore require the redeployment of forces--and theirsupportinq elements--from western and central military dis­tri~, in addition to .those near the Soviet-Afghan border.~)

• Tes 3267-79

•If·.-----------I!!:)....--------­

1'O~KOF; . OlttBAcr-oacoN

32. Soviet ground forces closest to Afghanistan arelocated in the Turkestan MD--some 45,000 men in four cadre­level motorized rifle divisions, an artillery brigade, andvarious Me-level support units. All of these forces aremanned considerably below their intended wartime strengths.In about a week some 50,000 reservists could be mobilizedto fill out the Turkestan units and an additional divisioncould be moved in from the Central Asian MD. ~)

33. Six other Central Asian Military District divisionswould also be available for operations but would require afew weeks or longer to mobilize reservists and move to theAfghan border. The Soviets probablr would be reluctant tomove any substantial portion of thel.r Central Asian forcesinto Afghanistan, however, for fear of weakening their posi­tion opposite China. ~)

34. The Soviets have 12 other divisions located wellover 1,000 miles from Afghanistan in the Volga, Ural, andNorth Caucasus MOs from which they could draw interventionforces. These units are also manned at low levels in peace­time and would require a few weeks to fill out and move to

. the Afghan border. ~) •

35. The terrain and lack of a modern transportationnetwork in Afghanistan are hampering the Afghan Government'smilita.ry effort agaiBst the insurgents and would seriouslycomplicate large-scale Soviet military operations. Mostof the country is hilly or mountainous--terrain that wouldlimit the use of transport and logistic vehicles. In addi­tion to controlling the mountainous areas, the insurgentscould disrupt Soviet movement by cutting the roadways thatlead from the border area to several key cities as well asthose roads between maj or urban areas. ,

Prospects

36. The prospect of a successful Communist governmentin Afghanistan is important to Moscow for ideological reasons:such a government would provide substance to deterministclaims that world "socialismll will eventually emerge victorious.The Soviets feel obligated to support such revolutions andembarrassed when they fail. The outcome assumes an addedimportance when the revolution occurs in a country on theUSSR's border. In addition, it is conceivable that someSoviet planners have welcomed the advent of such a revolu-tion in Afghanistan on strategic grounds, arguing that if

orcs 3267-79 •

this revolutionary regime could be consolidated in powerat acceptable cost, it could open the way for the eventualexpansion of Soviet influence southward. t..c.,.

37. For these reasons Moscow has been determined tomake the Khalqi seizure of power blossom into a workablegovernment, and has been frustrate~ by the steady declineof the regime I s fortunes. We have seen that as theinsurgency has worsened and the regime I s needs have grown,the Soviets have steadily expanded the flow of military sup­plies to the reqime to the limts of its ability to absorbthem. Similarly, they have gradually increased the numberand expanded the counterinsurgency role of Soviet advisers inthe country. They have. placed a battalion at Baqram airfieldto provide security for the airlift. As these measures haveproved inadequate to halt the deterioration of the regime'sposition, the Soviets have explored the option of seekinga broader based Afghan leadership but, even before the Amincoup, had clearly failed in their efforts to create a coali­tion that might a.ttract greater popUlar support while guaran­teeing the government's continued pro-Soviet orientation.lU~ .

38. Under these circumstances, the Soviets are likelyto have begun more serious consideration of the spectrumof possibilities for direct combat intervention. The likeli­hood that the Soviets had been weighing the military optionsdiscussed earlier was enhanced by the arrival in mid-August of General Pavlovskiy. The delegation led by theCommander of the Soviet Ground Forces was specifically re­ported to be preparing, among other things, a detailed re­port on the Afghan insurgency and the Afghan military.(5 HF~~).....

39. We cannot rule out the possibility that Pavlovskiy'svisit followed a decision already made by Moscow to in­tervene at one of the levels discussed earlier, and thatPavlovskiy's task involved working out the modalities. Oneclandestine source in early September alleged that the So­viets had already moved some 3,600 Soviet combat troops intoKabul, with the pw:pose of protecting Soviet citizens andfacilities. The Soviets might have considered such a moveinto Kabul prudent in view of the uprisings that have oc­curred in Kabul this year and the continuing possibilityof violence in the capital. Sizable numbers of such troopswithout heavy equipment could have been brought into the city

'rCS 3267-79

..

•from the USSR undetected by US intelligence if this had beendone gradually and incrementally as part of the ongoing air­lift of materiel for Afghanistan. We have been unable to~;s report, however, by other intelligence means.

40. It appears reasonable to conclude that the sovietleadership has wished to avoid allowing the situation todeteriorate to a point where only large-scale interventionby Soviet troops could save the Afghan regime. Moscow wouldthen have to calculate whether Khalqi survival was worthcommitment to the qrave and open-ended military task ofholding down an Afghan insurgency in rugged terrain. TheSoviets would also have to consider the likely prospect thatthey would be contending with an increasingly hostile andanti-Soviet population. The USSR would then have to considerthe likelihood of an adverse reaction in the West, as wellas further complications with Iran, India, and Pakistan.Moscow would also have to weigh the neqative effects else­where in the Muslim world of a massive Soviet militarypresence in Afghanistan. Soviet-Iraqi relations, forexample, have already soured because of Baghdad's suspicionabout Soviet intentions in the Middle East follo"fing theupheavals in Iran and Afghanistan. A conspicuous use of •Soviet nlitary force against an Asian population would~vide the Chinese considerable political capital.

41. On the other hand, if worse came to worst, and theSoviets chose to abandon the Khalqis rather than accept thepolitical costs and risks of a Soviet invasion, the effectswould again be damaging to the USSR. But whatever criticismthe Soviets might suffer for not defending a budding revolu­tionary movement to the end could be deflected by remindingdetractors that the USSR had provided Kabul with large amountsof assistance and had warned Taraki and Amin that they weremismanaging the revolution. Moscow's unwillingness to ac­knowledge the Afghan regime publicly as a Communist governmenthas suggested that the Soviets have wished to leave open a~ropaganda retreat in case the Khalqis collapse.

42. To avoid being confronted with an all-or-nothingdecision, however, the Soviets seemed prepared before theAllin coup in mid-September to provide the reqime with ad­ditional military assistance that could include some combathelp but would, for the time being, probably be well short

TCS 3267-79lS

q'~tt •

.'

of a major intervention (which we have defined as a multi­division ground force operation.) In short, the Sovietsseemed likely to act initially on the smallest and leastconspicuous scale co~!~ith Pavlovskiy's estimate ofthe regime's needs.~

43. As noted earlier, Amin's seizure of sole powerhas further complicated the soviet problems in dealing withboth the regime and the insurgency. We believe that theSoviets probably did not instigate or foresee this moveby Amin, which in fact may conceivably have been a preemptivestep to forestall a Soviet plot to have Taraki remove him.(~

44. We believe it likely that Moscow views the situationin Kabul as extremely unstable since Taraki' s fall, andth~t the soviets see the uncertain tenure of Amin' s regimeas requiring at least a brief deferral of new soviet mili­tary initiatives against the insurgency pending a decisionas to whether Amin can consolidate his po~ition. ~s.)

45. At the same time, the soviets have seemed readydecisively to· preserve security in Kabul if theation there should ra idl deteriorate

e Sov1etS lDay ear at Amin' s coup mightprovoke fighting within the Afghan Army and a breakdown ofcontrol in Kabul. In this event, the Soviets are probablyprepared to deploy one or more Soviet airborne divisionsto the Kabul vicinity to protect soviets already there aswell as to ensure. continuance of a pro-Soviet regime in thecapital. We believe it likely that we would promptly de­tect a deployment of Soviet forces on this scale. We do notbelieve that the Soviets would intend such a deployment foruse in fightinq against the Muslim insurgency, althouqh itis not impossible that, once in Afqhanistan, such Sovietairborne forces could eventually be drawn into fiqhting.!1~

46. If, on the other hand, the Soviets within thenext few weeks conclude that AlDin has consolidated hisposition and that no effective challenge from within theregime and the Army is likely, we believe the Soviets willprobably increase their counterinsurgency role in the nextfew months, albeit incrementally rather than dramatically.

• Tes 3267-7916 - ,

" ~~;y?--HOFO~~ •Any moderate increase in the Soviet role--involvinq expansionof the combat activities of advisers, providinq some combatsupport and combat service support elements, and perhapsin!tially airliftinq in additional airborne or liqhtlyequipped battalions or regiments to provide security inkey cities~-would be primarily intended to bUy time. Per­haps the biggest immediate threat to the prospects for aUholding action" of this type is the loyalty of the AfghanArmy. Small-scale defections occur almost daily and, withfour major mutinies in the past seven months, its continuedallegiance is highly suspect.~

47. 'Unless the Army completely unravels, therefore,additional Soviet advisers and a limited sprinkling ofSoviet combat units would improve, but not guarantee, thestaying power of the Khalqis. In expanding incrementallythe level of their own involvement, however, there is adanger that the Soviets will increase their own stake inthe ultimate outcome, making it increasingly likely thatthey will raise the level of their participation stillanother notch if the situation continues to deteriorate.p-

48. In the event Amin does not consolidate his posi- •tion but an acceptable and viable Marxist alternative emerges,the Soviets are likely to shift their political and militarysupport accordingly.· If no such viable leftist alternativeappears, and the Khalqi reqime fragments, the Soviets wouldpromote installation of a more moderate regime willing todeal with them, rather than accept the political costs andrisks of 'a massive Soviet invasion to fight the insurgency.Nevertheless, we can foresee contingencies under which thechances of large-scale and long-term Soviet intervention .would become substantially greater:

Prolonged political chaos.

The prospect of advent of an anti-Soviet regime.

Foreign military intervention. ps~

'res 3267-79

17

~t •

•Warning Considerations

1. It· is difficult to assess warning time for im­precisely defined military options such as we can postulatefor Afghanistan. In Europe, for example, we know the param­eters of the "threat" forces and there is an extensivebody of good evidence indicating how they intend, in general,to employ these forces against NATO. In Afghanistan, how­ever, we have no evidence on Soviet military objectives oron the forces that the Soviets would consider necessary toaccomplish them. Moreover, in estimating warning time inEurope we have evidence of what the Soviets would considerto be a minimum force necessary to launch a deliberate at­tack and have predicated our minimum warning time on thetime necessary for the Warsaw Pact to prepare, and for NATOto detect, such an attack. In an intervention into Afghan­istan, however, the Soviets do not face well-organizedforces on their frontier to be overcome in an initial as- .sault. Therefore, even the largest intervention, whichwould take weeks to fUlly prepare if undertaken as a coor­dinated assault, could be undertaken piecemeal, beginningwith airborne or ground forces near the border. Such anoperation could be initiated in a day or so, with littleor no warning, as follow-on forces were being mobilized. ~f

2. The options available at the lower end of thescale provide the least. warning but also would likely havethe least military impact. Soviet airborne troops or small

"ground forces Units probably could be readied for an inter­vention in a day and it would take about that long to mar­shal the air transport to move them into Afghanistan inasingle lift. We could not be confident that we would detectthe increase in troop readiness early on, but the concurrentmarshaling of transport aircraft for a major airlift probablywould become apparent in a day. In addition, Soviet airborneand airlifted troops could be introduc~~~wU'ning atall if they were moved in piecemeal.~

3. The larger intervention options offer more warn­ing time, depending on the level of the soviet commitment.M~ltidivisional operations to secure a few lines of communi­cation into Afghanistan, for example, could be initiated,probably in about a week using the four divisions in theTurkestan Military District; it would take us a few days to

• TCS 3267-7918

*7~et:

detect the mobilization and movement of these forces. Op­erations in the face of Afqhan Army resistance or efforts topacify substantial areas of the country probably would re­quire forces from areas beyond the Turkestan Military Dis­trict and would take up to a few weeks to prepare. We probablwould be able to detect the mobilization and moveme~~~divisions in these areas in a few days to a week. ~~.

TCS 3267-79

19

'!';>Jr<t •

•"

DE R:JQMERDE RUEHC.6809/01 2722240ZIIY CCCCC ZZHo .p 292201Z SEP 79FM SECSTATE WASHDCTO ROSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0012INFO RUSBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 11380RUEBMOIAMEM8ASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7116RUSSAK/AMEMBASSY MEW DELHI PRIORITY 1376RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 4791

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 0101" 02 STATE 256809/01

E.O. 12065: G 0 5-9/28/85 ( PECX, ROB~RT)

TAGS: PEPR, SNAR, AF, UR, US, PK

SUBJECT: NEWSOM MEETING WITH AFGHAN FOREIGN ·MINISTER

1. CONFIDENTIAL- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ~UHMARY: DURING LENG~HY, BUSINESSLIKE SESSION IN NEW YORK,UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM AND AFGHAN FONMIN SHAH WALl TRADED MUTUALEXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST IN IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS, BUTAGREED ON LITTLF. ELSE. DISCUSSION TCUCHED ON THE DUBS ASSASS­INATION AND THE ')'tA APPROACH 'f0 ACCEPTASCE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.SHAH·WALI AFGHAN-FUGITIVES- WERE BEING TRAINED THERE. HE MIN­IMIZED THE SOVIET PRESENC~ IN AFGHANISTAN AND DEFENDED HIS GOVER­NMENT'S INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNMEN~. WE EXPRESSED APPRECIATIONFOR THE DRA'S .INTEREST IN ~ONTROLLING NARCOTICS. END. SUMMERY.

3. AT US INITIATIVE, UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM CALLED ON AFGHANFONNIN SHAH WALl FOR A GENERAL HOOR-~ONG EXCHANGE OF VIEWS SEPT27 IN NEW YORK. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS AND NEA/PAB DEREC­TOR PECK SAT IN. SHAB WALl HAD ONLY A NOTETAKER WITH HIM.

4. NEWSOM OPENED BY NOTING THAT WH~ HE WAS ·LAST IN AFGHANISTANHE MET WITH THEN-PRESIDENT TARAKI AND FON. MINISTE~ AKIN. HEWANTED TO USE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE FONKIN'S WISIT TO EXTENDHIS EEST WISHES TO AMIN AND TO SHAH WALl AS THEY ASSQMED ~HEIR

KEW RESPONSIBILITIES. NEWSOM SAID CHARGE AMSTUTZ HAD REPORTEDTBAT HE BAD A CORDIAL CORVERSATION EARLIER THE SAME DAY WITHPRESIDENT AMIN.

S. I~ RESPONCE SHAH WALl SAID THE ORA HAD FROM THE BEGINNING·WANTED TO HAVE ~OOD RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES WITHOUT EXCEP­TION. AFGHANISTAN HAD TRADITIONAL~Y FRIENDLY R~LATIONS WITH THEUS AND THE ORA HAD BEEN DESIROUS OF MAINTAINING THESE ~IES.

REFERRING TO THE DUBS ASSASSINATION, SHAH WALl SAID· CERTAINEVENTS R HAD ACCURRED WHICH THE ORA DID NOTWhNT. THE ORA HADDONE ITS BEST TO PROVE THAT THESE EVENTS HAD BEEN OUTSIDE ITSCONTROL.

94

6. NEWSOM NOTED THAT THE REACTION IN THE US TO THE DUBS ASSASS­INATION HAD BEEN VERY STRONG AND LED TO THE CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONWHICH REDUCED SOMEWHAT OUR COOPERATION. WE HAVE ~RIED TO EXTENDOUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AS LONG AS WE COULD ~NDER THE LAW, ANDARE PHASING OUT OUR PROGRAMS IN AN ORDERLY FAnHION. THE US WASALWAYS READY TO DISCUSS STEPS WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN TO PUT OURRELATIONS BACK ON h MonE NORMAL BASIS. WE WELCOMED WORD THATPRESIDENT AMIN WANTED ~ETTER RELATIONS. WHEN THE TIME CAME WHEY'BETTER RELATIUNS COULD BE DISCUSSED, WE WERE WILLING TO EXPLOREHOW THE CONDITIONS LAID DCWN BY CONGRESS HIGHT BE MET.

7. IN kEPLY TO SHAH WALI'S SUGG~STION THAT- FALSE PROPA~ANDA-

ON THIS ISSUE RhO UNDULY INFLU£NCED US POLITICAL LEADERS, NEWSOMSArD IT WAS THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE A~SASSINAT~ON THAT WERE~~SPO~S!BL£.·NOT NEWSPAPER REPORT5. WE ALSO FELT THAT W~ HAO NOTGOTTEN AS MUCH COOPERATION IN THE INVESTICATION AS WE COULD HAVEEXPECTED. IN DEFENSE, SHAH WALl POINTEC TO THE SERIOUS DOUBTSSTILL REMAINING ABOUT THE KENNEDY ASSAS~INATION AND REITERATEDTHAT THF DRA BELIZVED IT HAD DONE ITS BEST.

P.. REMINDED OF PREVIOUS USG ASSISTANCE T~ AFGHAN DEVELOPMENTPROJEC~S SUCH AS THE HELMA~D VA~LEY. SHAH WAL: SAI~ THAT IT WAS~ECAOSE OF THE PKEVIOUS~RI~~~LY RELATlONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNT­Rl~3 THAT THE DRA CONSIUERED Tn~ PRESENT SITUATION TO BE -ABMOR­~AL.· HE SAW NO HINDRANCE OR PROBLE~ WHICH COULD NOT BE SOLVED.HE DENIED THAT THE ORA WAS TURNING AWAY FROM THE PRIOR AFGHANPRACTICE OF DRAWING ON MULTIPLE AIU SOURCES AND ADVISERS IN PUTT-ING TOGETHER COOPERATIVE PROJECTS. SHAH WALl POINTED TO THE .CONTINUATION OF WORLD BANK, GERMAN AND OTHER PROJECTS, AND ARGUED­THAT AF~HANlSTAN·S ACTIONS_IN SOME ·SPECIFIC CASES -( READ U.S.) HAD ARISEN fROM A FEELING THAT INDIVIDUALS DID 50ThAVE PROPER OUALIFICATIONS. HE ADDED THAT AFGHANIS~AN HAD ASKEDFOR MORE PERSONNEL IN CERTAIN CASES, CITING THEIR REQUEST TO CARZ­MEDICO ( WHICH HAD A LARGE US PERSONNEL COMPONENT ) FOR MORE ME­DICAL SF~CIALISTS. HE ADDED WITH APPARENT REGRET ~HAT CARE-MEDICOHAD BEEN UNABLE TO COMPLY, AND THAT HE RAD LEAkNED SnORTLY BEFOREDEPARTING KABUL OF CARE-MEDICO'S DECISION TO WITH~RAW ALL OF ITSPERSONNEL FROM THE COUNTRY.

9. SHAH WALl REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE WH~N ASKED IF HE EXPECTEDCHANGES IN BASIC ORA POLICIES rOLLOWING RECENT LEADERSHIP CHANGES.HE EXPECTED CONTINUITY SINCE THE POLICIES WERE LAID DOWN BY THEPARTY, AND TUE FARTY STILL EXISTED. NEWSOM SAID WE HAD NOTICEDPkESIDENT AKIN'SBT16809

n~NNVV ESB004DRA 546nn RUOMHRDE RUEHC *6809/02 2722242ZUY cceee ZZHo P 292201Z SEP 79PH SECSTATE WASHOCTO RUSBLK!AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 00J3

95

INFO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMAbAD PRIORITY 738}RUEHNO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7JJ7RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY ]377aU9.MHR/AHEM~ASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 4792BTCONFIOEH~IAL FINAL SECTION OF 02STATE 256809/02

STATED DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN'S~£IGHBO~SPAKISTA" AND IRAN, SHAH WALl SAID THISREFLECTED ~HE/SINCERE O~SI~ESOF THE AFGHAN PEOPLEAND THE PARTY. HE SAID DEFUTY FONMIN DOST'S VISITTO PAKISTAN IiAD RESULTED 1111 HAVANA Al~D FORMER PRE­SIDENT ~ARAKI HAD ALSO TALKED WITH PAKISTANI PRES­IDENT' 211. ThERE. H~ WAS CAREFUL TO POI~T OUT THATTHE LATTER MEETING " REFL~CTED THE DESiRE OF OURGOVERNM£NT" ~ H~ INDICA'J;ElJ THAT lio'ta AGHA SHAHIAND ZIA HAD BEEN INVITED '1'0 KABUL, BUT THAT IT WASUND£RSTOO~ ZIA WOULD COME ONLY AFTER AN A~HA SHAHIVISIT HAD TAKEN PLACE~

10. AT ANOTHEk POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, SHAH TOOKA MILD SWIPE .0\'':. PAKISTAN WHEN DISCU~SING THE UNDER­LAYIN ~AOS~S OF THE INSURGENCY. HE SAID THS R~3LES

WERE MOST~r ~HOSE ~HO HAD LOST THEIR FO~~~R FEUDAL. PRIVILEGES, 3UT ADDED T3AT PART OFtTHS PROBLEM WASCREATED BY AFG3ANISTAN'S N2IGHBORS. HE ~OINTED ~O

':'HEC1'.l"'.PS IN PAXIS'l'AN WHERE AFGHAN " FUGITIVES" t'lEREJf.kAOZlfEO. ,HE ADDED THAT PAltISTAN ALSO SENT SOME "MILITIA" INTOAFGHANISTAN. ASKED ABOUT THE REFUGEB SITUATlaN, SHAHWALl ARGUED TBA~ AFGHANISTAN'S BORDERS WERE VERYPOROUS AND THAT 2.5 MILLION NOMADS CROSSED THE FRONT­IERS EVERY YEAR•. '1'11£ EXPLA~ATION, HE CONCLUDED, WASTHAT- THEY HAVE DETAINEUOUR NOMADS.

11. ON THE SUBJECT OF RELATIONS WITH TH~ SOVIET UNIONSHAH WALl SAID AFGHANISTAN'S TRADITIONAL GOOD RELA­TIONS WITH ITS NORTHERN N~I~HBOR HAD CHANGED LITTLEWITH THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENTS OVER THE YEARS. ASKEDIf· HE SAW ANY CONTRADICTION BETWEEN A!'GHANISTAN' SPROFESSIONS OF NON-ALIGNMENT AND THE PRESENCE OFSOVIET TROOPS IN THECOCNTRY, SHAH WALl SAID THENUMBERS OF SOVIET ADVISORS HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED.A MOUNTAIN HAD BEEN MADE OUT OF MOL~HILL. HE POINTEDOUT THAT AFGHANIS~AN HAD HAD SOVIET ADVISERS BEFORETHE REVOLUTION, AND SAID THE NUBER HADUOT CHANGEDMUCH. HE DECLINED TO B~ PINNED DOWN AS '1'0 EXACTNUMBER THERE NOW, AND SAID THERE WERE ADVISORS FROMOTHER NATIONS SUCH AS. INDIA. IN APPARENT CONTRADICT­ION OF HIS EARLIER STATEMENT. HE CONCLUDED THERE HADBEEN NO QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN THE SITUATION, JUST AQUANTITATIVE ONE.

96

. '

12. SH~H WALl ALSO DECLINED TO BE PINNED DOWN'ASTO WHETHER THE PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHA­NISTAN( PDPA) WAS A MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY. HE',SAID WE COULD JUDGE OURSELVES FROM THE PROGRAM OFTHE PARTY. THE PDPA, HE ADDED, REFLECTED THE SO­CIALIST STRUCTURE OP'THE COUNTRY. NENSOM RBCALLEDH!S"EARLIER DISCUSSION WITH THEN FOREIGN .MINISTERA~IR rON THE NATURE OF THE PDPA !N LIGHT QF .US ..LEG­ISLATION BEARING ON RELATIONS WITH NATIONS DOMINA­TED OR CONTROLLED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST .MOVEMENT. DID SHAH WALl CONSIDER THE·PDRA'A PARTOF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT OR A~,A·PURELY AFGHAN ENTITY? SHAH WALl SAID THE PDPAWANTED RELATIONS WITO ALL PARTIES, NOT JUST THOSEIN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. HE ASSURE~ NEWSOM THATHIS WAS A SOVEREIGN GOVERNEMENT NOT UN~Ek THEINFLUENCE OF ANOTHER GOVERNHENT ~R.PARTY. AFGAN­ISTAN WAS FAITHFUL TO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT ANDWANTED.TO HAV~ A.POLICY OF ITS OWN~ NEWSOM COMMEN­TED THAT THE US RESPECTED RTRUE NON~ALIGNMENTR, BUTTHAT WE HAD PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERrNCED WITH SOMECONTRIES' DEFINITION OF NCN-ALIGNMENT--SPECTIFICA­LLY THAT OF CUBA.

13. SAUNDERS SAID WE APPRECIATED THE ORA'S INTERE­ST IN CONTROLLING THE cLOW,OF NARCOTICS. D~SCRIB­

ING NARCOTICS AS A MAJOR NATiONAL PROBLEM I~ THE US,SAUNDERS SAID WE WERE'PREP~RED TO'WORK WITH AFGHANAUTHORITIES,AND.WOULD APPRECIATED ANY coorERATIONTHE ORA MIGHT GIVIL SHAH WAJ..I 'BRI'GHTENED 'v,isIIiLYIN~THANKING US FOR.MENTIONING.THIS MATTER. 'HE SAIDTHE ORA HAD BURNED A CACHE OF' HASH ls,i I,AST YEARWORTH DOLS 25 MILLION, BUT ·.THE 'WEs'IiERN PRESS nADPAID THIS NO' HEED ..NEWSQM "RECRETTE'D ~,THE 'LACK OF!>U3LICITY BU~' SAID WE. IU ' THE' eSG IIAD. NOTICED,. WERECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTIESCOUNT~IES F~CED IN IN­TERFERING WITH TRADITIONAL NARCOTICE CU~TURE ANDTRAFFICKING, PhRTICULARLY SIUCE NARCOTICS COULD BEAN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF INCOME.tbRPOOR FARMERS.IT WAS AU ACT OF.COURAGE FOR ,A GOVERNMEN~ IN ACOUN'l'RY SUCH AS Jl.FCHANItTAN TO TAKE A STRONG STAND.AND WE JlPPRECJ;ATED _,THIS. HE ADDED TH'IS WAS A POSI­TIVE ELEMENT IN OUR .RELATIONS.

"14. IN CLOSING, NEWSOM S~IO HE WANTED ~O KEEP THELINES OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIESOPEN. HE HAD ASKED A LOT OF OUESTION. BUT THIS HADP 'EN IN THE INTEREST OF FINDING A BASIS ON WHICH ~E

'LD IMPROVE OUR R~LATIONS. HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGETHE RECEPTION PRESIDENT AMIN HAD GIVEN TO OUR

,.riGE EARLIER IN THE DAY AND HOPED THIS WOULD SIG­NAL CONTINnED IMPROVEM~NT IN OUR RELAT!ONS. VANCEBT416809

<:'7

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TO RUEBC/SiCSTATF W~SF.DC IMM~DIAT~INFO RUMJPG/A~r.~BASSY BEIJIN~ 7f4RUSBCD/AM!.~!~~SI ISLA~A~.r. 935~

ROQMRA/A~EMPAS3! JIDDA 4~4RUDTC/AHEMB~SSY LO~DON lc~7

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.,: CINCPAC AND CINCEUR ALSO rOR POLAr,

•t.0.12065: RDS-1 1~-1~99 (fLtTIN, Eaccr A.) O~-~TAGS: PEPR. PI NS, MILl, :"lOPS. 'U', tTR.SOIJ: (5) REPO~TS OF SOVI!T CO~!AT TROOPS IN AFG3ANISTA~

REr: (ABUL 5772 (NOTAL)

1. (S-rNTIRE IE!r)

2. TO SUPPLrME~T TH! EMIAssr'S RtPORTIN~ IN INTELLI~ENCECHANNELS ABOUT TEE PRESENCE or SOVIET CO~PAT FORC!S I~

ArGH!NISTA~. THE rOLLOWI~G OBSERVATION~ ~r rOXEIGN DIPLO~HATS AT !ABDL AR~ ADDED.

3. ON sr.PTr~BrR 30, YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR DOGDAN ~AL~A~I:

!PLIASE PROTECT) ASKED TP~ A/DC~ VHF-TRER RECEN! J.S.NEWS RiPOP.TS" or TROOP ACTIVITY IN SOVIlT CENTRAL ASIA

INVOLVED AI~PO~NE UNITS. ~ALBASIC, A rORMER AR~l ;~~~~AL.

WHIT ON TO STATE THAT P.E BA~ BEARD TPAT THE SOVIETS f.AV~ALREADY PREPOS ITIONED surn CIi:NT ARMAMENt AND !~UI ?~mir lORONE AIPBORNE DIVISION AT BAGRAH AIR BASE, NORTH ~r rABUL.HE SrJMF.D TO BE C~O!AIN OF ~HIS INFORMATION.

U 102

,. T!f. YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR TEOUG!T TB4T THI SOVIET UNIONVOULD INTRODUCE COMBAT 70RCr.S HERE ONt! A~ A LAST RESORT.WI O!SERVE~ TBAT OTP.ER OPTIONS SHORT O! 5UCH A DRASTICSTEP VERE srILL OPEN: r..~ •• PHOADENING THE POLITICAL BASEAND POPULAR APPEAL OF 1ST {HALOI FF~IM1 -- AND A QUIC,MILITARY COOP WHICH WO~LD R~PLACE TaE !BALQI LEADERSHIPVI!B FRESH, INITIALLY APOLITICAL P£RSONALITIES.

5. ALSO ON SEPTE~BER 30, J. DA~tAT SINGH, rHE I~DIAN DC~

(PLIAS! PROTECT), TOLD THF. }!DC~ TEAT ONE or HIS SOURCESBAD RECENTLY DISCUSSlD TH~ PrtESfNCE or SOVIET COMBATTROOPS VITH A FORMER AFGEAN ARMY OFFICER. NOW A PRISONIRAT POL-I-CHARKI, WHO BADA BErCHF HIS ARRrST, SERVIL ATTHE ~BOOSE OF TPE P~OPLE PEADOUART~RS or TEE {HALQI LEADE?­SHIP. THE AlGRlN OFFICE~ RrpOp.~EDLY SAID THAT 4REN BELAST VAS IN A POSITION TO P.AY! ACCr.SS TO SF.~SITIVE INFOrt~A!ION,

TBlRE wI~E 9.~00 SOYIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISiAN. T~E INDIAN DC~

• DID NOT !MOW rB~ EXACT DATE OF HIS INiO?MATION. BUT ~AS OF fHE~ OPINION TPAT IT WAS FAIRLY RECENT. SINGE HIMSELF TFIN~S TEE cua­~ RENT FIGURE IS EETWEEN 1Z.~0a AND 29,09~ (HE LEANS TOVARD TBE~ UPPlR END or THAT RANGE) -- A~D SAID THAT HE HA! AL~lADY RIPORTED: TFI~ SPRr.AD TO NE~ DELHI.~•f 6. ON SSPTEMPER 3e, A wEST GERMAN E~!ASSY OFFICER TOLD T:E~ A/DC~ THAT ~ERMAN TRUC~ DRIVERS rySIN~ THE REBEL!ARMY-DESERTEP/: BANDIT-INFESTED Hr~AT-To-r.ANDAF.AR ROAD ?ECENTLY REPOR!I~ srtIN~

• VRAT WERE CLEARLY ETHNIC RnSSllN SOLDIERS MAN T~E L~AD ARMORED'EF-IeLI IN THEIR ROAD CONVOY. HE CLAIMED T£IT TnEt ~OC~ PHOTO­GRAPHS AS PROOF. THt GER~A~ OFFICER THOUGHt 50~I WEsrERN ~£rS

PUBLICATION WOULr. PAT MUCS FOR T1.051 PHOTOGRAP~S.

,. COMMINT: rHE ABOV! 'IE~S ARE !iIN: REPORTED WITH SOMIRESERVATIONS. T1.E YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR'S OBSERVATIO~ AB~UTPREPOSITIONED ARMAMENTS AND E~UIPMENr AT BAGRAM RIFLECTSTFE SITUATION ~OTED AT OT~ER LOCATIONS AROUND AFGEANIS1AN(E.G., TBF PUL-I-CFla~I TANK BAS~) WSERE LARGE N~M!ERS OFAIRCRAFT, TA~~Sl AND OT6E~ ~ILITARY ITE~S AR~ NOW EEIN~P!~~ED -- AN AS~EM~tY OF AR~AMFNT ~RICB WOULD APPE!R 10 DEFAB ~ORE TEAS THE AF~~AN A~MI ITSELF COULD ~AN IS rHE I~MELIATf

rUTURE. vr S~VF NO INF~R~ATION ~c CONFIRM TPE YUCOSLAr'SREPoaT OF PR!POSITIONED EOUIPMtNT rOR A~ AI~BORNl DIVIEIOS.

9. AS roR TFE OBS~RVATION O~ SINC~. A SOUND DIPLO~AT ~EO15 N!VERTPELESS GIvFN OCCASIONALLY TO UNCRITICA1 ACCEPTANCEO! TPF INFoP.MA!ION DRIFTIN~ ABOUT IN TPt &ABCL RU~OR MILL,IT WOOLD BE SIGNIFICAN~ If O£ SAS I~DLED FROVIDED 1SE le,aZ3­TO-2~,000 FIGUP.F. ~o TRE D~CISION-MA~ERS AT NE_ DtLf.I. ~E

~NOVa! NO CNF.FR SOUDCE H~R~ CITIS~ A FI~nR~ T?oAT [IG? AND

103

WE DO NOT (REPEAT NOT) BELIEVE IT OORSELVf,S.

9. ALTBOUGB AMERICAN OfFICERS BAyr OCCASIONALLY SEEN saVItTSOLDIERS AROUND KABOL, WEARIN~ AFGEAN ~NlrORTA (A CUSTO~ARYPRACtICE FROM TBE ROYAL AND DiOODIST ERAS), NO us orrlcrRBERI RAS TEf SPECIrICALLY SPOTTED WHAT C~~LD BE IDENrIfI!DAS A ·SOVIET COMBAT UNIT.- ACCORDING TO AVAILABLE EVIDENCE.BOWEVER, WELL-BIDDEN SOVIET COMBAT rORcrs A~E UNDO~BTEDtYALREADY INSIDE TBE COUNTRY. CURRENT ESTI~ATE~v __SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN 9iN A, CLUDING Taos OA~DI~

BAGIAH AIR BAS~, IS PER PS 4. ~e WITP. N ADDITION L ~,ee0fARY ADVISORS. -

: le. AS lOR TBE GERMAN STORY, . BADLY ILLUstRATES EO~i SOVltT HILITAR! ADVISORS ASSIGNED TO RE~ULA~ AfGBAN AR~YUNITS CAN BE IMPLorED IN DIR~CT OPI!ATIONAL ROLES AT TI~tS.

; J"S!U!~IT

~ .'252oI .~:~z~•z=•g•2~

RR RUOMHRDE RUQMGU '7248 2741450ZNY CCCCC ZZP.a OU420Z OCT 79aM AME~EASSY ANXARATO RUEHC!SECSTATE WASHoe 8S07INFO RUMJGM/AMEMB~SSY COLOMBO 132aU!~JDX/AMF.HBASSY DACCA 20.8RtlSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3821RUXOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 132RUSBLY/AMEMBASSY XABUL ~840RUEHMO!AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1468RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1609RUQMIlR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6160RUEHDT/USMiSSION USUN NYJ878BTCONFIDENTIAL ANKARA 7248

E.O. 12065: CDS 10/1/85 ( XUX. DENNIS), OR-PTACE: HOPS, PP,PR, TU, AP, UR, PXSUBJ: (C) TURKISH VIEWS ON OSSR-AFGRANISTANsFOLLOW-UP

REF: CA) STATE 250373,rS) STATE 250400,(C) ANKARA 7201

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE ( SEE PARA 7).

3. SUMMARY: POLOFF FOLLOWED UP ~r(c) DEMARCHEWITH WORKING-LEVEL MFA OFPICER WHO RXD SERVED INAFGHANISTAN nURING THE TARAXI REVOLUTION. TilEOFFICIAL STATED THERE WAS SUPPORT WITHIN THE MFAFOR A TURKISH DEMARCHETO:THE RUSSIANS ,ON AFCBA_JS~AN. BOT'THERE WAS LITTLELIKELIHOOD OF A PUBLIC S~ATEMENT.· ~RE TURKS WEREVERY INTERESTED IN.OTHER COUNTRIES' VIEWS ON ANDRESPONSES TO THE SITUATION. THE MFA OFFICIAL SPEC­ULATED ON POSSIBLE RUSSIAN INTEREST IN ETEM~ADI,

RORMER AFGHAN AMBASSADOR TO PAKISTAN AND THE USSR,AS A REPLACEMENT FOR AMIN. END SUMMARY.

4. GOT-USSR DEMARCHE: MFA MIDDLE EAST SECTIONCHIEF ALP KARAOSMANOGLU INFORMED EHBOFF (RICCIAR­DONE) SEP'1'EUBER 28 THAT THERE WAS STRONG SUPPORTWITHIN THE MFA FOR AN UNPUBLICIZED DEMARCHE TOTHE SOVIETS ON AFGHANISTAN. HOWEVER, SINCE THEFONMIN WAS NOW IN Nr,W YORK, IT WOULD TAKE TIMEBEFORE A FINAL DECISION WOULD BE TAXEN.IT WAS VERY UN ~~~~Y_HTA'1' THE GOT WOULD MAXE PUBLIC

STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN. THE GOT WAS VERY MUCHINTERESTED IN OTHER COUNTRIES' REPRESENTATIONS( IF ANY)TO THE SOVIETS ON THE SUBJECT OF AFGHAN­rSTAN. KARAOSMANOGLU REACTED VERY POSITIVELY TOTHE DEPARTMENT'S SEPTEMBER 19 PRESS STATEMENT ASA SIGN OF US INTEREST IN THE AFGHAN SITUATION.

105

(COMMENTI THROU~HTOUT THE CONVERSATIONKARAOSMAnOGLU HADE ITCLEAR THE GOT WOULD LOOK FAVORABLY UPON INCREASEDUS INTEREST AND INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE rORMERCENTO REGION ( SEE ANKARA 720] (NOTAL)L

5. USSR INTERVENTION: ~RAOSMANOGLU REITERATEDTHE GOT'S BELIEF TH'T THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT SENDMILITARY FC'CES INTO AFGRAN:STAN UNLESS A CRISISDEVELOPED IN WHICH RUSSIAN LIVES BECAME THREATENED.HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS WERE LOOKING rORANOTBBR_RORSE~TO BACK IN VIEW OF AKIN'S NARROW ~ASEOF SUPPORT. THE TURKS BELIBVED THAT ETEM1XDr, FOR14ER

AFGflAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW AWD LATER '1'0 ISLAMABAD,­WOULD BE A LIKELY CANDICATE AND THAT THE RUSSIANSWERE AT THE MOMENT • TRYING TO GET IN ToaCH WITBHIM-. KARAOSMANOGLU SAID ETEHAADI HAD RETURNE~ TO~ABOL FROM PAKISTAN THE DAY BEFORE THE TAKAKI COOP,AND HKS BEEN IN JAIL SINCE SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HEADDED THAT ETEMAADI !lAD HAD EXCEL1.ENT RELATIONS WITHTHE RUSSIANS AND MIGHT HAVE HAD COJinc"Ts AMONG-ExT'iiMy-n"PARCHA"IST GROUPS IN EXILE IN MOS~O~.~RA 'OSMANOGLU ASKED FOR OOR VIEWS ON THESOBJECT OFETEMAADI AS A SUCCESSOR TO AMIN.

6. MILITARY INSUBORDINATION INCIDENTI THE TURKSHAD BEARD THAT SOME 20 AFGHAN PILOTS HAD ORIGINALLYBEEN ASSIGNED THE MISSIon TO BOMB HERAT DURING THETROUBLE THERE SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. THE PILOTSDELIBERATELY DROPPED THEIR BOMBS OFFTARGET, RETURNEDTO BASE, AND WERE REPLACED BY RUSSIAN PILOTS WHOBOMBED THE ASSIGNED TARGETS IN DOWNTOWN HERAT. THEAFGHAN PILOTS WE~E SUMMARILY EXECUTED FOR THEIRINSUBORDINATION.

7. ACTION REQUESTED: PER PARA 5 EMBASSY WOOLDAPPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S EMBASSY EABUL'S COMMENT ONTURKISH VIEW THAT SOU lETS MAY BE CORSIDERING ETEMAADIAS POSSIBLE REPLACEME»T FOR AMIN.SPIERSBT'7248

IOE

•_...~~

. MEMORANDUM

CONF IPENTIAL-

5709 r\r-(,-CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURI,ty COUNCIL

October 2, 1979

INFORMATION

ME."IORANDOM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

DAVID AARON

THOMAS THO~Soviet-Afghan Contingency Planning (C 1

A week ago you asked where the contingency plan was for re­sponding to a possible Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.You asked for something by last Tuesday. (Cl

State has dragged its feet considerably on this and the bestthat they could come up with by end of last week was theattached outline. They tell me that they will have a fullyfleshed out paper by the middle or end of this week. (U)

This has not been a sterling perforJance. The pressureseems not quite so great, however, and I am inclined to letthem have until the end of the week. In all fairness, theoffice that has to produce this has been under very greatpressure on a variety of fronts -- including my demand thatthey get to work on a contingency plan for a Pak nuclearexplosion. (C)

•..cOWi'IPENTIALOriginal Classif. by Thomas ThorntonDeclassify on Oct. 2, 19B3 \ DEClASSIFIED

I E.O.12958. Sec.3.6~l\IL lw RE Nu--li'\-U.BV NARS.OATE~

. ...__.... -...-....~" ........._ ~_. _.:c-.-,.. __..' .. . .....:-.:-: ------=~... - _.- ... _. ...•.

·r

. .

.~~;.)~ .-,. "

a. with Regional Countriesb. with Alliesc. Stimulate consultations among others

1. COnsultations

.. " ,,' ~

.;.",.. .. ~---~--_. -

-- --' --'".- .. _ ..--_:..----_:.:..-. .--.-..- ._ .....•_-..........

~_~~~ . : OUtiine for USG Response Paeer to Soviet Options

:- .....:...-. . -". I.7":' Incremental Expansion of··Sovj.et mili.tar)" Role -"' -. -" .~_~-_. _ ~ Equipment and Advisers:=: .._.=:.. -==-...:: ~-

~:~. __ Diplomatic Responses

-----_.-

~---_._- t-.:=;:.. .....~- ;.:: .. •

(1) South Asians(2) Iran - India(3) Other Moslem and Third World countries

2. Further Reductions in Kabul Staff

Publicity

1. VOA2. Press Backgrounders

Military - None

f.

-··.-

.._--..~, ..

~.'.....:.::.. ~._ .........~---···B.

t

r=..:::t~-:=::-='.~..::.-i:=..:.:....~c .

. __ . .-....---

.- 1.2.

Encourage others to discuss human rightsUNHCR Refugee program

~ ~::::::::::..-----.-..-..----.-­

~~. - ..

..:c.~D •

Extensive diplomatic consultations - seek expressionsof concern publicly and to Soviets

COnsider break in diplomatic relations

Publicity

-...,.....---_._-. ~:

-_.__...-•

..~,.. . -..-._­--..--.- ... .. -

DECLASSIFIEDE.Q.12S53. ~.3.6 -~•.\MlE ll'-l-:t-<52--:~~S.OATE~

• •I'

•~..~..- ..~_ .. ..-.-

~,- :.-.

'_- •. b P.· International Fora - Encourage reqional st.ates~- .=: .~ - . - • - to·· raise in Security Council/URGA context

G. Talks with Paks under 1959 bilateral withattendant publicity

--------- ..--111. Massive Combat Role

-- ..--'

----

A. Diplomatic Consultations - seek' condemnations.Test Indian willingness to reassure Pakistanmilitarily

B. Breaking of Dip Relations with Kabul-- C. Publicity

~. o. Military - fleet movements, tacair deploymentto Pakistan

E. International Fora - Secu~ity CouncilorUNGA to address

• •i.

-_ .._-_.-

II

I

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VIEWS·

I. ce-ENTIRE TEX'i')

2. SlJIIIlIARY: ACCORDING TO 1M£: YUGOSlAV AMBASSADOR AT KABUl.,THE SOVIETS WERE AWARE OF' A DEVELOPING TENSION BECHIE~

AF'GHANIsrAN·S F~l'IER PRESIDENT NOOR P10HAMMAD TARAKI ANDFlHjWjE IHHISTER HAFIZUllAH Al'IIN FOR "SEVERAl 1II0NTHS" BEF(JfETHE P1ID-SEPt'£PIBER aUSIS THAT LED TO Al'IIN·S VIOLENT TAKE­OVER OF fILL POWER. THE SOVIETS DISQ.AII'I ANY f"OOEKHOW­LEDGE OF THE COUP ITSElF', HOWEVER. P10SCOW APPEARS TO BEIiIILLING to WORK WITH AMIN, NO~ THAT H~ HAS PRESEtoiTED THESOVIETS WITH A FAIT ACCOl':PLI. EM> OF SUMMARY.

2. REQUESTING ABSOLUTE PROTECTION AS A SOURCE, YUGOSLAVAl"BA·SSADOR BOGDAN 1'1ALBASIC BR IEF'ED THE AIDCI'! ON SEPTEMBER~~ ABOur A RE'CENT CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH SOVIET Al'lB·ASSADOR ALEX AtI) ER M. PUZANOV CONCER HI Ne; HAfIZ ULLAH AMI N· Sfilm-SEPTEMBER COUP D"ET AT. CMALBASIC EX P'1" AI NED THAT HEOCCASIONALl Y HAS LONG CHATS WITH PUZANOV, AM) HAS FOUNDHIM RELATIVELY FORTHCOMING IN SUCH SESSIONS. PUZANOV PRO­FESSES A CONTINUING FRIENDLY INTEREST IN YUGOSLAVIA, ~"HERE

HE ~ERVED FOR SEVER AL YEAR 5.)

1::)'1

4. ACCORDING TO MAlBASIC, PUZANOV PROVIDED THE Fa-LOWINGBACKGROUND TO THE DR AM AT IC PO\'ER SIR UGGl.E WITHIN THE l(HALQIHIERARCHYO THE SOVIET AflIBASSAOOR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HADBE~N INVOLVED TO A CERTAIN EXTENT -- BUT WAS -SCILL NOT CER­TA Itt- ABOUT AlL THE EVENtS HTAT HAD ATTEhOED Al'IlN' STAKE.OVER. HE D ISQ.AIMED ANY FOO EKNOWLEDGE OF THE VIOLENTSEPTEflIBER 14 CON~ONTATION, AND OBSERVED THAT THIS SURPRISE

.DEVELOPl'lENT CAUGHT THE LOCAl SOVIET COMMUNITY WITHOUT ADE­QUATE SECllHTY PRECAUTIONS. (NOTEt AMERICAN OFFICERS SCOUTINGAROUN) KABUL THAT DAY WHO HAD NOTED INCREASIIIG NUI'IBERS OFAFGP.AN SOLDIERS Ati> POLICE IN THE STREETS, DID OB~EHVE THATRUSSIAN DEPEN>ENTS WERE flIOVING ABOUT NOR" AlLY , AND THAT SOVIETHOUSING AHEAS DlD NOT HAVE Ar~Y OBVIOUS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.)

5. PUZANOV TOLD I'IALBASIC THAT THE STRAHl BETWEEN FORMERPRESIDENT TARAXI AN) AI'IIN HAD BEEN INCREASING OVER THE 'PAS~SEVERAl. MONTHS. PUZANOV WAS auneAl OF TARAKZOS ·CULT­OF29",3-HD IVIDUAL - PUFFER Y -- Atll CITED TARAKI'S' UNWILLI NG­NESS TO PASS THE FULL RANGE OF PRII'IE I'IINISTERIAl. POWERSOVER TO AMIN WHEN THE LATTER WAS QESIGNATED AS -FIRST MIN­ISTER.- PUZANOV tlOTED, FOR INSIA'NCE, THAT TARAKI CONTIN-UED TO CHAIR SESSIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF' flIINISTERS -- ANDTHIS GREATLY ANNOYED AI'IIt~. .

6. PIIlANOV RECALLED THAT THE CLRRENT al!SIS Sf ART ED AFTERl'ARAK1'S RETURN FHOI'! HAVANA AND flI0SCOW ON SEPTErlBER 11 •.AT A SEPTEI'lBER 12 CABINET SESSION, APlIN -INDICATED 'THE'NEED· FOR CABINET CHANGES -- I.E., THAT 11IINIsrER 01: IN-TER lOR P10HAl'lI'lAD ASLAM WATANJAR .. MINIstER OF FRONTIER AFFAIRSStiER JAN flIAlpOORYAR, AN) flIINIZLEVEOF COPIMUNICATIOIl1S SAYED'MOHAI'lMAD GlLABZOI .BE RE;,PLACED II'IMED IATEL Y. TARAKI OBJECTED,TAKI NG ISSUE WITH AI'! I NOPE rt. Y.

7. ACCORDING TO PUZANOV'S ACCOUNT, -THE' QUARREL CONTINIJEDON SEPl" EI'lBER 1.3,- AN) CAI'lE TO A HEAD ON SEPTEMBER 14, WHENAMIN WEfo.7 AHEAD WI1H AN ANNOtlNCEMENT ABOUT' THE CABItiETCHANGES. TARAKI '"CALLED AJIIIN OVER'" TO DISCUSS THAT ACT-­AW THE GUNfIGHT ENSUED ° PUZANOV SAID .THAT HE HAD HAD -TWOMEETINGS· \HTH THE: KHAl..(H LEADERSHIP DURING THESE CRITICALDAYS. PoE DID ..NO! GIVE ANY DETAILS ABOUI' THE FIRST. THESECOND WAS THE JIIORNING SESSION HE HAD WITH ifllIN ON SEPTE:MBER15, THE DAY BEFORE THE LATTER WAS DESIGNATED AS TARAKIoSSUCCESSOR. CNOTE: T HIS !'lEET! NG WAS R[PORTED BY THE PRESS).BT"72~ 1

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t. MALBAS1C li,;D rHE IMPRESSION F'RQtlI HIS TALI< llIITH PUZANO\iTHAT THE SOVIETS F'OUfIl THEPlSELVES COMPELLED TO ACCOI'lI'lOOATETHEIR AFGHAN POLlCY TO AI'IIN'S FAIT ACCOfllPLI. AlTHOUGH THEYDID NOT I til ICATE GREAT ENTHUSIASM. WHEN HE C()II)f!iENTED TOPl!:ANOV ABOUT MIN'S WEAK POINTS, SUCH AS HIS BAD PUBLICJI'lAGE. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR JlEf\.IED. -AfI1IN IS STRONG ANDWELL-ORGANIZED. OF CO~ SE, HE HAS SOPlE FAULTS. BUT WHATLEAD EH DOESN"n-

9. INTEREST INGl Y ENOUGH. PUZANOV WENT ON TO COPIPLIf'lENTTHE FIRED WATAtWAR AS -A GUeD "AN.- (NOTE's - FREQUENTLYHEPRD POST-COUP RU'I~S PORTRAYED VATANJAR AS HAVING SOUGHTAS'tlUl'l IN THE SOVIET EflIBASSY -- AND THE INDIAN EPlBASSYBELIEVES THAT PUZANOV HAD TR lED TO INTEltCEDE IN BEHAlF OFWATANJAR AN> THE OTHER FIRED P1ILITARY PlUISTERS ON SEPTEPIBER 14.)

10. MAlSASIC GOT THE STRONG II'IPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS HADEXTRACTED CERTAIN CONCESSIONS FR(JlI AlliIN IN EXCHANGE FORTHEIR POST-COUP SUPPORT. ttl THOUGHT. fat EXAI'IPLE, THAT ·THESOVIETS HAD INSISTED THAT TARAKI BE KEPI' ALIVE. MAlBASICOBSERVED THAT AMI N IS NOW COl'1PLETa Y DEPEtI>ENT UPON THESOY lETS -- AM) -MUST PAY THE fIR ICE.-

11. fI1ALBA-SIC OPINED THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOli Ef{)E~,VOR TOMA KE AJWi I N -MORE PAL AT ABL E- AS A LEAD ER. FAILI NG T HI S• THEYMIGKI' CONSIDER THE ALTEHNATIVES SHOOT OF DIRECT MILITARYH.7ERVH7ION, SUCH AS A QUICK COUP D"ETAT BY THE: -AFGHAN"ARl-iED FORCES" HE DID NOT RlLE OUT AN EVENTUAL RESORT TOTHE USE OF SOVIET COMBAT Foo CES. HOWEVER -- BUT THOUGHT ITRATHER UNL IKEL Y THAT THAT EXTREME STEP ""OUlD BECOME NECESSARY •

1.10

12. COMMENT: PJM.9ASIC'S ACCOUNT SQUARES IN GENERAL WITH THEKEY ELEMENTS Of VERSIONS HEARD fR()III OTHER REASONABLY RELIABLESOLR CES. AS CAN BE EXPECTED, HOWEVER, THE KABUl RU"~ RILLHAS ~ 00 ueE» A GR EAT VAR lET Y Of ACCOUNTS. I'IOST STOR IESBEGIN WITH TARAKI'S SEPTD18ER 9-10 TALKS WITH BREZHNEV INMOSCOW. SOI'lE SAY HE WAS THEN rOLD 8Y THE SOVIET LEADERS THAT HE WAS FIll

SliED -- BUT THAT SOMBER NEWS WOULD BE DIFfICULTTO LINK WITH APlIN'S BUOYANT DEMEANCIf WHEN HE RETlRRED TO KABULON SEPrEI'IBER 11. OTHERS SAY THAT BREZHNEV TOLD HIP! TOGET Rm OF APlIN -- AM) THAT HE MUfFED THE JOB. THIS EltBASSYIS INa. I NED TO FAVCR THE VIEW THAT THE COPIING LEADERSHIP CfUNCHWAS NOT DISCUSSED AT ALL IN MOSCOW -- Al() THAT TARAKI FIRSTCONFRONI'ED IT UPON HIS REltH N. <INCIDENTALLY, WATANJAR WASTHE SECON>-RAN1<ING MAN IN HIS AIRPORT WaCOPIING PARTY--SI'ANDINGNgXT TO AMIN.>

13. AS FOR PUlA NOV' S O~N ROLE, THE INDIAN EI'IBASSY VERSION,TO WKICH REFERENCE WAS MADE IN A FmEGOING PARA~APH N EVENHAS AN ARMED PUZANOV PARTICIPATING IN THE SEPTEPIBER 14 SHOOT-our AT THE HOUSE CF' THE PEOPLE. ALTHOUGH WE DOUBT THIS. WE.DO THINK IT ~OBASLE: THAT PUZANOV AT SOI'lE POINT PlIGHT HAVETR lED TO INTERVENE IN BEHALF' OF' THE ~ATANJAR GROUP -- AS HISPOST-COUP CQP:MENT TO MALBASIC INDICATES.

14. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE A FEW LOCAL OBSERVERS WHO THINK THATTHE SOVIETS OPr FOR TTA -IRON F'IST- (1N THIS CASE, APlIN)SOLUTION WHENEVER THERE IS A TOUGH PROeLEM TO BE LICKED(E.G., THE emRENT AFGHAN INS~RECT ION>. WE ARE INCl.I NED TOBELIEVE Tt\AT THE SOVIETS WERE PROBABLY NOT COMPLETELY INTHE PTCTtRE AS THEIR VIOLENT. DIFFICULT-TO-CONTROL HALQIQ.IENI'S SI'AGED THEIR UTERNAL CONrnONTATION. LIKE SCORPIONSIN A JAR. THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF' RUSSIAN WOPIEN ANDCHILDREN IN PUBLIC A..ACES AT KABUL DURING THE DSVE:.LOPIHGSEPTEMBER 14 aUSIS, AS WELL AS THE CONTINUING SOVIET MEDIAPLAY OF' TARAKI'S flOSCOV VISIT AFTER AlIlIN'S SEPTEflIBER 16TAKEOVER, WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED BY EPIBASSY 1lI0SCOV ANDFBIS, IM>ICATE T}tAT T}tE SOVIETS VERE PERT QS U()EED SURPRISED.3D

15. PUZANOV APPEAREsro HAVE FAILED I N AN ATTEIlIPT TO KEEPSTABLE THE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT HERE. BECAUSE PUZANOVWAS On'EN REPORTED TO HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN AT SERIOUS ODDSWITH AlliIN 0 lR ING THE PAST YEAR, THE LOCAL DIPLOMATICCOlllPlllfUTY IS ROSSIPING ABOUT HIS CONTINUED TENURE HERE. ANAFCYA'N SOlRCE. WHO HAS BEEN USUALLY RELIABLE IN THE PAST,TOLD THE A/DQlJ ON SEPI'EflIBER 27 THAT MOSCOW HAZ REQUESTEDAGREI'IENT FOR Pl!ZANOV'S SUCCESSOR. THE SOlfiCE DID NOT HAVETHE NAPIE. END COMI'IENT. APIsr UTZ9Tn281

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3. AT 1dE AIRPORT TOLAY, I RAN INTO SOVIET COUNSELOi VILIJ~~. OSADCRIT, wHn VAS IN rHE VIF LOUNGE (A RARE PRIVI~EGE)AWALTlkG IMBARCAT!O~ O~ AN AEROF101 FLIGBT TO MOSCO~. (TiiI~PORTANCl OF C5ADCHIY, A~D THAT OF rHI SOVIEt E~BASS~. 'ASOND~RtINED IY SIS BEING ALLOWED TO CSt THJ VIP LOON.ErOR A 'ACAfION TRIP TO TEE USSR, WHICR PR VILEGE ISS'~"'ITHIHG DINUD TO MOST AMBASSADORS lICE T WHEN THEYFIRST ARRIVE OR LEAiE PERMANENTLY.)

,. OSlDeBIY tiAS ALWAYS BEEA ONE or THE FRIEND:IEST kWLHOS! OPXN OF SOVIET OFFICIALS BERE, AND I SEIZED TgEOPPORTUNITY TO ASi HIM SJME QUtSTIO~S. HIS ANSwEhSVERI, I TBINK. WORTH RECORDING:

__ TA~AKI IS BrING HELD A PR1SO~ER "ALONE" IN Tr.£ PtCrl~'SPALACE COMPLEX (WEERF. PRESIDF.NJ HAFIZOLLAH AMIN ALSO LI~:S);THE IMPLICATION BEINr, THAT HIS FAMI~T IS NOT wITH hIM. R~ 13DtrI~ITILT A~IiE AND WAS ~CT ~OUN~ID BY ANI WEAPON. ~~EN IASIED OSlDCHIY A~OUT A RuMOR TRAT TARAKi MIGHT SE ~OIN~ :JMOSCO~ fOP MEDICA~ !REAT~ENT, OSADCHI! REPLIED, "POSSIhLYLA~EP BUT NOT RIGHT ~~~ ••HE IG~ORED MY INQUIRY ABOUT TH~ F.IAC~ srA1E OF'fARA"'S BEALTH.

_ ;:X-H1NISTERS WATAlJJAR, GULBZuI AtiD HUDOORYARARE AT LARGE, BUT OS4DCHIY ~RorIS~~D NOT TO KNC~ TH1IR iXA~TWBER~ABOUTS. HE SAID THERE 'AS A ROMOR fBAT THEY H~L ESCAFL~,.0 A Ni:IGB1;Qif.INt} ':ODNTR!. liEitN I Isni' IF II'; MEANT TU; ~JnE,]UNIO~, HE CHUCKLED AND SAID: ·POSIfIVELT ~OT. If THE! ~A:,VE worLD NOT KEEP THAT A SECRET. AFTEEk ALL, ;~ ARE NO.DENYING THAT BABRAK ~AMAL I~ LI_ING IN PRAGU~."

__ WHEI~ I OBSER'El' ThJiT '.1. FAIl JuST lIEAii.D TEAT TAli!?l ;.s~THE THREE EX-MINIS~f~S JAD tiE~ EXPELLED rFO~ T3B ?A~TY.

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B ( BEING REPEATED TO 07TAWA) RFGAROING CURqENTCANADIAN INCLINATION ':"0 F(lCtJ~ V.OqI: ON IM1>I.ICIITIONSOF ArGHA~ INSTABILITY FOR FhKISTAN THAN ON LIKEI,IH­000 THAT THAT IHSTADILITY COULD PROVOKE DIRECTSOVI~T INTERVENTION IN APGH~NIST~N. WE HAD PRF.VIOU­SI,y PROVI:lED CANADIAN REP 10>1 TH C'OMMF.Wl'S T~"NSMI TTEDRE!" A AND RF.PEATE~ THI:M INRF.:;uO~lS.F. '1'(' CA~;,'D!i\IJ

INTERVENTION IN POLi\DS. or.; BOTH OCC1\SIOllS. r;1\NAD1.ANREP REGISTERED OTTAWA'S I~TEREST IN RECEIVl~G FCR7HErIN~(\R~1\'!'ION, ESrEC!ALLY CCNCERNIS .... SOVII:-r MILITARYACT!VITIES ~0RTH OF TilE ~jVIET-.l\l"GHAIlBI)RL'E;:;. WHle,lMIGHT BE HELPFUL IN f.EA!'SESSING Tilt CANr.DIll" ATTtTUDETOt4ARDS A POSSIBLE APP" '",A': I: TO ':'11£ SOVI£TSASD WENOTED THAT WE HAD MADE A STAUDING REnUE~T THAT WASH­INGTON KF.EF U~uu-~O-D1\TF. IN THIS ~EGARD ( qEr ':).

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.'4. AFGHANI STAN. THE TWO DELEGATIONS TRADED ASSESSI'IENTSOF THE INI'ERNAL AFGHAN SITUATION AND THE TTRE4TAFGHANISTAN POSED TO PAKISTANI SECURITY. SHAHI SAID THATTHE AFGHAN REVOLUTION HAD AFFECTED PAKISTAN PROFOUNDLY.THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF AFGHANISTAN AS A BUFFER STATE HAl)DISAPPEARED, AND PAKISTAN FOUND ITSELF ILL-PREPARED ANDILL-ElilUIPPED TO PlEET THE MILITARY THREAT. PAKISTAN DIDNOT LXPECT AN IMMEDIAT~ INVASION, BUT WAS DEEPLYCONCERNED OVER THE LONG-TERM POTENTIAL FOR CROSS-BORDERSUBVERSION.

5. INI'ERNAL SITUATION. SHAHI SAID THAT THE MARXISTREGIME IN KABUL REMAINED ·OFF &ALANCE· IN THE fACE OF THECONI'INUING INSLHGENCY AND INTERNAL PARTY AND MILITARYDISSIDENCE. THE POLITICAl BASE OF THE REGII'IE WAS EVENNARRWER FOLLOWING AMIN'S INTERNAL COUP. AT THE SAI'lE TIME,THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL HOLD Of THE SOVIET UNION ONAfGHANISTAN WAS STRONGER THAN EVER AND APPEARED TO BEGRWING. THE SOVIETS FOCUSED ON CONSOLIDATION Of THEREVOLUTION AND P,RSONALITIES DID NOT MATTER. SOVIETAMBASSADOR PUZANOV HAD RECENTLY WARNED DEPARTINGPAKISTANI AMBASSADOR PlkACHA THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD NOWTHINK SERIOUs..y ABOUT CHANGING ITS POLICIES TOWARDAFGHANISTAN SINe, THE USSR WAS DETERMINED TO DEFEND THEREVOLUTION. PUZANOV SAID THAT BY SPRING THE SOVIET UNIONWOULD HAVE CREATED A "NEW AFGHAN ARMY- THAT WOULD THEN BEIN A GOOD POSITION TO MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY CAMPAIGNAGAINST THE INSURGENTS•

" SHAHI ARGUt;D THAt ONCE THE REGIME HAD CONSOLIDATED ITSPOSITION, IT WOULD TURN ITS NEWLY ACQUIRED MILITARY CAP­ABILITY AGAINST PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN VIEWED THE THREAT ASBEING ONE TO TWO YEAIiS OFF, DEPENDING ON THE PACE OFINTERNAL.CONSOLIDATION IN AFGHANISTAN. THE TIME TO DO

SOI'IETH~NG WAS NOW."

1. THE PAKISTANIS INDICATED TI£Y WERE EVEN MORE UNCOMFORT-ABl.E WITH AMIN'S ONE-liIAN .ILE THAN THEY HAD BEEN WITH THE

. , PREVIOUS REGIME •., IJHILIi:; .·....;N· HAD ,MIIQE ·,$Pl'lE,.P~LICjSTATE-,I'IEHI' s,·; APPAREiaLY, AT,! ,~OV 11:01' \IRQI.HG" REGA80ltHl\AdIESIRE.;

FOR BETTER: RELATlONS, 1£: HAD; ,u.SO\!Gl,YEN!CONTRARY. SIGNALS•THE PAKISTANU 'HAD; BEEN. P{lRTICULARLY•. CONCERHE~ BY.;THE: IPRESENCE· OF., EXILED PUSHTUN: NATIONAl-1ST LU~ElhAJ"AL hi.;..

,KHATTAK AT A RECENT PUBLIC l'IEETlNG IN:KABUL,ATWHICH·KHATTAK WAS GIVEN EQUAL STATU!> WITH DIPLOMATIC ~EPRESENTA­TIVES ASSEMBLED TO HEAR OF PLANS FOR A NEW CON:iTITUTION.SHAHNAWAZ CHARACTiRIZED THr: REGIl'IE AS A MIXTURE OF PUSHTUNCHAUVINISM AND IDEOLOGICAL MISSIONARY ZEAL, A COMBINATION~ICH POSED A DOUBLE THREAT TO PAKISTANI INTERESTS •BT1790'

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SUBJEcr, :US-PAK TALKS' REGIONAl. ISSUES. . . .. ,R£FERENCES, CA) STATE 2704841 (B) STATE 2749)",I. CONfIDEUUAL - ENTIRE TEXT..•..2. SUI'lMARY,· OVER HALF OF THE FOkMAl. DISCUSSIONS BETWEENTHE PAI<ISTANI AND US DELEGATIONS OCT08EH 16-17 IN WASHING-TON WAS DEVOTED TO REGIONAl. ISSUES. OUR ASSESSMENTS ONAFGHANISTAN'WERE QUITE S1l'ULAR, THOUGH THE PAKISTANIS I

VIEWED THE'THREAT IN SOI'.EWHAT MOkE IMI1t:DIATE TERMS THAN DOWE. Tilt PAKISTANIS WERE FAIRLY RELAXED ABOUT THE STATE OFTHE CURRENT'RELATIONS WITH INDIA, bUT STILL CONSIDER INDIATO BE PAKISTAN'S PRINCIPAL LONG-RANGI:: SECURITY THREAT, ONIRAN,SHAHI E"PHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTA&lISHING A 'FeRSONAL"'EiUATION WITH KHOl'lElNI AND INDICATED THAT. PAKISTANJiAS TRYlIIB'lO" SAVE 'THE RCD IN THE FACE· OF IRANIAN •.. iJ)PPOSlfIOIlJ.~TJlE~U' STRON~P REAHIRl'IED 'llS SUPPORT ,FOR, .

"PAKbUNI-SEC""ITYi 1,BUT 4WE INDICATf.D 'THAT' OUR· ABILITY. TOt LEXPRESSltHlslSUPPORT~IN"PRACTlCAL TERMS WOULD REjlJAIN"CON~ ,I

. ,SI'RAINEDtASt'tOHqYAS OUR tDIFFERENCES OVER~ THE HUCl.,EAR 1ISSUE.dWERE' UNRESOLVED. ·THE'US ALSO REAFF'IRl'I£D'THAT IN/THE EVENT,PF AFGHAN AGGRESSION AGAINST PAKISTAN WE WOULD' CONSIDER THE'

. I'" BILATERAL AGREEMENT TO BE RELEVANl,., (SEPTEL). iDISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, CHINA ~THE INDIANOCEAN !'LSO ~OVERED IN SEPARATE TELEGRAMS, END. SUMMARY.!. !"., ,.3. ·:THE FIRST DAY OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE US AND

. PAKISTANI DELEGATIONS AT THE DEPARTI'lENT (OCTOBER 16) WASDEVOTED LARGELY TO REGIONAL ISSUES. ON THE PAKISTANI 'SIDE, THE DISCUSSION WAS LED BY FOR~IGN AFFAIRS ADVISORAGHA SHAHI AND FOREIGN SECRETARY SHAHNAWAZ, WITH SOI'lECONI'RIBUTIONS DY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MINISTRY OFDEFENSE, GU, GHLLAM JILANI KHAN. ON THE US SIDE THESECRETARY LED lJFF WITH AN OPENING STATEMENT CREnEL A) ANDPARTICIPATED IN NUCH !IF THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS. UNDERSECRETARY NEWSOM PROVIDED AN OVERVIEW OF US INTERESTS INTHE REGION.

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AFGHANISI'AN -- Arm TH;:; !;;OVIHS THROUGH AFGHANISTAN -­NEEDED TO bE ·ACCOMMO~AT&::D- SiNCE PAKISTAN HAD BEENUNABLE TO ACQUIRI:': ADEQUATt: (lUTsIDE suppor,T. SOI'lEPAKISTANI TRIflESl1iN AkGUiD THAT IT WAS PAKISTAN'S DUTYTO FIGHT THE ANTI-I9.AIHC AND NARXIST Rt:GINE IN KABUL aUT,IF THE GOP WAS TOCI AflfAID OF THE RUS~lIlNS TO 00 SO, THENPAKISTAN SHOUll) ('IAKE lT~ PEACE WITH TIlE SOVIET UNION.PAKISI'ANI lEADi:.kti IIOIlRIED THAT, If AFGHANISTAN PUTPR~SsIJRE ON PAKISI'AN IN THI:': PRESENT SITUATION (E.G., !iY' APOLICY OF HOT PUHSUIT ACROSS THE BORDERS, DISI'HIBUTION OFARMS IN BALUCHISTAN OR PROVllKING AN I NSURGl::NCY> , PAKISTANWOULD BE IN A VERY DHFICUl.T POSITION. " "

~ ": .. .., .10.' ASKED IF PAKISTAN ANTICIPATED THE DIRECT :PARTICIPATIONOF SOVIt:T TROOPS IN PUTTING DOWN THE INSURGt:NCY, SHAHNAWAZSAID HE COULD NOT GIVt:: A CATC:GORICl\l ANSWER. THE: 'SOYIETSa.E:ARlY WOULD GIVt': WHATI:,Vt:k ASSI~iANCt:: \oIAS NECESSARY TOA5'GHANISI'AN, INCLUDING MILITARY AID~ " 1£ THOUGHT THEY ..

~g~~~o~~Y A1g ~~~~1aiH~or:~~IC ~~~~O~FO~~i~~{~~ ·~~gO:~lq,·'EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF SOVIET Ct:NTltAl ASIAN TROOPSMINGLED IN WITH AFGHANS, SHAHNAWAZ ,oaSC:RVED THAT THE'SOVIETS HAD THIS CAPAlliLITY. Ii£. THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THATTHE SOVIt':T UNI(,N WOULD USE CUclANS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCETHEY HAD THEIR OWN CI::NTRAL ASIAN ThOOPS TO [);(AW ON IIHOWERE CULTURALl Y MORI:: ASSIMIl·AflLl. ' :!'

II. ASKED If THt: PAKISIANIS SAW CHINA AS PLAYING A MAJORROLE ,IN CONTAINING GROWING SOVIET INFlUENCE INAFGHANISTAN, SHAHI SAID THi::Y,DID NvT. THEY'HAD ON SEVERALOCCASIONS TALKED WITH THE CHINESE ABOUT AFGHANISTAN, flutTHE CHINESE· Fill BACK ON AN IDEtllOGICAL ANALYSIS FROMWHICH THEY CONCLUDED THAT THt': AFGHAN PEOPLE WOULDl1.TIMATElY BE VICTORIOUS. THE CHINC:SE HAD ADOPTl::D AHANDS-OFF POLICY. THt':RI:: WERE ALLEGATIONS THAT THL::INSURGENTS WERE !fECEIVING ARPIS FRllM THI:: CHINESE, &UTPAKISTAN HAD NO EVIDENCE OF THIS.

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12. INDIAI ThE t:XCIlANGE ON INDIA CONTAINED NO ~UIlPRHjE.:;.THE PAKISTANIS VOICED FAMILIAR CONCERNS ABOUT LONG-IIANGEINDIAN INTENTIONS AND INDICATED'THAT 'TH~Y' CONTINUE TO •CONSIDER: INDIA'THt':P,UNCIPAl 'TMEAT Tll 'PAKISTANI SECURITY,DESPITE THE INNEDIACY OF THEIR PROBLEMS WITH' AFGHANISTAN.

1.5. 'SHAHf' NOTED THAT PAKI~\AN'S RELATIONS WITH INDIA\lEkE/'lORE -TENSION-f'HEE- THAN'AT'ANY'TlML::' IN THE'PA::;T. "THt.Y "GAVE CONSIDERABLE CRt:DJf TO FORMER PR 1111:: I'll NI STEil' Dt':SAI,AND \oIERE PARTlCl1.ARLY t" ,ECIATIVE OF DESAI HAVING STOODUP TO BREZHNEV AND i<Oln' .. ,j IN MOSCOW BY REFUSING TO PUT

PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN OVER AFGHANISTAN. HilS \oIAS, SHAHISAID, A "HEALTHY DEVi::lOPMt:NT-. HIE PAKISTANIS NONETHELESSEXPRESSED CON;IDEHABlE ANXIETY Rt:OAhDING THE POLICIESWHICH ~I1GHT BE PURSUEll BY WHAIEVEIf INDIAN COV!'RNPlt:NT Wt"lJLOEMER GE FH OM THI:: N~XT ELECT I ON.

14. SHAHNAWAZ l:iAID THAT PAKISTAN HAD TRIED PAhllCULAhlYHAIIO IN flECENT 110NrH:i TO KE£P RELATIONS WITH INDIA Ali SAT­Ii['l7~itJ 1

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8~ THE~PAKISI'ANIS DID NOT PLACE MUCH HuP;:: INTHEJRDIf\.OI'lATIC DIALOGUE WITH AFGHANISTAN, BUT INlilCATED'THI::YWOULD KEEP TRVlNe. :>HAHI SAID HE DID NOT KNOW 'WHETHEWT~ INVITAT{ON Tv HII'I TO VISIT KA"Ul WOULD bE RENE~D.·Itj'AtjYCAS£; THE DIALOGUE SEEM£D NCIRE IN THE' AfGHAN' ,'"

"'INrERESI' THAN 'IN PAKIS7AN'S INTERI::~l. TH~ AFGHANS WANTEllTO!GJ:;T:PAKISI'AN TO FOflCE THil' nI::FUGI::L::S flACK ACROSS THE'

fl, :BORDiR'(SHAHNAWAZ PRIVATt:lY SAID WHAT THE'AFGHAN~..IREAlLY\oIANTEIi WAS THE £XPl1.SIOI~ OF 1tc.t.EL lI::AIlt:RS,. AND IoIErlE,',NOT

• PREPARED TQ TALK ~iRIOUSLY A~(JUT ANY OTHt:H ISSUES. THEIR"I PURPOSE WAS TWO-f·OLD.' FIRST, THl::Y WOULIl bt': £lETTER AalE

-TO COPE WITH TH£' 1NSUkGC:NCY If THl:: PAKISTANI HEFUGE' WAS~UNAVAIlA~L&::;AND,!;ECONDly,;THI:;Y'WANTlD TO CRt':ATE A; '. ,,'

SITUATION 'IN 'WHICHTHty COULD AGAItl POSE, AS THE'; CHAMPIONSOF',PUSHlUN NATIOtJALISI'I. 'IF THEY COULD FORCE PAUSTAN:TOABANDON THe: kEFUGEES, PAKI!iTAN WOULD ill:: DIl:iChI::DlTED ANDTHE DRA WOULD HAVE A b&:.TTl::h LONG-HANGE CHANCE TO RAllY THETRIBES TO THEIn SIDE,

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3i19~'ITTHr:~SECREtAhY"ASKED 'IF 'PAKISI'AN SAW THI:: DANGt':R FROM-AFGHAN'ISlAN AS'oili.or,lONG-RUN SUUVI::RSION OR1DIRECT:, ""'MlLITAHY'\AGGRI£SSION •• JSHAin Rli:PlIEDI THAl" flOTHI WERE' AI :iI..

.;; CONC~RN~~BUT""'ENT"O~T('01 SCUSS PHl11ARIl Y THf:ISUflVERSIVETHREAT '1$ THEnArGHANs~il,Hl:: SAID, Wk:HE, GI VING' UP, ON' THE"I -: ,Q..DER;GENERATION or~PUSHT£lN NATIONALISTS ANIl'.WERE' CorPI' ':C£HTRATING ON A YOUNGli:k' GENERATION OF PUsHTUN~~ AND. f1AlUCHISIIHO WERE SHOIIING tlARXISI' TENDENCIES'- THE INTEllECTUAL

,'SUBIIERSION, OF THI:. PAKISTANI' PEOPLE WAS ALREADY SHOWING• ; 1 SOI'IE SIGNS OF SUCCESS, AND NANY PAKI~TANIS WERE SHIFTING

'THEIR, ATTITUDES Tl)JARD AFGHANISTAN. WHEN THE AFGHAN COUPFIRST OCCURRED, THERt:',\;AS BHOAD !;;UPPuHT IN PAKISTAN' FORl'IEASUHES TO Ht:LP THE Rc:rUG&::t':s AND ASSIST THE INSURGENTS.I'IANY PAKISI'ANIS WEllE NOW COMING AROUNll TO THE VIEW THAT

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15. THE PAKlSfANIS DEVELOPED THE THEME THAT THEY HAD HADFl1.L' AND. fRAtiK DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIAN OFfICIALS ON TilENUCLEAR QUESTION ANti THAT INDIA ACCEPT~D PAKISTANIA~SlJRANCES OF PEACLFUL 1HTENT AT FACE VALUE. SHAHIR~COUNTED HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIAN FOREIGN ~INISTERPlISHRA IN BOTH HAVANA AND NEW YORK IN WHICH SHAHI OFFEkEDTO GIVE WHATI:.VER ASSUHANCES INDIA MIGHT ~EQUIRE IF INDIAHAD DOUBTS REGAIiDING THE NATURE OF PAKISTAN'S PROGRAM.SHAHI SAID HE ALSO I::XPRESSED CONCERN OVt:R CHARAN SINGH·SI\ED FORT SJ AUMENT. I'll SHRA REPCJRTEDL Y REPLIED THAT THISHAD ElEEN MADE; IN THt: HYPOTHETICAL CONTI::XT OF' A PAKUiTAHlNUCLEAR W£AP(,NS PIl011RAM, SHAHI INDICATED THAT l'IISHRA WASSATISFIEo BY PAKISCANI AS!iURANCE~.

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16. SHAHNAWAZ CHll'u::D IN TO 1'0INt' "UT THAT THE R£D FORTsrATEl'l~NT CAI'IE ONi. Y A n::11 DAYS AFTEh SENATON PEkCY'SREl1Aft KS 1N CIIL curT A "t:GAIi DI hG THt: PilTI::NT!AL THREAT TOINDIA'S ClTII::S OF A PAKISTANI bOl1tJ. (WHILE ~ DID NOTDftAW THE CONClUSION SHARPLY, ~HAHNAIIAZ SEEr ,D'TO'&EIMPL.YING THAT THe: US gORt: SClI'lt: IiE!iPClNSIBjLI.Y FOIi CHAANSI NGH· S OUTbUh !iT • )

17. SHAHNAWAZ ALSU D£SCkIflED 1111 :iOME DETAIL HISDISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WITH INDIAN LEADUlS,'INCLUDING FORNER PhII'l£ MINISTt::R DESAI, IN DELHI LAST MAY, ,~ SAID DESAI MADE A ·COI'iPUTEL Y UHA.lflIGUOUS STATEMENt- . -,THAT HE WAS SATlSFJEll IIITH PAKISTANI ASSUR.ANCES. SHAHNAWAZAlSO WENT OVEH FAMILlAH GROUND ON THE OESAI-ZJACORhESPONDENCE IN WHICH ZIA IiEPORTEDLY SUGGESTED A JOINTSJATEMENf RI::NOUNCING NUCLEAR Wt:APONS AND CiESAI 1,0lJNT£RED 'IUH A PROPOSAL FOR UNILATERAL STAII:.MENTS WHICH WOULD HAVETHf EfFECT OF A JOINT STATEMENT. SHAHNAIIAZ CONCLUDEDTIlAT, SINCE BOTH CESAl AND ZlA HAD STATllI THAT THEY DIDNOT INTEND TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE INDlANS WEREAPPARENTLY SATISFIED.

liS. IRAN. Nli:WSOM lJESCRI&EP US EFFOhTS TO kEASSURE THEtiI!."W GOVERNjoJ~NT THAT WE ACCEPT THE REVuLUTION. wE HAD NOT'tET APPROACH&::D KHOI1l::INI lIIRt:CTLY. lIlAN'S REFUSAL TOACCEPT OUR AMBASSADOR MADE COMMUNICATIONS MOR&:: DIFFICULTAND THE CO NT INUING EXECUTIONS GAVI:: US A PUbLIC RELATIONSf'ROBLEM. HEW~OM ~ESCRI8~D SOVIET-IHANIAN R~LATI0NS AS"TENSE· •

l~. IN REPLY, SHAHI STRESS£D THE IMPOkTANCE OF HAVING APERSONAL EQUATION WITH KHOMEINI AND THE AYATOLLAH'S "TOUCHINESS ABOUT CONTINUING ANY PROGRAM OR POLICY' bEGUN11'1 THE SHAH. tit: f't':LT THAT SENDING A ~.t:LEGATION TO KHOMEIhlWOlLD BE IHE ONLY WAY TO IMPROVE. USRt.LATlONS WITH THEPGOI, BUT RECOGNIZlD THAT THIS COULD BE DIFfiCULT fIJR USIN TERMS OF US PUbLIC OPINION.

21.:. SHAHI l'.ENTlONED THAT PGOI SUSPICIONS OF ANYTHINGESfAbLISHED ElY THE SHAH LED IT TO WANT TO ABOLISH THE kCD.~ SAID THAT PAKISTAN WAS TRYING TO SAVE IHE OIJGANIZATION.PAKIST AN WAS "e:VALUATI NG" THE ROLE OF' RCD, , AND' HOP£D' THATTHE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY WOULD PERSUADE THE IRANIANS THATTHE RCD HAD UTILITY IN FURTHERING REGIONAL ECONOMICCOOPER AT ION.

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21. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, SHAHI NOTED THAT IT WOULDNOT BE t:ASY TO SET UP A NEW REGIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTION.THE PERSIAN GULF SIiAIKHODl'lS, WHICH WOULD LOGICALLY BEINCLUDED IN A NEW ORGANIZATION, WERE UNEASY AbOUT THEREVOLUTION IN IRAN AND WOULD THt:klFCJRE PROBABLY BE NERVOUSABOUT AN ORGANIZATION WHICH LINKED THEI~ IIITH IRAN ANDWHICH HAD IRAN IN SOME SORT OF LEADERSHIP POSITION,

22. PAKISTANI OPEl,' G THE lJISCUSSION ON PAKISTAN'SSECURITY REQUll1i..,l:.tfi NEWSOM SAW HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOoIHOW THE GOP THOUGHT • ~ COULD ASSI ST PAKIsi AN ·IF WE ARE

ABLE TO RESOLVE THE PRO&LEMS THAT CONFRONT US". NEWSOMINDICATED THAT THE US VIEWED PAKISTAN'S SECURITY REQUIRE­aT'7901

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~O N F~I"D E'N T i AL SECTION 83 OF 04 STATE 21uei/83ISFACI'oR'Y AS ·POSSUI1..E IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN AFGHAN­ISfAN.' HE NOTLD THAT, DURIIIIG HIS VISIT TO NEW DEL.HI INMAY, HE HAD CONDUCTED PAKISTAN'S FIRST WIDE-RANGING . .EXCHANGE OF VJEWS WITH INDIAN OFFICIALS. ON AFGHANISTAN, "HE HAD FOUND THE INDIANS EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS IN EXPRESSING ,"THEMSELVES, POSSIBLY OUT OF FEAR THAT THEIR VIEWS WOUL.DGET BACK TO THt: SOVIETS, SHAHNAWAZ SPECULATED THAT THEINDIANS ARE PRO&ABl.Y CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGt:R WHICH I "

SOVIET ADVANCES IN AFGHANISTAN POSES FOR INDIA ITSELF AND.CANNOT BE PlEASED THAT AFGHANISTAN IS NO LONGER A BUFFERSJATE. THESE CONCUlNS, HOWEVER, HAD NOT REACHED THE POINTWHERE THE INDIANS WOULD ADI'IIT THEM OPENLY. NONETHELESS, 'PA~'S EXCHANGE OF VIEwS WITH INDIA ON THIS ISSUE MAYHA~D SONE IflPAcr, ASKED IF THE INDIANS HAD AT ANY TIMEEXPRESSED THEIR CONCEIINS TO THE SOVIETS ABOUT AFqHANISIAN,SHAHNAWAZ SAID HE THOUGHT THEY HAD NOT, BUT THAT,THEY,HAD ,Dt:MONSTRATED THIS CONCERN BY RESISTING SOVIET REQUESTS FOR'Pk~SSURE 011 PAKI Sf AN. . . ,

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TO DO TO ENHANCE PAKISTAN':; DifENSE CAPABJLJTY•. NEWSOM .. '~SCRIBI:':D THE UGIS-ATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON ",UI A:O' PROGRAM 0

AND NOTED PRObl.EMS WITH MAJOR MILITARY ~AI.E. ~t:QUIRINGCONGRESSIONAL ACQUIESCI::NCE. THE PAKJSTANiS NAD£ Cl.EAR THATINDIA REMAINED THE PRINCJPAL THHEAT AGAINST WHICH PAKISTANMUST PLAN IT~ ~EfEN~E, AND SUGGi!;iTLD THAT THE:ADSENCE;OF A'

, GOOD FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, SUCH AS r-16:), WAS THEJk KEYWEAKNESS. IN A DISCUSSION Of THI:: OIPLOl1ATlC ELEMENTS 0;'PAKISTANI SECUHITY, THE US ~IDI:: ~THES~ED ITS' INTENTION TO'CONTINUE TO TAKE' INTO ACCOUNT PAKIS1AN'!: IHn:RESTS IN THEl'iANAGEI'lENT OF ITS RELATIONS WITH TH~ MAJOR CONTINENTAl.POWERS Of ASJA. WE ALSC SAID WE WOULD' CilNTlNUE TO USE aUkJNFtUEHC~ IN N£:W DC:LHI TO E:NCOUHAGt: IN~IAN "EsTRAINT ANpCOOPERATION. WITH PAKISlAN. ON Af?HA~~~qA~. "I€: ~~ID.~r :.,:

'WOULD USI:: Io/HAT~V~R Lc.VERAGE WE 'HAO: IN KABUL TO ENCOUHAG£·IAFGHAN RESTRAINT RELATIVE TO PAKI:)]'AN, AN\) THAT WE WOULD'CONTINUE TO IMPRESS UPON THI:: ~OVI'::TS'THAT lit: lXPC:CT THEI'lTO RESPECT AfGHAN JI~DEPENDENCE AND'TO RiFllAIN' FIlOI'! INTER-fERRING IN AFGHAN INTl::IlNAL AffAIflS, THE US SJDE' .•SPECJFlCALl Y AfrIHMi.D THAT THt: 15l5g lIIl.ATiRAl. AGRE£MENTWITH PAKISTAN 1o/0ULD ut: RELEVANT IN THE E:VENT OF AGGRESSJONmON AFGHANISTAN. (flJl.l.ER DISCUSSION Or THIS ~UBJECT IN~PTEL.), VANCEBT17901

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.: TO ANy'COUNTR;Y'5 ~Cl/flITY. OBVIOUsly THESE"ARE ISSUES"';' .ON WHICH ONly"PAKISTANIS THEM:)£~VES CAN MAKE DECISJONS. ;.- :."BUT OTHER 'COUNTRJES CAN f'ROVIDE' ECONOMIC AND TEC~NICAL ...•• 'I£LP TOo/ARC REACHING THESE GOALS. '. " "I'.~ ;: I ....'.. " "1 - •• ;'. . .;., •.• ' . • .. '\,. t~ • I .. ;. • ~

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3. SUMMARY: DURING DISCUSSION or ~VENTS I~ AFGBAN:srA~.

A~ MFA OFFICER TOLD US ~~AT THE TUF.~S CONC~RRED ~IT~ TEIU.s. ASSESSI":E~T or THE STRAUS EETliEEN A.,'iIN AND THESOVIETZ. THE TURKS BELIEVF.D THAT TRF T~~F! MINISTrRS _EOFLED 'ROM AMIN MIGHT H! IN HIDIN~ IN rHE SOVIEr EMBASSY;!~JT SOVIET A~BASS1DOR POZANO' WAS PRESFNT AT THE AnGPALACl: AT A'1IN'S !NVIrATION ':'iif,N THE l!ULt::T~ FLEW; AN:THAT rO!~ER PRIMIN ETEMAtI YAS DEAD. THE TURKS WE HE V~R!

INTFRESTrD IN ~r.PORTS TREY 3AD RECEIVED TBAT A~IN HAD H!~

SURTACE-TO-AIR MISSILES INSTALLED AT ~AG~AM Ar~BASE.

TEET RAD ALSC BEAP.t :HAT lAR'~I'S FORM~R ~ItE r~ CA~P,CRIE! OF GERNERAL STAFf YAY-Uf, ~IGF.T BE READED FOR APOR~[. AND fRAT ~INPUBLIC ~OR~5 PANJSBI~1 BAD LEiT FORMOSCOW -FOR HEALTH ~rASO~S-. END St~MART.

4. AMIN/USSR STRAI~5: ~M?OF'S :ALLED ON MFA MIDDL~ FAST!NORTE AFRICA S~CTION CHIFF ALF ,AP.AOS~ANjGLU OCT~BER 24FOR A DISCUSSION EASED ON RtF (A). ACCOrtDI~~ TOKARAOSMANO~LU. THE T3R~S SHARED Tft u.s. ASSESS~ENT THATTHERE WE~r S~RAINS ~ET.ErN A~I~ AND THE SCVltTS.XARAOSMANOGLU P~I~TEV TO A~IN'S OCTOBE~ ·1~ S?EECH BEFOR~

A M~TING or 'l'=! NIW CO,.STI70,:,IC:-O COM"iI'I'rlE. I~ '1131eB iii"USEP~TRE M~RXIsr BUZZ~~Hrs -~ICTATonSHIP OF TEE"PROLErh~IAT­ANDUSTATE O~~E~SBIF Of THE ~tA~~ OF PFODUr.TION • AS ~~.s·s

121

CLEAREST PUBLIC D!CLARATION TO ~'Tr. OF TH~ ~HALQI PAR~Y'5COMH~NIS! AFFILIATIO~. ~ARAO~MA~C~L" SJRMISrn TBAT SO:F.STA~EHENTS A! THIS TIMF ~[ST IRRITATE TSE SOVIETS. ~H~

WOULD PROBABLY PRFFEa A~I~ TO APPEAR AS MO~tR1TE ASPOSSIBLt IN ORDER TO BROA~EN HIS RA~! OF SryPPORT. fH!TURXS INTERPRETED ANO~HER INCIDfNT tS A~ INDICATION OFUSSR-AMIN STRAINS: sovr~r A~~ASS~DOR PUZANOi. -PEP.BAP~PLATING THE ROMAU CONSUL • PAD SE~T nIS DCM IN HIS PtAtlTO ATTEND rOREIGN ~INI5TER $HA~r.LI'~ ~!CFNr PRI~FIN= FC1SOCIALIST J.LOC AroBASSADORS.

; ;NNO~~~i~H~HA~!Ai~:A;A~~F~~:'~~I~;D ~;~~A~~T:~~~~Ti~~!!f.EO~HFR two HINI~TERS PU~GrD ~FPTEMBER 13 E~TEiING 1Sl

~ SOVI!T EMPASST T!! SAME tAT. KARACSMANO~LU BELIEVE~ TEAT: THE THREE KINISTtRS MIGPT W~LI STILL BE INSIDE TnE seVIET: E~BASS!; IN A~T CASE. HE WAS SURF TrEY ~[FE NOT DEAD.~ CITING AS suppoaT A~IN'S RtCENf STATEMENT TO FOREIGN~ JOUR~ALISTS ~RA~ ~E KNr~ ~rERE WATANJAR, ET AL, WERE. PUTi TRAT THEY conLD ~or IE REAC~ED PT TELEPHONE.,; 6. PUZANOV: ~EE TUP.r.S "KNO." ~~AT SJVIET AMBASSADOR

POZANOV WAS ~RESENT AT T5~ ARG ?~LA~E WHf.N THE SHOOTINGSTARTED. TEEf RE~UNST~OCTtD EV~NTS THUS: TARA~I HADSUMMONED AMIN TO T~E PALAC~. A~I~. ~I~DFUL or A SI~ILAR

INVITATION TP.E PREVIOUS Y1A~ ~J A RECALCITRANT HINISTERWRO ~)~ tXECorED UPON ArPFA~rNG AT THE ~ALACE, ASKEDPUZANoV :0 BE PR~~ENT. EOPING rFAT HE ~orLL CONSTITUTEA SORT GF LIFE rN~UR~NCE. TqE TURK~ DID NOT ~NOW ~BO

STARTED THE SHCO:INC. AND. GIVE~ PUZANOV'S INV1TEDPRESENCE, THEY BELIEVED IT POSS~BLE THAT AMIN MIGHT NOTHAVE PLlNNED TO STRIKE AT TARAKI. AT LEAST NOT IT THATMOMENT.

7.~ETEM1DI: THE TURKS NOW EELIEVED FORMEP. PRIMIN NURAHMAD ETlMADI ~REFS B. c. D) BAD BEEN EIEcnTED. AFGHAN~RIEr or INT~LL!r.ENCE ASADULLlE AHIN BAD P.EPORTEDLY TOLD

SOMr. or HIS FRIENDS" THAT ETEMADI HAD BEEN tX!CU~ED O~T1R1[I'S ORDERS. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TEND~D TOCCNrIB~ TBIS. IN THE TUR'ISF. VIEW: SISCE ETEMADI'SrHPRISON~tN! TH~ DAY AFTER TEE TARA(.I REVOLUTION. RISFAHILY HAD BEEN rrRMITTED. WITHOUT S;EIN~ HIM. TO BRINGFRESH FOOD AND CLOTHES TO 7FE PRISON AND TO EICB\NGELETTERS WITH HIM. ABOUT TWO ~O~THS AGO ~ErSE PRIVILEGESVERE CUT BACK. A~D TS~ DAIS AGO. EVEN THE LETT?R EXC~AN~[

WAS STOPFED.

8. jpAMS: THE TUKtS HAD RECiIVED RrpnRTS rHAT AMIN RAD_B~~JUR'tCr-~p-!IR MISSILES INSTA!.LE~ AT PAGR~~ AI~BA~!.

THEY SAW THIS A~ A 7ERY SIG~IrlCANT DEVFLOPMENT :r TRUE;. fHE ONLY FORESEEABLE TARGETS OF sueR ~EAro~s COULD ~E

BT.7?~€ 1~2

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JlOQHf.R/AMEl'lBASSY TEHRAN.Sl?0,. IT

CON r I ., E N T I AL SECTIO~ 0~ OF 02 ANU!!! ~7955,

~ U'CP.ANISTAN'S OWN AIRCRAFT. 11 AHIN BAD IN nCT INS1'1LL£D, WEAPONSAGAl'NSl' THr UENTUALI'1'Y OF 1 STRUE :BY US OWN~ All fOHCE, THIS WASNE~ EiIDENC~ or fURTHER REAL OR PER­." CEIVED EROSIOH 07 AMIN'S CRUCIAL HltlTART SUPPORT.

UUOSHANOGLUAS!ED lJS TO CREC&: TBE .Rr.PORTS or THE SAr.I' INSTALLATIONS A'l' RAGllH.

9. PURGES: rRET~a~s HAD EEARD THAT AjGgA~ CalEf 'OFS'1'11FAND FORMER TARA'! AIDE DE CAMP GE~ERALYA~UP WOULDII PURGED. THEY ALSO ·KNEW· THAT MINISTER 01 PUBLICVOPIS PANJSHiRI (REF E, PARA 5), ·ONE OF T9E lAST 01fall PACBEMIrES" !N. THE tHIN GOVERNI1t;~'r, HAD DICA"'PIL FORMOSCOW ·FOR HEAL!B RI1SONS" ONLY FIVEUAYS AFTEB ASSUMINGBIS FORUOLI" •

. 13. ·ACTION REQUESTED: WE WOULD l~PRECIAT! ANY CONFIRMA­tION I)R CO"I1ENTS D};Pt.RTHEl~tJR t:A.DllL CAN ~1i.E! ON THE'fORtIS! RI-PORTS. PARTICULARLY ON TEE IN10RMlTIOK OF TF.EJAGRAM SAH INSTALLATION. lOR USE IN OUR CONTIN~ING DIS­CUSSIONS Wll~ YEE 'fURKS. SPIERSIT.'1966

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~.o. 12etSS: GDS lel25/85 (TAn-OR, JAMES E.) OR-PTAG;'; PEPH, ~HR, PINT, AF, UR, GESUBJ: <LOU) NEW EAST GERMAN AM~ASSADOR TO REPLACE CENTRAl

FIGURE IN LAST SUMMER· S REPORTED ATTEMPT TO BROADENREGIME'S POLITICAL BASE

itE~: KAEUL 6309 (l~01Al)

POL

CHRG£CONRFCHRN

1. eCl SUMMARY: A NEW EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN NA~ED

TO KASLI!. TO ftEPLACE HERMANN SCHV:IESAU, A CENT~IU. FIGUREHERE IN LAST SUMMER'S PURPORTED SOVIET nTEMPr TO riAVE tHEJ(h;.LQI REGIME "BROADEN ITS l'a..ITICAL BASE."' WHETHER THERE WASAA/'( nRE i:EHIND THAT POLITICAL SMOKE. REflIAINS UNCLEAR, BUTTHEkE IS 1.lTTLE [JOUBT tHAT THEN PlUJll£ MIt:ISI'ER HAFIZULLAHAMI~t THE REPORTED TARGET FOR THIS "'CAMPAldN"' FOR WHIC!'{SCH'.rIIESAU liAS A MAJOR MOUTHPIECE, KNEW ABOUt The; AFFAIR. SCHWIESAUABRUPTLY DEPART~D KABUL ABOUT THE TlflIE IT BECAME OBVIOUS THATAflIIN'~ POWERES WERE HOT BEING CURTAILED, BUT FIRM EVIDENCEREGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES &URROUNDING HIS DEPARTURE ANDREPlACEMENT HAS HOT YET COPIE TO LIGHT. AT AN·I RAtE, FOR T~

SHORT TERM AT LEAST, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO KltVE LITTLE CHOICEBut 10 BA~K AMIN'5 EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE TKE REVOLUTION.END Of SUMMAR Y.

2. (LOU) ON THE EVENING OF OCIOBER 24, THZ ORA ANNOUNCEDTHAT IT HAD GIVf.N AGRE.M£NT FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF KRAFTBUMBU (AFGHAN FOREIGN !'lItUSTRY SOURCES INSIST THAT IS THECOkRECT SPELL I NG) ~s THE NEIt.! AMBASSADOR OF r HE G£.1MA N DEMO­CRAT IC REPUElLlC TO KABUl. NO FURTHER DETAILS ARE INCLUDEDHi T HE BRIEF RC:PORT •

.3, CC) COl"iMENT: auf~aEL REPLACES FORMER GDR Al'I.r,ASSADOR H'.:R­MANN SCHWIESAU "H~ WAS A CENTRAL FIGURE IN LASl SUMl'!ER· SREf-UTEC SOVIET "CAMPAIGN" TO PERSUADe::" THE DRA L£ADERSHIP Ttl-BfdJADE!'l Ib POLITICAL cASE OF" SUPPORT." ALONG W!!'i SOVIETMINl.:;TER-COUt~SS:LOR VASILl Y SAFkOHCHUK, SCh.. lESAU A"! THATTIME IrJA5 EXTREMElY OUTSPOKEN ... ITH HIS DIPLONA1IC COLLEAGLlE;5RECARDING THE DOI"IISTIC DIFFICULTIES ~F THE KHALGIS, AND ES­PECiALLY AdOUT THE DRA"S NEED to SkOADEN IT~ SUFF-ORT IwTTHINTHE CCVtlTR Y. SOME UNCONFIRMED REPORTS WERE HLAHD T HAT A~

H1TEGitAL PART OF THIS ALLEGED SOVIET EFFORT WAS THE THElfl:::THAT THEN PRINE I'lINISTER HAFIZULLAH AM1N" £; POWEtiS HAD TO BECL.~TAlLED, SINCE HE WI'S THE PfRCEI VED VILLA I N BEHIND THE ORA'SREPRl::~SlVE AND RADICAL POL!CIES.

.124

Ij. CCi AS TIME PASSl::D, AMI N' ~ REAL POLITICAl. POtiER APPEAREDTO INCREASE, DESPITE THi. OSTENSIBLE SOVIET EfFORT TO CLIPHIS Irt'l!:GS, AIm AMI N DROPPED SEVEIiAL PUBLIC HINTS THAT HE""A~ A~'Ak£ OF" THl SOVIET -MAttl:.UIlERING~ WHICH SAF'RONCHUK ANDSC~.iIESAU WERE PUSLICIZII.G ALL OVEP. TCltII.. NOT LONG AFTERIT BECAMe: Q.EAR THAT AlliIN'S flOWERS WERE ~OT DECLINING, SC!l­~IESAU ABRUPTLY DEPARrED KABUL, HEPuRTEDLY BECAUSE HE HAD;iUHERED A ~ROKEN LEG WHICH WOUI.D ftEQUIRE SIX MONTHS INGERl"/M~Y TO HEAL, O'.JH GOR COLLEAGUES HERE GAVE NO INDICATIOHTHEN Of: IN THE INTEP.Hi T!-IAT SCHWIESAU WOUl.D NOT RETURN TOKA1HL TO TAKE UP HIS AMoASSADCJRIAL ASSIGNMENT,

5. CC) AS WITH MuST ELt::MENTS OF TlilS '-lURK" STORY, THE REA-SONS BEHIND BU"I~EL 's APPuI N'f!'iENT ARC: NOT CLEAR, AND SCINl[SAU'S~ERMA~NT DEPAkT~RE COULD HAVE ~EV~RAL EXPLAhATIONS. THE MOSTOBVIOUS IS ThAT HIS MEDICAL PHCJi:.LEMS HAVE REQUIRED THE GDRTO FD..L ThE VACANCY HERf;, RAT HER THAN TO WAIT FOR SCHWIESAU'SFlU. F.ECOVERY. AHCTHER EXPLANATIu;, 1~ THAT SCHWIESAU HAD~RVED HIS PL:RPOSE IN ANY -:i:-:uI.IiE"IIt;G ThE bASE- CAf'ER, ANDTtfliT H15 SERVICES AS A SuVIET - SPC':;.':i·,AN- ~EJtE NO LOtJGERttEDlD iN KABUl... IT COUl.D ALSO 0-1 •• , iivl.':'V":k, THAT AMIN, THES:Jf'POSE~ P'iUNCIPAL TARGeT ~? ANY _n~"T Te, iJt:!='~SE THE DOP'.ESTICOPPOSlT ION TKliOUGH POLlTIC':'L r';::'.,i\~, u"DI::i:t:i; SCHI.:IESAU'S ABRUPTDEfARTUhE POSSIBLY AS 1\ !.,i.'.(JN~Ti.:.Li,;,. It;,:.! Ai'llN WAS, IN FACT,A LEADER OF THE AFGHAN Lc.liuLUTII..i:. '. !iO HAD Nt. It\TEIJ110N OfVU.. WJTMULY RfLINQUISHING 1,IS I'LJi.'.:.:, :::VL:~: It" ~:I~ C~OSE FRIE:mSTHE SOVIETS TP.~MSi::LV:S ~!i-:~.;;: ':'lJ,.'::S:":',. l.;;id{HG o!::HIND THE S~ENE,)

TO SRII.G ABOUT ~l!CI! A 1;::'Vj;;~.(J?r'j:,jff. ui. ~Ai..i',:\CE, THEREFORE,'NE BELIEvE H:AT ~CH~:ESAU· S A£nuPT I:E.PAiiTURi::: At\iJ r,EPLACEjllENTCOUL.Ii .ELL hAVI:: ~c:::::.: g SOrli 'oJ:'Y f-OLITIC:'.LLY A~D NCT NEDI­

·CALLY 1';",TIIIAlt:D. ~'HA1'o:.lIii': THt. CASE !'!AY EE, AS {, RESllLTOf THE STILI. iJI.~LiA;\ ~I::PTEMJt:R 14 SHOulOUT IN KABUL, THESOVIETS APrC:A~ TO HAVE LITTLE Sl{CRT-TERI') CHvICE bUT TOSUPFGi1T hI'in; lfJ HIS ATTEMPT TO ,"UELL ':'HE DGMISTIC INSURGENCY;.tlti CONSOLIDATe: THe: SECUttITY OF THE Ri::VOLUTICN.

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HEF: I.NJ<ARA 7956 (N(;TAU

1. (C - Ef'lTIRE TEXT>

2. PLflSUANT TO Elr.BASSY ANKARA' 5 REQUiSi It. PA,;AG•. ~.P!: 1: -0;THE REFTEL. TIllS EMBASSY HAS THE fOLLlJt'iING "l.-~:LVt.TI":I:S 7(11AKE A!JOUI TH: POINTS DISCUf.SED BY KARAO.A:,t.~:l':;Le:

CA) AlllN-SOVIE:! STRAINS: ALlP'juuH THEI1:: ;,;WS L-=:':I~ ii;r~-

CAT IONS IN THE f':ST THAT !Ht: ~(jVIC:TS 1':1GIo!T :".~IJ": P'.1::'-::J,;._:- .s~;:

OfHEi1 POLITICAL ~OLUTIOr\ TO lHE Ui{~TAEl...i A;:C,:'f,:: :...nuril~~. -:;:1-..T H.C: CONT I NUi::D lEADEP.~Hli-' !IF T H.E RUT HLESS ANL !.l •.'Pu?UL k •.HAFIZlLLAH AlllN, I'JOSCvi:! IS NOW Cl.J::AkLY 5T:':Ci'. lin/; H!l:. ?7Li:':AST FOR THE SHOnT RllN. \:E AGREe: ~ITH r:A:.,H... i,;tH:v"LL 7',,1 "'l,:'$OVIl:."TS ARE N(1I.~ UNDOUbTEDLY GliIDII-;G AI11N j C rlLLO' t; r1Ci[':. (\:::.COiiRSE 1 iii ORDZil TO Bf. OADEN. IF AT ALL PlJ:= S:;;.L.. d..; :J\'~: .. ,;s L ~,::-

SUPPOtU. wE .'\1.S0 FOUND THi: ABSENCE 'CF AI'loAS;,ADO!-' ;'!Z!\N(;V Fr,()'FOREIGN MIIHSTER 5HAfl ~jALI'S UNUSuAL OC!OEc:r f. L. .. ;~il'.G ;,?C'SSI&LE P;DICATIONS TIiA! THl:: :"OVET liuLi:: :'i. SEPT:.:.1:~i;, 14COULD HAVE pEEI\ RE-GARDED A::; AtITI-AMl1l. :iCIl:::V'::r.. ::! ;. :·...:CI:·.CONVERSATION IHTH A SOUTH ASlf,N IiIPLOI'iA1, ;"C''v'lET \'~iNb'TE:-­

COU~SELOR SAFRONCHUK TRIED TG D()\;.'NPLt.Y PlIZilt>C'}"~: :-;.:.PE~' -.::;::14 Rq..C. DESO:<IBING I!I AS All ifFunT Ie. PRi:.St:pVE PL",.Ci E.:::,:::C:~'

IHE WARR!Nt; FACTIO~~ Or THe: Ai'"GHA/o; P:.RTY. or; GCTur..ik 2S.PUZAf'OV PRAISED I.:-':IN EIGHL Y Tu c?ITISH At':flll'::.>ALv/,_r,C:SlSI\l.:'::H1LLIER-F:;Y. (WE SH",ULD ADD THAT 1 HEilE l;RE S(l~lc ;"FFIc.::r.5 1 i,nus Ef1E:ASSY WHO Bi::Ll£VE THAT 1-',;51 Tl;LK 0F STi\AINS L::j\~:::::"

AMIN AND THl SO'.'IETS HAVE uEi::N A "SHr:LL GAI'i::" -- AI~lJ HU·T THE'lllUtiH" SIt,ONGM,"J HAS 8iEN r:O::;COw·s !'iAN bi~Ci.. TH::: ~":JINr:It.G (,1 Tn..KliAL In ERA.) 126

127

-- - AMI"'S "FiEFERENCE TO "lJICTATORSHIP orrm: Ph CLE:TAR I AT"' 1:.HIS OC!C,hEr. H.. SPiI::CH ISIIIOT N'~. ;u: AND F(,j-.::':'/\ PI:ESUiEI\;TARAKI HAVE OCCASIONALLY USED THH 1l..kr·: H iHE. PAST. /iISSIATEMENT THAT ..... ALL THE I!'iPukTAtn AREAS iJF P;';OliUCTIC,... ILLBE CONSIDERED PUblIC PROPERTY" WAS I-jADE IN THE C(,NTEXT OFASSlJUNG THE CONTINUED SECURITY OF PRIVATE Pf.OPi:RTY <A Pt:O­MISE FTcE.QUENTL Y MADE ZY THE KHALQI LEADEkSHIP TO AFGHANIS': AN'Z-NATIONAL CAPITALISTS"), WHILE THR~ATENING TO r;EPRIvEPOSSESSORS (iF "~OCIAL PRODUCTs- FRO:·; -THE Pl.wEH TO SUDJECTTHE lAi..CiR OF OTHEf<S THROUGH PRIVATE ",.'NERSHIP THElcEOF." THISFORNlLA!ION AL~O REPEATS A THEP1E wE HAVE HEARD Hr:r.E DEFOn:::.

<B) A~nUi'1: VI:: DO NOT THINK THE THl\Ei ::XPELLEli i·:ILITt.F.YMINISlERS A;~i ~TILL WITHIN THE SOVIET El':bA5SY, IF, INDEED,THEY HAD C;NC::: SOUGHT PROTECTION THERE. THE ";OS1 COt1MONLYI£LD LOCi,L VIEf.I IS THAT WATANJAR, PERHAPS ACCOrr,pt.iHc:r.l 2.YGUlABZCI, IS IN HIS HOI·:E :f.0VUICE OF PAKTIA. ~AFIIDNCHi.:K

• RECEtlfLY TULD A SCiUTH ASIAN DIPLOI'1AT THAT THAT PAIR IS "~T1LL

AT LARGE." THEY AXE bELIEVED BY SEVEFiAL LOCAL OaSERVERS TOBE TRYING Te ESTABLISH THEl'll:JELVES WIlH DISAFFECTED rllLITARYFORCES Hi SOUTHEASTERN AFGHANISTAN)Q IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THllt'TWATANJAR AND EiUlAEZOI !"AY ~E zr.; THt US5ft SO THAT THE SoVIE':'SCOUlD KEEP THEIR ACTIVITIJ::S UNDER CONTROL, ALTHOUGH A HIGHSOVIET EMBASSY OFFICER DENIED THIS TO CHARGE AMSTUTZ· ON OCTQcEn3 eKABUL 7318). MANY BELIEVE MAZDOORYAR 'AO BE DEAD, BUT ASOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMAT STATES THAT Hi WAS RECENTLY TOLD EYSAflIONCHUK THAT f'lAZDOORYAR IS BEING KEPT UNDER HOUSE ARRESTIN HIS QUARTERS AT THE PUL-I-CHAnKI TANK BASE. IF THIS ISTRUE. HE WOULD PROEABLY Ei:: UNDER ~UVIET PROTECrrON Fr.Oi·: A:~lN<T HE: SOVIETS PROBAblY NOW CONTROL THAT bAS=:). WHO k'OULDUNDOU3TEDLY HAVE HIff, KILLED Ii'iNEDIATELY IF HE COULD ~E cROUGHTUNDEfi KHALQI CONTROL. THE: SOVIET MOTIVE IN ~UCH A SITUTATIONCOUlD BE TO I'IAINTAIN LEVERAGE AGAINST AiollN, WHC P:UST EE PAIN­FU.LY AWARE OF THE E;{ILED AfGHAN lC:ADEiiSHIP THE ~GVIETS ARZKEEPING ON THE SH[lF e'::.G., THE. PARCHAi·1I5TS).£:T1718"

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l:;} ,·,:,:· .. v: .;";;.::.l~.~ ;.~,~.. _!'f.l: ':ALI'~ :':£LL-;\i::POii'i'EDi : L ,.. -: ~ : ;._ .;.,:.~ '~'_: .. : ':'~:I..r :;.~: :'1?Ll;i·:ATS Ct. lICTul.c.n 6, ~E.:.U.·.. _. !..Z"::._ -; :i: P':; ........; . to. F....._t._LY AT iH, PALACE AT~ ;.._: !. .._~: ~':' i-;.:_; : .. TI._ ~1- ... "'i'I..UT -- If' I\(,T THROUGHOUT'l';~ _:.:_ •. _. ,'.L .. v ';::1:.:" 1:' ?Lri~~IL.L~ TriA! tAf.kKI f':IGHT:;'i,'.: _ • .:" '_ " .,......•;', ..... l.i·"" .•. ~ ... ::l!Y ?t.:r:ATUnELY raJ. APlIN ATT~;.~ :-: -- ;,:l '[~.>"" '. ;._ Lt.L· •. :. . :r;,j"iT N\iT HAVr: OftGINALLY~~;.t.:: _!.. ... 'J ". "",.'::;: 1.... 1._.. ':" .. .:.: IS.:. ;URI~G THIS PARTICULARj'':..;' _I';" :\,.1\,,:., ~: 1 _7 ;':'1.1<.:. l,; AXY ":tECALCITr.ANT;·: .. l_~.~:." :::, .. : ...... _.:.,;.' ;..C:.;·!_L ':'1 'inc. PALACt. IN IHt: PREVIOUSY_.:":.. 1L :.EC:, J./'':' J~,;,,;.;.:;..i·.,'\:.I.~Ll: hcFiniU~G7 CFuRlIlEn DEFENSE:1":1::-. ~.:..._:..:":" (of.'..;:... , .~:,~ "I.~ Ii.ICK.:..D INTC COMING TO THE2.AC_ ..;- :" ,_.7.~ ;.::., : ;.... ;':.::':;.;.'1'.:.1, I~ i.~LIC:VED TO ~TILL QEf.L H'~ h~' r •.L - r- ..;: :.:... j{j t'i: I :';..1•• )

(UET:,::,;L.I: .'f":' _:.•. 1::.GhINC :.~VC:f.I.L id:.LIAI..L:: hEPORTS, lo'E;';;CI l-:Av:,,~t.:":"Y Cl:;CL:';L.~ iliA! Ful·:(·;.;;itPRH:c :'iINISTt:R NUn AH[~AO

::'1·i:.i:~l:·1 ;,;';: 1:.:,::':'.1.0 _:'_: . .::;:t:CUT ":L. ALTHCliGr THt. Ai';! N REGIMEr... ~I.:pt:l:r ...~LY I •• I.:",. HI :iHIFT THe:. ...LAC·,t. F("R THAT ACT ON TARAKIAtoI! H..;~;:~ .. n~_;' C:I1':"F A:'A['~U,H, Tnc. C:XECl.rrlv~ Pf\(j6AbLY CiCCURREDI:.FT£.h ?r.:::'~ _... ?i._;:_::L 14 Tfd\::.i.iVc.f\. THe: C()NSIANT REPORTSt.i::"lJT ~u'v'l.:.·. PL':'::~ Tv l;T:;:Ll:~ c.TiL·,ADl FO;:; A ?CLITlCAL ALTai­I~r 11/.;. Tt.! A.. I:. t.?f'At;;::!<TLY :... AL;::C THZ:: vLC r';Ai,,'S FATE.

C.:.i ;.,';i:':' ;.:r ...'Lit,t.i·:: i..l,:i:.Ai·, All\~A:::.;:. I~ U:.;;:,r:I, .!::vVIET CONTROL,A:,O M:Ih I~, j'~.Li.c.Fl,:\.:., ;~lJI A~LC Ii" HA\t;:. M:Y ~PECIAL l'E:lPGNSI NST ALLt.;' T ;'...1._ I,.'li' He:;: ;,{J\t 1"::T CCi:'Cl;.. FlZ:'C'::: f\!~~ ~t;PP(;i\ -; • HE;'j:GnA',,~ ;tI~V," !':h: ~.A,:~ bII;Ci;. THE. ~A(,jULI5i i..'A, FL.:.:iUi:A..:LY TOCG,:r::N!; PAh1'l:ALL Y \.'ITH T~ F.£LATlVE i,iUpc.r.l"'i'.1TY c,F" TI-!:':f'Al:IsrAlil Alh runC"::. THS:ii::: IS Nv INDICkTh.:', :~':CIDn'TALLY,

THAT Tii;;' t.F~:-:AI\ ALi "'Ul~C':'f l"H.ICH IS, Il' ZF"F.:.CT, ~OVIET­

COl\T"uLL.';, lll..PniSi::r~.H;Y 1I'Il'.l:,UIAT': n.ii..:.T TC Ar1g A£ lCr;G;..5 Ti-:~ _0.1~·;~T:> L'::~lRt. Tv ~c.;:; 1:1:': ni.::l!Ag g rU\o1c.h.

<F") :~(J; .• _5: CHlt.F ... F ~'iAFF" YA~OU:" :.;".::~ r,~! APPEAr. TJ ... :::.l:~ Ai;,( PI-LIT I CAL T.. v~::'Li AI THe I Ni·lc.::' I AT .:. TII·lt.. IN FACT,~ .h~ ;.i:CE~:i'LY r.Mig!.: TO Hi~Ci:::;TJ.AL cor·;r:lTTc..:. uf THi::t~LH:G PA:;lY. P~;"LIC wvi-.KS r'iI~;I5Ti;: PArwJ£HI/tI, I.'HO IS'::'d.IiViO 7li al,c:,: ii/Wi:: HAD PARCHA;H sr LEAr\lNGS, HDEEt DIDLZAVC: r'un rj(J~Cil:~ FO;; "";i:CICAL ThEAnl:c:.NT" AF"TI::R M~IN'S COUP,;..~~~ HA~ :,l:! ~c.a. h.:.rITIlJNt.!.; ::'lNC::: IN T1-:1:: !·.'DIA. HE COULD 'JELLr:r: CO:',::: ;.. Ii I CT h. 01 r HI:. 1\::i\T io lJU Nl.i uF' pun Gc.s. IN 5UCH A CASE,:t:;. ~;:'VL:'.i ~ ::CULD Pl:,~;r;"'Li f.-LSv (.'rF't:r: Hll~ iiEFUGi: O~: nCI;lII ~.i. Si~1v~ : Hit F. "

•I

1i;

• 77 ... 128

A!IG 1997

: .

.. ~..

.....

Near East andSouth Asia Review

13 N~cmbcr 1979

':-

NEAR EAST AND SOUTE ASIA REVIEW

23 November 1979 ••

CONTENTS

Outlook for the Insurgency During Winter1.~s~~:.

The course of the insurgency ~ill be shapedprimarily by factors that have been centralto the conflic~ ~ince it began in 1978-­soviet support, loyal~of the military,and rebel disuni ty. _

.-

5

•. .. . - .. .

... ~ ..... :.:-:) .,!' ••.-: .. ~

o•

'0. ....,.

.~

Afghanistan: OUtlook for the Insurgency During Winter-The e'ff~t of winter--which arrived this month innorthern and eastern Afghanistan--on the scale and te.ItpOof the insurgency 'Will depend.' on the severity of theweatller. Last 'Winter insurgent tribesmen took adval.~age

of unusually mild weather to expand their areas of op­eration in the eastern provinces, currently the scene ofthe heaviest fighting.' ...

. The courfie of the insurgency during the wintermonths ending in April.will.be shaped primarily by fac­tors. that· have been central -to the conflict, since it be­gan.in the spring of 1978-~Soviet support; loyalty of

. the military,· and disunity. of rebel forces. Neither thegovernment nor the rebels ~ppear capable of gaining a de­cisive .edge in the months ahead. Both sides ~ay concen- .tra~e .~n.~s~~~ening thei:r;: respective pos~t:iOJls....

• ~'.41 ... ':'~:t':~~:~£:"". -.' ~ .. .:.; • ". . _.. ~ ".' :' ..... ::0..... '> . ... ',:, The ;.Chances this winter are good for' further ·mutioies

in the~~Aimy,·and this 'could bring about the'~collapse ofPresident Amin' s regime. Unless the "Army turns againstthe.regime:and r~~ches an understanding with the tribes,however, .the r~~ellion probably viII dragon inconclu-

.sively into the spring. JIll .... " . .:". . .-

.::~ ..~'.'.... !~~~;~

I,': ~~~., .,....~..

"w..: ~ _ _ -"".

- - ,,;....~:..: ..''':W.,

-'." 0" ... , ... : •

Pages: rJ.. ±----=:::3L- .....,...._

."

=- ..

Key Factors

Other factors vill tran~cend weather in determiningthe cocrse of the insurgency durir.g the coming months.The" rebel effort vill continue to be impeded by the ;....

"failure of the various independent insurgent groups 'tocoordinate operations.' Additionally, unless the 'rebelsreceive more meauingful military suppo::-t____

·than it has thus far--particularlj-anti~craft veapons--and more financial backing from 'Saudi: .Arabia, . their effort to bring the Soviet-equi~to tl:~ point of c011apse may lose :n~m~tum." ...-.

. ~

\', w" •. :1.

",

'.

•SECRET

(l/F-:RLBARRY:I'iR1,2 115/79 X 2 112LSIMS: ~'SHULl1J"!'i

IMT1EDIATE MOSCOL./ V: .. _. - .( \ :-';~'_'i ::;lJ;:.sive ir.fc

( ) CL.-..sslFY :-:5 . ,.()Dl)\VNGl~ETStO()Sor()C,O/'UJI'

E.O, 11652: RDC, 12/15/9~

SUBJECT: SOVIeT ;'l:::Ll TAI\Y ~~r~OYli[r-.;T

1· {S - ENTIRE TEXT.]

2. SHULMAN CALLED IN Sr,vILT CHAf~G[ vASeV DECEMBER 15AND MADE POINTS IN REf·7EL· VAS[V \~R[ED TO TRANSMITREQUEST FOR INFORMAl ION TO MOSCOW. HOWEVER, HE SAID.SPEAKIN G r ERSON ALL Y, HE f3 L L I [ '.' Ell f1 \) SC0 U W0 Ul. D 8 EDISTURBED ey OUR REQUFST. l!IHJLt~ f1[ :1/-1) NO INFORMATIONON SOVIET DEPLOVI1[NT 1'1; !.F{,HMJISTidJ-. ANY SUCH ACTIONSW0UL D B[ IN THE corH [ XT 0 !: SCV ~.. ET- AF C· HMi REL ATION SAND WOULD CONSTITUTE NO THREAT TO THl US. MOSCOW MIGHTCONCLUDE THAT US FOCUS ON AFGHANIS1AN WAS DESIGNED ASA DIVERSION TO DETRACl II i'TeNT 1orJ ;-ROM PLANNED US ACTIONAGAINST IRAN·

3· SHULMAN ASSURED VASE\.' i"!;j,T iW.t~E WAS NO FOUNDATIONfOR ANY SUCH SUPPOSITION AND 7HA! OU~ CONCERNS REGARDINGAFGHANISTAN l"EPr ~[~,u[') '·r.L' TO -H[ ~IT:";ATIO:~ W: :AWDEVELOPING ThERE .

L

MS 1/RLEG.:ss

~/ 1)ID'1

• U~SSIFtEDSPEcrAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

I II )t-- .. -": .

'1~./

December 17, 1979

Time and Place: 8:45-9:45 a.m., ~~ite House Situation Room

Subject: Iran

participants:

The Vice President

StateWarren ChristopherHarold SaundersRichard Cooper**

DefenseSecretary Harold BrownW. Graham Claytor

JCSGeI1.eral David JonesGeneral John Pustay

CIAAdmiral Stansfield TurnerFrank CarlucciRobert Dean***

EnergySecretary Charles Duncan**

TreasurySecretary William Miller**Anthony Solomon**Robert Mundheim**

White HouseHamilton Jordan**Jody Powell**Stuart Eizenstat**Lloyd Cutler**Zbigniew BrzezinskiDavid Aaron

NSCColonel William OdomGary SickThomas Thornton***

**Domestic Issues Only***Afghanistan Only

JusticeAttorney General Benjamin Civiletti**John Shenefield**

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Domestic Issues:

'- ..-

PA~.tLJ,) JDaclassihedlReleased on ~J I'8

under provisions of ~:12958by R. Soubers. NlltlO~/Il se.CIJP"1co~CJl

?

S

C4assiofiee dnd EnteAQlildReassl'!. use l.13(f) ,

kc..(CI~:t./ ,,, ~ ~Abl<

1. Economic Steps. A message was sent out on Saturdayclarifying our understanding of the various steps which the allieswill implement on a voluntary basis. We should have reactions fromthe various capitals today. Once those reactions are in, a jointmessage from Secretaries Vance and Miller will be sent requestingimmediate implementation. That message will be prepared for Presidentreview today, in anticipation of its being sent tomorrow. State hasprepared a matrix showing our present understanding of what the alliesare repared to do. A copy is attached. UM

I

/

•/.

_J~

2U~SSIF1EDState also prepared a paper on the steps available to us in invokingChapter VII sanctions through the UN. A copy is attached. TheSCC was briefed on the President's interest in taking the necessarypreparations to move on Chapter VII if and when a decision is madeand the President's preference for seeking maximum sanctions. TheSCC did not believe that seeking Chapter VII sanctions would providea~ excuse for delay of action by the all!~s si~=e :~~~ already see~

prepared to proceed with limited voluntary steps bu~ will bereluctant to go beyond those measures in any event without Chapter VIauthorization. We will wish to consult in advance with the Sovietssince a veto could have serious implications for SALT, as well aspreventing sanctions. We should seek Sovjet abstention, if supportis not possible. Mr. Cutler suggested that we move immediately toget a finding by the SC on Article 39 that the Iranian situationconstitutes a threat to the peace, since the Soviets may be willingto support that. State pointed out that a call for a finding under

.') I)(.'-/~"'· Article 39 is, in effect, a call for sanction and should not bec:'! I. 1 undertaken until we are prepared to follow through with the entire~~ ", ~-./. ,. program. <J1). f f ,to,1.. -',~~, ;, ....1' ., The SCC agreed that it would be useful to wait for several q~ys)'c before invoking Chapter VII in order to see the outcome of allied

decisions on voluntary steps, effects of the ICJ ruling, reaction tothe Shah's departure, and the results of consultations between thenew Iranian Ambassador to the UN, Mansour Farhang, with the SecretaryGeneral. In order to sustain momentum, it would probably be useful

~~. ~l. to be prepared to proceed with Chapter VII on about Thursday orFriday. Once the decision is made, the sec recommended seeking stepsland 2 of the State paper (denial of military sales and credits,interruption of normal air, rail, post and telecommunications links,and a selective embargo except for humanitarian items), but stoppingshort of a total trade embargo which wouTd ~nvolve extended debateand possible failure in the UNSC. (Z)

APPROVE ---- DISAPPROVE ---In order to maintain the public appearance of momentum, it will be

)'~ f~c~: necessary to publicize in some form the types of actions which our~ f_' allies have agreed to undertake. Some will not object: others will

j; ~\ ~~. wish to keep their advice entirely private. The SCC recommended~~~ ~~ that State contact the countries involved and determine what they

would be willing to announce publicly. Depending on their reaction,we will probably want to do a careful backgrounder to get out thewhole story. This can be linked to intelligence information on thedecline of shipping into the Persian Gulf, to increase the appearanceof effective disruption of trade. We would expect to do the back­grounder by Wednesday. (;M

APPROVE v DISAPPROVE

2. Presidential Views. Dr. Brzezinski briefed the sec on thePresident's comments on the notes of Friday's meeting. The Presidentapproved the proposed strategy on the White Paper (that the informati •mwLASSIFIED

be collected and papers prepared, but not to publish a formaldocument) but asked that the internal documentation be completefor selective use. Approval was granted for leaking informationabout certain banks' circumvention of restrictions on Iranianassets. At this point, however, there appeared to be no flagrantcases to be exploited. ~

•UWGLASS,F\EO 3

3. Trials. The President noted that it is important chatwe do nothing which would lend legitimacy to any trials of thehostages by Iran. The question of the lawyers preparing legal sup­port for the hostages will be raised at the meeting tomorrow. ~)

4. French. The Iranian case against u.s. branch banks inFrance has been refiled. The sec agreed that Giscard should bereminded of his assurance to Vance that this case would be tied upin the courts and not be subject to an early court decision. (~)

Political-Military Issues:

1. Afghanistan. Admiral Turner briefed the latest developments.Soviet forces had remained stable from July until recently, but nowthere is evidence of movement. Two new command posts have beencreated just north of the Afghan border, there is a buildup of airassets, and two divisions may be on the move. There are about 5,300Soviet military personnel in Afghanistan and approximately 2,000civilians, some with families. CIA does not see this as a crashbuildup but rather as, a 'steady, planned buildup, perhaps relatedto Soviet perceptions of a deterioration of the Afghan militaryforces and the need to beef them up at some point. Most of thecountryside is now in rebel hands, but no major cities are expectedto fall unless there are significant defections from the Army. Webelieve the Soviets have made a political decision to keep a pro­Soviet regime in power and to use military force to that end ifnecessary. They either give this a higher priority than successfulcompletion of SALT, or they may believe it is irrelevant to SALT.They may be ready to dump Amin, but they have not found a suitablereplacement. ts')

The sec, after some discussion, recommended a three part strategy.First, for the record, we will continue our diplomatic demarches tothe Soviets on a private basis. There is no benefit in going publicat this time. Second, we will explore with the Pakistanis andBritish the possibility of improving the financing, arming andcommunications of the rebel forces to make it as expensive as possib:for the Soviets to continue their efforts. Third, we will attemptto increase propaganda pressure on the Soviets worldwide. We willrecommend to our European allies that they encourage their press topay more attention to the subject. We will also step up our effortsto cast the Soviets as opposing Moslem religious and nationalistexpressions. ~)

•APPROVE

UMmSSIFIED

DISAPPROVE

•4

We are hamstrun9 by the divisionsw~t in t e tribes, and an effort to organize them would be a mammothundertaking. However, we can put in enough to keep them activeand perhaps prevent the Soviets from wearino them down. One ad­ditional option would be to circulate a letter at the SecurityCouncil drawing attention to the Soviet role in Afghanistan. Thesee felt that it would be better to wait until the hostage problemwas resolved before such a move since we want to maintain maximumSoviet cooperation at that issue. (%)

'U~SSIF'ED

o

UN8MSSIFiED •

• NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILWASHINGTON. O.C. 20506

December 26, 1979

I JAl.nl J\.c..c.1I;J.J=O~l£ ..

7359-X

(2IF FIll ~j(z Z~1A

SPECIA: CODRDINATI~~ CO~~!IT~EE MEETI~G--·------Oecemoer-"26, i.979

TIME AND PLACE: 9:30-10:30 a.m.;White House Situat~on Room

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions: SCC Meetingon Soviet Moves in Afghanistan (S)

• PARTICIPANTS:

WHITE HOUSEDr. Zbigniew BrzezinskiDavid Aaron

NSCThomas ThorntonCol. William ~om

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCEAdmiral Stansfield Turner,

DirectorFrank Carlucci, Deputy

DirectorArnold Horelick, Nro for

Soviet UnionMili tary ,-(,J

Analyst

STATESecretary Cyrus VanceWarren Christopher,

Deputy SecretaryDavid Newsom,

Under Secretary forPolitical Affairs

Harold Saunders,Ass't. Secretary forNear Eastern & SouthAsian Affairs

DEFENSEW. Graham Claytor, Jr.,

Deputy secretaryRobert W. Komer, Under

Secretary for PolicyAffairs

JCSGeneral David JonesLt. General John Pustay

eHLended by E. 8ralila~R.ki

~E!aeeA I liSe 1. i:5 {b) _

[kcfO~ilf f)/I : 014/)/<

Partial~~:lasSjfjedlReleaSel1 on b/81C;J'b R pro\'lsJons of E.O. 129~V •Soubers. Nationel Security Council

--"'

7359-X

2

The CIA briefed the SCC on Soviet military actions inAfghanistan over the past two days. As many as 215 trans­ports, including AN-22s, AN-12s, and IL-76s, arrived inAfghanistan from the Soviet Union durino December 25th.Kabul airport a?pears to be a major rece?~ion ~oin~.Ac~~~vity at Bagram airport ~s not known. This size air­lift, it is speculated, could raise the Soviet combat forcelevel in Afghanistan to somewhere between two-thirds and oneand one-half divisions. No ground forces at Termez or Kushkahave yet crossed the border into Afgpanistan. Thus we havean unusually large air movement but no ground re-inforcement.There is directpoli tburo supervision ot par~s of opera tion. (2)

The greatest risk that we face is a quick, effective Sovietoperation to pacify Afghanistan. This would be extremelycostly to our image in the region and to your position hereat home. Our objective, then, should be to make the oper­ation as costly as possible for the Soviets. The covertactions that you authorized have been very slow in gettingoff the ground. CIA will submit a full status reporttomorrow. (.8)

There will be a PRC tomorrow to discuss the broad regionalimpact of the events in Iran and Afghanistan. By that timewe should have a more definitive picture of the scope ofSoviet activity. At the PRC we will develop options fordealing with the issue, including possible recourse to theUN. In terms of immediate actions, we decided this morning:

1. We will permit information of the newest Soviet actionsto reach the media on its own and maintain our currentpUblic posture.'

I, -

•2. The new developments will be briefed promptly to con­

cerned countries in the region as well as other interestedparties.

3. State will brief the Congressional leadership today inconnection with planned briefings on Iran.

4. You should not become personally involved in a furtherdemarche to the Soviets at this time. We will have TomWatson reiterate our concerns and press for an explana­tion of recent troop movements: the Soviets have probablypassed the point of no return. l~

S

~ut:ended ey g. B!'eei!lift~

-Rea lion' USC 1.13 (e)._

D.ed4.tS"~t>.- ! oil 1>1<.. •

•. ...• L

MEMORANDUM

--December 26, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

THE PRESIDENT J"\ <C-...ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ~~ .

Reflections on Soviet Interventionin Afghanistan

I will be sending you separately a proposed agenda for the NSCmeeting on Friday, and it will focus on both Afghanistan andIran. In the meantime, you are receiving today's SCC minuteson both subjects. This memorandum is meant merely to providesome stimulus to your thinking on this subject.

As ~ mentioned to you a week or so ago! we are now facing~' jrea10nal crisis. Both Iran and Afghan1stan are in turmoil; ,an PakIstan Is both unstable internally and extremely appre- ~hensive externally. If the Soviets succeed in AfghanistaAi anaif Pakistan acquiesces, the age-long dream of Moscow to havedirect access to the Indian Ocean will have been fulfilled •

Historically, the British provided the barrier to that driveand Afghanistan was their buffer state. We assumed that rolein 1945, but the Iranian crisis has led to the collapse of thebalance of power in Southwest Asia, and it could produce Sovietpresence right down on the edge of the Arabian and oman Gulfs.

Accordingly, the Soviet intervention in ~ghanistan poses for usan extremely grave challenge, both internationally and domestic­ally. While it could become a soviet Vietnam, the initial effectsof the intervention are likely' to be adverse for us for the follow­ing dome~~~~ and ~ternational reasons:

,:.' . - .......~~~~-~Domesi:i"t ,:.. ';'1'- • •.-::- .'

) --::'J:.J , .~~A. Ther\ ....~"~.bention is likely to ati.mulate calls formore - . ··:·tJ.~?·~litary action in Iran. Soviet -decisive-ness- vil~"'·.coDmstedwith our restraint, which will no longerbe labeled".. prudent but increasingly as timid:

B. At the same time, regional instability' may make a resolutionof the Iranian problem more difficult for us, and it could bringus into a h~ to head confrontation with the Soviets, ~

Declassihed/ReJeased on .,/l '7/;~under prOVISIons of f.e .2958

by R. Soobers. National St":'"c"'1'; C::-unril

f~ j ~ 7b

lWASSlflfu -2-

sanguine about Afghanistan becoming

C. SALT is likely to be damaged, perhaps irreparably, becauseSoviet military aggressiveness will have been so naked:

..D. More ~enerally, our handling of Soviet affairs will beattacked by both the Right and the Left.

International

A. Pakistan, unless we somehow manage to project both confidenceand power into the region, is likely to be intimidated, and itcould eventually even acquiesce to some form of external Sovietdomination.

B. With Iran destabilized, there will be no firm bulwark inSouthwest Asia against the Soviet drive to the Indian Ocean:

C. The Chinese will certainly note that Soviet assertivenessin Afghanistan and in Cambodia is not effectively restrained bythe United States.

Compensating Factors

There will be, to be sure, some compensating factors:

A. World public opinion may be outraged at the Soviet interven­tion. Certainly, Moslem countries will be concerned, and wemight be in a position to exploit this.

B. There are already 300,000 refugees from Afghanistan in Pakistan,and we will be in a position to indict the Soviets for causingmassive human suffering. That figure will certainly grow, andSoviet-sponsored actions in Cambodia have already taken theirtoll as well.

c. There will be greater awareness among our allies for theneed to do more for their own defense.

.. A Soviet Vietnaa?~ ...

However '_0 ,.:ci

a Sov!e~.

A. badly organized and poorly led:-- ('-'-. ':4 ·t~., ," 4" .'!( .:.. "l.

B. They have iiO . ctuary, no organized army, and no centralgovernment -- all ~f which North Vietnam had:

C. They have limited foreign support, in con~rast to the enormousamount of arme that flowed to the Vietnamese from both the SovietUnion and China,

~MSlfltll

D. The Soviets· are likely to act decisively, unlike the U.S.,which pursued in Vietnam a pol~cy of -inoculating- the enemy .

..;.~..,..As a consequence, the Soviets might be able to aSsert themselveseffectively, and in world politics nothing succeeds like success,whatever the moral aspects.

• tlIfti:ASsintU -3-

What is to be Done?

What follows are some preliminary thoughts, which need to be dis­cussed more fully:

A. It is essential that Afghanistani resistance continues. Thismeans more money as well as arms shipments to the rebels, andsome technical advice;

F. P.inistan t

'1

D. We should concert with Islamic countries both in a propagandacampaign and in a covert action campaign to help the rebels;

We should encourage the Chinese to help the rebels als01C.

B. To make the above possible we must both reassure Pakistan andencourage it to help the rebels. This will require a review ofour policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid,and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan .cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation policy; f

....,E. We should inform the Soviets that their actions are placingSALT in jeopardy and that will also influence the substance ofthe Brown visit to China, since the Chinese are doubtless goingto be most concerned about implications for themselves of suchSoviet assertiveness so close to their border. Unless we tellthe Soviets directly and very clearly that our relations willsuffer, I fear the Soviets will not take our -expressions ofconcern W very seriously, with the effect that our relations willsuffer, without the Soviets ever having been confronted with~need to ask the que_tion whether such looa1 adventurism is worththe lon9-.~ d...9.~ to the U.S.-Soviet relationship;

,.., . ~'~:~'''i':;~

·~··i1iotI14 consider taking Soviet actions in Afghan­....:._•.threat to peace.

". ~~"':-.'''''.:.-'''.-..~...:...~ ..;' ..". ~ , ..; .....-;"..:c• .;z.•.~I:~ ",'1tW ~~

•ES1HHi

•7 I; I (ill >ltdd eli

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILWASHINGTON. D.C. Zll506

UNClASSIFJEDPRESIDENTIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING

December 27, 19-9

TIME AND PLACE: 4:30-6;00 p.m.;White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: Southwest Asia

PARTICIPANTS:

STATESecretary Cyrus Vance~:arren Christopher,

Deputy SecretaryDavid Newsom, Under

Secretary forPolitical A£:airs

Harold Saunders, Ass't.Secretary for NearEastern & SouthAsian Affairs

DEFENSESecretary Harold BrownW. Graham Claytor, Jr.

Deputy Secretary

JCSAdmiral Thomas HaywardLt. Gen. John Pustay

Central IntelligenceAdmiral Stansfield Turner,

DirectorFrank Carlucci, Deputy

Director

WHITE HOUSEDr. BrzezinskiDavid Aaron

NSCThomas P. ThorntonMarshall Brement

Turner: One unknown at this point is the extent of Sovietactivity and their full intentions. They have brought in per­haps an additional 4-5,000 troops. We know that Babrak is aParchamist who has been in Prague as Ambassador. After hisdismissal he remained in Eastern Europe. His father was a~ullah and this is being used to his advantage. Resistancein Kabul has died out for the night.

SE

'.

eJl68RQ99 S~T i!bigniew BI zezil1skiileaSOLl- NSC' J 3 (b £ 8) ~

Declassihed/Releaseo un bI~Is~under provisions ot E.O. 12958

by R. Soubers. National Secunty Council

.'

~'ED 2

7484 lex Add 011

•Brown: Was the Soviet movement designed primarily to forcea change in government?

Newsom: Or do they think perhaps that the insurgents can bebe~t~r dealt wit~ b~ Babrak?

Brown: The insurgents are not going to buy that.

Turner: They probably felt that they had to replace ~in; wedon't know whether they have made a broader commitment. Theforces in the Turkestan milita=y district may just be tosupport this move.

Brzezinski: Who is in charge of the Afghan Army?

Turner: Watanjar was purged and Amin kept the defense port­folio.

Brzezinski: The Soviets have ~een directly engaged.

Turner: Yes. In Kabul they a=e engaging in combat. We donot know what is going on in t~e countryside. There arereports of Soviet flights in Herat and Kandahar.

Brzezinski:casting?

What is Radio Afghanistan outside of Kabul broad- •Turner: :ve don't know.

Vice President: What is the number of Soviet military therenow?

Turner: We do not ,know exactly -- perhaps 10,000 men.

Vice President: What are the reactions of other Islamiccountries?

Saunders: We have not got them yet.

Newsom: We sent a Message last night to the Islamic posts.

Vance: Let's go to the State paper now. Are there any sub­stantial problems with the "objectives?"

~IED

•PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW COMMIftEE·

December 27, 1979

.- .•. _- ----..,-

TIl-IE AND PLACE:

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS:

4:30 - 6:00 p.m., White House Sit~ation Room

Southwest Asia

STATESecretary Cyrus VanceDeputy Secretary Warren ChristopherMr. David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political AffairsMr. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and

South Asian Affairs

OSDsecretary Harold BrownDeputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

JCSAdmiral Thomas HaywardLt. General John Pustay

OCIAdmiral Stansfield TurnerDeputy Director Frank Carlucci

WHITE HOUSEDr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National

Security AffairsMr. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs

NSCMr. Thomas Thornton, Staff MemberMr. Marshall Brernent, Staff Member

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

: ,,20y Ue=J2Ss.1Ied/ReJeilsed OIl / ~/J I, '!under prtlVlSlOIlS of f.O. 12356 / l

: i D. Van Tassel, National Secunl'/ Cc~'

Ff'1- 1'/4

The PRC met to discuss the situation in Southern Asia, especiallyin light of recent events in Afghanistan. Admiral Turner briefedon the fast-moving situation in Kabul, noting that the Soviet

e

lIIil1tary presence a- ·the '"COuntry Vas as hiqh as perhaps 10 ;"000. ~(v..:)

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MEMORANDUM FOR

FROM:

SUBJECT:

OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 28, 1979

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKIDAVID AARON

MARSHALL BREMENT~Response to the Soviets RegardingAfghanistan: A Menu of Possible Actions

To emphasize the outrageous and unprecedented nature of the .Soviet coup in Afghanistan would be to belabor the obvious. Anyfailure to respond adequately on our part would be perceivedas glaring weakness by our Allies,by the non-aligned, and especially in the Persian Gulf. Thedomestic near-consensus on Iran could evaporate over Afghanistan.It is therefore imperative that we not only act to counter whatthe Soviets have done in Afghanistan, but that we are perceivedas having done so.

The speciousness and bald-faced arrogance of the Soviet actioncan hardly be exaggerated. There was no need, for example,to announce Amin's immediate execution, which gives the lieto the Soviet assertion that they were invited in by the Amingovernment. Furthermore, the use of the recently-signed Friend­ship Treaty with Afghanistan as the juridical basis for theiractions creates a logical implication that the Soviets couldequally undertake the overthrow of any of the ten governmentswith whom they now have such treaties, e.g. India. Equallyto the point, would Sadat and Siad have thrown out the Sovietsso cavalierly if they had felt that one serious Soviet optionwas to fly in an army and set up their rivals in power?

I. The Public Posture

We have no real option of downplayinq the significance of theSoviet action. We need a clear, sharp and unequivocal response,which should be given full play by all our communications media.The themes we should stress are as follows:

a. The fact that Amin was assassinated within two days ofthe Soviet invasion makes a mockery of Moscow's claims thatit was invited in by the Amin Government. That Amin' s familywas killed along with him shows the kind of people we are deal­ing with. .......

I ~ I q • ~\ \ •

Deciassified'Released on .,1.1 ~ I,~under prOVISIons 01 E.O. 12958

by R. Soubers. National SecUrity Council

fH-b1 b

-2- •b. The fact that the Soviets cite their Friendship Treatywith Afghanistan as the basis for interference in the Afghans'internal affairs implies that the Soviets have a similar rightin all other countries with whom they have friendship treaties.

c. This is the first use by the Soviets of their armedforces in a combat situation outside the Soviet Bloc since theSecond World War and is therefore an extremely ominousprecedent. Do the Soviets claim such universal rights in allother areas? How can this be squared with the UN Charter?

d. Afghanistan had been the classic buffer state for thepast 150 years. The Soviets had no legitimate national interestin taking such actions. The fact of the matter was that the AminGovernment was, by any reasonable standard, pro-Soviet, as wasthe Taraki Government which preceded it. Furthermore, the AfghanGovernment which existed before the April 1978 coup was notanti-Soviet in nature and maintained cordial state-to-staterelations with Moscow. All the military needs of that regime,for example, were supplied by the Soviets.

e. Does the Brezhnev doctrine apply to the entire Third World?What are the limits to the Brezhnev doctrine? As Soviet forceprojection capabilities increase over the cominq decades, they willhave the capability to mount such an action anywhere in the world. •Is this a tolerable situation for the international community?

f. We are extremely concerned at the human toll which theSoviet-supported combat is taking. There are 350,000 refugeesnow in Pakistan, and we would not be surprised to see that numberrise to half a million in the near future. Thus, as in Cambodiaand in so many other countries since World War II, the Soviets arecreating another enormous refugee problem, this time in South Asiaand among an overwhelmingly Muslim population. The United Statesis prepared to do its utmost to assist the Afghan refugees withhumanitarian aid.

g. The Soviet Union is atheistic by doctrine and has publishedenormous amounts of anti-religious and anti-Muslim literature. TheUS, on the other hand, firmly believes in religious freedom andenshrines it in our Constitution. Three million Muslims practicetheir religion freely in the US. In the USSR, Muslims havebeen persecuted, mosques have been closed, and religion has beendiscouraged. In Soviet Azerbaijan, for example, there are only24 officially recognized mosques now operating, whereas beforethe Revolution of 1917 there were several thousand in operation.

h. In sum, replacement of one government by another throughthe use of armed force, as done by the Soviets in Afghanistan, isan egregious violation of normal international standards of behavior,sets a very dangerous precedent, and is regarded by the US asreckless adventurism. We calIon all nations, and particularly •nations with significant Muslim populations, to appeal to theSoviet Onion to allow the Afghan people to settle its own problemsin line with the principle of no interference in the internal affairsof other nations.

~UnlJlAuul\ -iL.ij

• -3-

II. Other Possible Actions

1. Dispatch a high-level mission to give the Pakistanisthe kind of assurance they need to bolster their confidence andto assist us in our support of the Afghan insurgents.

2. Dispatch a mission to investigate conditions in therefugee camps in Pakistan, which would presumably result inadditional US and international assistance to support the refugees.

3. Explore with all pertinent governments the stepping upof covert assistance to the insurgents and in the process commitourselves to maximizing such assistance.

4. Form a special committee in NATO to examine threats tothe peace outside the Treaty area.

5. Liberalize our arms sale policy to the sub-Continent.

III. Other Possible Actions in the OS-Soviet Context

The above actions might be enough domestically and in world opinionif the Soviets are basically unsuccessful in tamping down the in­surgency and thus become mired in a Vietnam-type situation. Butif they are successful, these actions will not be sufficient andwe will look weak and ineffectual. In any case, the Soviet actionin Afghanistan almost demands that we take specific bilateral stepsto indicate our abhorrence. Among those steps which the Presidentmight consider (and it is too early to make definite decisionson this score) are the following:

1. Withdrawal of SALT. If, after consultation with Byrd andothers, it is determined ,that SALT no longer has a chance of earlypassage, the Administration could consider withdrawing it uni­laterally, while waiting for a better climate, although stillcommitted to the fact that the Treaty is in our basic interestand still favoring ratification by the Senate.

2. Grain Sales. The Administration could suspend the US­Soviet Grain Agreement or simply suspend all sales of grain to theUSSR for ~e indeterminate future. This would require Congressionalauthorization to purchase and store the excess grain.

3. TeChnOl~ Transfer and Licensing. We could announce amuch tougher pol~ regarding technology transfer to the USSRand a closer look at licenses for petroleum-related exports.

4. MFN. We could announce that we do not intend to intro­duce legislation giving MFN to the Soviet Onion during the currentsession of Congress •

lWl1.J~l~~ _~ -4- •s. Postponement of US-Soviet Trade Council. We could announcethe postponement of the next session of the US-Soviet TradeCouncil, scheduled to meet in Washington April 16.

6. Tighten Up COCOM Procedures. We could announce that weare undertaking with our Allies a review of current COCOMprocedures with a view to tightening them.

7. E~ulsion of a Lar3e Group of Soviet Agents. We couldidentify an arrest 50 to 1 0 Soviet KGB agents in the US, makingclear to the Soviets that any retaliatory action on their part wouldmean further expulsions by us at a rate of two Soviets for oneAmerican, i.e. the current ratio of Soviet Embassy personnel in theUS to Americans in the USSR, leaving out the 550 Soviets at the UN(which makes one-for-one expulsion entirely unsatisfactory and un~

reciprocal to us).

8. Withdrawal of Ambassador. We could (and probably should)recall Watson for consultations. (Dobrynin's absence is obviouslynot entirely medical in nature.)

9. Broaden Securitf Relationships. The US could undertake newsecurity relationships w1th Oman, Somalia, and Turkey, i.e. threeMuslim countries.

10. Broadcasting. The US could announce increased broadcasts •to Western Asia and to the Muslim portions of the USSR.

11. China. In conjunction with the Brown visit, the US couldlet it be known that we have agreed not only to the sale of certainhigh technology items to China, but to the sale of over-the-horizonradar and anti-tank missiles -- clearly defensive weapons -- as well.We could explain that this was done explicitly in light of theSoviet action in Afghanistan. Future arms sale to China, we couldadd, would be on a case-by-case basis.

12. Removal of Inhibitions on Covert Actions. The US could askfor revision of all of the legislative inhiBitions on our abilityto conduct covert actions anywhere in the world.

In sum, Soviet negative reaction to various protests and expostulation:including ours, is completely predictable. These were taken into con­sideration by the Soviets before they made their move. This is anevent of such importance that a strong and vivid US response mustbe made to it, and not just in terms of Soviet action in Afghanistanitself, but in terms of overall US-Soviet relations. The Sovietsmust be made to understand that this was a very expensive in-vasion and that it should not set a precedent for future action.The American people and the Congress should be sympathetic to toughresponses by the President, especially if the Soviet actions inAfghanistan are cast in the proper light, i.e. the Soviets havekicked us while we were down, and we do not intend to stand for it. •­URuLRuuU 'loU

December 28, 1979

•INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR

FROM:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

I

IJ

ZBIGNt:RZEZINSKIDAVID ON

~1ARSHA BREMENT v5

J 7406

SUBJECT: Where Soviet Actions in Afahanistan Violatethe Agreement on Basic Principles ofRelations and the Agreement on the Preventionof Nuclear War

The following specific provisions of the basic principles ofrelations of May 29, 1972, are either violated or called intoquestion by the Soviet actions in Afghanistan:

"The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventingthe development of situations capable of causing a dangerousexacerbation of their relations ••• both sides recognize thatefforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of theOtEer, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with theseobjectives. The prerequisites for maintaining and strengthen­ing peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR are therecognition of the security interests of the parties basedon the princi¥le of equality and the renunciation of the useor threat of orce."

"The USA and the USSR have a special responsiblity to do every­thing in their power so that conflicts or situations will notarise which would serve to increase international tensions.Accordingly, they will seek to promote conditions in which allcountries will live in peace and security and will not besubject to outside interference in their internal affairs •.. "

From the agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War of June 22,1973:

"The parties agree that they will act in such a manner as toprevent the develo ment of situations capable of causing adangerous exacer at10n 0 t e1r relations ... "

"The parties agree ••. to proceed from the premise that eachparty will refrain from the threat or use of force againstthe party, against the allies of the other party, and againstother countries in circumstances which may endanger inter­nat10nal peace and security .•. "

• - - RANDUMfr·

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7410

-ftNFIBEII'fIAL

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

/

//Decem~28' 1979

ZBIGNIEW ~RiEZINSKI

MICHEL O~BERG ~Afghanistan (U)

...-

•I consider the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a majorwatershed event. It has profound implications for Sovietwillingness to use military might to advance their interests.In strategic importance, it outweighs the hostage problemin Iran. (C)

We must make this a costly effort for the Soviets byinsuring that the insurgents have adequate arms and byincreasing our aid to Pakistan. The President's nuclearnon-proliferation and arms restraint policies must takesecond place to a concerted effort to teach Moscow thataggression does not pay. Here are the measures -- someadmittedly extreme -- which I think we should now consider:

Significant increases in arms sales to Pakistan. (C)

Covert arms supply to Afghan insurgents. (C)

Encourage third countries to take the invasion to theU.N. (C)

Toughen export controls to USSR. (C)

Immediately approve sale of telephone switching equipmentto the PRC. (C)

Encourage France to sell military equipment to the PRC. (C)

Quietly encourage dock workers to disrupt the loadingof grain on ships going to Russia. (C)

Copy to:Marshall Brement

CQUPIDEN'I'IALReview onDecember 28, 1985

• ...i-......- __----- - -"---

7405

December 28, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKIDAVID AARON

ROBERT BLACKWILL~The President's"December 28 TelephoneCalls to European Leaders (C)

I wili do a full record tomorrow of the President's callsto Thatcher, Schmidt, Cossiga and Giscard d'Estaing, butI wanted you to have a quick summary now. (C)

T~e President used the talking points at Tab A almost verbatime~cept for #4, the one on SALT. He put that issue in the-" :>llowing way: "We are going ahead with SALT independently

: what happens in Afghanistan, but we are not going to allow;r concern about SALT to interfere with our strong condemnation: Soviet intervention in Afghanistan." . (Schmidt's response:> this line was "I think that is appropriate.") The President

.150 told each of the leaders that he was going to send a very;~rong message to Brezhnev on Afghanistan, and he invited"1rs. Thatcher, but none of the others, to do the same. (C)

AS you know, Thatcher, Schmidt and Cossiga all immediately~greed to a meeting of deputy foreign ministers this weekend..mder NATO auspices, but Giscard said "no." He did not favorthe NATO structure for this meeting because Afghanistan wasnot in the NATO Treaty area. Thus, £t was not proper to usethe NATO instrument in this case. A meeting in London ofthe NATO members, but not under NATO sponsorship, was thecompromise. (C)

Incidentally, Giscard made ~he impo~tant point that we musttake the Soviet intervent~o.. i~ A:ghanistan seriously becauseof its impact on Pakistan, Iran and the Gulf States. Thelatter, said Giscard, would certainly feel threatened ifthere were no Western reaction to the situation in Afghanistan. (Cl

The President urged both ~rs. Thatcher and Giscard not to offersubstantial amendments to our UNSC resolution on Iran. He toldThatcher that we could accommcdate in the resolutior. the Britishconcern about the 10 ships that British oil companies jointlyown with Iran, but not the other British suggested amendments --

.emlFIQENTI.1l,l.Review 12/28/2009Extended bv z. Brzpzin~~i

•,

es~biallY the one concerning extraterritoriality. After'indi­eating that the British concerns were purely technical, Mrs.Thatcher seemed to hint that HMG might eventually agree to o~

formulation. In response to the President's question on thissubject, Giscard said that the only thing about our draft ~eso­

ulation which he could not accept was its prohibition on airlineflights in and out of Iran. That would endanger French and otherforeigners there who might want to'get out in a hurry. ThePresident said that he did not even know this was in Our language.(Gary Sick tells me it isn't.) I briefed .Bill Maynes on this partof the two conversations and he is getting in touch with theBritish and French to try to reach an agreed text. Finally, Cossigatold the President tha t he will be seeing the Soviet Ambassador'tomorrow who has asked to come in. Cossiga will say that theGovernrr,~nt of Italy is gravely worried about the Soviet interventionin Afgtinistan which is contrary to the policies of detente andwhich 'c~ars the risk of creating a far worse situation in theregion ~nd beyond. (Cl

,... ,. .,&ONFIl)iNWbM.

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•1, sum, none of these leaders showed the slightest hesitation ina;reeing with the President's analysis of the strategic importancec: Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. We have yet to see what",hey will be willing to do about it. (el·

. ~

~ . .' ,

Talking points for Discussions on Afghanistanwith Allied Leaders

1. We regard the soviet intervention in Afghanistanas an extremely grave de~elopment.

2. It has profound strategic consequences for thestabili~y of the entire region.

3. We believe that it is essential that we makethis action as politically costly as possible to the SovietUnion anc to that end will be a?proaching a number of govern­ments; particularly the non-aligned and the Muslim countriesto speak out •

.4. We are. not going to be deterred from making anissue of this because of SAL~. The Soviets have clearlyrr4de a decision that this· intervention is more important thanSALT •

5. ~e also are prepared to carry it all the way to'the United Nations; ho\.;ever, because of our own efforts inthe UN with regard to the hostages, we would appreciate itif others could take the initiative there. -

6. We also believe the North Atlantic Council shouldmeet immediately at a high political level to assess the matterand to coordinate allied strategy. (For France: I hope thatFrance can work within the North Atlantic Council and showsolidarity on this issue.)

DECLASSIFIEDO12958 Sec.3.6.0 I ~&)

PER:Jd.~~~NAL¥.JRS~.DATE~BY_~~-

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

THE WHITE HOliSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT It ...ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ~:>

Our Response to Soviet Interventionin Afghanistan (U)

.....,oo...uCocc...c

One of our basic problems with the Soviets, as has been thecase with all our recent predecessors in office, is maintainingour credibility in Moscow. We have frequently protested Sovietactions (bases in Vietnam, Cubans abroad, etc.). Since we havenot always follow~ these verbal protests up with tangibleresponses, the Soviets may be getting into the habit of"dis­regarding our concern. (C)

Warren Christopher will be meeting with our major Allies inLondon on Monday. They will be looking to us for leadership,for specific evidence that we are unwilling to let the Sovietsget away with this invasion with impunity. With this in mind,you may wish to instruct Christopher to inform these governmentsthat we are taking tangible steps in our bilateral relationshipwith Moscow to manifest our displeasure. (S)

Since in your conversations yesterday with European leaders youdrew a parallel between the Soviet intervention in Afghanistanin 1979 and the one in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it may be usefulfor you to know what actions Johnson and Rusk took after theAugust 20, 1968 Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. (You maybe sure the Soviets have the list at hand and will draw compar­ative conclusions about the international environment in whichthey operate. The same- will be true of most countries of theworld, especially those"anywhere near Afghanistan.) Withinthree days of the invasion:

(1) The President made a strong public statement.

(2) Secretary of State made a public statement.

(3) We initiated a Security Council meeting.

(4) We suspended bilateral talks with the Soviets onpeaceful uses of the atom •

(5) Embassy Moscow was instructed to restrict all officialand social contacts with Soviet officials.

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•(6) We sent the same instructions to all US diplomatic

missions worldwide.

(7) Rusk told Dobrynin on August 23 that there would be nomovement on other issues until the situation in Czechoslovakiawas clarified.

(8) The State Department actively discouraged us businessties with the Soviet Union.

(9) We stopped, turned down or delayed requests forexport licenses to the Soviet Union:

(10) We stopped participation in trade fairs in the SovietUnion.

(11) We cancelled pending cultural exchanges with "theSoviets. (C)

As you will recall, the invasion of Czechoslovakia also resultedin the cancellation of the scheduled first round of SALT talksbetween Washington and Moscow. While I would oppose any freezeon our efforts to achieve SALT ratification, I think it would bea mistake to confine our response to this Soviet intervention inAfghanistan to words. In this connection, I enclose a memorandumfrom Marshall Brement of the NSC Staff which lists a menu ofactions we could take to evidence our displeasure with Moscow.I would welcome your guidance on what you feel might be done.I do think something definite in our bilateral relationshipwith Moscow should follow this extraordinary act of Sovietarrogance and brutality and that Warren Christopher shouldinform the Allies on Monday what specific steps we intend totake. In my judgment, such resolve on our part would havesignificant benefits for us, both domestically and inter­nationally. (S)

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UNCUSSIFIED •

••

-ME.MORANDUM

c:eetfP IeeU'f I.ltL

ACTION

FROM:

SUBJECT:

~~ 7405 Add-on

NATIOl'iAL SECURITY COUNCI~01-

~~December 29, 1979

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKIr" ,ROBERT BLACKWILL >/Summaries of President's TelephoneConversations with European Leaders (C)

Disapprove---

.~ •

I attach for your approval memoranda of the President'stelephone conversations yesterday with Thatcher, Schmidt,Cossiga and Giscard d 'Estaing. (C)

/ Approve

CO~FICENmI.AL

Review 12/29/85

•TH E: WH ITE: HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERATION

SUBJECT: Surumary of President's telephone conversationwith Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga ofItaly, December 28, 1979, 12:26 -12:33 p.:n. (C)

The President told t~e Prime Minister that he had calleeCossiga to discuss the Soviet intervention in A~ghanistan.We regarded this as an extremely grave development,equivalent to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Moscowhad changed a buffer state into a puppet state, and this hadprofound strategic consequences for the stability of theentire region. Cossiga agreed, and said the consequenceswould not only be felt in the region. The President saidabsolutelY,that this event would have reverberationsthroughout the Moslem world, the Non-Aligned world, and evenwould affect the North Atlantic nations. The President saidthat we were going ahead with SALT independent of the

-situation in Afghanistan, but ~e would not let our concerns •about SALT prevent us from strongly condemning the Sovietintervention. The President said we were prepared to carrythis issue all the way to the United Nations but, because ofour own efforts in New York concerning the hostages, we werenot the ones to take the initiative now at the UN onAfghanistan. The President said that he would like to sendWarren Christopher, our Deputy Secretary of State, to a NorthAtlantic Council meeting this weekend in order to exchangeviews on the Afghanistan situation. Did the Prime Ministerthink this was advisable? eC)

Cossiga said that he supported the President's proposal andthe two leaders agr~ed that either Vance or Christopher wouldbe in touch with the Italian Foreign Minister to work out thedetails. The President said that Cossiga's position was verygood news for him. We did not want a major confrontation withthe Soviets, but we would not let them do this in Afghanistanwithout some political cost and some expression to the worldabout our concern. (C)

Cossiga then passed the phone to his diplomatic adviser,Berlinguer, who translated Cossiga's response into Englishas follows:

-'=6Ni IDEN'rIALReview 12-29-2009Classified & extended by Z.Brzezinski

Reason for extension:--bU~ iAb •

Cossiga was in complete agreement with all the President hadsaid. He was going to see the Soviet Ambassador next morning,who had asked to come in, most likely on this issue. Cossigawould stress Italy's grave concern about Soviet militaryintervention in Afghanistan, which was contrary to the policiesof detente and which bore the risk of creating a worsesituation in the region and beyond. Cossiga was at thePresident's disposal for any further communication with him asthe President wished, and completely agreed to a NorthAtlant~c Council meeting this weekend. (C;

After ~~e President said that the State Department would bein tou=h in a few hours, he stressed how deeply he appreciatedCossig~ls attitude. The President looked forward to meetingthe Pr_~e Minister personally and we were already planning ourt=ip t~ Italy in the late spring. Stressing that Cossigas:oulc call him directly at any time, the President conveyedr~s bS3t wishes to the Prime Minister, politically andc:nerw:.se. (C)

~ .

-G9NRBEN+W:- •THE WHITE: HOUSE:

COW rpEll'i'IALe:

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJEC':': Summary of the President's Telephone Ccnve=sa~icn

Mrs. Margaret Tha~che=, Prime Minister c:Great Britain, Deca~be= 28, 1979, 1::40 t=11:50 a.m. (C)

After an exchange of holiday greetings, the President toldMrs. Thatcher that he wanted to speak to her about A£g~anistar..

He said that we regarded the Soviet in~ervention in A!ghanistanas an extremely grave develoFment, similar in scope anc ?e~­

anent Dmpact to what the Soviets did in Czechoslovakia. Ineffect, Moscow had changed a buffer naticn into a puppet nationunder Soviet direction. This would have profound stragegic con­sequences for the stability of the entire region. (C)

The President continued that it was essential that we make this •action as politically costly as possible to the Soviet Union. .Although we could not force the Soviets out of Afghanistan,~~ey would have a serious problem with the Nonaligned countriesand particularly with the Moslem countries. This was true notonly of Pakistan, Iran, India and others of a similar naturein the region, but also of the entire Nonaligned Movement.The President said he intended to call on these countries tospeak out against the Soviet intervention. (C)

The President then noted that we were going ahead with SAL~

independently of what happened in Afghanistan, but we wouldnot let our concern about SALT interfere with a strong UScondemnation of the Soviet intervention. The President saidthat he did not ~~ink that we could afford to let the Sovietsget away with this intervention wi~~ impunity. (C)

Noting that we were prepared to carry the Afghanistan issue allthe way to the United Nations in the next number cf days, thePresident said because of our own efforts in the UN concerningthe hostages, it was probably not advisable for us to take theinitiative on Afghanistan in New York. There were others whocould do this -- Britain, China or some of the Nonalignedcountries. (C)

='t:QUFIOmi':FL\LReview 12/28/2009Extended by Z. BrzezinskiReason for Extension: NSC 1.13(a)

SANlTlZED~ d..J.~~·,~2~.5B. Sec..3.6~RE ~-t."-Ci.~BY~NARS OI\"'C~~/4r,.. •

..

• @NFICEW'1'IAL

The President said that the last ?oint he wanted to make wasthat we should dramatize our concern about Afghanistan. Wewould like to have a meeting of the North Atlantic Councilsolely on the Afghanistan problem. The President would senda high-level person to attend the Council this weekend. Itwas critical for the Allies to decide as a body how we shouldaddress the problem in Afghanistan. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher replied that she and Peter Carrington wo~ld beabout ~~is weekend a~d a VS representative would be very welcomein London. The President asked if the Prime ~inis~er agreecthat we should get t~e North Atlantic Council together.Mrs. Thatcher said yes, and observed that when something likethis occurred, it was important to act right at the beginning. (C)

The President agreed and observed that the Soviets had probablygotten away with this intervention for too many hours already.We had raised our concern about this for two or ~~ree weeks,but prL~arily at the Secretary of State level. The Presidentsaid that he was probably going to make a personal public state­ment this afternoon to stress his concern about the Sovietintervention. (C)

. Continuing, the President noted that the Germans were veryconcerned as had been reflected in a conversation bet...,eeI70Cy Vance and Genscher that morning. The FRG was worried aboutthe future ~pact of this event on countries not only likePakistan, but also Romania and Yugoslavia as well as theprecedent it established with relations between the WarsawPact countries and the European Allies. (C)

In response to Mrs. Thatcher's repeated willingness to welcomea us representative over the weekend, the President said hewould probably send Warren Christopher, our top man secondonly to Cy Vance. The President suggested that Cy Vance wouldcall Lord Carrington in the next few hours to discuss thedetails and the Prime Minister replied that she would letCarrington know. Mrs. Thatcher said again that it was impor­tant to act quickly. (Cl

Turninc to Iran, the Presiden~ said that Cv Vance would bedelivering our Iranian message to the Security Co~~cil per­sonally tomorrow or the next day. We were especially concernedabout the extensive amendments that the UK had o:fered on ourSecurity Council Resolution, and the President told Mrs. That~her

he hoped that the UK wculd not be adamant about these suggestedchanges. (C)

CONFT Dpl'" I A:,

J=9lG-lB!:ll'lAL -3- •Mrs. Thatcher responded that the British amendments weretechnical in nature, having tc do with their own legislation.The President replied ~~at we had a long-standing debateabout extraterritorialitv, a debate we certainlv could notresolve in the next few days. The OS could, ho~ever, beresponsive to the u~ concern over jointly-owned Iranianflag ships. But the other British ocints would be vervdifficult for us. (el • •

The President then said that we could accommodate the Britishneed on the ten ships owned jointly by OK oil companies andIran and this could be worked out between Cy and Lord Carrington. (

•Noting that he would be calling Schmidt, Giscard d'Estaing, andcossiga, the President said he wanted to talk to Mrs. Thatcherfirst. She ~~anked h~ and said that they should stay in closetouch. She hoped that the US had the requisite number of votesin the Security Co~~cil to pass the Iranian resolution. ~he

President said he ~~ought so if we gave the Secretary Generala brief period of tL~e to try to work something out pendingL~position of the sanctions. This would be a two-step approachwith the first step taking five or six days. The Presidentnoted that we had just finished a National Security Councilmeeting and this was what he had decided although he would notannounce it publicly. This two-step approach should bringaboard more than enough votes. (Cl

Mrs. Thatcher agreed, and said it would give the Iranians anopport~~ity to react. ~he President observed that they couldsave face in ~~is way i: they wa~ted to. However, it was hisjudgment that Khcmei~i had ~c such desire although he was prob­ably getting pressure fr~m ether ma~ers 0: the RevolutionaryCouncil. (C)

In concluding the conversation, ~~e President said he would besending a strong personal message to Brezhnev and that i:rtrs. Thatcher would consider doing something similar, it wouldbe helpful. (C 1

• THE WHITE: HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMO~~DUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's telephone conversationwith Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the FRG,December 28, 1979, 12:01-12:09 p.m. (Cl

After an exchange of holiday greetings, the President to~d

the Chancellor that he hoped Sc~~idt was look~ng forward toa great year, political and otherwise. Thanking thePresident, Schmidt said that he knew the President was stillgreatly concerned about our people in Tehran. The Presidentnoted that Secretary Vance would be taking our resolut~cn tothe Security Council tomorrow. (Cl

Indicating that the principal purpose of this call was todiscuss Afghanistan, the President said we regarded the Sovietintervention there as an extremely grave development, secondonly to what the Soviets had done in Czechoslovakia. Theyhad changed a buffer state into a puppet or satellite stateunder Soviet control. This would have profound strategi9consequences for the stability of the entire region. (Cl

I The President said we had received a message from Schmidt'speople earlier in the day and Vance and Genscher had alsospoken together. We knew how concerned the FRG was over thismatter. The President said he was going to send a strongpersonal message to Brezhnev, a message in the strongestpossible terms. We thought it was important that the Sovietsnot complete this action in Afghanistan with impunity.Although we could not dislodge them from Afghanistan, wecould encourage the Non-Aligned and Moslem countries to speakout and condemn Soviet action in Afghanistan. (Cl

The President continued that we would not let the Soviet actioninterfere w~th SALT, but, equally, we would net let ourconcerns about SALT dissuade us from strons condemnation ofthe Soviets. Schmidt replied that he thought that approachwas appropriate. (Cl

The President noted that we were prepared to carry this allthe way to the United Nations, but given our own efforts inNew York concerning the hostages, we were not the proper ones

•cc ~lP I f)EMY IAJ:r.Review 12-29-2009Classified & extended by Z.BrzezinskiReason for extension~

OECLi:.SSIFIEDE.G.i 295(3. Sec.3.G!$ ~fh«E ~-~~~:~ ~': NAAS.OA~5i C

~. l~. n

to take the initiative in the UN on Afghanistan. ConcerningIran, we hoped to get a Security Council vote on ourresolution before the end of the year when the compositionof the Council changed. (Cl

The President then said he thought we ought to have a specialmeeting of the North Atlantic Council on Afghanistan. He wasprepared to send Warren Christopher, our Deputy Secretary ofState, to Europe this weekend to discuss common statementsor action we might want to carry out in response to theSoviet intervention. Schmidt replied that he thought this wasquite appropriate. Noting that he had talked to Mrs. That~he=after first trying to reach the Chancellor, the Presidentsaid she agreed completely about the seriousness 0: the Sovietmatter and the need for a North Atlantic Council meeting. (Cl

Schmidt then said he would like to make a formal suggestionregarding the Council. Since Afghanistan was outside theNorth Atlantic Treaty area, it might be necessary to givethe Council meeting a headline that would not lead others toshy away from participation. Given the events in Belgi~~,

Holland and Denmark a few weeks ago, it might be worthwhileto give the session a little different headline. The Presidentasked what sort of headline, and Schmidt stressed that for him,calling a meeting explicitly on Afghanistan was okay; he saidthat other capitals in Europe might prefer something like •"discussion of the global situation." Schmidt then repeatedthat the idea of this meeting was fine with him, and he wouldso inform Genscher. The President said Vance would be callingGenscher in a few hours to work out the details, and he wouldbe getting in touch with Giscard d'Estaing next. ThePresident said that he thought it was necessary to moveexpeditiously on Afghanistan outside the UN since the SecurityCouncil was so involved with Iran. Thus, the idea of a Nort~

Atlantic Council meeting. (Cl

The President closed the conversation by saying how sorry hewas to interrupt Schmidt's vacation on Majorca, and theChancellor stressed that he had welcomed the call. (Cl

• THE: WHITE: HOUSE:

WAS"IN(;':'ON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Teleohone Conversaticnwith V~lery Giscard d'Estaing, President c:France, December 28, 1979, 1:54 to 2:0~ F.ill. (Cl

After a brief exchange of greetings, the President told Giscarc~~at r.~ wanted to talk to him about Afghanistan. We regardedthe Sc·:iet intervention in Afghanistan as an extremely graved~'lelc~ment. The Soviets had changed a buffer state into af:?pe:' state and this had profound strategic consequences fort e e~~ire region. Giscard agreed. (Cl

.e P=:sident continued that we believed it was essential that~ maj:= this action politically costly to the Soviet Union.~ wo~:ld be approaching a number of governments, particularlyhe NC:laligned and the Moslem countries, to speak out. Al-:houg~ ~~e plight of our hostages made it impossible for us:0 ta:·:.= Afghanistan to t..'1e UN now, eventually this would. have:0 be,d-one by the US or someone else. The President said that·e co:-.sidered this Soviet intervention to be a violation of;reements the Soviets have had with us since Nixon concerning

.:ene::-a}. principles of detente. (C)

~he ?resident noted that the Moslem countries, and especially~1ose directly adjacent to Afghanistan, would be deeply concerned.He had just talked with President Zia, who said the Soviet in­ter-,-ention was tragic and destabilizing. Zia believed that thedirect overthrow of the Afghanistan government was orchestratedby ~~e Soviet Union. The President said that there was no doubtabc~t that. Indicating that we had all that we could handlein the Security Council right now with our hostages and Iran,the President stated that Cy Vance would be presenting our casein New York the next day. (Cl

The President said that he felt deeply that we needed to have aconsultation about events in Afghanistan, perhaps as soon asthis weekend before too much time went by. He was thereforeplanning to send Warren Christopher, our Deputy Secret.ary ofState, to Europe to talk to seme of our North Atlantic Councilpartners. (C)

•ESeNrIDSSl'tIA:C-Review 12/28/2009Extended by Z. BrzezinskiReason for Extension: NSC 1.13(a)

~NPIf)E!i'fIAL -2- •Giscard replied that ~~e Soviet i~terver.tion in Afghanistanwas an important development and we must take it seriously.This was because of its impact on the countries in the region,not only Pakistan and Iran, but also the Gulf States. Thelatter would certainly feel threatened if there were no Westernreaction. Giscard said that he knew we must present our caseto the Security Council and that France would support us. Thetwo delegations were discussing details in New York a~d, as weknew, the French had spoken to an African count::-y on tl1eSecurity Council. Giscard thought things were mc~ins in tjeprope::- direction. (C)

Gisca=d had seen the comments on the Soviet intervention madeby the FRG and UK and the French statement was about to beissued. It was important, Giscard continued, to have consul­tations on Afghanistan. However, he did not favor doing thisthrough the NATO structure. Afghanistan was not in the NATOarea. It was there=ore not proper to use this instr~~ent.

On the other hand, Giscard said, if the US sent an en'lOY toconsult in capitals, the French would be willing to have thisconsultation. (C)

In response to the President I s observation that it would be •difficult to call in at all the capitals in a short time,Giscard said that was not his problem. In any event, o~ly

a few NATO countries had an important interest in the issue.The President asked if Giscard would be willing to have aconsultation this weekend in London, Bonn, Paris or Rome.We would send Warren Christopher to the meeting. (C)

Giscard replied "whatever you like." France could matchChristopher wi~~ a French representative. Bonn was not thebest place for such a matter because of its proximity tothe Soviets. Giscard said London was the place and it wasbetter to have an umbrella created by the participation of~~e countries concerned. Any European country could join,but not under NATO auspices. (C)

The President said he had never quite understood France'srelationship to ~ATO. He had talked to Schmidt, Thatcherand Cossiga earlier. ~~ey all believed that we should gettocether, althouah Schmidt had some of the same =oncernsas·Giscard. The·President asked again if Giscard agreed thatthere should be a meeting this weekend at the Warren Christopherlevel and Giscard said all right. (C)

Noting that Vance would follow up with Fran~ois-Poncet, thePresident said ~~at he would have to check with the otherleaders, but he was sure that a meeti~g in London wou:d be OKwith them. Giscard then noted that France would continue to •g{)UPIBE~L

,,~ '"

-3-

support the US concerning Iran and the hostages. In responseto the President's expressed hope that France would not sugges~

substantial amendments to our Security Council Resolution,Giscard said that he would not get into details. However, hedid not think it was a good idea to prevent airlines from flyingto and from Iran. That could be dangerous to our citizens in­side the country who might need to get o~t in a hurry. ~~e

President responded that he did not know that this was ?a~~ c:our resolution, and he understood Giscard's concern. ~~e

President then asked if anything else in our reso:ut:~o~ wcrriecGiscard, and Giscard said the detail he had men:icned was theonly thing. (C)

~~iP IDEN'fIAL

-•'-

SECRET .---; iSUBJE:T. ArsesF~ent ~~ ~nviet Actions 4nJ In~eI~ions

ill Af9hani .. tdn

soviet military intervention in Afghanistan

represents a major watershed in Soviet policy. It

is the first time since World War II that the Soviet

Union' has intervened militarily outside the Warsaw

Pact area to overthrow an existing regime and impose

'.\One cannot exclude from this

The calculated Soviet intervention in Afghanistan

another of its choice • ~. I·...

~~i:! .­~ i:-~~

I " .:~takes on a special dimension because of the implications ~; I ~ 0

::1, j.; slfor the troubled, volatile region of the Middle East. J' l" ~

The Soviet intervention was primarily designed to .H 9shore up what the Soviets perceived as a deteriorating M ~

>. . ~

~ ~ it~~Q --:situation in Afghanistan, Le. an increasingly alienated ~~ r~ ,.r.:J

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leadership challenged by widespread insurgency.

However, the USSR surely undertook this major step

US-Iranian crisis.

regional considerations, including the effects of the

after weighing its consequences in terms of wider

assessment the probability that the Soviets acted

.....

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.~

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in Afghanistan on the assumption that the "correlation

of forces" in the region and elsewhere made the timing

propitious for such a major new stage in Soviet

mil~tary assertiveness.

' ..'\

•SE2RET

.1'"

SECRET

:>irlom, tj:; :md '\.n~el.l.; gerlce repvrtd J..tril.g past

months provided conclusive evidence that the Soviet

Union was striving to broaden the Afghan regime's

base of power and popularity. Although former

President Taraki was not a popular figure, much of

the opposition in Afghanistan appears to have focused

on Arnin himself. Following Taraki's visit to Moscow

in September 1979, our intelligence indicates that

he was given the necessary Soviet backing to seek

Arnin's removal, i.e. demise, after Taraki's return

2 •

to Kabul. This plan backfired and resulted instead

in Taraki's death with Arnin becoming president. Not

unexpectedly, insurgent opposition to Arnin intensified

during the three months of his rule.

The Soviet choice of Babrak Karrnel as the new

leader of Afghanistan may not be consistent with

the earlier Soviet desire to broaden the regime's

support and popularity. This is because Babrak,

a leader of the Parcham (Banner) wing of the Afghan

People's Democratic Party, appears to be even

less acceptable to Afghan opposition elements in light

of his long pro-Soviet stance. If Babrak now proceeds

to purge leading figures of the Khalq (Masses) wing

of the party, the Soviets can hardly expect that the

SFCRET

•SECRET 3

ParchariFt factio,) wi~l a~hie~e mu=h mor~ rroa~ly based

support than did ~ne ~hal~ leQ~ershi~. ~ ~LLt,tive

conclusion from this is that Babrak's loyalty to Moscow

was considered more important than his likely political

acceptability among opposition elements in Afghanistan.

Pre-Soviet intervention assessments of the

likelihood of the Soviets taking this step tended to

stress the inhibitions posed by the reactions that

would be caused in the third world--above all in the

Islamic countries--and in the West, principally as

US-Soviet relations were affected. In light of the

scale and consequences of the Soviet intervention, our

assessment of Soviet motivations and assumptions includes

the following factors:

-- The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan

required firm, decisive actions;

-- The turmoil in Iran, particularly the US-Iranian

crisis over the hostages and the Shah, offered a unique

smokescreen for the intervention with less risk of

weakening the Soviet position elsewhere in the region:

-- The US position in such key regional states

as Pakistan was seen as sufficiently troubled so as to

deny any US attempt to counter the Soviet intervention

effectively:

~FCRFT

SECRET 4 •

.s"

.".

~.

'-

.. - US-£o"\i£t rela-:ion;, ircJuc;ing ,,:h~ prc,sfJects

for SALT II ratification, were assessed as sufficiently

poor to conclude that there was more to be gained

in Afghanistan and the region than to be lost in the

benefits of the existing US-Soviet relationship.

US-Soviet Relations/East-West Detente

The Soviet leadership's decision to intervene

massively in Afghanistan clearly bespeaks, as noted,

a judgment that the uS-Soviet and East-We,st consequences

would be acceptable in terms of the probable areas of

forfeit in these relationships. If one assumes that

the Soviets calculated that their intervention would

further undermine the prospects for SALT II ratification,

this need not mean that the USSR has abandoned its

interest in arms control. The Soviet leadership may

well believe that the gains in Afghanistan will be

consolidated in due course and, after this intervening

period, the SALT process can be resumed on its own

merits. Correspondingly, there would not appear to be

any basis for concluding that the USSR will forego

TNF negotiations (other things being equal), withdraw

from MBFR, etc. On the contrary, the Soviets have long

maintained a clear distinction between their foreign

policy and military ventures and most of the arms

SLCRE~

• cont.rvl d.cea.3.

S~CRE7' 5

.~

.~

-...............

As for the future of detente, the boviet action can

only be taken as representing a qualitatively new,

dangerous stage of Soviet assertiveness. In the past,

the Soviet leadership has moved cautiously and deliberately

in undertaking moves of such consequence. It is clear

that the West should now reassess Soviet policy in terms

of how likely it is that the 1980's will see greater

Soviet willingness to achieve its foreign policy aims

through the overt intervention of its military forces,

particularly in the Third World. In this regard, it

is extremely probable that the USSR will weigh the

success of its intervention in Afghanistan against the

ultimate consequences and, if the balance sheet is

favorable, the Soviets may well conclude that the

discrete use of their military power is a tool which

should be more frequently employed.

The most dangerous consequences of the Soviet

intervention in Afghanistan would derive from a

Soviet decision to broaden and extend the "Brezhnev

doctrine" to those non~aligned countries where, as

in Afghanistan, the opportunity arises to deal with

an initially pro-Soviet, anti-US regime with which

SECRET

SECRET 6 •

.~

~.

the t1bSl< then .no.res ...0 conc.lude a t.:eat:- cf frie~dship and

cooperation, assists militarily, etc. There now arises

the legitimate concern that the USSR would be as willing

in another country to "safeguard" the revolution by

again intervening to crush opposition forces which began

to threaten the regime and its pro-Soviet stance.

Recent years have seen the expansion of the number

of friendship and cooperation treaties which the Soviet

Union is concluding with Third World countries in key

world regions. The fact that the Soviets invoked the

relevant provisions of the treaty with Afghanistan is

an ominous development and only time will tell whether

this instrument will become the license for selected

Soviet interventions in countries where the~~ position

is subsequently weakened. This use of such treaties

is much more significant than the accompanying Soviet

reliance on Article 51 of the UN Charter in "justifying"

•'.~

its actions in Afghanistan. (A separate INR paper will

'-analyze the Soviet invocation of Article 51 over the years.)

Finally, in this regard, the West must seriously consider

whether a more assertive and interventionist Soviet Union

will, in effect, begin pursuing a dangerous course which

is based on the belief that "what's once mine remains

mine."

EURlsav'G7Matth~ws:12/~91Iq

SECRET •

7426•...

P4EMORANDUM._ sECRE'f

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

NATIONAL SECURITY COU CIL

ZBIGNIEW ~ZE~SKI.,­....-STEPHEN LARRABEE 1t-

SUBJECT: Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan (U)

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is an event of majorpolitical and strategic significance.

-- It is the first time since WW II that the Sovietshave used their own combat troops outside Eastern Europeto establish a puppet regime.

-- To defeat the guerrillas, or at least to neutralizethem, will probably require significantly more troops thanthe Soviets presently have in Afghanistan.

-- If the Soviets are successful, Pakistani securityand the balance of power in Northeast Asia will be seriouslyaffected.

-- The invocation of the Treaty of Friendship as justi­fication for Soviet actions sets an ominous precedent andsuggests that the Soviets may extend the application of theBrezhnev doctrine to any country with whom they have a Treatyof Friendship. (S)

The Soviet intervention requires a firm, measured and forcefulresponse on the part of the Administration, particularly thePresident. The President must take the initiative and showleadership in coordinating a response with our allies and thenon-aligned. If he does, he can help himself considerably,both domestically and internationally. If he doesn't, theu.S. will be perceived as sitting idly by as the Soviets marchedinto a neighboring country, just as Hitler marched into Austriain 1938. Our prestige -- and that of the President -- willerode further, particularly in the eyes of those countries mostdirectly affected by Soviet actions, who will draw the conclusionthat they have no choice but to accommodate themselves to Sovietpower. (S)

-&EeUIReview 12/29/85

... -e-2-

The Soviet action is so blatant a violation of international lawthat we should be able to count on tactical allies in many differ­rent quarters, particularly among the Moslem countries. Weshould exploit this tactical advantage to the hilt.

Recommended actions:

Soviets

Consider withdrawal of SALT. Soviet action in Afghanistanhas probably doomed whatever small chance SALT had of being ratifiedin 1980. If this analysis is correct (and the President shouldconsult Byrd and others to be sure it is) then the President wouldbe better off seizing the initiative and withdrawing SALT, statingthat while he still believes SALT is in the national interest,Soviet actions have made a rational debate impossible (which istrue). (He could point to Johnson's decision to delay initiationof the SALT talks after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as anexample of a precedent.) This would make clear to the Soviets thatthere are costs, would undercut domestic criticism from the right,and gain the President some points for steady, cool leadership. (S)

-- Simultaneously make clear that MFN for the Soviet Union inthe near future is out of the question.

-- Cancel upcoming (late January) USDA joint commission meetingin Moscow.

-- Publically make clear that Soviet actions in Afghanistanwill inevitably have an effect on bilateral relations. The Sovietscannot have detente and military intervention in foreign lands atthe same time. (S)

Regional

-- increase cooperation and coordination of policy withPakistan

increase arms sales to Pakistan

review arms sales policy to Northeast Asia as a whole

consider supplying arms to the insurgents. (This makescooperation with Pakistan and review of arms transfer policy allthe more necessary and urgent.)

-- expose Soviet subversion activities in Baluchistan. Thiswould have negative impact on Soviet relations with Iran as wellas Pakistan. (S)

Non-Regional

-- encourage Chinese to aid rebels and consider sale of somedefensive arms -- anti-tank weapons for instance -- to China.

•. '....

-SECRET

-e-3-

-- encourage NAM to condemn invasion; stress that Soviet actionsstrike at the heart of the non-aligned movement. Yugoslaviacan be helpful here.

-- work through UN to get public condemnation of Sovietaction and withdrawal of Soviet troops. While we may not besuccessful on the latter point, pressure will serve to embarrassthe Soviets. (S)

Moslem World

-- Step up broadcasting to Moslem world, including SovietCentral Asia. The foundations for this have been set by thedecisions taken at December 11 SCC on broadcasting. However,we must keep up the pressure to ensure that the SCC's decisionsare implemented, especially by OMB, which is reluctant to appro­priate the necessary funds.

-- Publicize Soviet intervention, stressing anti-Islamicelement, particularly among countries of Middle East. We shouldportray regime as a Soviet puppet and Soviet action as anti-Afghanand anti-Moselm. Aim should be to isolate Soviets within Moslemworld.

Continue to stress our own common interests with Islamicworld, contrasting our approach to internal change with Sovietapproach.

Consult the Saudis with aim of getting them to bankrollarms to Pakistan and insurgents.

Strengthen our military presence in the Middle East. Wemust do this in a gradual, measured way, however, closely coordin­ating our efforts with the countries in the area as well as ourWest European allies and Congress. (S)

Allies

Initiate consultations with our NATO allies, not only onAfghanistan, but on the problem of non-European threats to theAlliance. The latter is one of the major problems that we arelikely to confront in the coming years, but the European allieshave yet to face up to it. A permanent working group on thesUbject should be established within NATO. We should also encourageleading foreign policy organizations here and abroad to holdconferences on the subject in order to raise elite and mass con­sciousness on the subject. (S)

-SECRET _

-e MEMORANDUM

-eOUF!OtNTIAL

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

CitRO~ t:/t..c

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ZBIGNIEW B~Z

i ,,/STEPHEN~.

Soviet Policy in Afghanistan (U)

7436

"".. .'

-€eNrIOE.<l! !1tl..Review 12/31/85

e

e-

There is an increasing tendency in the news media and aroundtown generally to make an analogy between Afghanistan andVietna~. In my view, this is simplistic and dangerous.While the situations do share some similar characteristics -­the danger of a protracted involvement, for instance -- thereare important differences:

-- logistics and transport: The US had to transportt=oops and materiel over 5000 miles; the Soviets can movet~oops and materiel quickly over short distances and across':pen borders.

-- organization: The North Vietnamese had been fighting~~e war for 25 years before the US became heavily involved.7~ey had a well organized, well disciplines army and underground;~e Afghan tribes have a history of insurgency, but they are notwell organized and many of their actions are uncoordinated --or at least have been until now.

-- leadership: The North Vietnamese were led by a leaderwtlO was generally regarded as a national hero, even in the South;at present no such national leader has emerged in Afghanistanwho can rally the disparate tribes and provide cohesive, inspir­ational leadership.

-- weapons and supplies: The North Vietnamese could counton outside aid and weapons in large quantities; this is not (yet)the case in Afghanistan.

-- political constraints: US was constrained by (1) dis­unity over its goals; (2) its unwillingness to commit the forcesneeded to "win" the war militarily; (3) a desire to accommodateits South Vietnamese ally. The Soviet Union is under no such"constraints. Having overthrown Amin and installed their own

DECLASSIFIED

~2~~; ~NAAS"OATE~

. .CONFIDENTP,L- -2- •puppet, who is completely beholden to them, the Soviets arelikely to commit the resources needed to neutralize, if notdefeat the insurgents, rapidly and in large number.

-- role of the media: Vietnam was a "media event" and thishad a major impact on US domestic and international opinion,turning much of it against the war and US ~~volvement. This willnot be the case in Afghanistan. The Soviets will restrict accessto the war by the press, and there will be few film clips of Sovietsoldiers setting fire to Afghan huts or mopping up Moslem villagesbeing flashed across TV screens into Soviet living rooms -- or :orthat matter across TV screens anywhere. This will minimize Sovietdomestic and international criticism, after the initial furordies down. (C)

Nonetheless, the Soviets will not have an easy time in Afghanistan.While Moscow will probably attempt to broaden the support for thenew government, Karmal is not likely to prove to be any more popularthan Amin was: indeed in the eyes of many Afghans he may be regardedas worse, since he is clearly a creature of the Soviets. Moreover,the Soviets

-- will face a hostile climate and terrain, which will makewiping out the insurgents difficult:

-- have difficulty transporting supplies once inside thecountry: this too will hamper their efforts:

lack experience in guerrilla warfare:

will probably need to "Sovietize" the war because theregular Afghan army is in no shape to defeat the guerrillas. (C)

The basic point is that, while the Soviets confront significantproblems in Afghanistan and the prospect of deepening involvement,they are not likely to face many of the constraints that the USfaced in Vietnam. They can be expected to move rapidly and in forceto carry out their goals, with little of the vacillation character­ized by US efforts in Southeast Asia. This will be a criticaladvantage. Whether it will be enough remains to be seen and willdepend to a large extent on

-- the ability of ~~e Afghan insurgents to coordinate theiractivities;

-- our ability to work effectively with Pakistan and othercountries to aid the insurgents;

-- our ability to keep up public awareness of Sovietactions and to mobilize pressure against them within the Nonalignedand Moslem world. (C)

~e!f! lDE.:<l'llA"h-cc: Brement: Thornton; Odorn, Ermarthi Griffith: Henze

• DEPARTMENT OF STATE

W.... 'neton. 0 C 2OS20

December 31, 1979

7923825

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKITHE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: U.S. Soviet Relations andAfghanistan

In accordance with the NSC request, I attachthe Department's papers on U.S. Soviet relationsand Afghanistan for Wednesday's NSC meeting •

1.' /~ V,--' () re to..-..r'~

Peter Tarnoff~Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Afghanistan: Steps in the Frameworkof U.S. Soviet Relations.

Tab 2 - Possible U.S. Actions.Tab 3 - Possible Soviet Reactions.

SECRETGDS, 12/31/85

I" -. "I"'l;_.- ".

FeiflJi: Ik-· N~ -qf"" -71.D" .: ~,~

.. -Afghanistan: Steps in the Framework of OS-Soviet Relations

There are three kinds of impact we hope to achievevis-a-vis the Soviets in our responses to the Soviet movesin Afghanistan. The first is punitive: we want them to paya price for infringing fundamental principles of internationalbehavior. The second is coercive: we want them to withdrawtheir troops and allow Afghanistan to return to a semblance M ~

of sovereignty and neutrality. The third is deterrent: we #'~:want to prevent the Soviets from crossing further thresholds,such as hot pursuit of rebels across international frontiersor escalation of the fighting with the rebels to a massive ' ..scale. -: ~

We are also interested in the impact of our responses :~~on other international actors, including European Allies, ~ ..nervous Eastern Europeans, nonaligned Third World countries, :::~ .-and Islamic governments. Thus, even actions that may make I:: I~ ":little impression on the Soviets can be of value for other H' •audiences: some US actions could cause concern to our Allies. ~ \

Many of the steps we might take cut across other high­priority national objectives, including maintaining thestrategic nuclear balance. We have already faced this kind ofdilemma in considering whether to give priority in theSecurity Council to achieving our objectives in the Iranhostage situation or to mobilizing international action onAfghanistan. There may also be opportunities as well asproblems for us in this crisis to the extent we are ableto gain new collaborators or settle old problems, as in ourefforts to gain base access on the Indian Ocean periphery.

To achieve these objectives, there are political, economicand military actions we can take in each of two broad categories-- bilateral and multilateral. Soviet reactions may also take theform of countermoves across a broad spectrum. In choosingone course of action over another, the irrevocability of anaction will be one important factor to consider. To citeonly one example, failure to implement the SALT fractionationlimits can lead to testing of a high number of RV's on a singlemissile, permanently precluding verifiable lower warhead l~its

and severely affecting MX vulnerability.

With regard to the possible impact on the Soviets of varioussteps, Moscow will not be much swayed by deterioration in theclimate of US-Soviet relations. This deterioration aLmostcertainly was anticipated, and has therefore been discountedin advance. Certain steps affecting OS-Soviet relations mayhave the desired effect on other countries, but the mosteffective steps in getting our po~n~ across to Moscow are likely~n ~n ~~ L~_L -~----~,

• . f

CONTENTS

PAGE-

1­2.

U.S. Unilater~l Actions

3.4.S.

~l:-: L. ·--/~6.~. ~.

~" ....-t ..... r-

.'t. ~ 7.

~·1.d~8.9.

~o.11.

!.fl2.13.

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

33455

666

1

11

8

91011

11

.1./ c.

/ r g •h.

././d.

Withdraw SALT II from Senate ConsiderationAnnounce Feview of other Bilateral ArmsControl NegotiationsPresidential Statement on OS-Soviet RelationsRec~ll Ambassador WatsonRestrict Social and Official Contacts withSoviet OfficialsForce Reduction in Soviet Diplomatic Staffin USSuspend Preperations for Opening of ConsulatesGeneral in Kiev and New YorkExpel Soviet Intelligence AgentsRaise Level of Human Rights CriticismStep Up RL/RFE, VOA BroadcastsPublicize Soviet Role in AfghanistanDel~y Recognition of Karmal Regime: Suspend/Break Relations to l..a.-y4

Other Bilateral Political Measures.'/ a. Cancel Consular Review Talks

b. Reimpose Travel Ban on Soviet NYAdvance PartyRefuse/Delay Visas for Official SovietVisitorsReduce Soviet Media Representation in US

v ......'e. ~Exchange Agreement Negotiations/~el or Reduce US ParticipationCancel/Reduce US Participation inSelected ExchangesOlymp ies ~ .. -.-<...--- .,......:;. ,~.~j. . - .........

Harassment

./ ./f.

Political

Military

A.

B.

I.

.. ­.. -

1..; 2.

US Military AlertIncrease US Permanent Military Presence inIndian Ocean and Persian Gulf

11

11

•.,

._- ~i

17

PAGE-n

121213131414

US 1515

17

17

-2- /

/Economic

3.

",' / 2.

C.

Abandon Effort~ to Secure Soviet MFNGr a in Sales .../Postpone Joint Commercial MeetingPostpone Business Facilitation TalksPostpone Civil Aviation TalksTighten US Export ControlsLimit Soviet Commercial Expansion inS;,.sp~nd Soviet Fish ing in OS Zones".~ ~--...-.- ""

OS Multilateral Actions

A. Publ ici ty

~I/·l. Orge OR, FRG, and France to increasebroadcasts to Muslim countries andSoviet Central Asia. 179ai1y circular to ON and other~ on sta~s~of the occupation. I"-L. .....l ._J ... • ''1 ~'" 17Continue world wide demarches, urgingothers to take actions complementing ourunilateral initiatives.

II.

.1'- Arms Control-. -

1. CSCE/CDE/CBM's~. MBFR3. CTB4. CW

17

1717

18

18 j18

.' ,-~....18 .... -

.1' oJ ~

18

18

18 .'191919

Seek Security Council ResolutionSpecial ONGA

·/1/4.

B. ON

J /I../';2.

.; I C. Economi c Act ions

~v/l. Consultations with others to reinforceu.S. unilateral moves.

vI/2. Tighten COCOM restraints on USSR/loosenJ on China.

~ ~ 3. Increased economic assistance to countriesin region (FY 80 supplemental and FY 81incremental)Urqe IFI's and countries with assistanceprograms to ~fghanistan to terminate suchassistance.

• '..-

-3-

E. Afghanistan 19

Withdraw Embassy and urge others to followsuit. 19Supply insurgents. 19

"F. Regional Security

1. Accelerate process of increa3ing USpresence and acauisition of base rights.

2. Increase US arms supplies to Sovietperiphery.

~G. Other Concerned Countries

1. Yugoslavia2. ~omania

3. Turkey

China

1. Increased political ties2. Incre8sed military ties

20

---1 v..--20 . -20}

" ..il

~20

202020

20

2020

_...5',-

•'. ­-. -

I. 0.5. Cnilateral Actions

A. Political

1. Announce Administration decision to withdrawSALT II from Senate consideration in light of atmospherecreated by soviet action in Afohanistan.

2. Announce that Administration will review utilitvof pursuins other bilateral arms control negotiations'(ASAT, Indian Ocean, CAT, CW, etc.) in wake of Sovietaction and its impact on SALT ratification prospects.

3. Presidential statement on U.S.-Soviet relations

PROS

would provide opportunity for highestlevel condemnation of Soviet actions in Afghanistanand implications of Soviet invasion for regionalstability and future course of OS-Soviet relations.

-- Would focus world public and media attentionon situation in Afghanistan.

CONS

President has already condemned Sovietrole in Afghanistan. Future statement wouldhave to go SUbstantively farther in condemningSoviet activities.

-- Press and public interest in Afghanistanis already high.

4. Recall Ambassador Watson

PRO

-- Would be clear and highly visible demon­stration of depth of U.S. concern.

CON

-- Might limit u.s. access to highest levelsof Soviet government in subsequent exchanges.

5. Restrict social contacts with Soviets, andhave our officials worldwide keep Official contacts withSoviet coupterparts to the minimum.

I

,.

-2-

PRO

-- Would underline seriousness of U.S.displeasure.

CON

-- Would to some degree comolicate day today bilateral business (visas, commercial activities,etc. ) •

6.' Reduce number of permanently assigned officialSoviet personnel in the United States to equal that of suchAmerican personnel in USSR.

PRO

-- Dramatic impact, both on Soviets themselvesand on rest of world not to mention its (likelyfavorable) impact on US public •

-- Unmistakable sign of our displeasureover Afghanistan and of our willingness to putteeth in threat of serious consequences for therelationship.

-- Would provide opportunity to reducenumber of intelligence service personnel inUS.

-- Would provide us with something quick andvisible to do after relations return to more evenkeel, i.e., graduated approval for return ofSoviet diplomatic oersonnel to the United States.

CON

-- It would be an unprecedented move on ourpart. We did not take similar action over Hungary(1956) or Czechoslovakia (1968).

It would inflame the crisis bilaterally.

It would marginally disrupt severalongoing bilateral agreements/projects, especiallyin exchanges and commercial area .

-3-

-- Peciprocal implications: despite clearimbalance in numbers, Soviets would not hesitateto kick out some of our diplomats in USSR byretaliating on principle. They could be countedon to hit key, hard-to-replace Embassy personnelfirst.

7. Stop all work on ooening of new consulates generalin Kiev and in Naw York.

PRO

-- Soviets would view this as a negative andtangible consequence of their actions. (They areready to go in New York: whereas renovation of ourConsulate General Building in Kiev is not expectedto be completed until late 1980. Thus, in shortterm Soviets would lose more financially andadministratively than we would.)

CON

-- We have a clear interest in establishinglistening posts in USSR outside of Moscow andLeningrad. This action would harm that interest.

-- Closing down Soviet CG-in-formation inNew York would do little to hurt Soviet operationsin New York, given large number of Soviet commercialand UN-related personnel there. (On other hand,Soviets say they badly need visa-issuing capabilityin New York to handle 1980 Olympics flow of visitors.)

8. Exoel Soviet intelligence agents from US

PRO

-- A swift expulsion of Soviet intelligenceoperatives would galvanize awareness of the damageof Soviet Afghan operation on their bilateralrelations with US.

-- In the short term, such a mass expulsionwould deprive the Soviets of the greater part oftheir US domestic intelligence capability.

-- In the long term, such a mass expulsionwould enabie us better to regulate the influx ofsuch agents.

-4-

-- Any retaliation against our people can bemet with reciprocal response on the basis of twofor one. The damage to their intelligence operationwould therefore be greater than to our own.

CON

-- Soviets might read into expulsion morethan we intend. At the extreme, expulsion ofintelligence operatives could look like a prepara­tion for war, but less so than expulsion ofdiplomatic personnel in general as proposed initem 6.

Soviets would retaliate against our people.

The expulsion and retaliation couldindirectly support charges made by captors of ourhostages in Tehran that Embassies are -nests ofspies.-

9. Consider Raising Level of our Human ~iahts

Criticism of the soviet Union.

PROWould fan an old irritant.

It would place Soviets on defensive ininternational dialogue.

-- It could really inject some long-termwedges in Soviet internal politics.

CON

-- Such an action would contradict thejustification for our human rights policy that itis world-wide and not directed against any country.

-- It should thus lend substance to Sovietcharges that Soviet dissidents are in treasonousleague with the West and would expose those whoremain at liberty, including Sakharov, to greaterdanger •

•-5-

-- Such a policy might be construed as apolicy of ·words· to which we take refuge when welack any credible policy of ·deeds·.

-- Soviets would dismiss campaign as meddlingin their internal affairs.

10. Step UP Radio Liberty/Free Europe and/or VOABroadcasts.

PRO

-- Special programming would be devised toinform the Soviet public of the political andeconomic risks to which it is being subjected byits government. Our programs would review thehistory of how small nationalities, especially inCentral Asia, have previously been overrun bytsarist and Soviet imperialism and other programsmight attempt to clarify for the entire Moslem •world the contrasting roles played by the U.S. andthe U.S.S.R.

CON

-- To an Islamic audience, many of whomhave sympathized with recent attacks on ourEmbassies, our hands would not appear clean.

-- We might spark troubles within the U.S.S.R.(say, in Lithuania) which we would not want andabout which we could do nothing.

11. Worldwide Demarches and rCA activities toPublicize Soviet Role

PRO

-- Would focus world official and publicattention on Soviet role in Afghanistan. Dissim­ination of information on extent of Soviet involve­ment and implications of their invocation ofFriendship Treaty to cover invasion would haveparticular impact in Muslim and Third Worldcountries.

• -6-

CON

-- Interest in Soviet invasion is alreadyhigh and their role already being condemned by allbut most loyal clients. U.S. effort to furtherpublicize might be interpreted as attempt tocapitalize on situation.

12.or Break

PRO

of New Af ime: Sus end

-- Would underscore our view of illegitimacyof current regime, and allow more flexibility forother initiatives in international fora.

CON

-- Would leave field to Soviets, eliminatingwhat little ability we have to monitor Afghandevelopments and to insure maximum awareness ofthe extent of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

-- Precipitate withdrawal of U.S. personnelmight place them in physical jeopardy, althoughSoviets would probably wish to guard against sucha development.

13. Other Bilateral Moves

a. Consular Review Talks -- Cancel

PRO

-- Would hit the Soviets in one strokeon several consular issues where they hope to seemovement after four years of discussion.

-- Ball is and has been in Soviet court fornearly four months. To cancel talks now wouldthus be a symbolic gesture with low cost tous.

CON

-- Since the talks thus far have involved carefulhorsetrading, we would lose negotiated gains, too •

-7-

b. Rescind temporary lifting of recreation travelban for Soviet Consulate General Advance Party staffin New York.

PRO

-- It would be a sharp disappointment forSoviet personnel involved, since lifting began onDecember 28 and will run only through January 10.

CON

-- Small potatoes. Would probably retardrather than help speed up renovation work on ournew Consulate General in Kiev.

c. Refuse or Delay Issuance of Visas toSelected Soviet Offlcials Seeking to Come tothe U.S.

PRO

-- Would signal toughened U.S. postureon Soviet official representation here.

-- Probable Soviet retaliations wouldseriously hamper our operations in the USSR.

-- Sets a bad precedent for 0.5. visapolicy, particularly with respect to UN anddiplomatic personnel.

d. Consider Reducing Soviet Media Representationin the U.S. to 26 from 35 to Achieve Parity withU.S. Media Recresentation in U.S.S.R.

PRO

Soviets could not retaliate without riskingfurther reduction of their press corps.

TASS San Francisco (t, - correspondentslcould be removed easily since ~nere is no counter­part for it in U.S.S.R.

•-8-

-- Argument that move against New York­based newsmen infringes UN Headquarters Agreementcould be met by revoking accreditation for newscoverage outside the ON.

e. Further defer exchange agreement negotiationsand cancel or reduce as Darticipation in existingexchange agreements. Actions possible bv February29 are:

~I

Delay of resumption of negoti'ations with theSoviets on the General Exchange Agreement, whichexpires 31 December 1979. Negotiations weresuspended in early December and our position hasbeen to wait for a Soviet request to resumetalk s.

---.

-- Cancel or ~f~hiPment by C-S aircraft of MHO(Magnetohydro ynamic) channel.

PRO

-- Taking any such action would signifyour displeasure with the Soviets in unmistakableterms.

Shipment of MHO channel via c-s is amajor undertaking that would suggest close tech­nical cooperation at a time when such cooperationseems unarranted.

-- Cancellation of delivery, especiallyafter making formal request for clearance of C-5landing and signalling thereby our technicalreadiness, would impress Soviets with seriousnessof our concern.

CON

-- Such actions would severely damage thebasic structure of the exchanges and precludeattainment of our objective of opening up Sovietsociety to American scholars and observers atleast in the near future.

-- Most of the academic exchanges are nego­tiated well in advance and on a strictly reciprocal

-9-

basis. Thus any action here would either need sixto nine months to be effective or expose Americansin the USS~ to immediate retaliation in the formo~ expulsion.

-- We have already decided to wait untilSoviets request resumption of talks on exchangesagreement. Any further statement on this issuemight lead to damage to fundamental structure ofthe exchanges and loss of those benefits wepresently derive.

-- Deferment now, would mean postponement ofMHO project for an entire year. This wouldinvolve a major professional setback for team ofAmerican scientists working on project.

-- The MaD channel has been built exclusivelyfor testing in Soviet facility at a cost of$10,000,000. It cannot be used elsewhere.

-- MHD technology involves generation ofelectrical energy by means of coal combustion.This coal-based source of energy has strongsupport in the Congress.

f. Cancel or ~educe Level of US Participationin Selected Exchanaes, such as:

Agriculture Joint Committee Meeting, scheduledfor January in the USS~ at the Assistant SecretaryLevel.

-- Housing Joint Committee meeting, scheduled forFebruary in Moscow--SecretaryLandrileu plans tolead USA delegation.

-- Health Joint Committee meeting, scheduled formid-February in Washington.

-- Codel Green, scheduled for January 11-18, Moscow andLeningrad.

PRO

-- These are all visits or meetings involvinghigh level participation, and any change in

•-10-

composition or cancellation would be a noticeablesign of our displeasure with the Soviets.

-- In most cases, the basic structure of theexchanges and bilateral cooperation would be leftundamaged and current levels of participationunchanged.

CON

-- Such actions are limited and might be seenas a weak or ineffectual response.

-- Joint Committee meetings are simply fordiscussing future of the bilateral agreements.Curtailment of US participation would hinderdevelopment of the agreements.

-- In the case of the Health Agreement, suchaction would introduce an element of politics intoan agreement which has been functioning smoothlyup to this point.

g. Take some as yet unspecified action in connectionwith USSR hosting of 1980 Olympics.

PRO

-- US withdrawal from Summer Olympics inMoscow would be serious blow to Soviet internationalprestige.

CON

-- US announcement might preclpltate Sovietwithdrawal from Lake Placid Winter Olympics butthis would be Soviet initiative.

-- The Olympics is organized totally withinthe private sector. The President has alreadypledged the roc to admit all competitors accreditedby that organization. Thus we have no recoursefor the Winter games at Lake Placid withoutviolating an existing international agreement.

-- Refusal to participate in the summergames would be too delayed a response, and would

-11-

hurt American athletes far more than it wouldaffect Soviet policies or actions.

h. Harass Soviet diplomatic personnel in US throughsuch measures as:

Tightening travel controls

Denying Mobile Lounge to Soviet VIP's at Dulles

PRO

-- By moving ahead of the Soviets in theadministration of travel controls, we wouldunderscore our displeasure over events inAfghanistan.

-- Denial of mobile lounge would irritateSoviets, especially Dobrynin, in an area wherethey could not readily reciprocate.

CON

Soviets would retaliate by restricting ourtravel.

Denial of mobile lounge would disruptestablished pattern of courtesy.

B. Military Measures

1. 0.5. Military Alert

PRO

-- Would underscore seriousness of situation.

CON

-- Could be perceived worldwide as unwarrantedescalation of situation and might be perceived bySoviets as empty saber-rattling.

2. Increase cermanent U.S. military cresence in theIndian Ocean and Pesian Gulf.

•-12-

PRO

-- While such measures are already underway,greater public emphasis of our intent to move inthis direction, commensurate with the state of ournegotiations with other countries concerned, wouldassure our friends in the area of our resolve andwould demonstrate to the Soviets that they cannot,with impunity, seek to alter the balance of powerin the region.

CON

-- Could provoke regional arms buildup andprovide Soviets with justification for maintainingtroops in Afghanistan.

C. Economic

•,,

1

(

1 . Announcement that US will not seek MFN for USSR

PRO

-- Clearly indicate that economic relationscannot improve in the absence of improving politicalrelations.

-- Lack of MFN limits Soviet ability toexpand exports to the USSR.

CON

-- Soviets have probably already discountedprospects for MFN in the near term.

2. Grain Sales

Suspend grains shipment for the 1980 crop year(October 1, 1979 - September 30, 1980) in excess of thoseprovided for (8 million tons) under the grains agreement.

PRO

-- Would present Soviets with problem offeeding population in the wake of a bad harvestand as 1980 crop year gets off only to a fairstart.

-13-

-- Since agricultural sales represent largestOS exports to OSSF would signify that business asusual will not continue.

CON

-- Would damage possibility for developinglong-term agricultural sales program with USSR.

-- ~ould have negative repercussions for USbusiness efforts to expand sales to the USSR.

-- Could lead to opposition from domesticagricultural producers.

NOTE:

(a) Of estimated im~rt need of approximately 35million tons this ~ear, Soviets can obtain notmore than 10 million tons from non-OS sources(Common Market, Argentina, Australia, etc.). Onlyloophole would be if foreign dealers sell fromtheir supplies and then seek to replenish them bypurchases from the OS.

(b) A suspension of sales could have some effect(presumably downward) on US grain prices.

3. post1one US-USSR Joint Commercial CommitteeMeeting Schedu ed for April 14-15 In Washinqton.

PRO

-- Would indicate depth of our concern overAfghan developments.

CON

-- Would hurt US firms' efforts to expandcommercial relations with the USSR.

4. Postpone Business Facilitation Talks scheduledfor January 9 in Moscow.

PRO

-- Would indicate that we are not preparedto proceed on business as usual basis.

•CON

-- We lose opportunity to discuss problemsaffecting US commercial presence in the USSR.

s. Civil Aviation

Postpone bilatera})talks scheduled for February13 and consid~r limiti~ Aeroflot scheduled service to theUS to two flights weekly, the number for which there isbasic o?erating authority.

PRO

-- The talks are unlikely to produce majorresults, especially in the absence of a US carrierwilling to serve the USSR.

•Reduction of service would be a further

step in reducing the imbalance in bilateral civilaviation relations •

CON

-- Could create transportation problems forthe summer Olympics.

-- Could make more difficult an effortto induce an American carrier to serve Moscow.

6. Export Controls

Tighten export controls and review outstandinatrade deals <including the licensing of spares for Kama).

PRO

-- Would be visible and would have someimpact on Soviet interests.

CON

-- Sovies are not moved by economic consid­erations when important state interests are atstake.

US companies would suffer.

•-15-

NB: Any action on export controls would have tobe in conformity with the Export Administration Act of 1979which severely limits the utilization of export cointrolsfor foreign policy purposes.

7.in US.

Limit expansion of Soviet commercial efforts•PRO

Would slow growth of Soviet exportsto us.

Would reduce national security problemscreated by increased Soviet presence.

CON

-- Would hurt efforts of US firms seeking toexpand commercial links with the USSR. •

8. Suspend Soviet fishinq activities in the USFishing Zone

PRO

-- Would underline the extent of our dissatis­faction at their activities in Afghanistan. (Ourfisheries activities have been running smoothlyand have been mutually satisfactory.)

Would deprive the USSR of a needed sourceof food protein.

CON

-- Would be a unilateral violation of thebilateral fisheries agreement. (Which providesfor one year's notice of termination. Moreover,we should be cancelling it without cause relatedto the purposes of the agreement.)

-- The US has not cancelled a bilateralfisheries agreement with any country for foreignp"'l icy reasons.

•-16-

Unilateral cancellation would harm USfishing activity and interests, as we receivebenefit from Soviet fishing operations in ourzone, both by obtaining research information andthrough commercial operations in the US-USSR jointventure. We also receive substantial license feesfrom the USSR for permission to fish in ourwaters •

~

-17-

II. US Multilateral Actions

A. Publicity

1. Urge UK, FRG, and France to increase broadcasts toMuslim countries and Soviet Central Asia.

2. Daily circular to UN and others on status of theoccupation.

PRO

-- Will ensure high degree of awareness ofevents and may strengthen willingness to othersto take concrete actions in response.

CON

-- Direct identification of information withUS may undercut its credibility or make some NAMcountries reluctant to confront Soviets onbasis of "US allegations."

3. Continue world wide demarches, urging others totake actions complementing our unilateral initiatives.

B. UN

1. Seek Security Council Resolution

PRO

Focus international attention on Sovietactions

CON

-- NAM countries may be reluctant to engage inwhat they may see as East-West issue.

Soviets will in any case veto.

Complicates our efforts on Iran.

2. UNGA

PRO

As above. Would put Cuba in the box. It wouldfind it hard as head of NAM to remain silent.CON

-- We may encounter large number of abstentions.

• eC. Economic Actions

1. Consultations with others to reinforce u.s.unilateral moves.

-- Could significantly increase costs to ./.Soviets by, e.g. denying them access to internationalcredits.

CON

-- Allied reluctance is likely.

2. Tighten COCOM restraints on USSR/loosen on China.

-- Removes existing restraints on China whichare becoming difficult to maintain.

CON

-- Allies might not be able to agree to furtherrestrictions on trade with USSR.

3. Increased economic assistance to countries inregion (FY 80 supplemental and FY 81 incremental).

POO

-- Clear demonstration of heightened US supportfor friends in region.

CON

-- Budget restraints.

4. Urge International Financial Institutions andcountries with assistance programs to Afghanistan toterminate such assistance.

D. Arms Control

1. CSCE (reserve on response to Warsaw Pact proposals) .

Should not appear to lend any credence toSoviet security concepts.

CON

French may react negatively if posture appeared tohurt COE,

• J•.

~EeReT­

-19-

2. MBFR (withdraw Western proposals)

-- Show we will not reciprocate Sovietwithdrawals during Afghan crisis.

CON

-- Adverse impact on TNF: might split allies;in any event ball in Vienna is in Soviet courtand we expect no early resolution of differenceswith East.

3. CTB (delay start of February Trilateral round)

Demonstrate that bilateral relationship isunder review.

CON

Nonproliferation and other considerationsare overriding; could put onus on US at forth­coming NPT Review Conference; should in anyevent consult with UK.

•4. CW (go ahead in initial multilateral CD consideration,

but delay US-Soviet round scheduled for Jan 10).

PRO

Demonstrate US-Soviet relation under review;while keeping internationl consideration moving.

CON

Concerns US is too negative on arms controlissues.

E. Afghanistan

1. Withdraw Embassy and urge others to follow suit.

2. Supply insurgents (depends on Pakistani position andcooperation) .

Increase casualties, costs to Soviet ofoccupation of Afghanistan. •

..~ "Of~B€~

-20-

CON

Risk of Soviet retaliation against Pakistan.

F. Regional Security

•r

1. Accelerate process of increasing US presence andacquisition of base rights.

2. Increase US arms supplies to Soviet periphery.

(a) Increase FY 81 FMS/IMET budget levels

POO

Provides positive signal.

CON

Budget decision has been made in contextof budgetary constraints •

-- Deliveries are over a year away.

(b) Increase FY 80 FMS/IMET levels by seekingincrease in appropriations (budget still inconference) or through supplemental.

More immediate impact than FY 81 increases.

Congress probably would be receptive.

G. Other Concerned Countries

1. Yugoslavia (offer of increased assistance).

2. Romania (closer consultations and gesturesl

3. Turkey (respond positively to outstanding requests).

H. China

1. Increased political ties (see other paper).

2. Increased military ties (see other paper) .

\

\\..

:eOMT•

POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTIONS TO

u.s. RESPONSES TO AFGHANISTAN CRISIS

7. Resume ASAT tests.

1. Stop the flow of Jewish immigrants;

•Severely restrict u.S. diplomatic travel;

Jam VOA broadcasts;

Harass press, businessmen, and diplomatic corps.Charge members with espionage;

Take initiative to withdraw from SALT and refuseTNF negotiations;

Take actions in contravention "lith SALT In'terimAgreement and/or contravening SALT II provisions(e.g. encrypt some telemetry) •

3.

6.

US/SU Bilateral

The Soviets have the following options to "shove back"in response to u.s. actions. Lists represent a range ofreactions and some are contradictory.

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8. Take gloves off informal KBG "rules ofengagement."

SU Multilateral

In ME/PG region

1. Veto the UN SC resolution calling for economicsanctions against Iran;

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2. Approach Iran and Pakistan with offers ofeconomic and military aid and a new regionalsecurity arrangement;

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3. Support Afghan forces in cross-border operationsinto Pakistan:

4. Actively support Baluchi nationalism in Iranand Pakistan;

5. Offer India advanced weapons under very favorableterms. Hint to India that it will turn blind-eyeto Indian nuclear bomb program if Pakistan pressesahead with its weapon program:

6. Expand military presence in South Yemen and Ethiopia.

7. Intensify subversive actions against us allies/friends (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Somalia, Gulf Sheikdoms) •

In Asia

1. Offer Vietnamese advanced weapons on very favorableterms. Attempt to significantly expand basingrights in Indochina:

2. Increase air and naval operations off Japan.

In Europe

1. Put pressure on Berlin:

2. Demand greater internal political discipline inPoland. Press for increased defense spending forall NSWP states:

3. Increase threats to Romania that it must tow the"internationalist" line or face severe consequencesBegin economic sanctions:

4. Forward deploy new tactical nuclear systems (i.e.,~~-21 and nuclear artillery) into GDR and CSR.

In the Americas

1. Accelerate delivery of advanced arms to Cuba;

3. Increase subversive activities in the Caribbean andCentral America.

2. Provocative ship visits and other military activityin and around Cuba.

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