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FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR FRUITS AND VEGETABLES PRODUCTION
Tomato Farming Business Plan
APRIL 27, 2020
AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY
ADO-EKITI, EKITI STATE.
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary .................................................................................................................. 1
1.1. The Problem ........................................................................................................................... 1
1.2. The Opportunity ..................................................................................................................... 1
1.3. Mission ................................................................................................................................... 2
1.4. Value proposition ................................................................................................................... 2
1.5. Theory of change .................................................................................................................... 2
1.6. Solution ................................................................................................................................... 2
1.7. Social Return on Investment ................................................................................................... 3
1.8. Financials ................................................................................................................................. 4
1.9. Management Team .................................................................................................................. 4
2. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 5
3. Operational Summary .............................................................................................................. 6
3.1. Organizational Structure ......................................................................................................... 6
3.2. Value Proposition .................................................................................................................... 6
3.3. Business Model ........................................................................................................................ 6
3.4. Profit formula (Unit Economics) ........................................................................................... 13
3.5. Measuring results ................................................................................................................... 14
4. Market Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 17
4.1. Industry analysis ................................................................................................................... 18
4.2. Our competitive edge ............................................................................................................. 21
4.3. Risk Analysis ......................................................................................................................... 21
5. Strategy for Growth ............................................................................................................... 24
6. Management Summary .......................................................................................................... 26
6.1. Management team .................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.2. Advisors .................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.3. Personnel Plan ....................................................................................................................... 29
7. Financial Plan ......................................................................................................................... 30
7.1. Revenues ................................................................................................................................ 30
7.2. Expenses ................................................................................................................................ 31
7.3. Net surplus ............................................................................................................................. 31
7.4. Quarterly statement of income ............................................................................................. 31
7.5. Annual cash flow statement ................................................................................................... 32
7.6. Capital Requirements ............................................................................................................ 32
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1
CHAPTER 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1. The Problem
Nigeria is simultaneously the world’s 13th largest tomato producer and the
world’s largest importer of tomato paste. Although approximately 200,000 Nigerian
farmers grow over 1.5 million metric tons of tomatoes every year, half of their harvest is
lost before reaching the market, and the remaining 50% is subject to significant downward
pressure on price due to common gluts in the markets and the perishable nature of the crop.
Farmers, who are among Nigeria’s most financially vulnerable population, bear the burden
of both these post-harvest losses and this price uncertainty. Smallholder tomato farmers
lack access to a consistent, large market for their produce, rendering them unable to
consistently make a profit and dis-incentivized to increase their yields or change their
farming practices. As a result, domestic supply cannot meet local demand for fresh
tomatoes, which exceeds 2 million metric tons or $2.5 billion annually. The country
supplements local demand for fresh tomatoes with $360 million (over 300,000 metric tons)
of imported tomato paste annually.
Nigeria is t he most populous country in Africa and the seventh most populous in the world
– its population is expected to grow from 170 million today to over 440 million by
2050. This has grave implications for the country’s food security situation, given
that it is heavily dependent on food imports. If global food prices were to spike and drive
up the price of imports, as they did in 2007-2008, Nigeria would struggle to feed its
population.
1.2. The Opportunity
A well-located, commercial tomato processing operation focused on continuous production
rather than absorbing seasonal harvest gluts can increase incomes over five times for
participating smallholder farmers, who comprise 75% of Nigeria’s workforce.
The Nigerian Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development has made a
commitment to improve farm-to-processor links in the tomato value chain, but no business
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has yet developed a viable, sustainable model to competitively aggregate, process, package
and sell tomato paste domestically. Our model links farmers directly to paste production,
simultaneously reducing poverty for small holder farmers, who are among the country’s
most vulnerable population, and decreasing Nigeria’s dependence on an imported food
product that is a dietary staple in Nigerian cuisine
1.3. Mission
Tomato Jos is an agricultural production company that believes in the power of farming
and processing local food products for local consumption. Our mission is to make tomato
production a sustainable, profitable business for
Nigerian farmers.
1.4. Value proposition
Value to farmers: we give farmers the tools and
the incentive to sell a greater proportion of an
increased tomato yield at a consistent, fair price.
Value to consumers: we provide consumers with
access to domestic tomato paste that matches the quality of imported products at a lower
cost.
1.5. Theory of change
If we can connect Nigerian farmers to domestic consumers of processed tomato products,
we will improve the lives and incomes of smallholder farmers, provide more non-farming
job opportunities for the increasingly urban population, and increase the stability and
sustainability of the food supply in Nigeria.
1.6. Solution
Substantially improving the livelihood of smallholder tomato farmers requires moving
multiple metrics simultaneously. Farmers must be able to sell more of their product, by
increasing yields and reducing post-harvest losses; they must be able to capture a greater
amount of the value of their harvest; and they must be less vulnerable to seasonal price
3
fluctuations. To make this possible, Tomato Jos embeds farmers’ production within
a supportive, self-contained agribusiness ecosystem focused on local production,
processing, distribution, and farming practice improvement.
At scale, Tomato Jos will operate three business lines: (1) Farm and agricultural center with
farmer education and bundled inputs to help smallholder farmers grow and harvest crops
more efficiently;; (2) Logistics and supply chain support to navigate the “last mile”
to smallholder farms and safely bring produce to the processing facility; and (3) Food
processing and packaging facility that prepares finished goods for distribution in Nigeria.
As the business attains profitability, Tomato Jos will consider options to reinvest a portion
of profits into expanded agricultural support programs for farmers in the surrounding
community. Through investment in the community, we hope to further align farmer
outcomes with the success of our venture and improve the lives of smallholder farmers and
the competitive landscape for local agriculture, translating into future returns for the
business.
1.7. Social Return on Investment
Tomato Jos will have a large positive impact on Nigeria’s agribusiness sector, the
social fabric, and overall economy by ultimately achieving the following:
● Increase revenues from tomato sales five times for participating smallholder farmers
by year five.
● Create a demonstration farm that actively spreads agricultural best practices to the
surrounding community.
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● Provide a consistent market for approximately 1,000 farmers within our network by
year five.
● Link farmers to markets and strengthen value chains through logistics systems that are
able to navigate the “last mile” to smallholder farms.
● Improve access to the appropriate quantities of fair-priced inputs such as fertilizers and
high-yielding seeds through bundling and pooled procurement.
● Reduce financial risk from volatile crop prices by offering forward purchasing
agreements.
1.8. Financials
Tomato Jos follows a low margin, high volume base of the pyramid model where profit is
driven by both scale and technological innovation to control costs. We project that Tomato
Jos will become profitable within three years of launch following investment focused on
expanding the farmer network, our nucleus farm and expanding tomato paste processing
capacity. Over this period we anticipate that Tomato Jos will undergo two key capital
raises: a $500,000 in seed equity in the first quarter of year two to fund our Nigerian nucleus
farm expansion, launch the Dami system and begin processing tomato paste. Following the
successful scale-up a $3,000,000 growth equity subscription in quarter one of year four is
required to fund expansion of the business model. Once Tomato Jos reaches scale we
believe that profit margins will approach 15%.
1.9. Management Team
Our four founding members have over 10 years of combined work experience in Africa,
with professional and educational backgrounds that span agribusiness, logistics and supply
chain management, consulting, finance, marketing and business development, investment
management and nonprofits.
Mira Mehta, CEO: Two years’ investment management experience, four years at
Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) solving HIV-related operational and supply chain
problems in Nigeria.
5
Nike Lawrence, COO: Five years’ investment banking research, one year at Acumen
Fund building agriculture and healthcare pipelines and portfolios in Liberia, Sierra Leone,
and Ghana.
Shane Kiernan, CFO: Three years’ investment banking / management experience, two
years at CHAI assisting national governments to secure financial resources for national
health systems.
Jared Westheim, CTO: Three years’ healthcare consulting experience, three years at
CHAI and Technoserve implementing international development and agribusiness projects
in Africa.
CHAPTER 2
INTRODUCTION
In Nigeria many farmers complain of having to borrow at 100% interest rates from local
lenders to buy seeds and fertiliser. And once the tomatoes have been harvested, local
producers have limited access to consumers in cities such as Lagos and Abuja.
Furthermore, with labour and raw inputs scarce, mechanisation often
limited and weather patterns increasingly unpredictable, small-scale farmers like Kutumbi
can struggle just to break even.
Tomato Jos wants to change the lives of smallholder farmers like Kutumbi by improving
access to education around best practices, increasing access to high-quality inputs, and
enabling access to end consumers. Farmers selected to work with Tomato Jos receive seeds,
fertiliser and other resources on interest-free credit. They are trained by agronomy
managers who help monitor the progress of their tomato field and Tomato Jos buys their
produce at market price, thereby securing tomatoes for its processing plant.
Farmers like Kutumbi previously yielded 7 metrics tonnes of Tomatoes per hectare that
could sell for around $1000 at the local market. Now farmers utilizing the Tomato Jos
6
model can increase their yield to 26 metric tonnes per hectare reaping more than $5000
from selling to Tomato Jos for tomato paste processing.
“This is still a new thing," says Kutumbi cautiously, "I hope it will work because
if it does, it will help me, my family, and our community. Things could be much better
than before," he continues, "and maybe if my children see farming can be profitable, they
will even want to stay and be farmers too!"
CHAPTER 3
Operational Summary
3.1. Organizational Structure
Tomato Jos plans to operate as a for-profit entity.
3.2. Value Proposition
Operating a vertically integrated tomato processing business enables end-to-end control
and allows Tomato Jos to add value both to farmers on the upstream side and end customers
downstream.
Value to farmers: we give farmers the tools and the incentive to sell a greater proportion
of an increased tomato yield at a consistent, fair price.
Value to consumers: we provide consumers with access to domestic tomato paste that
matches the quality of imported products at a lower cost.
3.3. S Business Model
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How Tomato Jos Generates Revenue
At scale, Tomato Jos will generate revenue by manufacturing tomato paste, branding and
packaging it, and selling it directly to two major supermarket chains, Shoprite and Spar,
and indirectly to open-air markets through regional distributors. Approximately 55% of the
tomatoes used for paste production will originate from farmland directly operated by
Tomato Jos (“the nucleus farm” or “the nucleus estate”), while the remaining 45%
will be purchased from smallholder farmers (“the network”) operating within a
20mile radius of our production facility (“the factory”).
The profitability of our company depends on our ability to run the factory at minimum
capacity over the course of the tomato harvesting season - because tomatoes are fragile and
spoil within 1-2 days of harvesting, a constant supply of tomatoes must be delivered to the
factory every day. We believe that the best way to generate this constant supply of high-
quality tomatoes while remaining asset light is through a “nucleus estate” contract
farming model. The nucleus estate contract farming model is common for tomato
processing facilities in the US and China, the two leading countries for tomato paste
production, and the characteristics of this model are defined by the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) as follows:
● Involves a centralized processor and/or packer buying from a large number of small
farmers
● Vertically coordinated with quota allocation and tight quality control
● The sponsor also manages a central estate or plantation
● The central estate is usually used to guarantee throughput for the processing plant
and is sometimes used for research as well
● Involves a significant provision of material and management inputs
The Nucleus Farm
In its first year of operation, Tomato Jos will establish a 3 hectare nucleus farm in order to
prove that tomato yields in Nigeria can be improved from 7 MT/Ha to 30 MT/Ha over the
course of one year, solely by using high quality seeds and fertilizer, and by making basic
improvements in farming techniques. In order to comply with government regulations,
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which have barred the use of genetically modified (GM) seeds, Tomato Jos will source
only hybrid seeds, which are created through farm-based cross-pollination of two different
plants rather than the lab-based genetic modification.of a single plant’s DNA.
At scale, Tomato Jos plans to operate a nucleus estate with a 10 hectare
“best practices” greenhouse and a 500 hectare open-air farm that yield 150 MT/Ha
and 75 MT/Ha, respectively. These facilities will be used to guarantee a minimum
throughput for the factory, train farmers in the network on farming best practices, and
conduct ongoing research on tomato harvesting.
The Network
In year two, Tomato Jos will recruit its first
cohort of farmers into the network, which
will comprise 60 hectares. By year five, the
company will work with a network of
farmers operating on 1,000 hectares.
Although formal market surveys have not
been conducted, primary information
gathered from farms, villages, markets and
distributors during the team’s visit to
Nigeria in March 2014 suggests that our
principal customers are smallholder farmers who grow for the market. The average
smallholder tomato farm size in Nigeria ranges from 1-2 hectares. A few large-scale
farmers plant from 10 to 200 hectares of tomatoes, leaving the overall average tomato field
size at 1.5 hectares.
For our first farmer cohort, we will rely upon our existing local partners on the ground, a
cooperative of mid-sized vegetable farmers, to refer us to smallholder farmers whom we
can interview and vet in the first year as we set up the nucleus farm. As we scale, we expect
though that our greatest product champions and advocates will be the farmers in our
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network. A successful Tomato Jos network farmer who has been using Tomato Jos inputs
and best practice methods will be able to demonstrate within his own social network the
financial and labor benefit associated with our model. For our most successful and
enthusiastic farmers we will have them hold field days at which all farmers in the village
and the community can be invited. At these field days the appropriate Tomato Jos
agronomy manager will be invited to speak at the field days and explain how our
partnership works.
Following up on these leads is the role of our agronomy managers who are vital to the
continued expansion of our network farmer model. It is the agronomy managers who are
responsible for applying the Tomato Jos evaluation criteria to prospective farmers to
determine their suitability to work with Tomato Jos. Other engagement mediums
(advertising, radio, billboards, print, social, local sponsorship, etc) will be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis to determine the suitability of each mode of communication.
The Dami System for Continuous Improvement
Tomato Jos will offer a complete bundle of services called a “Dami” (which
means “bundle” in Hausa, one of the main languages spoken in Nigeria) to help
all farmers in the network achieve a yield of 30 MT/Ha. In general, all of the farming
inputs and capital equipment that Tomato Jos sells to farmers in the network will be sold
without making a profit; that is, we will sell these items to farmers at our own purchase
price. The Dami consists of four main components:
1. Improved Inputs: Sell high quality seeds, fertilizer and pesticides at our purchase
price, in bundled packages so that farmers can easily determine how much of each item
to use.
2. Training Support: Educate farmers on tomato-farming best practices through
NGOdeveloped curricula and hands-on training at the nucleus farm.
3. Forward Contract Financing: Specify a price in advance of the growing season for
delivery of a specified quantity of tomatoes, reducing farmers’ exposure to
seasonal price fluctuations and guaranteeing a market for increased yields.
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4. Guaranteed Market and Transport for Produce: Establish a processor on-site that
will absorb all surplus production at a reliable price and manage transport from farm to
factory.
Once farmers in the network are able to achieve a yield of at least 30 MT/Ha consistently
over three harvesting cycles, they will be classified as “bronze level” farmers.
Tomato Jos will support its bronze farmers to make further gains in yield by selling them
highquality drip irrigation systems at our own purchase price.
In the US, where open-air farming is the main technique used to grow paste tomatoes, drip
irrigation systems have been known to increase yields by a factor of 50%. As such, farmers
in the network who are able to achieve a yield of at least 45 MT/Ha consistently
over three harvesting cycles will be classified as “silver level” farmers. Tomato Jos
will support its silver farmers to make further gains in yield by selling them the materials
needed to build a greenhouse at our own purchase price.
Farmers in the network who are able to achieve a yield of at least 80 MT/Ha consistently
over three harvesting cycles will be classified as “gold level” farmers. As
the most advanced and motivated farmers within the network, and also (by default) as
the farmers with the longest relationship with our company, the gold farmers will be
eligible to participate in the Tomato Jos paste franchise program. This program enables the
gold farmers to procure low-volume paste production equipment and produce tomato paste
for resale to Tomato Jos, which will package, brand and sell this paste alongside the paste
produced in the factory.
In this way, over a period of three to five years, Tomato Jos will transform the most
dedicated and motivated farmers into entrepreneurs who create non-farm jobs in their
communities and are able to capture a larger portion of the tomato value chain by selling
paste rather than tomatoes.
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Transporting Tomatoes from the Network to the Factory
To transport the tomatoes from our network farmers and the nucleus farm to the processing
facility we will use a fleet of leased trucks. A typical tomato truck holds 22 M/T of
tomatoes, which is about 300,000 tomatoes. We anticipate a need for one truck in year one
and scaling to 20 trucks by year 5. An additional benefit to leasing the vehicles is the benefit
of a maintenance program and the not requiring the capital expenditure and depreciation
associated with owning the vehicles.
Running the Tomato Paste Processing Facility
The tomato paste processing facility enables Tomato Jos to transform highly perishable,
raw tomatoes into long-lasting, higher-value tomato paste, and as such it will always play
a large role in the ongoing operations of the company. During the paste production season,
which is expected to reach 6 months by year five, the factory will run continuous
production to minimize tomato wastage and maximize power efficiency. The biggest cost
associated with running the factory is power, for two main reasons. First, the “hot
break” equipment used in the critical evaporation stage of processing requires constant
nearboiling temperatures. Second, Nigeria’s unreliable national power grid will
require Tomato Jos to run the plant with diesel rather than electricity up to 75% of the
time.
Tomato Jos has opted to invest in medium-capacity infrastructure for the factory for three
major reasons. First, the overall capital outlay is much smaller for medium-capacity
equipment than for full-scale equipment; second, the modular approach allows us to scale
manufacturing capacity in sync with the growth of the nucleus farm and network; and third,
in order for Tomato Jos to work closely with golden farmers to set up satellite processing
facilities, our company needs to have a clear understanding of equipment that the golden
farmers will use. Staffing requirements will vary based on whether or not the factory is
producing paste. Year-round staff requirements include a plant manager, engineers to
maintain and service the equipment, and a skeleton crew of 5 to 8 additional workers.
During paste production season, the employee requirement increases significantly for both
skilled and unskilled labor, from 8 and 10 to 18 and 75, respectively.
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Marketing Paste in Domestic Channels
Lastly, Tomato Jos will secure an end market for our local brand of tomato paste. Our
approach will be two-pronged: first we will ensure the offtake of our packaged output to
large retail centers, and second our traditional marketing efforts will drive consumer
purchases of our unique product.
1. Get Tomato Jos products on shelves. Initially, we plan to sell Tomato Jos
products to both large supermarket chains and traditional open air markets. The two largest
supermarket chains in Nigeria are Shoprite and SPAR, which is the world’s
largest food retailer. Both Shoprite and SPAR are large enough that they contract and
purchase local food products directly from local manufactures without going through a
distributor. Tomato Jos will use its fleet of trucks to deliver products directly to the
supermarkets, thereby preserving margin for us and the supermarkets.
While we expect that our initial placement with these supermarkets will be on a trial basis,
once we demonstrate consumer demand, we intend to secure long-term, yearround delivery
contracts with each of these chains for each of their 16 locations throughout the country
(as of 2013).
Despite any success that we have with Shoprite and SPAR, we plan to diversify our
distribution channels to traditional open air markets because only 5% of food in Nigeria is
retailed through supermarkets. Tomato Jos’ fleet will transport our product to
centralized, large open air market distributors based in Abuja and Lagos. From there, these
distributors will ensure that our product makes it to the largest open air markets in the
largest cities in the country. While the price for fresh vegetables fluctuate in the open air
markets, the price for our product and other packaged goods in the market remain fixed.
The largest driver of costs to be successful in placing our product on retail shelves will be
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the transportation costs, namely the diesel, required to truck our product to the various
supermarket chain outlets.
Our current product (70g sachets of tomato paste) is the most commonly purchased size of
tomato paste in Nigeria’s retail market. However, over time, we plan to extend
our distribution model into the food services industry, supplying larger drums of tomato
paste to the food services market (i.e. restaurants and hotels).
2. Drive consumer purchases. We will drive consumer purchase by promoting a
brand that is high quality and uniquely Nigerian. Our branding strategy will be to target the
lower-, middle-, and upper-income market segments as they all purchase and use tomato
paste for everyday meals.
Tomato Jos will rely on very frequent traditional marketing methods, such as radio
advertisements, billboards, and taste tests on-site in supermarkets to drive first time trial of
our product. We also plan to get state and federal level government endorsement of our
product as a product that is 100% made and packaged in Nigeria. We will encourage repeat
trial of the product by linking purchase of the product directly to the farmers in our program
via advertisements and social media.
The social media portion of our branding strategy will involve launching pages on
Facebook, Twitter, etc. and sharing stories of our farmers on a regular basis.
The largest cost driver for this piece of our operations will be the traditional marketing
spend on advertising space as we plan to flood the market with our unique positioning early
and often.
3.4. Profit formula (Unit Economics)
Tomato Jos expects to produce over 6 million 70 gram sachets of tomato paste in year two
and over 100 million sachets in year five. From our primary research in Nigeria, we know
14
that these 70 gram sachets are the most popular size with consumers and sell in the market
for 40-50 Naira per sachet.
Using this retail-selling price as a starting point we work backward to assume that the retail
margin is 40% of the selling price. Our COGS represent 30% of the cost with our margin
and other expenses accounting for the remaining 30%.
3.5. Measuring results
We measure our success in terms of financial returns, agricultural output as well as social
impact achieved, and will continually measure our progress in these areas. Management
will be held accountable to specific financial, agricultural and social indicators, and their
performance will be evaluated regularly.
Our Farmer performance record (annex 8) provides the ability to track detailed agricultural
and social metrics, which will be reported to investors, partners and other stakeholders on
a regular basis. Tomato Jos will provide social value to our partner farmers in several ways.
In the first three years of operations we will focus on improving yield per hectare and
reporting impact in the following key areas:
15
Increase in crop cycle income
Our most readily quantifiable social impact is the increase in the Gross Margin achieved
by farmers. This is the difference between the Gross Farm Income (GFI) and the total
variable cost (TVC). Tomato Jos will use this technique to track and determine the cost
and return associated with tomato production for our farmers. It is mathematically
expressed as; GM = GFI – TVC
Where;
GM = Gross Margin (Naira/Ha)
GFI = Gross Farm Income (Naira)
TVC = Total Variable Costs (Naira/Ha)
And
NFI = GM – FC
Where;
NFI = Net Farm Income (Naira/Ha)
TFC = Fixed Cost (Naira/Ha)
Other financial metrics we will track include:
Gross Ratio: is the total cost of production divided by the gross revenue. A less than 1
ratio is desirable for our farmers. The lower the ratio the higher the return per naira
invested.
Operation Ratio: is the total variable cost divided by gross income. It shows the proportion
of the gross income that goes to pay for the operating costs. The lower the ratio the higher
the return on investment.
Return on capital investment: is the gross Margin divided by total variable cost.
Increase in tomato yield per hectare - Knowledge component
Assuming the majority of the farmers in our network produce 26,000 M/T per hectare in
year 5, the financial benefit from our farmers to the economy is over $100 million per
annum. Our farmers producing 26,000 tons at a net income of $4000 per year achieve this
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figure. By year five, the social impact of Tomato Jos, based solely on this metric, could be
as much as $5000 per farmer per year.
In tandem with yield increases Tomato Jos agronomy managers improve physical
accessibility by farmers to improved inputs (seed, chemicals, fertilizer) by providing free
delivery of all the raw material. We will measure improved tomato yield per hectare by
tracking the total amount of produce harvested for grading. By 2016, we forecast that
Tomato Jos will achieve 70 M/T per hectare in our greenhouses.
Decrease post harvest losses
Estimates suggest that Nigeria loses 40-60% of its tomato production after harvest. These
post-harvest losses are decreases in the amount of agricultural produce that actually reaches
markets in a salable condition. These losses may occur before transport due to many causes,
including suboptimal application of fertilizer, inappropriate irrigation, diseases, water loss,
and poor ventilation of products. During transport, other losses frequently occur, including
mechanical injury, temperature changes, and contamination.
By improving both farmer transport of produce, increasing the availability of market, and
improving farming practices, Tomato Jos plans to substantially decrease the percentage of
tomatoes that are lost after harvest.
Other metrics
We will use the pilot test findings to build out our metrics further and set specific targets.
Additional key indicators for measuring financial returns and social impact will likely
include:
● Sales – Scale of outreach
● Number of farmers – Size of farmer network and its value as a barrier to entry
● Average crop cycle days – Capturing improvements to the length of the harvest cycle
● Farmer satisfaction – Ability to meet or exceed farmers expectations
● Increased employment – Increasing employment is another key social impact for
Tomato Jos particularly among the young.
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CHAPTER 4
Market Analysis
In Nigeria, the market opportunity for producing tomato paste for domestic consumption
alone is immense. Despite being sub-Saharan Africa’s largest producer of tomatoes, the
country spends over $360 million annually to import over 300,000 metric tons of tomato
paste. Tomato paste has become highly integrated into the Nigerian diet. Household
consumers often choose to buy paste over tomatoes, since ease of transport, low costs of
production, and less wastage for the product allow it to be offered at a lower market price.
The regional opportunity is even larger. In 2011, Sub-Saharan Africa imported 550,000
metric tons of tomato paste, and, for seven years’ prior, consumption had been growing at
13% annually. Capturing portions of the tomato paste market domestically and regionally
could offer large returns.
Annually, 40-60% of Nigeria’s tomato harvest is wasted. Without domestic
manufacturers buying, processing, and thus preserving tomatoes that otherwise quickly rot,
farmers have no market for their produce. Excess farm production already exists that could
be profitably absorbed by a processing business.
Nigeria’s government has made a commitment to produce more of its finished and raw
agricultural products domestically, and plans to cut imports by more than $10 billion
annually. In the past, Nigeria’s commitments to increasing domestic production
have translated into its government actively protecting infant industries and by increasing
availability of Central Bank financing.
18
4.1. Industry analysis
Agriculture in Nigeria
Agriculture comprises approximately 40% of Nigeria’s GDP. Nigeria has the
greatest area allocated to arable crops production across the entire region. There are 84
million hectares of arable land but only 40% is cultivated. Nigeria also has 263 billion cubic
meters of water – with two of the largest rivers in Africa. The agricultural sector is the
largest sector of the State’s economy, employing over 70% of the adult labour force.
The agriculture sector has a large impact on many aspects of development, from the dietary
and caloric needs of the population to the state’s industrialization efforts and the
overall quality of life of the people. At the same time, agricultural production and
productivity depend largely on the quality of land and sustainable practices. Consequently,
there is a need to make agriculture economically viable by seeking a balance between
efficient and productive agricultural enterprise and environmental protection and
sustainability.
Nigeria produces 1.7 million metric tons of tomatoes annually. These tomatoes are grown
in two seasons, which correspond to the country’s rainfall. Despite the country’s
large overall production, smallholders, who are the majority of Nigeria’s
farmers and farm less than 2 hectares, get extremely low yields year after year. While the
average yield in North America is 494 metric tons per ha, Nigerian farmers average only 7
metric tons per ha.
During the dry season, which spans from January to April, tomatoes tend to be plentiful;
during the wet season, which stretches from April to September fewer tomatoes are grown.
The boom and bust of Nigeria’s tomato production corresponds to severe price
fluctuations: the price that farmers are able to command for their tomato crop varies
seasonally from 600 to 3000 Naira per 36 KG basket.
Low yields are at least partially caused by these seasonal pricing fluctuations. Since farmers
receive the lowest market price during periods when production reaches its peak, they have
19
reduced incentive to increase their yields, since the market cannot absorb the temporary
produce glut. Advanced pricing guarantees, which would disregard fluctuating market
prices, could incentivize smallholder farmers to produce more crops than they currently
do.
Farming practices also tend to be suboptimal. In many cases, smallholder farmers cannot
afford or do not have access to improved inputs. This may particularly be the case for seed,
which has few domestic Nigerian producers. Fertilizers on the market may often be fake
or unlabeled. In other cases, improved inputs are not adequately applied, since technical
knowledge of agronomy best practices is often unavailable.
Competition
There are currently no large-scale domestic producers of tomato paste in Nigeria. In the
Kadawa valley region to the North, Dangote Holdings, Ltd, has made plans to develop a
large-scale tomato paste processing facility. Dangote’s facility announced that it would
launch in November of last year with a total capacity of 400,000 MT/year, but so far it has
remained unopened. It is unclear whether regional conflict has slowed construction or
whether internal analysis found the low yields of smallholder farmers would be able to
economically support such a large-scale manufacturer.
Competition will most likely come from other tomato farmers and imported products.
Although over 200,000 farmers may produce tomatoes throughout Nigeria, raw tomato
products tend to be more expensive than paste in Nigeria due to high costs and wastage
rates from bringing raw produce to market. Since raw paste and tomatoes are substitutable
goods, in local markets, paste and tomatoes will compete.
Market analysis conducted during the team’s trip to Nigeria in March 2014 revealed
that multiple tomato paste brands exist within Nigeria, most of which originate in China.
Major companies involved in this space include Olam, which produces Tasty Tom, Chi
Ltd, which produces Peppe Terra, Noclink Ventures, which produces Taima, Tomavita,
and
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Tomato Fun, and Watanmal, which produces Gino and Pomo tomato paste. These multiple
brands target Nigerian consumers without segmenting the market, and make little to no
effort to differentiate themselves. Some brands such as Tasty Tom are packaged for
individual consumption in Nigeria after being bulk imported from foreign markets. Within
the retail market, 70-gram servings of tomato paste are the most popular size - they are
packaged in either small cans or sachets and sold for 40-50 naira throughout the country.
Imported tomato paste is widely distributed by all supermarkets and open air markets, most
small, private markets, and some non-food retailers.
Pricing
A major strategy of Tomato Jos is to offer the fairest market prices to our farmers to ensure
a high volume quality inputs for the factory and drive down the cost of production. The
marginal cost of paying above-market prices for tomatoes produced in our network is lower
than the marginal cost of running the paste factory below capacity, thus providing us with
a continued incentive to pay a fair price for our raw material. Tomato Jos will strive to keep
its gross margin at the minimum required to cover costs of the raw inputs, operating costs
and overhead, and to show a reasonable profit. However, an effort will be made to
accumulate sufficient reserves to permit Tomato Jos to continue to expand and allow more
farmers access to our economies of scale and to end consumers. Operating costs will be
kept to a minimum.
Selling prices will be based on market information about the price levels of competitors
and prevailing retail operating margins.
Working closely with our key partners
(Shoprite & Spar) we aim to develop long term
supply agreements to align our production
forecast with retailers’ respective growth
strategies.
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4.2. Our competitive edge
Our competitive edge lies in our vertically integrated value chain that offers the most
advanced inputs with the support and training to maximise the full potential of our
network farmer’s small holding and offers access to guaranteed pricing. This
places Tomato Jos in a uniquely unoccupied territory in Nigeria.
Key competitive advantages:
1. Reduced Input costs: Tomato Jos acts as a bulk purchaser of inputs on behalf of our
smallholder farmers, realizing a significant discount in purchase price of cultivation
inputs and passing 100% of those cost savings along to the farmer
Why is this sustainable: While a competitor can replicate these savings, the trust and
goodwill built with our community of farmers over these years are not easily replicable.
2. Vertical integration: One stop shop for farmers and training to optimize inputs
3. Local Nigerian brand: government and consumer support
4. Skills acquisition for farmer: from farmer to businessman
As a result, we will appeal to the target markets of many of our competitors while offering
services superior to each of the components of the value chain.
4.3. Risk Analysis
Security
There is a high threat from terrorism in Nigeria. Boko Haram is an Islamist extremist group
in Nigeria that aspires to establish Islamic law in Nigeria, to destabilise the Nigerian
government and to remove western influence from the country. Boko Haram regularly
mounts attacks in northern Nigeria. The majority of attacks occur in the northeast,
particularly in Borno and Yobe states where Boko Haram has based its operations. There
have, however, been a number of Boko Haram-related attacks in other Nigerian states.
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To mitigate the threat associated with terrorism we plan to operate in a state deemed by the
US State Department to be at low risk of insurgency. Additionally, we will work closely
with foreign offices and security companies to compile a weekly risk assessment report that
captures alerts on changing threats to safety and security of personnel, critical
infrastructure, supply lines and transportation routes. Finally, we will work with best
practice private security companies to secure our operational assets and, more importantly,
protect our staff.
Political
In February 2015 Nigeria will hold presidential and legislative elections. The elections
represent both an opportunity and a threat to Tomato Jos. There are many threats associated
with the election that could materialize and threaten the stability of the country. If elections
are contested and disputed, there could be a rise in insurgent activity, creating a threat to
life and property. Tomato Jos will be operating the pilot project at the time of the elections
and will continually monitor the threat associated with the political risk (see security risk
above).
Newly elected State Governors are keen to promote their region and may be able to offer
tax breaks or reduced rent for companies bringing employment to their state. Postelection,
state governors will be keen to deliver on election promises so positioning Tomato Jos as
public-private partnership to boost employment could yield advantages.
Corruption
Tomato Jos believes that competitive advantages gained from corruption are spurious and
unsustainable. We categorise corruption risk by:
1. Informal payments — improper payments by businesses in Africa can arise due to
significant levels of “red tape,” particularly relating to business permits, licenses
and the import of goods.
2. Use of intermediaries — agents, brokers and facilitators are used to “assist”
with negotiations. Fees paid to these intermediaries are often non-distinct and might
be used to disguise bribes.
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3. Petty corruption — petty corruption can be found in areas such as identity checks,
speeding or payload tickets or other such cloaked offences.
We acknowledge that operating in Nigeria we face significant operational challenges to
overcome corrupt practices. To that effect, Tomato Jos has developed an anti-corruption
program designed to mitigate the impact of corruption on our business:
1. Conduct a risk assessment program
2. Implement anti-corruption policies and controls
3. Implement anti-corruption financial controls
4. Conduct anti-corruption compliance training
5. Monitor the program
6. Re-assess risk and modify program
Operational
Production resources: Operating in rural areas of Nigeria poses many operational
challenges, from an irregular electrical supply with frequent service interruptions, to the
risk that our supply chain could be interrupted due to poor infrastructure causing truck
breakdowns. Having a consistent power supply is vital for processing operations. We will
invest in sufficient redundancy capacity through diesel generators that will enable that plant
to run for one entire batch on back-up power before requiring refueling. We attempt to
mitigate supply chain risk by leasing our transportation equipment with appropriate
maintenance contracts put in place.
Environmental: Droughts may occur during the optimal planting season for tomatoes,
exposing Tomato Jos to the risks and the challenges of securing sufficient water for crop
irrigation and processing at the factory. To offset the effects of drought, Tomato Jos will
reduce the reliance on annual rains at the nucleus farm by constructing bore holes with a
capacity sufficient for growing and processing operations. In addition, in year 2 we will
build a fresh water holding tank that is capable of storing 10 million meters3 of rainwater.
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Additionally, as one component of evaluating a farmer’s suitability to join the
Tomato Jos farmer network, the agronomy manager will determine all water sources
available to the farmer and using a scale rate each farmers drought risk.
Financial
Farmer counterparty risk: Tomato Jos places considerable amount of trust in its network
of farmers. Because our farmers receive all inputs on credit, Tomato Jos goes through an
intensive farmer evaluation process to rank farmers on their suitability for inclusion to our
network. We believe that this is important to establish trust with our farmers in order for
them to produce high yieldng, high-quality tomatoes and become our greatest advocates
and marketing tools for further network expansion. Tomato Jos is looking to mitigate this
risk by partnering with local microfinance institutions such as ACCION to roll-out or credit
scheme.
Pricing risk: Tomato Jos covers pricing risk by agreeing with farmers on a set
riskweighted average price in advance of the growing season. By offering one set price,
Tomato Jos can plan processing production and also manage price volatility of our most
important production input.
CHAPTER 5
Strategy for Growth
Tomato Jos is launching with the concept of scale at the outset. Our nucleus farm and
networked outgrower model is designed with a view to expand across Nigeria and reach
hundreds of thousands of farmers.
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Phase 0: Concept Development and Market Research. Jan - May 2014
The purpose of Phase 0 is to prove the various parts of the Tomato Jos value proposition
(to farmers and to consumers), to raise funds for Phase 1, and to lay the groundwork for
operations in Nigeria.
To date, we have secured $2,000 grant funding from the Harvard Business School Social
Enterprise Initiative which we used to visit Nigeria in March 2014:
Business Environment Context. We met with the following experts in Abuja to gain
insight on agribusiness in Nigeria: Doug Climan, Economic Officer for the U.S. State
Department in Nigeria; Paul Lubeck, a northern Nigeria expert at the University of
California, Santa Cruz; and Zannat Ferdous, a senior Market Analyst with Propcom
Maikarfi, a DFID funded NGO that aims to reduce poverty in Nigeria by enabling rural
markets to work better for the poor.
Cultivation. We conducted nine 1-hour in-person interviews with nine large-scale (10100
Ha) and smallholder (0.1-2 Ha) farmers based in Plateau state, Nigeria, the region with the
most suitable climate for vegetable farming. All interviews took place at the farms,
revealing valuable information about best practices and typical farming techniques. We
also visited the local agricultural services and training center and spoke to the head
agronomist about the equipment rental services and hands-on technical assistance available
for smallholder farmers and the particularities of the region’s growing conditions.
Processing. We toured a dairy processing plant and corn processing facility located in
Plateau and met with the heads of operations for each. We spoke at length about processing
challenges, such as hiring and training techniques for staff, assessing the tradeoffs around
mechanization, and access to electricity and other forms of infrastructure. We have also
interviewed technical leads from the two largest domestic tomato paste processing
companies in the United States.
Marketing: We conducted six interviews at three open air markets in multiple Nigerian
cities, where the lower- and middle-classes purchase their produce, and three high-end
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supermarkets. These conversations revealed consumer preferences; pricing and margin
trends for raw tomatoes and tomato paste; and product transportation costs and challenges.
Phase 1: Establish Nucleus Farm. Jun 2014 - May 2015
The purpose of Phase 1 is twofold: (1) prove that we can effectively “feed” the
factory by establishing a nucleus farm that grows high-quality paste tomatoes at a yield
of 30 MT/Ha; and (2) conduct intensive outreach to identify motivated tomato farmers and
lay the groundwork for our outgrower network.
Phase 2: Develop Farmer Network and Paste Factory. Jun 2015 - May 2017 The
purpose of Phase 2 is to put our model into action by scaling the nucleus farm, constructing
a tomato paste manufacturing facility, and building out the farmer network using the Dami
system to provide a constant source of tomatoes for paste.
Phase 3: Scale for Growth. Jun 2017 - May 2019
As the strongest farmers in our network begin to see substantial increases in their yields
and graduate to gold-level performance levels, Tomato Jos will continue to scale the model
by rapidly increasing the size of the network to include more farmers.
CHAPTER 6
Management Summary
6.1. Management team
Mira Mehta:
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Mira graduated from Brown University in 2006. She worked in asset management at
BlackRock for two years, and then moved to Nigeria to work for the Clinton Health Access
Initiative (CHAI). She spent two years working with the Ministry of Health HIV/AIDS
Division, the US Government, and various UN organizations to forecast and import HIV
commodities and accelerate new drug approvals at NAFDAC. Mira then moved into a
regional role, working to strengthen the relationship between diagnostic suppliers (Roche,
Abbott, and BD) and Ministries of Health in over 12 African countries, and scaling up HIV
diagnostic services across the continent. She has strong operational experience with the
supply chain for HIV products, and also helped to set up and operate national sample
transportation systems for infant HIV testing in multiple African countries.
Mira is currently a second-year student at Harvard Business School, pursuing an MBA. She
would like to return to Nigeria to work in the agribusiness, basic materials, or healthcare
industries. Her goal is run a company or a business line that supports economic growth,
helps diversify Nigeria’s economy away from oil and gas, and provides a source of skilled
labor to the workforce.
Nike Lawrence:
Nike is a Liberian national who is pursuing an operational role in West
Africa’s agribusiness sector upon graduating from Harvard Business School in Spring of
2014. She received her undergraduate degree in Operations Research / Industrial
Engineering from Princeton University and launched her career in research at Morgan
Stanley where she remained for nearly 5 years. Subsequently, she moved to Accra, Ghana
where she built the agriculture and healthcare pipelines and portfolios for Acumen Fund
West Africa, covering Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana. She spent this past summer
working in Cote d'Ivoire with Entrepreneurial Solutions Partners, a post-conflict private
sector development firm specializing in competitiveness advisory for governments and
investments in SMEs. Her focus was on advising a defunct cassava processing and export
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company on how to restart their operations. She is looking forward to returning to the
continent and contributing to the income generation and poverty alleviation that can be
achieved through an integrated approach to agribusiness.
Shane Kiernan:
Shane received his undergraduate degree in Business and Legal Studies from University
College Dublin in 2004 and went on to graduate with a Masters degree in Real Estate
Investment from Cass Business School, London in 2005. He worked as an investment
banker in London where he worked in Debt Capital Markets for Deutsche Bank and Real
Estate Private Equity for BlackRock. Shane brings entrepreneurial experience to the team
having established in 2008 a Dublin-based business called DealHunter that enabled
consumers in Southern Ireland to buy products from Northern Ireland more cheaply. After
selling DealHunter in 2010 he moved to Kenya to work for the Clinton Health Access
Initiative where he spent two years assisting national governments to secure financial
resources for national health systems on three continents. With the benefit of a Fulbright
scholarship Shane is currently pursuing a Masters in Health Policy & Management at the
Harvard School of Public Health and graduates in May 2014. Shane is looking forward to
returning to Africa to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities with a transformative social
impact.
Jared Westheim:
Jared Westheim is an international development professional with six years of experience
working on projects in healthcare, new technology, and agribusiness in the developing and
developed world. After three years as a healthcare consultant advising hospitals and health
systems on financial turnaround and the clinical impacts of health reform for the Advisory
Board Company, Jared began work in Rwanda on a variety of projects, including
agribusiness evaluation and project management as a volunteer consultant for Technoserve.
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In September 2011, Jared joined Clinton Health Access Initiative in Zimbabwe, where he
undertook a project to introduce new laboratory technologies, modernize treatment
guidelines, and organize health sector procurement and financing. Since then, Jared has
helped analyze procurement reform on behalf of an international aid bilateral and planned
new joint venture with manufacturers in Africa to improve access to processed nutritional
products for mothers and children. Jared continues to work for CHAI to develop its internal
communications and knowledge sharing strategy. He graduated from Dartmouth College in
2008, summa cum laude with high honors.
6.2. Personnel Plan
The following hires are identified as key postions to be filled within the first 18
months of operation.
6.3.1. Director of Agronomy (DA)
The DA is key appointment to the Tomato Jos team and should be hired
within the first 90 days of trading. In the pilot phase though we intend
utilizing the services of consultant The DA will be a qualified agronomist
and will be responsible for determining the agricultural best practices
determining how the soils, pesticides, fertilizers, and seeds come together
to make Tomato Jos farmers more productive. Prior to the recruitment of a
permanent DA we rely on the input of consultant agronomists introduced
to us via our advisors.
6.3.2. Agronomy Managers (AMs)
The AMs are hired to work as middlemen between the farmers and the
Director of Agronomy. The AMs explain the needs of the Farmers to the
DA, and the findings of the DA to the Farmers. The AMs are crucial to
articulate to the Tomato Jos farmer network how to achieve the greatest
return on investment and yield the largest harvest with the least amount of
capital. We anticipate one AM will be needed per hundred hectares.
6.3.3. Finance Manager (FM)
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The FM is another key FTE hire in the Tomato Jos FTE team. The FM
will work with Executive team to prepare financial statements and local
tax returns. The finance manager will be experienced in preparing
anticorruption policy and procedures guidelines.
CHAPTER 7
Financial Plan
7.1. Revenues
In the first year of our pilot operation our objective is to sell all the tomatoes that we
produce in local markets and to a small number of established retail partners in Jos and
Abuja. We have conservatively estimated an average tomato yield of 17 metrics tonnes per
hectare that we can sell at an average price of $288 per tonne giving us over $14,000 in the
first year.
Following the successful demonstration of our agricultural capabilities we expect a
consistent scale-up in revenues from $800,000 million in year 2 to $13 million in year 5.
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By that time we expect to be selling processing nearly 100 million sachets of tomato paste
per annum.
7.2. Expenses
In the first year our largest expense is personnel, with salaries and benefits estimated to be
around $49,000. This expense is in relation to the hiring costs associated with recruiting a
full-time Agronomist. After the completion of the pilot phase the largest ongoing cost is
projected to be the raw inputs (seeds, fertilizer and agrochemicals) utilized by the farmer
network and the nucleus farm.
Following the successful equity subscription in year two we will expand our nucleus farm
through land rental and greenhouse construction, commission the first phase of our tomato
paste processing factory and rollout our farmer network engagement strategy. This capital
acquisition program is expected to cost $0.5 million and will be financed through the
second capital raise and also from cashflow from normal operations.
Our wage projections reflect our focus on building a very lean, highly skilled team. With
the exception of the Agronomist and farm labor the Founders will cover all of the roles
before the seed round is raised, during which time they will not earn salaries. After raising
the seed round, founders will draw a salary of $5,000 per person per month (until Tomato
Jos is cashflow positive, at which point it may increase), and additional hires will be made
in the Agronomy and Marketing departments.
7.3. Net surplus
Despite a minimal loss in years one and two, we will be fiscally sound and selfsustaining
once we reach scale following the investment program in year 2. (see appendix 8.4)
7.4. Quarterly statement of income
Tomato Jos exhibits seasonality in expenses and income in accordance with the growing
cycles and the prevailing market fluctuation in prices. The planting season begins in
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September and harvesting ends in July, thus our largest expenses will be incurred in the
first and second fiscal quarters (see Appendix 8.4).
Once processing capacity is established revenues we anticipate to reveue distribution to
stabilize with the bulk of revenues realized in the second and third quarters.
7.5. Annual cash flow statement
The Annual cash flow statement attached in Appendix 8.4.
7.6. Capital Requirements
Tomato Jos’s funding strategy is based on three key capital inflows:
1. $100,000 of prize winnings and small grant funds from Harvard and other personal
sources in Q1 Year 1
2. $500,000 of seed stage equity secured in Q1 Year 2 to establish the proof of concept
nucleus pilot farm and begin. In this phase we expect to raise through development
financing organizations such as DIFID, USAID, CIDA and also angel investors.
3. $3,000,000 of growth equity secured in Q1 Year 4 to scale processing capacity
significantly. In this phase we expect to raise finance through private equity
investors and/or through an investment by a strategic partner.