Name of Presenter: James Michael Nguyen

Presenter E-mail Address: Jamesn248@gmail.com

Title of Abstract: Refusing the Refugee: Critical Cosmopolitanism

Personal Profile

I was born in Toronto, Ontario, and lived in Toronto most of my life. After graduating high school in Markham, Ontario at Bur Oak Secondary School, I began my academic career at McMaster University, and graduated with an Honours Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and with a minor in Philosophy. I have been fortunate enough to have been offered admission into York’s MA program in Political Science, and will be pursuing further education in the form of a PhD in Political Science. My research interests lie at the intersection of Political Theory and International Relations. Specifically, my interests in Political Theory lie in democratic and critical theory, with a particular focus on Foucault, Schmitt and Habermas. My interests in International Relations are in International Relations Theory, Political Economy, Citizenship and Refugee studies.

Abstract

Since Archaic Greece, philosophers and thinkers have conceptualized the notion of cosmopolitanism, to becoming a citizen of the world as opposed to citizens of a state. Cosmopolitanism has since been criticized through various theoretical lenses as something that is purely theoretical and largely impractical. In this paper, I argue that cosmopolitanism is at best, a theoretical solution that reconciles the role of the refugee and the role of the citizen in creating global citizenship; and at worst, conflates the role of the refugee and the role of the citizen and leads to "refusing the refugee". By refusing the refugee, I mean two things: (1) At the nation state level, and in certain theoretical outcomes at the global level, the state has no obligation to protect those it excises; (2) Inversely, in citizenship, if it is utilized as a method of inclusion as opposed to exclusion, it leads to the denial of the existence of what it means to be a refugee, which I argue is a state of not belonging. I draw upon examples of the power relations of what it means to hold citizenship, what citizenship means, and what it means to not hold citizenship. The impracticality of granting global citizenship in a cosmopolitan world state is multifold. It presumes a creation of a world state, one which recognizes micro and macro level difference in culture, economies, religion, and political systems. It also begs the question: How is human citizenship to be granted? Are all humans automatically granted citizenship, and are there any grounds for citizenship to be removed? Who determines this citizenship and what happens to stateless individuals in a world state?  I argue that citizenship and the refugee are in opposition to each other and that cosmopolitanism provides the best theoretical solution to this

problem, but is also a dangerous solution that can cause a global phenomenon of "refusing of the refugee".

Refusing the Refugee: Critical Cosmopolitanism

James M. Nguyen, MA Candidate, B.A. (Hons.)

York University, Toronto, Canada

CRS 10th Annual Student Conference

Jamesn248@gmail.com/nguyejm@yorku.ca

Introduction

In this paper, I outline what it means to be a citizen of a state, what it means to,

conceptually, be a citizen of the world, what it means to be a refugee of a state, and

what it means to, conceptually, be a refugee of the world. I begin by outlining the history

of cosmopolitanism, and where the dialogue of cosmopolitanism began to where the

conversations of cosmopolitanism lie today. Following this, I explain what citizenship is,

what value citizenship has, and how citizenship serves as a method of exclusion at the

level of the state. Extending this notion of state-based citizenship, I draw upon the

works of various cosmopolitan thinkers such as: Appiah, Held, and Ingram to argue for

what a global citizenship might look like. On the other hand, I demonstrate the role of

the refugee, and what it means to be a refugee, both at a state-level and a global level.

In doing so, I argue in this paper that cosmopolitanism is a theoretical solution to the

practical problem of exclusionary citizenship. At best, cosmopolitanism can provide

theoretical insights into the possibilities of global citizenship and the possibility of

inclusion that permeates all social fabrics of society. (i.e: Social, Cultural, Political,

Economic, etc).However it can also provide another method of exclusion at the level of

global citizenship. In the worst case scenario, creating a global citizenship will create its

inverse, a global non-citizenship; a global refugee; as citizenship naturally has

requirements, there may be individuals that do not fulfill these requirements and as a

result are unable to acquire citizenship. The possibility of “refusing the refugee” is a

potential outcome of global citizenship or cosmopolitanism; as it creates an additional

difficulty and is one that has already existed at the state level. How does one belong in

society? How does one belong in a state, and how does one belong in the world?

Therefore, by attempting to apply cosmopolitanism as a theory of global citizenship;

there are practical limitations that may create a new method of discrimination and

exclusion based on the possession of global citizenship as opposed to the current

system of exclusion at the state-level with citizenship based on nationality.

Linking the Past and the Present: Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism has its roots reaching as far back as Archaic Greece,

beginning with Diogenes. Diogenes questioned what it meant to have a good life, a just

regime and how to best conduct politics. Diogenes, when asked where he came from,

famously stated, “I am a citizen of the world, a kosmopolitês.” At the time, in Greece, the

understanding of “citizenship” in the broadest sense was in the form of the individual

city-state or the Greeks as a group. (i.e: Athenians, Spartans, Macedonians, etc). And

yet, in Greece, we saw the creation of a participatory democracy, where all individuals

in society participated in political affairs like voting, through the casting of stones in a

clay pot. This view of cosmopolitanism later evolved with the Stoics of Greece who took

Diogenes’ idea of being a kosmopolitês, and developed it into a concept whereby

humans naturally belong to two communities: the local community of our birth, and the

community of human argument and aspiration. Stoic cosmopolitanism argued that we

should regard ourselves as individuals belonging to multiple social circles in different

levels of society, as opposed to pigeonholing ourselves into conceptualizing our social

existence into one circle, one society, and one state.1 The stoics believed that we had

one social circle surrounding our self, another surrounding our close family members, a

third surrounding our society, and a fourth surrounding our humanity. The task, as

posited by the Stoics, is for human beings to draw these various circles together,

resulting in a sense of affinity and connection towards others.2

Moving from Ancient Greece and the Hellenistic period, and into modern

cosmopolitan thinkers, we are confronted with none other than Immanuel Kant, who

revitalized the notion of what it meant to be a cosmopolitan in his 1795 Essay on

Perpetual Peace. It is in this essay that Kant outlined his principles to protect people

1 Brown, Eric. “The Stoic Invention of Cosmopolitan Politics.” Proceedings of the Conference Cosmopolitan Politics: On the History and Future of a Controversial Ideal. Frankfurt am Main. December, Germany. 2006. p.3.

2 Brown, Eric. “The Stoic Invention of Cosmopolitan Politics.” Proceedings of the Conference Cosmopolitan Politics: On the History and Future of a Controversial Ideal. Frankfurt am Main. December, Germany. 2006. p. 5.

from war; and how to establish a self-perpetuating peace.3 His argument morally

grounds cosmopolitan right with his principle of universal hospitality.4 Kant’s arguments

are very much so reminiscent of modern democratic peace theory, but there are some

significant differences. Democratic peace theory is a theory which argues that

democracies are hesitant to engage in armed conflict with other identified democracies.

This theory presupposes that democracies are more peaceful in their foreign relations

as compared to different systems of governance. There are three variants of democratic

peace which include: “monadic” democratic peace, where states are proposed to be

peaceful in their relations with all other states in the global system; “dyadic” democratic

peace, where states are proposed to be more peaceful with other democratic states;

and “systemic” democratic peace which occurs when there is a higher population of

democratic states within a given geographical area, the more peaceful that particular

region will be.5

Kant, on the other hand, argues for three definitive articles which provide a

foundation of building peace: (1) The civil constitution of every state should be

republican, (2) The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states and,

(3) The law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality. I

will focus on his third article, whereby he argues that world citizenship is limited to

conditions of universal hospitality.6 In this, Kant argues that there is one right that

belongs to a human being, a human being in the world community, and it is the right to

hospitality.7 To Kant, this includes a myriad of different scenarios whereby an individual

3 Kant, Immanuel, and Hans Siegbert. Reiss. Kant: Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991. Print. p.93. 4 Kant, Immanuel, and Hans Siegbert. Reiss. Kant: Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991. Print. p.94.5 Kant, Immanuel, and Hans Siegbert. Reiss. Kant: Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991. Print. p.95.6 Kant, Immanuel, and Hans Siegbert. Reiss. Kant: Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991. Print. p.97.7 Kant, Immanuel, and Hans Siegbert. Reiss. Kant: Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991. Print. p.98.

may require your assistance for their survival, may desire trade, and may desire human

interaction. So long as human interaction is judged to be peaceful, Kant would argue

that you cannot deny individuals access to hospitality. Kant extends this to say that

individuals cannot deny universal hospitality, particularly if it will result in the destruction

of the seeking party. In other words, universal hospitality is the right of human beings to

seek contact with one another, to seek access to each other’s land, to seek access to

natural resources, and to seek protection.8 Kant does; however, place a limitation on

universal hospitality, whereby individuals have a right of visitation, but not a right to a

prolonged long-term stay. In other words, if an individual seeks natural resources for

survival, the individual should only be permitted to have enough in order to survive

during the period of visitation, and not be granted excessive amounts of natural

resources or to be able to occupy territory for an extended period of time. Kant’s theory

of cosmopolitanism changed what it meant to be a cosmopolitan, as he forged the

connection between cosmopolitanism and universal rights.

Moving forward from Kant’s theory of cosmopolitanism, Jacques Derrida created

a foundation of ethics based on hospitality and the readiness as well as inclination to be

hospitable, to welcome the “other” into one’s home. To Derrida, ethics is hospitality.9

What he means by this is that unconditional hospitality is a desire that supersedes

conditional hospitality in our relationships with others. Derrida’s theory of ethics

suggests the possibility of a hospitality that leads to the acceptance of an “Other” as

someone or something different, but of equal standing.10 He argued that isolation or

isolating the other is not a feasible alternative in the world, and as a result it is important 8 Kant, Immanuel, and Hans Siegbert. Reiss. Kant: Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991. Print. p.98.9 Derrida, Jacques. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. London: Routledge, 2001. Print. p. 4.10 Derrida, Jacques. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. London: Routledge, 2001. Print. p. 18.

to consider methods of how to best approach interaction with the other, and to

determine what exactly is at stake for the self and for the other.11 This leads to the

conceptualization of conditions of hospitality whereby the “self” needs to consider what

conditions to impose, and whether or not to respond to the call of the “other”.12 Derrida,

in an interview, discussed the history of cosmopolitanism and how it has evolved over

time. He began with Ancient Greece, and the Stoics with their conception of being a

citizen of the world, and a sense of global moral inclusiveness.13 Following this, he drew

on Kant’s Perpetual Peace and how the concept of the cosmopolitan had evolved from

a broad notion of inclusiveness, to a more concise concept of cosmopolitanism with a

number of conditions. In other words, ancient cosmopolitanism was an unrestricted

theory, whereas Kant’s version of cosmopolitanism is a limited theory. By unrestricted

theory, I mean a theory that is overinclusive and wide encompassing and is not limited

by any discriminating factor. By limited theory, I mean a theory that has theoretical

limitations imposed through discriminating factors. Therefore, Derrida’s works can then

be seen as an ethical and moral evolution of Kant’s theory of cosmopolitanism whereby

he builds upon the limited theory of cosmopolitanism.

We turn to two contemporary theorists, Appiah and Held. It is here, where

cosmopolitanism diverges into two different schools of thought, and in the next section, I

will introduce Ingram’s theory of cosmopolitanism as a brand of critical theory from

which my analysis of cosmopolitanism, citizenship and refugees will emerge. Those that

ascribe to the theory of cosmopolitanism are in some sense, moral universalists,

11 Derrida, Jacques. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. London: Routledge, 2001. Print. p. 22.12 Derrida, Jacques. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. London: Routledge, 2001. Print. p. 2313 Derrida, Jacques. “The Last Interview – 1930-2004” November 2004. http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~dclark/documents/rememberingJD/Derrida.I%20am%20at%20war%20with%20myself2.pdf

individuals that believe there is a universal ethic or moral code that applies to all

individuals irrespective of race, culture, sex, religion, nationality, or any other potentially

distinguishing feature. Kwame Anthony Appiah, is a theorist who advocates for a

contemporary form of cosmopolitanism. His definition of cosmopolitanism is universality

plus difference.14 From this he argues that the universality takes precedence over

difference and applies this argument to human culture. “Different cultures are respected

not because the differences in culture matter, but because people matter, and culture

matters to people.”15 Appiah’s notion of cosmopolitanism is that differences are to be

respected so long as they are not harmful to people and do not create conflicts with our

universal concern for every other human’s life and well-being. In Appiah’s book,

“Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers”, he introduces two ideas. His first

idea is that we have obligations to other human beings that extends past citizenship at a

state-level or global level.16 His second idea is that we should never take for granted the

value of life and we should aim to be more informed of the lives, practices and beliefs of

others.17 These two ideas, when intertwined with his definition of cosmopolitanism

present a “cosmopolitan standard”, whereby all humans are subject to the moral

standard of what it means to be a cosmopolitan, and that social boundaries are morally

irrelevant when it comes to the natural obligation to other human beings as well as the

valuing of life, and the difference of practices and beliefs of different individuals.18

David Held, argues for the second school of cosmopolitan thought, a school of

democratic cosmopolitanism. Instead of ascribing cosmopolitanism as theory of moral

14 Appiah, Anthony. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York: W.W. Norton, 2006. Print. p. 13.15 Appiah, Anthony. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York: W.W. Norton, 2006. Print. p. 44.16 Appiah, Anthony. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York: W.W. Norton, 2006. Print. p. 23.17 Appiah, Anthony. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York: W.W. Norton, 2006. Print. p. 31.18 Appiah, Anthony. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York: W.W. Norton, 2006. Print. p. 31.

universalism, Held argues that for the evaluation of how democracy and

cosmopolitanism can be entrenched in the global order in order to reconceptualize what

a global order might look like.19 Held calls this an “overlapping communities of fate”,

where countries are overlapping with each other in terms of resources, politics,

economics and culture.20 In pursuing this approach, Held argues that the classical

tradition of political theory has always been concerned with the characterization of the

world that we live in, and how to develop and reach normative goals. The goals that

Held mentions include: liberty, democracy and social justice and how to move from

where we are currently to one of these goals. The challenge that Held has undertaken

here is to explore how globalization has altered the practice of politics and how

cosmopolitanism provides an ideal standard to rethink politics and the political good.21 In

other words, Held’s theory of cosmopolitanism is a theory of normative ethics,

explaining how the world “ought to be” whereas Appiah’s theory of cosmopolitanism

explains how the world “is” in terms of utilizing cosmopolitanism as a theory of universal

morality.

Finally, we turn to our final theorist, James Ingram, who argued for

cosmopolitanism from below, as opposed to our previous two theorists who argued for

cosmopolitanism from above. Ingram argues in his work, “Radical Cosmopolitics: The

Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism”, that cosmopolitans pursue a world that

respects all rights and interests, but have compromised its egalitarian and emancipatory

principles in advocating for cosmopolitanism in defending it as a universal ideal.22

19 Held, David. Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities. Cambridge: Polity, 2010. Print. p. 21.20 Held, David. Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities. Cambridge: Polity, 2010. Print. p. 26.21 Held, David. Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities. Cambridge: Polity, 2010. Print. p. 34.22 Ingram, James D. Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism. Columbia University Press: New York, 2013. Print. p. 16.

Ingram’s argument for bottom up democratic cosmopolitanism on the basis of on the

ground, real world political practice, can moral and political universalism be salvaged23.

The first distinguishing factor in Ingram’s work is the distinction between a particular and

a universal. His work argues that we are essentially defending a particular position

(human rights) while advocating for a universal (cosmopolitanism) that compromises our

particulars (Ideal of human rights - egalitarian and emancipatory principles). Particulars

are unique to the individual and are discriminating or distinguishing factors or traits.

Universals, on the other hand, are not unique to the individual, but are a generalized set

of conditions or terms which apply to all particular cases. The second important factor

in Ingram’s work is that he is focusing on cosmopolitanism from below which advocates

for a political community in order to create or enact social change at the global level.24

The reason why cosmopolitanism from above is not an ideal to be strived for is because

we can see similar issues at the state level. In authoritarian or totalitarian states, these

nations are ruled from a top-down system of governance which allows for the

expression of power with little constraint or limitation, and often results in the abuse of

political power. Alternatively, a democratic or republican state that operates from a

bottom-up system of governance, and within these types of nations there are systems in

place to check and balance political power so as to prevent the abuse of power.

Cosmopolitics, on Ingram’s terms, is the unpredictable process of universalization which

occurs again and again, and gives rise to a form of political action that is then asserted

and reinvented.25 He argues that there needs to be a reconception of the dominant

23 Ingram, James D. Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism. Columbia University Press: New York, 2013. Print. p. 56.24 Ingram, James D. Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism. Columbia University Press: New York, 2013. Print. p. 188.25 Ingram, James D. Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism. Columbia University Press: New York, 2013. Print. p. 189.

ethos in politics, ethics and morality and that cosmopolitics and cosmopolitanism is

realized when we align theory with practice from below as opposed to from above.26 His

argument summarized is that we can affirm the ethical viability of cosmopolitanism

through constant and consistent political action as a form of active resistance against

exclusion.

What does it mean to be a (global) citizen and a (global) refugee?

Based on the survey of cosmopolitanism, from the ancients to the moderns, we

can infer a myriad of definitions and conditions of what it means to be a citizen, and

what it means to be a refugee. In its barest form, citizenship is a state or sense of

belonging, while being a refugee is a state or sense of not belonging. In a more practical

form, at least in regards to state-based citizenship, citizens are individuals that are

legitimized by the state and granted citizenship through official documentation, whereas

refugees are individuals that are not legitimized by the state and not granted citizenship

or any sort of official documentation. When considering state-based citizenship, we

must also consider the state as an agent that assures protection, rights and benefits to

its own. Therefore, those that are citizens hold social benefits, rights and protection from

the state that they hold their citizenship with. Alternatively, refugees are not assured any

form of protection, rights or benefits. Theoretically, the dynamic of the citizen and the

refugee is akin to Carl Schmitt’s Friend-Enemy distinction, whereby a distinction is

made and allies as well as enemies are determined.27 By creating this distinction, it

allows the state to allocate resources more effectively and efficiently to those that have

26 Ingram, James D. Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism. Columbia University Press: New York, 2013. Print. p. 205.27 Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political. Chicago: U of Chicago, 2007. Print. p. 25.

a claim to them, namely citizens. This distinction also creates a pervasive form of

inequality whereby those that do not have citizenship or status may seek means to

acquire status or alternate means of social goods in order to be elevated to the status of

the citizen.

A posited solution to the problems and limitations of state-based citizenship and

refugees is the view of cosmopolitanism. Specifically, this view aims to create a global

citizenship. The problem of turning cosmopolitanism from a theory into actual political

practice is multifold. For one, we must consider who will regulate global citizenship? At

the state level, each state is responsible for disseminating citizenship as well as

rescinding citizenship, should it be required. For the state to be able to have control

over the processes of granting or rescinding citizenship, it also enables the state to

have direct control over undocumented individuals, or refugees. Thus, this leads to the

state having the ability to “refuse the refugee”, as states have no real obligation to

individuals that are not citizens. If we extend citizenship to a global level, it begs many

questions of implementation. Who is the entity that will grant global citizenship? How will

it become legitimized? Will there be situations where global citizenship can be revoked?

Can there be refugees with global citizenship?

If we suppose a global order is indeed possible, with some sort of overarching

regulatory body, the problem of citizenship and the role of the refugee becomes

exposed. The difficulty with assigning citizenship is one of semantics. By granting

citizenship or creating what it means to be a global citizen, it will naturally create its

inverse, that is to say a non-citizen or a refugee. At the state level, for example, being a

Canadian citizen means that you are a citizen of Canada, and that because not

everyone can be a citizen of Canada, an inverse to Canadian citizenship arises.

From here, we can adopt either a positive stance to global citizenship or a

negative stance to global citizenship, and each of these stances possess a top-down

and bottom-up perspective.

Figure 1: Global Citizenship Table of Outcomes

Global Citizenship Positive Citizenship Negative Citizenship

Top-Down Cosmopolitanism

Idealism of Citizenship Totalitarian world state, discrimination via citizenship

Bottom-Up Cosmopolitanism

Activism of Citizenship Dissolution of the Political

Before explaining each outcome in the table above, it goes without saying that

cosmopolitanism, as mentioned before, is a theory and a theory that has large

impracticalities in its implementation. As a result, I recognize that a critique to all of

these perspectives is the practicality of implementation.

Beginning with the positive stance of a top-down cosmopolitan world state, it

creates what I call an “Idealism of Citizenship”. In other words, it is an altruistic

perspective of what it means to be a global citizen, and is over-encompassing and over-

inclusive of humanity as a whole. This positive stance of top-down cosmopolitanism is

reminiscent of Appiah’s view of cosmopolitanism in that all humans should be mutually

recognized and respected regardless of difference.28 The assumptions held with a top-

28 Appiah, Anthony. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York: W.W. Norton, 2006. Print. p. 23.

down version of cosmopolitanism is called “ideal” because it hinges on a global order

that recognizes difference and respects difference irrespective of any political, social,

geographical, or economic factor. Consequently, in this over-inclusive form of

citizenship, there would technically be no inverse to citizenship, no refugee, because

humanity would be granted citizenship by a global political agent. Another reason why

this citizenship is called “ideal” is because the method of citizenship with this positive

stance is as a method of inclusion as opposed to a method of exclusion. Historically,

states have utilized citizenship as a means: to discriminate, to allocate social goods, to

provide social benefits and support. In this Idealism of Citizenship, the necessary

assumption that is made in regards to citizenship is that it is a political practice of

inclusion as opposed to a political practice of exclusion. In relation to refugees, they are

perceived to be external and foreign to a given political system. The second assumption

that is made is that with inclusionary political practices, it realizes the humanity of

individuals irrespective of difference; thus, eradicating what it means to be a refugee.

The final assumption that is made in the Idealism of Citizenship, is that it does not result

in an abuse of power, to transform a top-down world state into a state of exception, or a

state of exclusion. Therefore, the Idealism of Citizenship hinges on the fact that

citizenship is a political method of inclusion as opposed to exclusion, and that those in a

position of political power do not abuse their power in order to create a state of

exception or exclusion.

Next, the negative stance of a top-down cosmopolitan world state brings with it

several problems and concerns. The historic issue with states is in the exercise of

power and the legitimacy of the state. Moving from this, the problems associated with a

top-down cosmopolitan world state would be akin to a top-down nation state. The

example I will draw upon are totalitarian or authoritarian states. By totalitarian I mean a

system of government that is centralized, dictatorial and requires its citizens or

residence to have complete subservience to the state. By authoritarian I mean a state

that enforces strict obedience to authority (like the police, the state, the judiciary) at the

expense of personal freedoms. In both totalitarian and authoritarian nation states,

citizenship becomes a weapon of the state. The state is able to control the distribution

of citizenship and is able to use it as a discriminatory tool. In being able to control the

population of those that are citizens, states are also able to control the population of

those that are not citizens. Therefore, nation states are able to adversely affect the

human population residing within their borders. As mentioned earlier, cosmopolitan

“gone wrong” is Carl Schmitt’s Friend-Enemy distinction at play, whereby the state has

the ability to ostracize and excise enemies of the state, and to provide protection and

support to allies of the state.29 This leads to “refusing the refugee” whereby states can

deny refugees any sort of support, social goods or benefits as a result of their status for

practically any reason. (Although as of late the most popular reason is security.) The

issue with this outcome is that because citizenship is viewed in a negative manner, that

is a tool of exclusionary practices, it allows those that are in positions of political power

to control and influence the practice of politics, specifically in the realm of citizenship.

As mentioned earlier, I argued that citizens and refugees practically inverse to

each other. The problem with a state that operates under negative citizenship, is that it

automatically creates a distinction between those who are citizens, and those who are

29 Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political. Chicago: U of Chicago, 2007. Print. p. 25.

not; and the problem with a state that operates with a top-down system of governance is

that it allows, under a wide case of political situations, for the abuse of power. Common

outcomes of totalitarian or authoritarian states that abuse their power include: violence

to domesticate and control their respective populations, economic abuses of power,

discrimination based on a generalized discriminating factor (i.e: religions, race, gender),

and failure to recognize minority groups. In other words, if we combine the concept of

citizenship as a practical of political exclusion, and the concept of a top-down world

state that is unrestrained in their use of force, we are faced with a totalitarian world state

that may discriminate based on citizenship and may create a state of exception in order

to combat the “other”, the non-citizen; or the refugee. Finally, this process could result in

the mass control of human populations via global citizenship. A top-down political

system generally has few individuals at the upper echelons of governance and

depending on the political system at hand, these individuals may have limitless power

(authoritarianism/totalitarianism), or have checks and balances to their power

(democracy/republic). In the former case, the potential for discrimination of citizenship is

very real and very possible at the global level, which would replicate a similar scenario

at the state-level. In the latter case, the potential for discrimination of citizenship is

minimized, but still very possible at the global level, and has the potential of replicating

either an “Idealism of Citizenship” under good governance, or replicating citizenship as

a discriminatory measure.

Next, if we consider a positive concept of citizenship alongside a bottom-up

cosmopolitan world state, I argue that we end up with an “Activism of Citizenship”. What

this necessarily entails is that citizenship and the creation of a world-state must occur

from below, from the masses as opposed to those at the top of the political hierarchy

and in positions of political power. As Ingram mentions, “only by prioritizing the

development and articulation of universal values through political action in the fight for

freedom and equality, can theorists do justice to these efforts and cosmopolitianism’s

universal vocation…..30 Only by proceeding from the local to the global, from the bottom

up rather than from the top down, on the basis of political practice rather than moral

ideals, can we salvage moral and political universalism.”31 In other words, Ingram is

arguing that a bottom-up, politically active community can give way to the legitimate

creation to a cosmopolitan world state. It is only through moving from the particular to

the universal, can we fully morally recognize each other as human beings. The

“Activism of Citizenship” is very reminiscent of Hannah Arendt’s theory of political

action. Arendt argues that by distinguishing action from fabrication, we can view action

as a mode of human togetherness.32 From this, Arendt develops a concept of

participatory democracy which, as she argues, stands in opposition from bureaucratized

and elitist forms of political practice. To summarize, Arendt argued in her work, The

Human Condition (1958), politics and political action is where political power originates

and with this political power, can change be enacted.33 I argue that the Activism of

Citizenship has three main conditions in order to realize a world state. The first condition

is that there must be a constant form of expressed political agency from the masses.

Without a consistent, on the ground practice of politics, it will be difficult to realize social

30 Ingram, James D. Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism. Columbia University Press: New York, 2013. Print. p. 16.31 Ingram, James D. Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism. Columbia University Press: New York, 2013. Print. p. 21.32 Arendt, Hannah, and Margaret Canovan. The Human Condition. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1998. Print. p. 12.33 Arendt, Hannah, and Margaret Canovan. The Human Condition. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1998. Print. p. 44.

change. A prime example of such a case would be the Occupy Wall Street movement

whereby in its infancy it received media coverage and public exposure to issues related

to capitalism in regards to the 1% of society possessing 99% of society’s wealth. The

problem with this movement is that although it results in an amalgamation of individuals

that protested against the pitfalls of capitalism, that it did bring about social awareness

and understanding of capitalism and what it can do to people; but it did not actually

influence meaningful political or economic change. The second condition is that

citizenship has to be realized through political action, it is not something that individuals

can simply possess and hold onto. What I mean to say by this is that citizenship must

be realized as a banner of unity and utilized in order to advance meaningful social

change. An example of a right of citizenship in most democratic states is the ability to

vote. Voting, in a democracy, is likely to be the most meaningful way a citizen can

participate in political affairs in a democratic state. The question I would like to ask here

is – Why is it that citizens only politically engage in action during an election year? The

issue with this process of political action is that it allows political parties and those in

positions of political power to manipulate the practice of politics in order to ensure that

they retain their political power through a successful election year. Therefore, the

second condition coincides with the first condition in that there must be a constant form

of political action as well as unity under citizenship. The final condition hinges on the

fact that there is an assumption that citizenship presupposes that a state will be able to

assure rights and protections to its citizens, and therefore requires an obligation

between the political agent that grants citizenship and the citizen. This final condition is

important as it realizes human rights, and protects the rights of individuals regardless of

difference. This is most relevant when it comes to the dilemma of recognition between

citizens and non-citizens. Under this outcome, though citizenship is utilized as a method

of inclusion, there will always be natural difference between individuals which will spark

conflict. As a result of this, though semantically, the idea of the refugee would be

theoretically non-existent, natural differences and conflict will create tenuous situations

that will affect individuals. Therefore, there must be a baseline recognition and defense

of human rights in order to assure the safety and security of individuals.

The Activism of Citizenship is, like the Idealism of Citizenship, an ideal. I argue

that it is an ideal because activism requires individuals to act in order to bring about

some sort of political and social change. The difficulty with activism, at least within the

21st century, is the problem of being recognized and actually heard. The other difficulty

is the representation of activist movements and just like how democracies have a

tendency to represent particular majority views, activist movements fall to the same

criticism of only representing a particular echelon of society. However, the purpose of

the Activism of Citizenship is that because it is a bottom-up movement, that it will

hopefully give rise to a political system that is representative in its values.

Finally, we come to the fourth and final outcome, a negative stance of a bottom-

up cosmopolitan world state, the “Dissolution of the Political”. The Dissolution of the

Political is the inverse to the Activism of Citizenship. I argued that in a positive stance of

a bottom-up cosmopolitan world state that activism and political action is needed in

order to create a representative, over-inclusive cosmopolitan world state. However, in

the negative stance of a bottom-up cosmopolitan world state, political action from below

is at its nadir. As mentioned in the Activism of Citizenship through Arendt and Ingram,

political action is needed in order to enact change, to bring about the proper

representation of morals from the particular to the universal and to foster a sense of

mutual recognition. The Dissolution of the Political is its exact inverse in that there is no

political action, no activism from below, no real political change occurring from the

bottom up, and no movement from the particular to the universal, and no sense of

recognition.

What these four scenarios aim to demonstrate is that there is variability in the

perspectives of cosmopolitanism when evaluated from its origin to the moral

perceptibility of citizenship. What is also important to consider is how citizenship is

politically, economically and socially perceived. If the cosmopolitan perspective is a

positive one, the outcomes tend to be ideal and are morally positive, as both outcomes

result in the eradication of what it means to be a refugee and affirms the existence of an

inclusive citizenship or political body. On the other hand, if the perspective is a negative

one, the outcomes are realist and slightly pessimistic and result in the affirmation of the

domination of the political elite and the inability to politically mobilize from below.

Another consideration to be had is the role of inclusion in positive perceptibility and the

role of exclusion in negative perceptibility. In both Activism and Idealism of Citizenship,

they both foster a sense of inclusion as opposed to their counterparts which foster a

sense of exclusion. Therefore, there can be valuable lessons taken from

cosmopolitanism and the various lenses to which we can view cosmopolitanism and

how it can affect the role of citizenship as well as the role of the refugee.

Reifying the Refugee – A Side Effect of Citizenship?

If we assume that cosmopolitanism is in its simplest form, a global human

citizenship that embodies and accepts humanity regardless of the relative nature of

society; refugees would cease to exist. The reason for why refugees would cease to

exist under global human citizenship is because refugees are human, and humans

inhabit the world, and refugees are intrinsically, individuals without status or

documentation. However, as mentioned earlier, the problem of cosmopolitanism is in its

implementation, and the agendas of those involved in its implementation, particularly

with the top-down variant. Thus, it is wholly possible that the state level phenomenon of

“refusing the refugee” can occur in a top-down cosmopolitan world state. As mentioned

earlier, nation states have the ability to control citizenship, and a world state will have

some form of a political institution in place in order to govern. The role of the refugee is

no different in a state as compared to in a cosmopolitan world state. The reasoning for

this is that refugees are individuals that have fled their home country for a variety of

reasons including: persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality or political

stripe; or because they are a member of a persecuted category of persons; or are

fleeing a war. Therefore, the main reason for the existence of refugees is difference.

This difference can be based on race, religion, nationality, gender, political affiliation,

economic standing, and much more. Although granting global citizenship based on

humanity would technically grant all human beings citizenship, it does not solve the

problem of difference and it does not solve the problem of inequality, and as a result

refugees could still emerge under a world state.

Ingram provides a solution to the problem of the moral universalism of

cosmopolitanism by arguing for cosmopolitanism from below, as opposed to

cosmopolitanism from above. What this means is that a cosmopolitan world state can

only be realized through political activism and political action from the masses.

Cosmopolitanism cannot be realized through the agendas or motives from the political

elite as it would replicate preexisting and predisposed inequalities in the former nation-

state under consideration.34 If we consider a top-down version of cosmopolitanism,

refugees would still exist, even if human citizenship is granted and by extension, rights,

social goods and protection from the state.35 The reason for why refugees would still

exist under this variant of cosmopolitanism is because it hinges on the notion that

political elites will determine how the world state would be governed and by extension

will create certain advantageous scenarios that will advantage one sect of society over

another. For this reason, although semantically, the abolition of the refugee will be nigh,

theoretically, there will still be advantages and disadvantages in society which will

create scenarios whereby inequality can emerge. On the other hand, a bottom-up

version of cosmopolitanism could eradicate the semantic existence of refugees

altogether, as political participation and political activism from below could give shape to

a system of inclusion, a system of governance that embraces difference and social

inequality. The difficulty with both a top-down and bottom-up version of

cosmopolitanism, or more loosely, a democratic cosmopolitan state is that both variants

fall victim to problems of representation, recognition, inequality and difference.

So long as citizenship is used as a standard of measuring ones allegiance to a

state, it will lead to the reification of the refugee. What I mean by reify, is the live action

34 Ingram, James D. Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism. Columbia University Press: New York, 2013. Print. p. 105.35 Ingram, James D. Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism. Columbia University Press: New York, 2013. Print. p. 108.

of making an abstract concept into reality. Refugees are only recognized and realized

because of citizenship. In other words, the citizen and the refugee are, theoretically, in

opposition to each other. The citizen is represented; the refugee is clandestine, the

citizen is recognized, the refugee is not. Citizens have claims to rights, equality and

justice, refugees are not assured rights, equality or justice by the state. Thus, the

aforementioned options of positive citizenship combined with either a top-down or

bottom-up version of cosmopolitanism will lead to the dissolution of what it means to be

a refugee. On the other hand, the options of negative citizenship combined with either

top-down or bottom-up versions of cosmopolitanism will replicate similar social settings

we see in the nation state today whereby citizenship is used as a political tool to control

human population and refugees arise as a result of this dichotomy between a citizen

versus a non-citizen.

Positive Lessons of Cosmopolitanism

The positive lessons of cosmopolitanism is that it theoretically could enable for

the elimination of the phenomenon of “refusing the refugee”, which can only be found in

positive citizenship alongside either variant of cosmopolitanism. However, this system is

not without its flaws, whereby misrepresentation can occur as a result of being a

minority faction in any society. Another dilemma is the tyranny of the majority, where the

majority faction will have the ability to dictate their ideologies and views in a given

society. Democracy has proven to be the most effective political system entering into

the 21st century, as it is based on rights, freedoms and legitimacy. Refugees,

historically, have sought out recognition, rights and freedoms; and as a result have fled

their home country in order to find a “safe” state to reside in. The best theoretical

scenario is cosmopolitanism citizenship from below with a positive outlook on

citizenship as it provides the best theoretical solution that enables the recognition of

humanity through political action and political activism. Alternatively, the second best

option of a cosmopolitan world state is cosmopolitanism from above with view of

positive citizenship whereby the upper echelons of political society create a system of

governance that universally includes humanity as a whole, irrespective of relative

differences.

Negative Lessons of Cosmopolitanism

The negative lessons of cosmopolitanism is of course, the other two options

whereby cosmopolitanism is viewed from a perspective of negative citizenship in either

variant of cosmopolitanism. The first scenario leads to negative outcomes with a top-

down cosmopolitan state becoming totalitarian or tyrannical and utilizing citizenship as a

tool of discrimination or to exercise political power. This scenario replicates the power

dynamics currently in place at the nation state, whereby states have the ability to

determine citizenship and as a result (in)advertently discriminate based on status. The

second scenario leads to negative outcomes with a bottom-up cosmopolitan state

becoming a state of inaction and dissolution whereby political power does not become

exercised by the masses, and as a result are unable to enact meaningful political, social

or economic change. As stated by Arendt, political power is something that originates

through action, and as stated by Ingram, only by moving from the local to the global,

can we recognize the universality of humanity by moving from the particularity of

society.3637

The overarching negative theme of cosmopolitanism, aside from its theoretical

nuances, is in its implementation. Currently we have international institutions in place,

and the real difficulty with institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade

Organization is that it is hard to be able to control and regulate these institutions as well

as to hold them to some sort of international standard. Therefore, though

cosmopolitanism is ambitious in what it attempts to do, it is still a theory worth

considering and revising until a viable implementable solution is possible.

Citizens, Refugees, Humanity

In this paper, I explicated the history of cosmopolitanism, starting from Archaic

Greece with Diogenes and ending at Ingram’s concept of cosmopolitanism. Following

this, I outlined what it means to be a citizen and refugee of a state, and what it means to

be a citizen and refugee of the world. I introduced my theory of cosmopolitanism which

essentially compares positive/negative citizenship with top-down/bottom-up

cosmopolitanism and outlines the best theoretical possibility to the worst theoretical

possibility. I moved to explicate more about the role of the refugee and how the

semantic existence of a refugee exists only because of the semantic existence of a

citizen and how the real-life effects of citizenship reify what it means to be a refugee.

Finally, I summarized both the positive and negative lesson of cosmopolitanism.

36Ingram, James D. Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism. Columbia University Press: New York, 2013. Print. p. 240.37 Arendt, Hannah, and Margaret Canovan. The Human Condition. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1998. Print. p. 12.

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